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Abstract 
Although governance innovations that involve moving powers closer to the citizens 
are receiving increasing policy support, their implementation is not without 
problems. This study uses review and case study approach to critically examine the 
contradictions and ambiguities of "peasant empowerment" in a co- management 
venture between Zimbabwean foresters and peasant communities. The institutional 
infrastructure for co- management was derived from and superimposed upon a 
complex web of local power bases, further fragmenting existing networks of 
interest, affection and association, and thus limiting the scope for co- management. 
The legislative environment, at least during the pre -2000 period, supported the 
expropriation and control of the land and resources of peasant communities, thus 
contradicting the underlying principle of co- management, which is that of co -equal 
partnership. Powers over natural resources have remained centralized in the national 
state; the little power that has been decentralised has been transferred to levels that 
are not close enough to the citizens. Furthermore, there is no legislation that gives a 
legal mandate and fiscal autonomy to units closer to the citizens than the district 
level. The co- management venture is "supply -led" rather than "demand driven ", 
implemented on the terms and conditions of their allies in the state bureaucracies 
responsible for natural resource management. However, in spite of their 
marginalisation, peasant communities continue to have a wide repertoire of tools, 
which enable them to significantly penetrate local and broader political processes. 
The study identifies the need for fundamental changes in the co- management 
system, including the creation of downwardly accountable institutions and 
experimentation with new co- management relations. It argues that such changes 
require related reversals in the ways that researchers, policy -makers, civil society 
organizations and other facilitators have traditionally conducted their business. The 
central thesis is that the state and other external actors have sought to mould 
seemingly local institutions and have tried to discipline these institutions towards the 
achievement of top -down conservation objectives. 
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Chapter One 
1.0. Introduction 
This study seeks to highlight that institutions to which power is decentralised need 
to be accountable to the local communities in order to have positive environmental 
outcomes (Rondinelli et al. 1989). Positive environmental outcomes, just like 
sustainability, are controversial and people mean different things when using the 
same term. There tends to be no universal definition. This research looks at co- 
management of forestry resources as an implementation strategy for decentralised 
forestry resource management (Dubois Personal Communication 16 October 2001; 
Lind and Cappon 2001). 
This thesis will assess the implications of the power dynamics in the accountability 
arrangements of decentralised co- management of Mafungautsil Forest Reserve in 
Zimbabwe. The study intends to conclude on how accountability arrangements 
within the forestry sector will result in either positive or negative social, economic 
and ecological outcomes. Decentralisation is gaining currency worldwide (cf Eaton 
2001)2 as it is perceived as resulting in a sustainable environment. A sustainable 
environment may be defined as an environment that can be used to meet today's 
needs without compromising its ability to meet the needs of future generations 
(WECD 1987). The World Bank looks at sustainability within the forestry sector as 
comprising of three key pillars, which are: 
1. Protecting vital local and global environmental services and values provided by 
forests. 
2. Harnessing the potential of forests to reduce poverty. 
3. Integrating forests in sustainable economic development (World Bank 2002). 
The research looks at the issue of decentralisation in the context of the actual powers 
that are decentralised and the outcomes of particular forms of decentralisation. The 
issue of accountability of the new devolved powers has often been overlooked and 
Mafungautsi is the correct name for the research area. Before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 the 
name was corrupted to Mafungabusi which will appear later in some sections when referring to some 
official documents. It is also important to note that even some official Forestry Commission 
documents use the two spellings interchangeably. For purposes of this thesis, the two differently spelt 
words will all be referring to the same research area. 
1 
assumed to be downward to the local citizens. Decentralised forestry management 
has not performed up to its expectations of devolving power to the lower tiers in 
natural resource governance. This research will use the Mafungautsi case study to 
analyse which powers have been devolved to the lower level institutions and to 
whom are the institutions accountable to. 
In this chapter the concept of decentralisation is discussed in a broader context. 
Decentralisation is generally defined as to alter or to be altered by the transfer of 
organisation from one central place to several smaller less central places. It is also 
the transfer of authority from central to local government (New Oxford Dictionary 
of English 2001). The first chapter will look at the overall introduction, state the 
problem statement, research objectives, outline the research hypothesis, give an 
overview of the research sites before finally presenting the organisation of the study. 
Decentralisation has been a topical issue in developing countries as a way of 
increasing efficiency and reducing the cost of central governments' contributions 
towards the cost of local governance3 (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Ribot 1999, 2000, 
2001; Conyers 1983; 2000, 2001; United Nations 1962; Eaton 2001). 
Decentralisation has also been advocated for as a means of promoting democracy 
and good governance (Agrawal & Ribot 1999). Decentralisation within the public 
policy domain has also been translated into decentralisation within the 
environmental sector due to the failure of old conservation practices. Hulme & 
Murphree (2001) (cf Brockington 2002) call the centralised form of resource 
management "Fortress Conservation. "4 Decentralisation is at the heart of any 
attempt to stimulate effective local participation (Gow & Vansant 1983). This was 
after the realisation that the "Tragedy of the Commons" School of Thoughts seems 
to have misread the commons as open access regimes. Hardin (1968) argued that 
resources which are used in common were nobody's property as they were likely to 
be destroyed as each individual pursued his selfish economic interest which was not 
2 Mawhood (1983) notes that the word decentralisation has often been used and abused in order to 
justify certain actions or inaction. 
3 Conyers (2001) calls it "passing the buck" in the Zimbabwean context. 
4 These parks were maintained in a paramilitary style in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands (cf. Moore 
1998). For examples on strong -arm tactics in conservation elsewhere, see Armstrong (1991) and Ellis 
(1994). 
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in the interest of the whole group. In order to avert the "tragedy of the commons," it 
was argued, governments had to reserve certain portions of land as gazetted lands6 
(Gauld 2000). Reserving land for parks and forest reserves by the state was crudely 
carried out through declaring forests occupied by local communities as "empty" or 
"wasteland" (Nygren 2000).7 The increased land demand from communal farmers 
has further worsened degradation8 of reserved forests. The increased pressure from 
communal farmers is now forcing governments to forge partnerships with the local 
communities in the management of natural resources. Forests have become `highly 
contested spaces, arenas for struggles and conflict' (Doornbos, Saith & White 2000). 
In the forestry sector in Mafungautsi these contests have added to the urgency of 
decentralisation as a conflict resolution mechanism. Van De Breemer & Venema 
(1995) label such initiatives local resource management and Ostrom (1990) refers to 
such efforts as self -governance of common pool resources.9 Common Pool 
Resources are resources to which a large number of people have access. These 
resources include grazing, forests and oceanic ecosystems (National Research 
Council 2002). Moyo et al. (1991) argue that the top down environmental 
management has been typical to the communal areas in Zimbabwe. 
Within the Forestry sector, countries such as India and Nepal have taken leading 
roles in the formulation of decentralisation initiatives, which range from co- 
management to resource sharing (Agrawal, B. 1992; Hobley 1996; Sundar 2000). 
These initiatives are based on three principles, firstly that the locally resident 
community10 has to participate in natural resource conservation. Secondly, 
5 Some academics refute his ideas on the premise that he lumped open access together with common 
property (cf Ostrom 1990, 1992; Murphree 1991, 1999). 
6 This was based on `scientific forestry' which has become difficult to sustain (Gauld 2000; 
Sivaramakrishnan 2000). Gauld (2000: 230) further defines it as forestry in which technical and 
productivity aspects rather than social and environmental aspects are considered. 
7 Sato (2000) argues that the reserved forests are areas which the local communities have derived 
livelihoods over generations and allocated use -rights amongst themselves. Doornbos, Saith & White 
(2000) call such moves "forest cleansing" as people are moved away to make way for trees and 
wildlife -which mainly benefits people at a global level. See also Alexander & MacGreagor (1996, 
2000) on the forced movements in Matebeleland, Ranger (1989) in Matopo, Hammar (2001) in 
Vhumba in Gokwe North and Matzke (1993); Matose (1994, 2002) on the Mafungautsi case. 
s This is a highly laden terminology evoking the `crisis narratives' (cf Fortmann 1995; Ekoko 2000). 
9 Twyman (2000: 806) points out that such methods facilitate "sustainable livelihood support 
programmes" 
10 The word community does not have a universal meaning and has been used by different researchers 
to refer to different things in different circumstances. This term, which may be used by outsiders, 
might not be congruent to the local people's understanding of their community. This term may be 
conveniently used to mask the differentiation that may exist in a particular area (Chambers 1983; 
3 
sustainability, which states that resources to be conserved have to be exploited 
(conservation through use) (Hulme & Murphree 1999, 2001). Thirdly that markets 
for forestry and natural resource products should play a greater role which help to 
add value hence their conservation (Hulme & Murphree 2001). Globalisation 
through donor agencies has also helped in spreading the decentralisation principles, 
which has seen governments embracing various decentralisation implementation 
strategies including co- management approaches. Deforestation is now seen "as a 
global problem and tropical forests as the lungs of the world, whose protection is 
essential for the survival of the planet" (Nygren 1998 cited in Nygren 2000: 24). 
1.1. Problem Statement 
Decentralisation of the forestry sector is considered desirable because: it recognises 
local and outside actors as important players; it generates income flows and other 
benefit streams to the local sector; it facilitates a sense of custodianship among local 
communities "if we lose it, we will not use it" and it blends with local livelihood 
strategies. Consequently decentralisation of governance within the forestry sector 
has been hailed as a crucible for democracy that enables local communities to 
sustainably manage their natural resources. However, this is the ideal foundation on 
which the decentralisation discourse is based; local specificities are an important 
variable which need consideration. 
This research seeks to examine the issue of decentralisation in the context of the 
actual powers that are decentralised and the outcomes of particular forms of 
decentralisation. An underlying assumption of most decentralisation initiatives is 
that institutions created at a local level will, by default, be accountable to their local 
citizens and not the central government. Evidence from the field shows that 
decentralised forestry management in Zimbabwe has not performed up to the 
expectations of its architects in that frequently power has not been devolved to the 
lower tiers in natural resource governance (Wekwete & de Valk 1990; Murombedzi 
1991, 1999; Makumbe 1998). Power in natural resource governance has not been 
devolved to the lowest units of resource management. Decentralisation efforts have 
Race & Buchy 1999). Gauld (2000: 242) points out at the dilemma of identifying a community, 
where to begin, where to end, who should be included or excluded and whether selected individuals 
will be advancing the cause of the community. 
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often resulted in the intrusion of the state at a local level - resulting in some sort of 
localised dictatorship. 
1.2. An Overview of Forestry 
Forests are the most widespread ecosystems in the world with nearly 500 million 
people dependent on forests for their livelihoods. World forest loss is between 17 to 
20 million hectares per annum and is largely in developing countries (World Bank 
2002). Environmental degradation has been outlined as one of the key challenges in 
sub -Saharan Africa. One needs to be careful not to wholesomely accept such 
generalisation or the "Crisis Narratives" which seek to paint a gloomy - and at times 
an un- analytical picture of the situation on the ground (cf Fairhead & Leach 1995, 
1996; Leach & Fairhead 2000). Research and funding of certain resources only 
become important once they are defined as a global problem (cf Adams 1996; Roe 
1993, 1995; Sachs 1993; Taylor & Buttle 1992; Nygren 2001). This is strongly 
linked to the donor agenda. Having cited the foregoing one needs to point out that 
the interpretation of forest processes and especially the African physical landscape is 
a contested arena. Contestants can be loosely grouped into two camps. Those that 
feel that tropical forests are into irreversible degradation, and those that feel that the 
ecosystems are dynamic phenomenon that regenerates from a state of decline. The 
former are normally associated with the donor" constituency and the later with 
Beinhart 1989; Scoones 1996; Leach & Mearns 1996; Tiffen, Mortimore & Gichuki 
1994a, 1994b. 
Natural resource management has been and continues to be a thorny issue in most 
African countries. The resource management dilemma has been worsened by the 
prevalence of poverty, which makes people strive for survival at the expense of 
sustainable resource management. The Zimbabwean experience is illustrative of the 
point being made here. Forestry resources in Zimbabwe's communal areas are 
perceived by the government as supporting an irrational rural economy with no 
significant `monetary' value to the state. Consequently, the state sought to control 
vast areas in the name of `conservation'. This state intrusion was a way of making 
the forests part of its fiscal base. The thrust of forestry policy was towards 
" This is a broad brush labelling. Within the donor community itself, there is an array of policies, 
which at times may be crudely approximated through their funding priorities. 
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accelerated commercial timber exploitation while stressing its ecological relevance 
(FAO 1993). A major challenge for governments is de facto as opposed to juridical 
(de jure) control of these reserved lands (Mapedza & Mandondo 2002). It is now 
increasingly being recognised that forest management plays an indispensable link 
between the environment and development in rural Africa and cannot be conserved 
for conservation's sake only (Ojo & Ashton -Jones 1998; FAO/DFID 2001). It is 
wasted effort to advocate for sustainable utilisation without alleviating poverty, 
"...it is both futile and an insult to the poor to tell them that they must remain 
in poverty to protect the environment" (Hulme & Murphree 2001: 1 citing 
the Brundtland Report, World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WECD) 1987). 
The World Bank's Revised Forest Strategy has sought to look at forestry through its 
three pillars, which seek to manage forestry resources within the context of reducing 
poverty as previously cited (World Bank 2002). 
Goodland (1991) quoting Mohandas Karamchand Ghandhi, also emphasises the 
importance of livelihoods by pointing out that "Even God dare not appear to the 
poor except in the form of bread" (Goodland 1991: 33). Some international 
organisations are recognising the importance of addressing poverty as a way of 
sustainably managing forestry resources (FAO 2003; United Nations 2002a, World 
Bank 2002). 
This new thinking is slowly becoming engraved in the resource conservation 
approach in African countries including the sustainable use of Non -Timber Forest 
Products (NTFPs). In a number of instances some of the resources have already been 
depleted. This is in line with the current move towards poverty alleviation, which is 
mainly focused towards rural areas. Contributing to poverty alleviation should be the 
major goal of forestry policies (FAO 2003; FAO/DFID 2001; van Gardingen 2002). 
In India trees can be used to redeem debts and mortgages (Chambers 1983). There is 
a synergy between sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation (DFID 
1997). Donor organisations such as the World Bank are making it a condition of 
lending money for forestry projects: 
The bank will stress new approaches to management of protected areas that 
incorporate local people into protection, benefit sharing, and planning and 
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will highlight the need to consider the needs and welfare of forest dwelling 
people (World Bank 1991: 65; cf World Bank 2002, FAO 2003). 
The World Bank's Revised Forest Strategy has further confirmed the importance of 
local communities in forestry management. This is what they see as a broad 
perspective towards sustainability (World Bank 2002). The FAO and DFID further 
call such an approach "people centred forestry" (FAO/DFID 2001: 5). "Eradicating 
poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development, particularly for developing countries" 
(United Nations 2002b: 2). 
There is no doubt that forestry management issues, just like other natural resource 
management issues, are intricate and complex. The dynamism and specificity of 
forestry issues make it impossible to generalise for other parts of the World. 
Historically the general approach has been that environmental issues were strictly 
viewed within the environmental context excluding the holistic rural development 
approach. Such inflexible sectoral and `compartmentalist' policies have been a 
setback for sustainable management, which is not unique to the forestry sector. This 
has meant that the Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe (FCZ) has been mainly 
concerned with the conservation of trees, whilst the Ministry of Agriculture has been 
focusing on agricultural issues without paying attention to inter -ministerial linkages. 
Legislation has been fragmented making it difficult to have an overall picture of the 
whole environmental scenario. 
In Zimbabwe, the Environmental Management Bill proposed in 199812 seeks to 
address such anomalies by having a holistic approach in environmental 
management. The exercise is being hastily done and this may compromise 
stakeholder consultation. Such a chaotic scenario is still not conducive for 
sustainable environmental management. This is likely to change if appropriate 
policies and strategies that recognise the interest of the local forestry user groups are 
implemented. Inclusion ensures maximum social, ecological, economic, cultural and 
spiritual benefits from the forests. Such change will usher an end to the technocratic 
approach, which entails management of forests for the people but against the people. 
12 This bill has now been passed (The Herald 27 November 2002). 
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This is because priorities are given to the trees and not the human beings. According 
to Penelon (1997), this has demotivated the rural communities whose energy could 
otherwise have been harnessed for successful forestry management in developing 
countries. 
In Zimbabwe tenure laws have always taken a criminalisation approach towards the 
local communities. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (Campfire) in Zimbabwe has proved that communal farmers can 
meaningfully conserve their natural resources if they are given a genuine 
opportunity to do so (Hulme & Murphree 1999, 2001). This form of self help 
management of trees and forests is most likely to be effective. Local communities 
will be dealing with their livelihoods so they are bound to be more committed than 
technocrats whose stakes might not be as high as those of the farmers are (Bird et al. 
1995). 
1.3. "Fortress Conservation" and its Rationale 
The section above has looked at the problem statement within the arena of reserved 
forests. The following section looks at what is a gazetted forest and what was the 
motivation for gazetting or reserving forest areas. "Fortress Conservation" is the use 
of force backed by legislation that seeks to conserve forest resources through the 
exclusion of people from gazetted areas. The gazetted forest reserves are a common 
scenario in a number of countries and they might be called by different names in 
different countries. In Zimbabwe these are areas set aside in terms of the Forest Act 
of 1996 mainly for ecological reasons. They are also referred to as protected forests. 
Within the wildlife sector in Zimbabwe, such reserved areas are called national 
parks in terms of the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975. 
Gazetting of forest reserves and parks was justified by the tragedy of the commons 
rationale. The tragedy of the commons theory (Hardin 1968) has often been used as 
a justification for government interventions in the management of communally 
owned resources (Feeney in Jodha 1992). The tragedy of the Commons first 
advanced by Hardin in 1968 stated that resources which are owned by a group will 
quickly be depleted as each individual pursues his own personal interest resulting in 
the destruction of the resource. This gave indications that rules and management had 
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to be externally enforced, in the interest of the local community. Justification for the 
designation of forest reserves is based on technical expertise aimed at arresting 
degradation of forests and catchment areas. In some cases decisions were based on 
the rule of the thumb. For instance the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
in Zambia in its 1959 Manifesto called for the setting aside of 15% of all land as 
reserved forest (Akapelwa 1996) with social and tenure issues not being perceived 
as relevant variables in solving the resource sustainability equation. 
Reality has awakened states as they continue to experience rapid degradation to the 
"protected" or "reserved" forests. It has become a clear fact to the Zimbabwean 
government that they can not stop the "tragedy of the state property. '13 Financial 
and human resource outlay associated with "reserved forests" have proved too 
prohibitive for the already cash strapped developing country governments (Pullan 
1988). 
Government resources channelled towards the upkeep of `reserved forests' have 
proved to be prohibitive and the fact that conservation issues including forestry have 
been seen as footnotes in the Ministries of Agriculture, Tourism or Mines.14 In 
Zimbabwe the Communal Areas Programme for Indigenous Resources (Campfire) 
has made government realise that communal farmers are capable of sustainably 
managing their resources. It only needs the government to entrust management of 
rural resources to rural farmers. 
The Tragedy of the Commons school of thought has been rejected by some 
academics (Bromley & Cernea 1989; Repetto & Holmes 1984; Ostrom 1990; Feeny 
et al. 1990; Murphree 1991; Runge 1992). Communal land was wrongly perceived 
as open access instead of common property. With the failure of state management of 
natural resources, academics are now exploring the possibility of community 
management of natural resources. The gazetting of common property forests, as 
13 The term, which I feel, seems to be an appropriate description of the flip side of the tragedy of the 
commons. 
14 In the 2002/3 national Budget in Zimbabwe the ministry of Environment and Tourism got the 
second least budget allocation of Z$2.494 billion out of a total budget of Z$782.41 billion. The 
official exchange rate is 1US$ =Z$55 or 1£ =Z$85. However, due to the shortage of foreign currency, 
rates which are twenty times the official rate, have been said to be operational on the parallel market 
(The Financial Gazette, 27 February 2003). 
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`reserved forests' has not helped reduce the rate of forest degradation. Communal 
farmers alienated from `their' resources tend to destroy the resource under 
contention. This has led to a change in the conservation paradigm as outlined in the 
next section. 
1.4. Conservation Paradigm Shift 
The section below looks at the most recent developments, which has seen the shift in 
natural resource management paradigm. It will also be demonstrated that the shift is 
a long process whose origins can be traced as far back as the 1960s. However, 
implementation of such initiatives has only been mainly carried out in the post 1980 
period. 
There has been a shift in the conservation paradigms in Africa in the past ten years. 
Hulme & Murphree (2001) regard this as the "new conservation ", which has moved 
away from "fortress conservation" to community based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) (cf Nhira 1998; Jones 2001; Kangwana & Mako 2001; 
Sibanda 2001; Matose 2002; Brockington 2002). Hulme & Murphree (2001) further 
point out that this new approach is not a panacea for all conservation problems in 
Africa, but it will provide a framework for conservation policies and institutions. In 
Zimbabwe, Campfire is such an effort and a move towards community participation 
in natural resource management. In Namibia, the Kunene community -based wildlife 
management similarly used pragmatic approaches to resolve competing interests 
over land based resources (Jones 2001). However, it is important to note that some 
academics observed that sustainable natural resource management has to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive as far back as the 1960s (Phillips et al. 1962). Whilst 
the implementation has largely been carried out from the 1980s, the issue has been 
highlighted as far back as the 1960s. 
Although the new conservation is a welcome development, it has come up with its 
own dynamics. Forests have sadly become battlegrounds in which the state interests 
wrestle the indigenous or local interests. The history of the study area of 
Mafungautsi state forest and its environs is characterised by a history of conflict 
between the Forestry Commission, a state agency, and the surrounding community. 
This violence against local people and their property, which at times involved the 
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use of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), are reminiscent of the experiences 
elsewhere in Lake Mburo National Park in Uganda (Hulme & Infield 2001) and 
Tarangire National Park in Tanzania (Kangwana & Mako 2001). As in the cases 
above, the ultimate victim of the conflict has been the forest. Some states, within the 
framework of the new paradigm shift, have embarked on resource sharing or co- 
management as a mechanism of correcting the past conservation injustices (Hulme 
& Murphree 2001). 
The Forestry Commission in Zimbabwe, going back to its establishment in 1953, has 
always thought that enhanced technical capacity in forest management would be 
sufficient to guarantee their renewal for the good of the nation (cf Penelon 1997). 
State forests are intended to generate financial returns and also to provide services 
for the public good, especially broad ecological functions such as watershed 
protection (Katerere 1992; cf Vermeulen 1997) and carbon sequestration (Nhira et 
al. 1998). 
This new paradigm has seen an increase in the advocacy for community 
participation in forestry. It is now important that management of ecosystems has to 
be carried out by those immediately dependent on the resource. Despite efforts by 
forestry departments and states to implement participatory forestry management it is 
ultimately the balance of power15 which will determine whether co- management will 
succeed or not. Many decentralised forestry management arrangements have 
resulted in increased responsibility for local people, without a corresponding 
increase in their rights and privileges (Penelon 1997). This renders some 
participatory forestry projects a burden to the local people and such initiatives are 
refused or passively accepted. In some instances the "donor community," including 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Zimbabwe, has acted as 
the main driving force towards change in forestry departments. The FCZ or district 
forestry departments have half -heartedly implemented the "devolved" management 
without meaningfully shifting the power loci to local communities. 
15 Power is a key aspect in the study of natural resource management as it helps shape the relations of 
production (Agrawal, B. 1992; Moore 1993). 
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Some projects are being implemented with the view that this is a passing phase in 
which donor funds can be accessed. According to Penelon (1997) participation has 
been accepted as long as it does not disturb existing power structures. Often this 
means its restriction to project frameworks, which have a limited life span (Penelon 
1997: ii). Such "development" activities might result in the entrenchment of 
government power as was the case in the Thaba Tseka Project in Lesotho (Ferguson 
1990). 
The paradigm shift under discussion is not a one off event. Forest management takes 
different forms, in a continuum with `fortress conservation' being on one extreme 
and devolved community participation being on the other extreme. Within the 
shifting paradigm, there are varying alliances and levels of devolution, which have 
worked under different contexts and circumstances (Hulme & Murphree 2001). 
There is an urgent need to bridge the gap between customary and formal rules in 
order to have sustainable forestry management in Africa (Dubois 1997). Devolution 
of resource management does not follow a single and well- demarcated path. This 
has to be done within a social and cultural context. Co- management is an 
implementation strategy or option of the decentralisation process within the 
environmental sector. 
The new paradigm has also meant that various stakeholder interests result in an 
imbalance in power relationships (Dubois 1997). "Principle 22" of the Rio De 
Janeiro Earth Summit points to the importance of recognising the rights of 
indigenous people over resources such as land. Indigenous knowledge is relevant, 
valid and useful for most rural development projects (Warren, Slikkerveer & 
Brokensha 1995). It is always important to learn from a community before you start 
to teach them anything. Indigenous knowledge plays an important role in forestry 
conservation and management (Messerschmidt 1995). This is also the message that 
emerged from the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa from 26 August to 4 September 2002. 
The poor in rural areas do not have the social and political power to capture the 
benefits derived from community forestry. Most communal area dwellers have often 
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been portrayed as destroyers of forests. Fairhead & Leach (1996) contest this view 
through their study in West Africa which demonstrated the fact that even the so- 
called scientific knowledge to forest degradation is based on perceptions rather than 
technical evidence. Their research further demonstrated that forests, which were said 
to be contracting over the years, were expanding contrary to the "expert wisdom." In 
another study from Zambia, for instance, it was demonstrated that the Chitemene 
system (shifting cultivation) of farming was not primitive and backward, but it was a 
complex and highly adaptive farming system (Richards 1939; Moore & Vaughan 
1994; Nkowani 1996). There was a tendency among observers to view any system 
that involved the burning of trees and eventual abandonment of fields as in some 
sense wasteful. Richards (1939) echoed the prevailing mythology of the colonial 
period that held that chitemene was backward and primitive, but this existed side -by- 
side with the view that this was a system well adapted to local environmental 
conditions, as well as being flexible and responsive to change (Richards 1939; 
Moore & Vaughan 1994). The above section looked at paradigm shift in natural 
resource management in Africa. The shift is from centralised resource management 
to a more decentralised and participatory type of resource management. The next 
section looks at the justification of this study. 
1.5. Justification of the Study 
There have been very few studies on the forest reserve /village interface in 
Zimbabwe (Matose 1991, 2002; Vermuelen 1994; Matzke & Mazambani 1993). 
This research fills the gap of existing data by using a decentralisation conceptual 
model (Agrawal & Ribot 1999) to explore the co- management within the forestry 
sector through the case of Mafungautsi in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe as 
later shown by Figure 5. The study will chronicle the progress and challenges 
encountered in the implementation of the Mafungautsi Co- management Project and 
complement documentation and analysis of Campfire. There has been a lot of 
research effort on decentralisation within the wildlife sector under Campfire by 
various researchers (Murphree 1990, 1991, 2001; Murphree & Cumming 1991; 
Murombedzi 1991, 1992, 1994; Dzingirai 1994, 1995; Madzudzo 2000; Sibanda 
2001) but few researchers have focused on communal areas /forest reserve interface 
(Matose 1994, 2002; Nhira et. al 1998). The co- management in Mafungautsi offers a 
unique opportunity to assess the decentralisation within the forestry sector. 
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Mafungautsi is the first attempt by FCZ to implement co- management. Gwaai in 
Matebeleland North was intended to be the second forest reserve where Shared 
Forest Management funded by the Department for International Development 
(DFID) was to be implemented. Not much progress has been achieved since the 
early withdrawal of DFID funding. 
The research further aims at contributing towards the ongoing attempts to merge 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and participatory approaches that is still in 
its infancy (IIED 1999). The research will analyse land cover change using aerial 
photographs and GIS (technical) and the household (social) data analysis. In 
forestry, Geographic Information Systems are assuming an increasingly important 
role (Borough 1986). The study is relevant to the current community concern over 
resource degradation and resource scarcity. This research will help communities to 
build and strengthen traditional institutional capacity and environmental values 
while integrating new planning skills and management practises in evolving forest 
protection systems (Poffenberger 1996). 
The research is important in that it is one of the few studies, which analyses co- 
management of forestry resources in Zimbabwe within the decentralisation 
framework. Co- management will be studied as one of the mechanisms of 
implementing decentralisation within the forestry sector. Co- management as a form 
of decentralisation within the forestry sector will only be successful if the 
decentralised institutions are downwardly accountable to their constituencies. The 
success or failure of forestry resource management will mainly be a function of the 
power dynamics16 within and among participating institutions such as the Forestry 
Commission, Village Development Committees ( VIDCOs), Resource Management 
Committees (RMCs), and individual households. Success or failure can also be 
determined by who has control over project material and resources. Control over 
resources will vary amongst the various stakeholders who include the Rural District 
Council (RDC), Forestry Commission, RMCs, VIDCOs and households. It is the 
16 These dynamics are not only between the state and the Mafungautsi community but they are a 
result of all the actors involved in co- management who are trying to push the relationship in different 
directions in different cases (Doornbos, Saith & White 2000: 7). 
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ultimate balance of control and decision making that will determine whether co- 
management succeeds or fails. 
This research is also important in that it attempts to look at the issue of tradable 
forestry rights through the permit system for resource harvesting and assess their 
implication for sustainable resource management for the Mafungautsi Forest in 
Gokwe. The research will make use of household questionnaire interviews in order 
to find out if the household attitude has changed and whether or not it is due to the 
benefits that are accruing under co- management. Key informant interviews will be 
conducted to ascertain the influence and role of benefits in affecting the decision to 
participate in the project. Benefits are meant to encourage structural and 
behavioural change. An important question for research is who benefits? What 
benefits do the poor and the women get? 
Most communal farmers in the communal areas have raised concern at the powers 
granted to the Rural District Councils to cut down trees in their fields. This has 
caused governance problems in the Mutendi area of Gokwe (Bird et al. 1995). It's 
surprising how the same problem has been replicated elsewhere in Africa. 
In the past farmers made a lot of effort to tend trees on their farmlands...even 
where farmers engaged hired labourers they told them to protect the young 
trees if weeding on a cocoa farm...Then you wake up one day to find the very 
tree you tended has been logged and your crops destroyed (IUCN 1996: 29). 
This study is important in that it draws lessons of experiences from co- management 
in Zimbabwe that may be used as a basis for comparison with countries with similar 
experiences. Lessons from Mafungautsi are also important in that they may help 
inform similar initiatives such as Shared Forest Management in Gwaai Forest 
Reserve in Zimbabwe. The next section now looks at the research hypothesis. 
1.6. Research Hypothesis 
The main research hypothesis is that powers seemingly devolved via one mechanism 
are being re- centralised via other mechanisms making co- management 
unsustainable. Such decentralisation which is accompanied by re- centralisation have 
resulted in no real power being devolved to the lower units in forestry management, 
which has resulted in negative environmental outcomes. "Power is defined as the 
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ability of actors to exercise their will in a manner that is contrary to the interests of 
others" (Madzudzo 2000: 126 cf Maquet 1971; Lukes 1981). 
The second hypothesis is that there will be a positive correlation between broad - 
0 
based downward accountability and greater equity in access to and use of forestry 
resources. The more accountable the forestry institutions are to their constituencies, 
the more chances there are of managing forestry resources in a sustainable manner. 
1.7. Research objectives 
The study seeks to address several objectives. They largely revolve around powers 
devolved, actors and accountability. The research objectives are as follows; 
To identify and explain institutional accountability arrangements in 
environmental decentralisation in Mafungautsi and to test whether more 
equitable and environmentally sound practices can be attributed to more 
downwardly accountable forms of local control over environmental decisions. 
To determine the accountability mechanism of the decentralised forestry 
management. 
To identify the factors contributing to decision -making arrangements at the 
household level that lead to the success or otherwise of co- management. 
To identify the configuration of decision -making and decision -support systems 
within the target communities contributing to the success or otherwise of the 
project. 
To determine the contribution of external inputs (nature and extent) to the fate of 
the project. 
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 To assess the likely future impact of benefits to the community in terms of 
perception and practice of forestry resource management. 
To determine the usefulness and the role of integrated participatory approaches 
and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in sustainable forest management 
in Zimbabwe. 
1.8. Research questions 
It is hoped that by addressing the above objectives critical questions outlined below, 
relating to resource management in Mafungautsi, will be answered. 
1. What powers (decision- making, law enforcement, sanctioning, and adjudication) 
have been devolved to Resource Management Committees (RMCs) within the 
co- management project? What powers has government and other institutions 
retained and why? 
2. Who are the lead players within these institutions? Does the Mafungautsi 
community understand its role? Do the people feel they own the process through 
which they were created? 
3. How are communities represented? What is the level and direction of 
accountability of these RMCs (To whom are they accountable? How accountable 
are they ?). 
4. Are the interests of marginalized groups (women, the poor, the youth) being 
addressed by RMCs? 
5. How is the community benefiting as a result of its active participation? From 
whose perspective are benefits conceptualised? 
6. Is the type and level of community involvement in the management of forestry 
resources likely to lead to positive ecological impact in the future? 
The research questions will seek to look at the formation of the RMC, its 
composition, decisions and powers. They will also seek to try and assess if the 
perception and practice of the Mafungautsi community has changed as a result of the 
co- management initiative. The next section gives an overview of property regimes in 
Zimbabwe in order to be able to contextualise the research property regime of 
Mafungautsi. 
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1.9. An Overview of Property Regimes in Zimbabwe 
Resource use and degradation has to be analysed within the property regime context. 
One needs to understand tenurial arrangements and assess their implication on 
sustainable resource management. Tenure refers to the terms and conditions under 
which land and natural resources are used in a given area. Property is not an object 
"but rather it is a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all 
others to respect the conditions that protect that stream" (Bromley & Cernea 1989: 
5). The right to benefit should correspondingly be linked with responsibilities. The 
various tenurial arrangements are incompatible and there are possibilities of various 
tenurial arrangements within one resource. In practice, natural resources in 
Zimbabwe are rarely managed solely within one property regime (Murphree 1993). 
1.9.1. The state property regime 
The state property regime occurs where the ownership and control of the resource 
lies with the state (Matose & Wily 1996). Access to the resource is sanctioned by the 
state. Usufruct rights may be granted over a specific period through lease or permit 
system. In Mafungautsi Forest Reserve a permit system has been in use. The 
Forestry Commission in Zimbabwe is finding it increasingly difficult to effectively 
"lock out" the communal farmers from using the forest. Some forest reserves in 
Zimbabwe are in transition to semi -open access regimes as the neighbouring 
communities contest state ownership of such forestry resources. 
1.9.2. Private property 
The essence of private property regime is simply the legal and socially sanctioned 
right to exclude others (Bromley & Cernea 1989). Commercial farms in Zimbabwe 
are under private ownership. Private ownership, it is argued, promotes investment in 
natural resources. In Zimbabwe (Beinhart 1984) points out that commercial farmers 
have not been better than communal farmers in conservation terms. It is also 
important to note that conservation is not the only objective of resource management 
(cf World Bank 2002's three pillars cited earlier). Large tracts of land tend to cover 
up the gross conservation inefficiencies. Bruce (1986, 1989) pointed out that 
individual ownership does not guarantee that grazing will not be subject to over 
exploitation through overgrazing. 
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1.9.3. Common Property Regime 
Common Property regimes give rights to use land and natural resources to specified 
groups or communities of people. Common property is not "everybody's property" 
(Ciriacy- Wantrup & Bishop 1975; Cousins 1990). Bromley & Cernea (1989) call it 
communal property whose main characteristic is an identifiable community of 
interdependent users, which exclude non -members and cultural norms govern their 
use by members. For the enforcement of norms there has to be a good institutional 
framework respected by the community. Swallow (1989) in Cousins (1990) outlines 
the characteristics of common property regimes as follows: 
(a) There are collective rights of the resource. 
(b) Group members have secure expectations that they can gain access to future use 
of the resource. 
(c) There is a functioning membership criteria. 
(d) There are communally defined guidelines for resource use. 
(e) There is an enforcement mechanism for punishing deviant behaviour. 
Examples in Zimbabwe include forestry, grazing and water resources within the 
communal area. The communal area of Mafungautsi can be classified under the 
common property regime. The communal areas are not a perfect common property 
as the government has passed legislation such as the Natural Resources Act Chapter 
20:13 of 1996, Communal Lands Act of 1982, Communal Lands Forest Produce Act 
1987, Forest Act of 1996 which vests appropriation powers over natural resources to 
the central government and its agencies at the expense of the local resource users. 
Legally, communal areas are owned by the state but practise on the ground show 
signs of common property resources. One, however, needs to note the complexity of 
property regimes within the communal areas of Zimbabwe. 
1.9.4. Open Access 
Open access regime is where there are no clearly defined rights of use. It is from 
such property regimes that Hardin derived his Tragedy of the Commons theory that 
he went on to generalise for the Common Property Regimes. According to Swallow 
(1989) in Cousins (1990), open access regimes are commonly characterised by lack 
of social authorities to define and enforce the rights of individuals or groups to use 
the resource. This ultimately leads to each resource user ignoring the consequence of 
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his behaviour on others. Common property resources have continued to be the basis 
of survival of many poor people in the developing world. Differences between 
common property and open access have been down played by Hardin (1968) leading 
to many governments reducing land and resources under the common property 
regime that is crucial for survival of rural households. 
The present synthesis study, as well as studies by other social scientists, have 
demonstrated a close link between common property resources (CPRs) and the 
survival systems of significant numbers of the rural people (Jodha 1992). The 
extension of forest reserves or protected forests was as a result of the "perceived 
unsustainability" of the Common Property Regimes. Whilst it is important to have 
reserved areas to improve the quality of germ plasma this should not lock out 
communities from deriving livelihoods from forests. Such moves will greatly 
disadvantage the poor rural communities who are more dependent on woodlands (de 
Beers & McDermont 1989; Bradley & Dewees 1993; Campbell 1996). 
1.10.Tenure 
Tenure regimes are socially defined rules for access to resources and rules for 
resource use that define people's rights and responsibilities in relation to the 
resources. They reflect power relationship between different stakeholders (Dubois 
1997). 
1.10.1. Tenurial Niches 
Tenurial niche is a space in which access to and use of a resource is governed by a 
common set of rules (Bruce et al 1993). This is relevant to the Zimbabwean context 
in that there may be no crystal clear tenurial arrangements in some areas. Within 
Communal areas there will be influence of government through legal instruments. 
Customary rights, individual tree management, local religious sanctions or 
pragmatic controls might not necessarily coincide (Matose & Wily 1996) thereby 
calling for the need for an arbitrator, a role which has been performed by traditional 
leaders. In Gokwe Chief Njelele claimed to have power over natural resource 
exploitation. His power is however waning due to legal setbacks and increased 
pressure on natural resources as the population size increases. Different rules might 
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apply on the same land during different times of the year thereby allowing flexibility 
in accessing natural resources for the local people. 
In Zimbabwe there has been a long tradition of resource management in which the 
local communities have participated. Most of these resource management 
arrangements are based on traditional leadership structures or spirit mediums. In 
most parts of Zimbabwe fruit trees are sacred and the local people are not allowed to 
cut down these trees (cf Gelfand 1971). Anyone who violates any of these local 
rules and regulations would be brought to the chief or headman for punishment. The 
main aim of the punishment is corrective (Chief Nj elele 2000 interview; cf Wilson 
1988). The mere fact that one would be brought before the headman or the chief is 
deterrent enough for the community members to stop cutting down sacred trees. It is 
however important to note that trees, including fruit trees are sacred. Sacred trees 
tend to vary from one locality to another. This then gives leeway for immigrants, as 
they will profess ignorance of local traditional rules. Some trees used for burial 
purposes were also sacred and their use for firewood purposes was often seen as 
bringing bad luck. This helped conserve trees. Trees at the rain making ceremony 
site were also sacred. Cutting sacred trees is said to bring vengeance from ancestral 
spirits to the local communities. Trees close to graveyards were also not to be cut as 
they were considered to be sacred as they provided shade to the dead hence any 
violation would bring bad luck. Wilson (1988) and Cavendish (1996) (cf Mclvor 
1989; Clark et al. 1996) name some sacred tree uses which include Mubvumira 
(Kirkia acuminata) talking to ancestors, Muchakata (Parinari curatellifolia) rain 
making, Mukamba (Afzelia quanzensis) for both rain making and talking to 
ancestors, Mupfura (Sclerocarya birrea) whilst Chitarara - provides shade on 
graves (Mclvor 1989). 
Some trees were left within the field to serve social purposes such as the provision 
of shade during the resting periods in the fields. Dangarembga (1988) points out that 
"there was always shade by the fields where clumps of trees were deliberately left 
standing to shelter us when we ate our meals or rested between cultivating strips of 
the land" (Dangarembga 1988: 2). What is needed is harmonisation of traditional 
natural resource management codes of conduct with the existing legislation. This 
was done with positive results amongst the Turkana in Kenya (Barrow 1987 in 
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Waters -Bayer 1995). Migration of some different ethnic groups into the `new areas' 
and the "opening up" of frontier regions such as Gokwe resulted in the cultural 
melting pot which has seen the mixing of various cultures resulting in the erosion of 
some of the traditional conservation practices. Tradition is dynamic. Immigrants 
only helped to quicken and probably influence the direction of change. 
Traditional leaders such as chiefs and headman have played an important role of 
"overseeing" the sustainable utilisation of the natural resources such as forestry. 
With the advent of independence in 1980 the government felt that the chiefs had 
been sympathetic to the colonial government hence they began to strip them of their 
powers. This was done through the establishment of the Village Development 
Committees (VIDCOs). These new structures announced through the Prime 
Minister's Directive of 1984, were meant to effectively take over the roles of the 
village head whilst the Ward Development Committee (WARDCO) was meant to 
unseat the headmen and chiefs. These structures have not been able to replace the 
traditional leader's role. One of the main reasons was that the traditional leaders 
commanded more respect as they were not elected but acquired their status through 
birth. The VIDCO and WARDCO leaders are elected. Some VIDCO and WARDCO 
leaders subsequently lose their seats in elections hence their command of local 
respect has been very minimal. This has meant that they have not been able to 
effectively enforce the management of resources such as forestry in the communal 
areas. Councillors, who are elected on a ward basis and represent the local people in 
the Rural District Council meetings, have not been successful in some instances, as 
they too do not command respect of the local people. On realising this anomaly the 
government passed the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 which seeks to harmonise 
the roles of the traditional leaders with those of the elected leaders through the 
formation of Village Assemblies which are now being chaired by traditional leaders. 
1.11. Local Natural Resource Management Strategies 
Failure to sustainably manage natural resources in developing countries has often 
been blamed on the discarding of the local level resource management strategies as 
governments impose western generated wisdom (Warren, Slikkerveer & Brokensha 
1995). In Zimbabwe some researchers have argued that the traditional or even the 
independent churches offer a potentially solid base for sustainable natural resource 
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management. Traditional religion has often been associated with fertility' and well 
being (Cox Personal Communication 11 December 2002) and this is why traditional 
practices such as mutoro are conducted in vegetated areas. Droughts or other 
misfortune are construed as some sort of punishment from God (Mwari). 
The people of Zimbabwe have a long history of worshipping Mwari based at 
Matonjeni (Ranger 1966; Daneel 1970, 1998). In Gokwe the Nevana spirit medium 
in Nembudziya is very influential. There have been efforts to revive such traditional 
and religious natural resource management in the Masvingo area through the 
formation of the Zimbabwe Institute of Religious Research and Ecological 
Conservation (ZIRRCON) in 1988. ZIRRCON has two affiliate bodies, which are 
the Association of Zimbabwean Traditional Ecologists (AZTREC) and Association 
of African Earthkeeping Churches (AAEC) formed in 1991. They aim at "clothing 
the earth" (kufukidza nyika) (Daneel 1996) which will be done through planting of 
indigenous trees in order to appease the spirits and God respectively. Their broad 
objectives include afforestation, wildlife conservation and protection of water 
resources. These initiatives are said to have yielded positive results (Daneel 1998) 
and there are hopes of scaling it up to national level. The following section looks at 
an overview of the Indian forestry experiences. The Zimbabwean co- management 
was modelled along the Indian experience. A study tour was undertaken to India 
prior to implementation of co- management in Mafungautsi. 
1.12. An Overview of the Indian Experience 
Having introduced the research in Zimbabwe this section now looks at an overview 
of the Indian forestry experiences. India has come a long way in terms of forestry 
management. In 1894 the first forestry policy was enunciated18 (FAO 1993; Schug 
2000). Forests were to be conserved for both climatic and physical reasons. Forestry 
land was to be converted to agricultural purposes whenever there was pressure for 
17 Daneel (1998) points out that his research on the Mwari cult in Matopo shows that it has been 
mutating as the provider of rain, fertility and healing power to warlord of resistance to colonialism 
(cf. Ranger 1966, 1967; Cobbing 1977; Beach 1979) and a socio- political figure of resistance. It is 
important to note that there is no agreement on the contribution of the Mwari cult to the 1896 -7 
uprising. 
18 Arnold & Campbell (1986) also give an account of forestry in Nepal where forests were 
nationalised in 1957 to stop the process of deforestation. Up to the 1970s nationalisation did not stop 
degradation of forests prompting the government to introduce community-based forest management 
(cf. Chilundo & Cau 2000) 
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agricultural land. After the Indian independence in 1947 the government priority 
was on food self -sufficiency and this implied the conversion of forestland for 
agricultural purposes. The forest area was now failing to cope with the demand of 
the increasing population of 330 million in 1947 (FAO 1993; Schug 2000). 
In 1952 the Second National Forestry Policy was launched. This policy 
acknowledged the impact of releasing forestlands for agricultural purposes. This 
policy even went on further to note the role of forests as not only being protective 
but also being productive. This resulted in 43 million hectares being cleared for 
agricultural purposes between 1951 and 1976 (FAO 1993). The Indian Forest 
Service was reconstituted in 1966 and 1977. The Forest Conservation Act of 1980 
made it mandatory for the national government to approve the release of any 
Reserved Forest for non - forest use by the state government. 
In 1986 the National Land Use and Wasteland Development Council was 
constituted to make policies on integrated land use, environmental protection and 
forest conservation. In 1988 there was another forest policy, which emphasised on 
the conservation of the forest rather than rural development. In 1990 the government 
introduced guidelines for Joint Forest Management (Government of India 1990). 
The committees created were known as Forest Protection Committees (FPC) or Van 
Suraksha Samitis (VSS) (Sundar 2000). By mid -1992 the protection of 1.5 million 
hectares of government forestland had been assigned to over 10 00019 communities 
(Singh & Khare 1993: 281). With donor support, this was praised as an era of co- 
operation between the forest department and the local communities (Singh & Khare 
1993; Schug 2000). The Zimbabwean experience will be drawing a number of 
parallels with the Indian co- management. 
1.13. Organisation of the study 
The study is organised around ten chapters. The first chapter has looked at the 
overall introduction, stated the problem statement, research objectives, outlined the 
research hypothesis, looked at the Indian case before presenting the organisation of 
the study. 
19 Agrawal & Saigal (1996) say these were estimated to be between 10000 and 15000 committees 
protecting over 1.5 million hectares of forest. 
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The second chapter looks at the historical background of forestry conservation in 
Zimbabwe. It then situates the forestry conservation within the broader conservation 
background. This helps to contextualise resource management issues outside 
forestry. Forestry resource management policy changes are often related to changes 
in other sectors within the broader resource base. This chapter further situates the 
history of conservation in Zimbabwe and the dual nature of the policies governing 
the commercial farming sector and the communal areas, with the latter being 
perceived as destroyers of the natural resources. This section will further highlight 
how the dual nature of forestry policy making has continued after Zimbabwe gained 
independence in 1980 (Nhira et al. 1998). 
Chapter 3 conceptualises the co- management framework by looking at the definition 
of co- management within the framework of decentralisation. It will also come up 
with an operational definition for this research. This chapter will look at the powers 
transferred, accountability arrangements, environmental outcomes and social 
outcomes. This chapter will look at definitions of co- management (Dubois 1997; 
Hobley 1996; Wily 2000; Borrini- Feyerabend et al. 2000). Co- management will 
generally be regarded as a "situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, 
define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management 
functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural 
resources" (Borrini -Feyerbend et al. 2000: 7). 
Chapter 4 analyses the issue of co- management in the context of the research area of 
Mafungautsi in Gokwe, Zimbabwe. This chapter will provide background and the 
set -up of the co- management programme in Mafungautsi. Co- management will be 
cited as a mode of implementation of the decentralisation process at a local level 
within the context of forestry resources. The overall decentralisation framework is 
pronounced at national level whereas the actual implementation of the national 
decentralisation policies is at a local level (Dubois Personal Communication 16 
October 2001). This is then linked to the overall conceptual framework of 
decentralisation within the forestry sector. 
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Chapter 5 is on the Research Methodology, which links the research methods to the 
research objectives. This chapter will point out the participatory tools that were 
used. Triangulation was carried out as a built in mechanism of cross -checking the 
data collected from the respondents. Chapter 6 gives the overall background to the 
research area of Mafungautsi, which is in Gokwe South District of Zimbabwe. 
Gokwe South is a unique district even in terms of its settlement history hence the 
need to give the background information to enable the reader to have a general 
understanding of the broader context of the research site. 
Chapter 7 starts off by analysing the two case studies beginning with Batanai 
followed by Chemwiro -Masawi. These will be described by giving a brief 
background, highlighting the formation process, operation of the RMC in the 
context of decentralised forestry management. The Chapter will conclude by 
offering a comparative summary of the two research sites. Chapter 8 gives an 
overview of the participatory GIS exercise results in Mafungautsi. Chapter 9 will 
give an overview of the research findings by relating the results to the overall 
framework of decentralisation. Chapter 10 will then highlight the recommendations 
and indicate areas for future research. The last section will comprise of references 
and annexes. 
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Chapter Two 
Forestry Conservation in Zimbabwe 
2.0. Introduction 
The last chapter introduced the research topic. This chapter looks at forestry 
conservation in Zimbabwe going back to the colonial period. It begins by giving an 
overview of conservation in general. It then moves on to look at an overview of 
vegetation cover and the historical development of forestry management and the 
establishment of the FCZ. The establishment of forest reserves is also outlined, 
followed by the land tenure arrangements and its implications for communal area 
forestry management. By way of conclusion, the chapter gives an overview of agro- 
ecological regions in Zimbabwe in order to contextualise the environmental history. 
2.1. Forestry Development History in Zimbabwe 
The history of forestry development in pre and post independent Zimbabwe has a 
trajectory conflated by a plethora of inconsistencies and contradictions. In the pre- 
colonial era natural resources were managed in the interest of the community. This 
type of management was based in customs, taboos, religion and clan name system 
(Schofelleers 1979; cf Wilson 1986, 1989; Cavendish 1994). The traditional leader 
always had to consent to the harvesting of natural resources and wildlife (Sibanda 
2001). Among the Shona groups it became a tradition that the elephant tusk which 
was closest to the ground was to be given to the chief (ishe) or king (mambo). 
Sibanda (2001) and MacKenzie (1988) further point out that people could not kill 
animals, which were part of their totems (cf Beatie 1966; Mair 1974, 1984). This 
was, arguably, a mechanism of conserving different animal species. Such traditional 
values, practices and indigenous knowledge systems were downgraded to 
retrogressive mechanism, which were thought to be retarding complete acceptance 
of more progressive views (Phillips et al. 1962). In Phillips et al. 's words; 
The bewilderment and irritation generated by the government's protection of 
wild animals are understandable, when it is realised that these self -same 
animals may damage crops and be a source of danger and yet, because of the 
law, are the source of negligible morsels of meat only (Phillips et al. 1962: 
303). 
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Paul Richards (1983) cites the lack of understanding of the African context by citing 
E.W. Bovill (1920)'s comment that the Saharan desiccation was caused by "the evil 
ways of the shifting cultivator" (Richards 1983: 22). It is however important to note 
that during the `Dust Bowls' in the United States some academics such as Dudley 
Stamp (1938) acknowledged the important role and appropriateness of the African 
methods of soil conservation, 
A recent tour of Nigeria has convinced the writer that the native farmer has 
already evolved a scheme of farming which can not be bettered in principle 
even if it can be improved in detail and that, as practised in some areas, this 
scheme affords almost complete protection against soil erosion and loss of 
fertility. It may be that the African has thus a contribution to make towards 
the solution of the great soil erosion problems of other regions (Richards 
1983: 25). 
People in the communal areas, according to Phillips et al. (1962) were further 
confused by the conflicting government signals towards natural resource 
management. Animals in areas such as Gokwe were shot in large numbers in the 
anti -Tsetse era yet it is now illegal to kill wildlife.20 One of the suggestions for 
improving wildlife management in the then Tribal Trust Land (now Communal 
Areas) was for "Education of the people on the need for and advantages of 
conserving wild life, including fish" (Phillips 1962 et al: 304). 
One important observation in the Phillips et al. (1962) report was that there was a 
need to meaningfully involve the people in the then Tribal Trust Lands21 to benefit 
from wildlife conservation in the form of meat and cash. The report pointed out 
that within the forestry sector it was important to find ways of winning the co- 
operation of the rural African communities in conservation. Furthermore Phillips et 
al. (1962) pointed out that the incorporation of African communities had to be done 
in view of the ever -escalating costs of protection. Although the need for community 
involvement was apparent, fortress conservation was viewed as the ultimate 
solution. As a result the reports still emphasised that the FCZ was the viable vehicle 
for resource management. 
20 Nygren captures a similar scenario in the Costa Rican forestry where contradictory advice was 
given to people. `First, the people of Alto Tuis were urged to clear the forest for development; today 
they are advised to plant trees in the name of development (2000: 28). This has been the tragedy of 
rural development policy inconsistencies. 
21 TTL were re -named communal lands after independence in 1980. 
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An ever -present and most refractory problem is the finding of funds adequate 
to implement a policy of protection, planned exploitation and silvicultural 
improvement (Phillips 1962: 65). 
Natural resources were considered as one of the means for national development. 
For this reason there was need to protect the indigenous forest. For example the 
availability of high value timber species such as `Teak' (Baikiaea plurijuga) was 
used as a justification for investing resources in protection of indigenous forestry 
resources. 
Another justification for spending resources on the indigenous resources was the 
aesthetic factor. Indigenous resources such as forest reserves were seen as an 
important foundation for the establishment for tourist ventures. The FCZ in 
Zimbabwe, alongside the department of national parks, now operate lodges and 
tourist services. The initial thrust was to promote "Western World" type of tourists. 
Traditional conservation practices were also prevalent for species such as fruit trees 
and those used for performing burial rituals were not to be cut (Chief Njelele 2000). 
Interviews with respondents in the field further corroborated this evidence. This was 
a management regime with its own merits and strengths if promoted. It is this 
management regime and structure, which seems to have been misunderstood by both 
the colonial and postcolonial administrations. The colonial administration assumed 
that the natural resources in the communal areas were open access and were a clear 
demonstration of "Tragedy of the Commons" thesis (Hardin 1968). 
Taking away ownership of natural resources from the local people resulted in 
contestation of ownership. Local people did not see the central government as the 
rightful owner of the resources. However, alienation of people from their natural 
resources had the effect of inciting local people to `steal' from the state (Sibanda 
2001). In such cases, even traditional leaders, who were former guardians of natural 
resources, felt stealing from the state was justified.22 This then degenerated into 
some form of open access. One could argue that the intervention of the state resulted 
in the degeneration of the common property into an open access where the people in 
22 Klooster (2000) notes that rural communities who would normally not steal from their neighbour 
will find it justifiable to steal trees from the state. 
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rural areas felt that power to control natural resources had been taken over by the 
state. 
Surprisingly, the post- independence governments in Africa parody the colonial 
governments, and continue to view the African farmers as the destroyers of the 
natural resources (Hulme & Murphree 2001). 
Mackenzie (1988) argues that exploitation of wildlife was accelerated during 
colonisation due to the access to better arms, which meant that fewer people could 
now kill more animals. The Native Commissioner's report confirms this, 
Game has been slaughtered in great quantities and poaching has been rife in 
localities where `Fly' has never existed nor has been suspected to exist. The 
worst offenders are undoubtedly the poorer class of Boers who club together 
to raise a wagon and span of donkeys, taking out one licence between them 
(or none at all) and proceed to exterminate every four footed animal, large or 
small of which the hide or flesh are of any value to them (Native 
Commissioner Report Sebungwe -Mafungabusi for the year ended 31st 
December 1914. ). 
MacKenzie (1988) further argues that it was the colonial states themselves who 
embarked on massive wildlife killing citing the activities of hunters such as 
Frederick Selous, Thomas Baines, George Phillips, Henry Hartley and George 
McCabe who were said to have killed hundreds of elephants. Mackenzie further 
points out that loss of land resulted in the increased dependence on hunting, as was 
the case in Rhodesia23 and even amongst the Khoi Khoi but these were hunting and 
gathering who always depended on hunting anyway. Jason Machiwanyika 
(undated) lamented the loss of game due to settler hunting; 
Europeans took all guns from Africans and refused to let them shoot game. 
But Europeans shoot game. If an African shoots an animal with a gun, the 
African is arrested and the gun is confiscated (Machiwanyika cited in 
Mackenzie 1988: 141). 
The exploitation of wildlife and natural resources was not unique to the present day 
Zimbabwe but also countries in Africa such as South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, the 
East African region and India were also subjected to the same levels of exploitation 
23 Zimbabwe, from 1890 when it was colonised by Britain, it was called Rhodesia, named after Cecil 
John Rhodes who spearheaded its colonisation. Rhodesia was the name used from 1890 to 1980. The 
exception was from 1953 to 1963 when it was called Southern Rhodesia when it joined to form a 
federal government with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). 
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(Mackenzie 1988). Mackenzie further illustrates this with an advert by the Uganda 
Railway, 
The Highlands of British East Africa...has become a fashion sportsmen in 
search of BIG GAME make it a hobby (Mackenzie 1988: 200, capitalisation 
in the original cf. Steinhart 1989). 
The change from massive animal killing to conservation was a response to the 
Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa of 19 
May 1900 and the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa of November 1933 
(MacKenzie 1988). 
2.2. Post Independence era 
Zimbabwe inherited one of the most unequal economies in the world. It also 
inherited a battery of legal and structural constraints designed to prevent it from 
changing the situation fundamentally (Stoneman 1988). This dual nature pervaded 
all sectors of the economy, which included natural resource management. 
Legislation further entrenched the dichotomy between communal and commercial 
farming areas - and to some degree, rural and urban areas. Policies within the 
forestry and wildlife sector were generally closely linked. 
Forestry policy dates back to the colonial period in most African countries (Malaya 
1996). Malaya (1996) further describes these policies as being command and 
control, top- driven, coercive and punitive. Sibanda (2001) points out that wildlife 
management in the past 50 -100 years had placed excessive emphasis on "the 
protected areas and law enforcement, on preventing communities from using the 
resource and promoting exclusively Western aesthetic values" (Sibanda 2001: 4). 
This approach resulted in the loss of value of natural resources to the local people. 
This view from the wildlife sector is similar to the approach taken within the 
forestry sector, which saw the creation of forestry reserves or gazetted forests in 
Zimbabwe. Kibreab (2001) argues that it is the state's interference with customary 
tenurial rights rather than communal property rights that has resulted in the 
degradation of communal resources (Kibreab 2001). A historical analysis of 
indigenous resource management seem to point out at success stories in the past 
which do not seem to be in tandem with what happened with the onset of central 
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government control of the local resources24 (Dore in Dore & Chafota 2000; (cf 
Bromley & Cernea 1989, Bromley 1991; Chipepo 1998). In order to contextualise 
conservation history in Zimbabwe an understanding of the vegetation cover will be 
important. It is in this light that the next section moves on to an overview of 
vegetation cover in Zimbabwe. 
2.3. An Overview of Vegetation Cover in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe consists mainly of the Miombo woodlands. "Miombo is a colloquial 
term, now widely used in literature to describe those central, southern and eastern 
African woodlands dominated by the genera Brachystegia, Julbernardia and /or 
Isoberlinia. These are three closely related genera from the legume family 
(Fabaceae, subfamily Caesalpinioideae) (Campbell, Frost & Byron 1996). 
Figure 1: Common Vegetation Types in Zimbabwe 
® Mopane woodland and savanna 
Miombo woodland and savanna 
NM Teak forest and woodland 
® Acacia 
Terminalia- Combratum 
[`] Other vegetation 
Kilometers 
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Source: Department of Natural Resources (1961) after Ratray & Wild 
24 This is a controversial issue with some academics arguing that there was never any sort of resource 
management BUT it was a case of an abundance of resources in the face of small populations (Dore 
2000). Some academics argue that there was and there are still some genuine attempts of local 
communities managing their natural resources (Hulme & Murphree 2001). 
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The Miombo woodlands cover an estimated area of 2.7 million square kilometres in 
southern, central and eastern Africa (Frost 1996). These woodlands are crucial to 
the livelihoods of many people (Gambiza et al. 2000). Figure 1 shows the common 
vegetation types in Zimbabwe. 
Vegetation cover is rather dynamic. There have been lots of changes in vegetation 
cover in areas such as Gokwe due to the opening up of woodlands for cotton 
cultivation. This was made easier with the eradication of Tsetse fly with the 
assistance of the European Union (EU). Table 1 shows the distribution of different 
land use systems in Zimbabwe. 
Table 1: Areas under Various Land Use Systems in Zimbabwe 
Land Use `000' Hectares Percent 
Tropical rainforest 11.5 0.03 
Plantations 155.8 0.40 
Indigenous Woodland 25 771.4 65.92 
Grasslands 1 893.9 4.85 
Cultivated Land 10 738.1 27.47 
Cities 139.1 0.36 
Rock Outcrops and Water Bodies 379.4 0.97 
Total 39 089.2 100.0 
Source: Forestry Commission (1996). 
Table 1 shows that indigenous woodlands account for 65 % of all land uses in 
Zimbabwe (FCZ 1996). The current coverage might have changed due to the 
expansion of agriculture and the current land invasions (Marongwe 2002). An 
understanding of vegetation cover gives an indication of forestry challenges in 
Zimbabwe. 
2.4. Plantation and Indigenous Forests 
Zimbabwe's indigenous vegetation is complex. Zimbabwe mainly comprises of the 
wooded savanna and savanna woodland with pockets of the montane forest in the 
Eastern Highlands. Plantation forestry is concentrated in the Eastern Highlands of 
Zimbabwe (Philips et al. 1962, Nhira et al. 1998). This is mainly due to the climatic 
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differences. The Eastern Highlands have an altitude of between 900 and 1700m 
above sea level and an average rainfall of over 1 000 mm per annum making them 
more suitable for timber plantations, coffee and tea growing. The need for growing 
coniferous trees in this area was justified on the grounds of the dangers of relying on 
imports as realised during the Second World War, which ended in 1945. The eastern 
highlands are unsuitable for other agricultural activities due to their terrain. This was 
then seen as a way of protecting land from soil erosion. 
Soil erosion has been cited as one of the most serious ecological challenges facing 
Zimbabwe (Whitlow 1988, Magadza 1990). Magadza (1990) further points out that 
rates of erosion as high as 100 tonnes per hectare per annum have been measured. 
The most degraded areas in Zimbabwe are Masvingo, Middle Save and Mutoko 
(CSO 2000). Conclusions were quickly drawn even where the `experts' admitted not 
having carried out first hand inspections (Guest 1948) but still made 
recommendations based on assumptions. Protected areas and conservation practices 
are seen as a solution to the reduction of soil erosion. Zimbabwe, like most of 
Africa, is perceived to be facing an "ecological crisis" that is part of a more general 
agrarian -political crisis (Richards 1983). Showers (1989) echoes the same views on 
Lesotho. The next section now looks at the colonial administration of forestry. 
2.5. Colonial Administration of Forestry 
The commissioning of J. Simms in 1909 to make recommendations on the 
exploitation and management of forestry resources in Southern Rhodesia marked the 
birth of a colonial forestry policy in Southern Rhodesia. The background to his 
recommendations can be traced to when the British South African Company 
(BSACo.) occupied what was called Fort Salisbury on 12 September 1890 hoping to 
get a Second Rand.25 
It was believed that the success of gold and diamond mining in South Africa 
could be repeated further north, and the right to administer and exploit the 
region was won by Cecil Rhodes and his (BSAC) which had received a royal 
charter in 1889 (Middleton 1997: 336). 
With the failure of getting a second Rand the settlers embarked on agriculture as the 
next best option (Middleton 1997; Phillips et al. 1962). Cecil John Rhodes who was 
25 Large gold deposits were discovered in the Rand area in South Africa. There was a general belief 
that there were similar gold deposits in the present day Zimbabwe. 
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at the helm of the British South African Company (BSACo) felt that effective 
occupation could be achieved through the construction of railway transport. He even 
dreamt of the Cape to Cairo railway link. The construction of the Bulawayo- Victoria 
Falls Railway line helped to expose the uneconomic ways in which timber was 
being exploited by Baerecke and Kleugden, a South African company (Phillips et al. 
1962, Judge 1993). "Timber mining "26 was being practised by a number of logging 
companies. Timber mining resulted in the commissioning of J. Simms in 1909 to 
make recommendations on the exploitation and management of forestry resources in 
Southern Rhodesia (Phillips et al. 1962, Nhira et al., 1998). 
There is a tremendous amount of cutting down of timber by Natives for their 
huts, cattle kraals and grain drying platforms. The Scrub is now beginning to 
take over in portions denuded. From information, some mines are also guilty 
of this indiscriminate felling of timber (Guest in a letter /memo dated 20 
August 1948). 
Simms's 1910 Report is the beginning of colonial forestry policy in Zimbabwe. The 
report recommended amongst other things the establishment of exotic plantations in 
the Eastern Highlands and the appointment of a Forestry Officer. In 1920, Mr J.S. 
Henkel was appointed the first Forest Officer in the Ministry of Agriculture. Due to 
the rampant timber logging methods Henkel recommended the establishment of a 
Forestry Department. In 1925 E. K. Kelly Edwards was appointed Assistant Forestry 
Officer and later took over from Henkel on his retirement in 1931 (Judge 1993). It is 
interesting to note that at this stage the main culprits of `timber mining' were the 
commercial logging companies. In 1941, one of the District Forest Officers for 
Matebeleland, Mr Wilkinson produced his `Report on the Rhodesian Teak Forests of 
Western Matabeleland'. According to Judge, (1993) one of the eight objectives of 
his report was to propose areas to be reserved. 
The most important aspect of his report covering 38 years to 1979 was the 
recommendation that forest had to be set aside or reserved (Judge 1993). As the 
Forestry Department was under the Ministry of Agriculture, Nhira et al (1998) point 
out that implementation of forestry policies relied heavily on the agricultural 
extension officers operating within the then Tribal Trust Lands (now Communal 
Lands). Wilkinson's report lamented the low levels of funding for the Forestry 
26 "Timber Mining" is a term used for the unsustainable exploitation of timber for short-term gains or 
profits. 
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Department. By 1958, largely through Mr Armitage's efforts the multiple land use in 
forestry was put forward. This entailed use of forests in a `holistic' manner, which 
entails grazing, bee -keeping, wildlife, tourism and tenant farming. It was felt that 
forest had to generate revenue or be destroyed (Judge 1993). Its amazing how the 
same concept cropped up in the post 1980 period where the community participation 
narrative took the centre stage (Hulme & Murphree 2001). 
Other relevant pieces of legislation pertaining to forestry in Zimbabwe include the 
Native Reserves Forest Produce Act of 1929. This Act allowed the people staying in 
the Native Reserves (later called Tribal Areas and now called Communal Lands 
CLs) to exploit forestry resources to meet their subsistence needs only. Any 
commercial trading of forestry products and minor forestry products had to be 
regulated by the state. The other important Act is the Land Apportionment Act of 
1930, which made for the provision of setting aside of forest areas. The Forest and 
Herbage Preservation Act of 1936 also made it possible to protect certain plant 
species. 
2.6. The Establishment of the Forestry Commission 
This section shows that the Forest Act of 1949 and its subsequent amendments 
resulted in the creation of the Forestry Commission. The Forestry Commission is a 
parastatal body under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The Forestry 
Commission was formed in 1954 with the passing of the Forestry Act in 1949 which 
was passed through Forest Amendment Act Number 28 of 1953 to make way for its 
establishment under the then Ministry of Lands. One of its main mandates was to 
implement the government's strategy in forestry. It was later moved to the ministry 
of Environment and Tourism. The mandate of the Forestry Commission according to 
the Forestry Act is to: 
Control and manage state forests; 
Protect private forests, trees and forest produce; 
Control the cutting and taking of timber; 
Conserve timber resources; 
Regulate compulsory forestation of private land; 
Regulate and control of trade in forest produce; and 
Create an institutional framework for the above. 
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In 1948 the Research Branch was created as a result of the need to collate 
accumulated growth and silvicultural data in order to manage and exploit indigenous 
timber from the Kalahari Sand Forests (Barnes 1993). 
The present day Forestry Commission's mission statement states: 
Our business is supporting sustainable development through research, 
training, tree planting, management of the nation's forests and investment in 
forest -based industry and commerce. We strive to provide Total Quality in 
products and services to satisfy our various customers. Our employees are 
our strength and we believe their growth is the growth of the organisation 
(Forestry Commission Mission Statement 1998). 
The mission statement above sounds like a continuity of the old Forestry 
Commission mandate and does not even mention community participation. It is 
more or less like any corporate mission statement in the private sector. The thrust of 
the forestry policy throughout this time was on industrial forestry. Not much effort 
was put on the management of woodlands in the communal areas (Scoones and 
Matose 1993, cf Nhira et al. 1998). The first forestry policy for the tribal areas (now 
Communal Lands) was the 1968 Policy that advocated for the establishment of 
woodlots in tribal trust areas through the provision of nurseries. The forestry 
challenges within the rural areas, it was thought, could be easily solved through the 
provision of tree nurseries which in most cases where the eucalyptus species. 
Ground implementation did not begin until in 1978. Even in the Philips et al. (1962) 
Report the issue of forests was viewed from economic point of view where more 
value was placed on timber for making railway sleepers and for the curing of 
Virginia tobacco which was grown on the commercial farms. There was little 
attention on the use of firewood in the tribal trust lands which are now the 
Communal Lands and other religious values of the forests (Daneel 1989, 1996, 
1998; Ranger 1989). 
Beinart (1989, 1999) argues that there is a need to view the natural resource and 
conservation issues and appropriation of natural resources as central elements in the 
understanding of human history. This is why it is almost impossible to de -link 
environmental history from the politics and decisions which interacted with the 
environment in various ways producing various outcomes. Some researchers believe 
that environmental policies were contributing factors towards the fight against 
colonialism in Zimbabwe (Ranger 1966, 1989; Beinart 1984, 1989, 1999). 
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Rodney (1974); MacKenzie (1997) and Beinart (1999) argue that colonialism was a 
pretext for exploiting resources in developing countries. The fact that the first 
investigations into forestry issues in Zimbabwe was as a result of the 
overexploitation of timber along the Victoria Falls Railway line shows how far the 
settlers and settler institutions were determined to exploit resources within 
Zimbabwe as was with other countries in Africa. This was not only unique to Africa 
as Greenblatt (1991) points out how Spanish conquistadores claimed pieces of land 
by striking down trees with their swords. The experience world -wide is not very 
different (Kjekshus 1977; Crosby 1986; MacKenzie 1988). MacKenzie (1997) 
points out the reduction in wildlife numbers due to the coming in of the colonial 
regimes. Even local African people were absorbed into commercial trading of 
wildlife. This was also true in colonial Zimbabwe where wildlife killing was 
labelled elimination of vermin in the process of opening up of frontier regions 
(MacKenzie 1988; Mutwira, 1989; Murombedzi 1994a; Musanika -Ncube (interview 
1 September 2000). In colonial Zimbabwe people engaged to eliminate wildlife were 
called "amagotsha" (Musanika -Ncube 1 September 2000; cf Ford 1971). Mutwira 
(1989) further cites the Report of the Department of Agriculture for the years ended 
1903 -1912 in the then Rhodesia which allowed for the mass slaughter of wildlife 
and 100 000 dogs to prevent the disease such as rabies (dogs) and foot and mouth 
(buffaloes) and general crop and livestock destruction on commercial farms. Other 
animals regarded as vermin included hyenas, cheetahs, wild dogs, baboons, lions 
and leopards (MacKenzie 1988; Mutwira 1989; Murombedzi 1994a). Henry Hartley 
is reported to have killed between 1000 and 1200 elephants in his hunting career 
(Mutwira 1989). A Native Commissioner in Zimbabwe lamented the role of white 
opportunists in the exploitation of wildlife in the Mafungautsi area, which still had 
wildlife as compared to heavily settled areas by then.27 
Beinart (1999) further notes that having destroyed most of the natural resources in 
the new colonies the colonial governments later realised that the natural resources 
were being seriously eroded. They then began implementing some form of colonial 
environmental management, which at times, were based on wrong `scientific' 
27 Cf. Native Commissioner's Report Sebungwe- Mafungabusi for the year ended 315t December 
1914). 
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assumptions as some researchers have shown (Beinhart 1984, 1989; Drinkwater 
1989; Tiffen, Mortimore & Gichuki 1994a, 1994b; Leach & Fairhead 1996). 
Approaches to forestry, it has been argued, were drawn from the scientific 
and commercial models of Europe and India, which excluded rural people 
(Ravi Rajan cited in Beinart 1999: 5). 
Scientific knowledge has been embedded in broader political and cultural agendas 
and that interventions have seldom been socially neutral. 
In Zimbabwe the FCZ has often been bedeviled with the contradicting positions of 
being a regulator of the forestry sector as well as being a player in the commercial 
plantation activities (Bradley & MacNamara 1993, Katerere, Moyo & Mujakachi 
1993, Nhira et al. 1998). There have been changes to the Forestry Commission 
Policy in 1955, which was modified in 1962, 1981 and 1990. Katerere, Moyo & 
Mujakachi (1993) point out that the Forestry Commission's operations can basically 
be divided into state and non -state activities. Figure 2 shows the divisions within the 
Forestry Commission. 
Currently the Forestry Commission is undergoing some restructuring in line with the 
government's call to reduce government expenditure. With the current financial 
crisis, which has seen the withdrawal of major donors and Bretton Woods28 
institutions funding to Zimbabwe, this has caused financial difficulties for the 
Forestry Commission. This precarious situation is not unique to the Forestry 
Commission alone but it has affected the operations of many ministries and 
government departments. A number of departments have been merged to form 
single units as a way of streamlining their operations. Under the state activities, 
Forestry Extension (which was responsible for the Mafungautsi Forest when co- 
management or resource sharing were introduced) has been merged with the 
Indigenous Resources division. Research and Development Division has been 
merged with the Training and Colleges Division. At present most of the streamlining 
28 This study is not an evaluation of the contribution of the Bretton Woods Institutions to the 
development or lack of development in Zimbabwe. For the Forestry Commission, however, 
withdrawal of its balance of payments support and the subsequent donor withdrawal has worsened 
the situation up to instances where Forestry Commission workers were getting delayed salary 
payments due to cash flow problems. In the past the FC has benefited from funds from CIDA, GTZ 
and the World Bank. 
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has been approved by the Forestry Commission Board but the Cabinet has to make 
the final decision. 
Units such as Ngamo Safaris which is the Commercial arm, has been making profits 
from tourism within the gazetted forests mainly during the pre -2000 tourism boom. 
Tourist numbers have been going down since the land invasions began in 2000. 
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2.7. The Establishment of Forest Reserves and National Parks 
Colonial forest reservation, a subject standing in need of detailed attention by 
historians, is also relevant to the problem of vulnerability to hazards. 
Although often undertaken as a conservation strategy (on behalf of the local 
community, but in many cases to safeguard commercially exploitable timber) 
control of agriculture in forested areas might produce unintended side 
effects. Sometimes, where the land was in disputed ownership, reservation 
could result in a group with less powerful representation losing residual 
entitlements such as hunting rights, thus intensifying difficulties experienced 
in times of food shortages (Richards 1983: 43). 
In Zimbabwe there are currently 21 gazetted indigenous forests ranging in size from 
567 hectares in Ungwe Forest Reserve to 144 230 hectares in the Gwaai Forest 
Reserve. Mafungautsi in Gokwe is one of the designated forests and has a total area 
of 82 100 hectares. The Forestry Commission administers a total of 800 258 hectares 
(Mushove, Shumba & Matose 1996). The Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Management, another government department, controls 5 405 500 hectares 
(CSO 2000), comprising of national parks, recreational parks, botanical reserves, 
gardens and sanctuaries. 
Most of the demarcated or reserved forests are in Matebeleland North and 
the Midlands Provinces and predominantly in Natural Region 4. They are 
managed by the Forestry Commission for the protection of watersheds, 
conservation, ecological diversity, forests and forest produce (such as timber, 
wildlife, grazing and thatch) (Katerere, Moyo & Mujakachi 1993: 27). 
Mafungautsi Forest in Gokwe is located in deep Kalahari sands, which are very 
fragile (Arnold & Easton et al. 1993). The establishment of these reserves does not 
seem to have stopped the depletion of either the wildlife or forestry resources. 
Can we continue to ignore the fact that protection alone does not safeguard 
the survival of our wildlife heritage (Musokotwane in Makombe 1994: 1). 
Developments in Zimbabwe's forestry and wildlife sectors seemed to be taking cues 
from South Africa, even in the rationale and legal framework (Philips 1962; 
Carruthers 1989) This trend seem to be common throughout most of Africa. 
According to Makombe (1994) the total number of protected areas in Africa has 
increased since 1960s to 698 sites totalling more than 134 million hectares and 67 
percent of which do not allow extraction of wild resources by the local communities. 
Cumming (1991) (cf Makombe 1994) further points out that in some countries, as 
much as 18 percent of the land is set aside as "protected areas ". The Transboundary 
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initiatives agreed to by Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe in December 
2002 has further consolidated national parks into larger units comprising of 
Limpopo, Kruger and Gonarezhou respectively29. The move by some environmental 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to buy land for conservation purposes has 
further increased the proportion of protected land (Saruchera Personal 
Communication, October 2002). In order for the conservation history to be 
understood within its perspective, the following section is on the background to 
Zimbabwe. 
2.8. Background on Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is a land locked country in the southern part of Africa. Mozambique 
borders it in the east, Zambia in the North, South Africa in the south. Its location is 
between South Africa and Zambia. Its lies between latitudes 21 and 23 degrees 
South of the equator and longitudes 30 and 32 degrees East. It covers a total area of 
390 580 square kilometres of which 3 910 square kilometres is water. The total land 
boundary is 3 066 kilometres (km) distributed as follows: Botswana 813 kilometres, 
Mozambique 1 231km, South Africa 225km and Zambia 797 (CSO Fact Sheet, 
ecoweb.co.zw). 
Prior to 1890 Zimbabwe comprised of different empires or kingdoms (Beach 1980, 
1984). At the beginning of the 19th Century, the present day Zimbabwe was largely 
occupied by Shona speaking cultivators and herders (Atieno -Odhiambo 1973). The 
Nguni and Zulu speakers moving northwards in the 1830s from the Cape area in the 
Mfecane30 period later joined them. The Ndebele settled in Zimbabwe around 1850 
(Middleton 1997). On 22 October 1889, the Queen gave a Charter to the British 
South African Company. In 1890 the British South Africa Company (BSACo) began 
its rule after signing the Rudd Concession of 1889 with King Lobengula. The 
concession was initially signed with Lippert a hunter in 1889 and subsequently was 
bought off by Cecil John Rhodes and this was ratified with Lobengula in 1891. 
When mineral prospects were not forthcoming the BSACo then began to acquire 
29 See The Herald 27 November 2002 and Musengeyi in The Herald of 11 December 2002. 
30 This was during the time of trouble when the Zulu people migrated northwards, partly due to the 
loss of land as settlers alienated land from the local people and partly due to the expansion of the 
Zulu empire under Tshaka. 
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land in 1902 for farming as a last choice. In 1894 Native Reserves31 were created. 
By 1913, a total of 104 reserves varying in size from 2 024 hectares (ha) to 607 
287ha had been established (Rukuni Commission 1984; cf. Nelson 1975). Reserves 
were set aside for the local people to occupy the marginal agro- ecological regions. 
In 1914, the Robert Croydon Reserves Commission further reduced these reserves 
by six million hectares. In 1896 a hut tax was imposed followed by a Pass Law of 
1902. Native Commissioners collected tax and recruited labour. In 1901 the Native 
Marriages Ordinance was passed which required that patriarchs accept a cash -based 
bride -wealth, in lieu of services, and burgeoning migrant labour markets allowed 
young men to earn sufficient cash (Hughes 2001b). 
The need to create pools of labour reserve meant that the resultant environmental 
degradation due to the high population pressure was not addressed (Gore, Katerere 
& Moyo 1991). The later role was lost to the Native Labour Bureau of 1903. Chiefs 
were incorporated into the administrative structure where they were to work together 
with Native Commissioners. It was due to the land appropriation that gave rise to the 
First Chimurenga of 1896. In 1898 the British Government evoked an Order in 
Council which required the Company to create Native Reserves for the native 
Zimbabweans. This was to be the beginning of the dual agricultural system in 
Zimbabwe (Rukuni Commission 1994). 
The Native reserves were set up in agriculturally marginal areas that were left when 
land was taken for commercial farming purposes. Native commissioners were 
appointed to manage these areas. This was to be the main cause of white economic 
dominance and black poverty for the natives in reserves (Herbst 1990; cf. Rukuni 
Commission 1994). The Native Reserves Commission of 1914 recommended that 
the natives be given less land in order to accommodate large farms for whites 
coming from abroad to settle. Loss of land and the introduction of the hut tax in 
1896, some researchers have argued, were meant to `force' rural people into the 
labour market (Ranger 1970; Rukuni Commission 1994). As long as the people had 
enough resources, they would not be willing to provide labour to the mines and 
31 These were areas reserved for habitation by the local population. These need to be distinguished 
from Forest reserves or gazetted forests which are areas set aside for forestry purposes on ecological 
grounds. 
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commercial farms. Separation of land tenure along racial lines was further 
consolidated with the passage of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. In 1945 
commercial farmers numbered 3 699. The figure rose to 6 255 in 1955 due to a 
number being given land for fighting in the Second World War.32 In 1951 The 
Native Land Husbandry Act was passed whose intention is often believed as to 
`enforce private ownership of land, destocking and conservation practices on black 
smallholders' (Rukuni Commission 1994: 10). This was subsequently scrapped in 
1961 due to the widespread resistance. In 1965 the Native Reserves were re -named 
Tribal Trust Lands. In 1969 the Land Tenure Act was passed to repeal the Land 
Appropriation Act of 1930. This divided the land area in Zimbabwe into 50 percent 
white area and 49 percent black areas. 
The 1982 Communal Lands Act sought to re -name the TTLs to Communal Lands. 
There were no major legal changes in this piece of legislation. The other highlights 
of land legislation is the 1985 Land Acquisition Act which gave the government the 
first right of refusal whenever commercial farm land was to be sold. In 1990 the 
Land Acquisition Act was repealed with another act which sought to acquire 5 
million hectares of land. This has since been amended in 2000 to cater for the 
government's fast track Land Resettlement Programme.33 The overview in terms of 
land issue has been given as there is an intractable link between the land question 
(Katerere et al 1993; Moyo 1996) and the issue of natural resources management 
under which forestry falls. Dealing with land issues has direct repercussions on the 
conservation of forestry resources. 
The "Shona" an administrative officer wrote, are essentially agriculturists. They are 
of the earth, earthy (vana vevhu). Agriculture to the Native is not an occupation or a 
trade. It is a mode of life (E.D. Alvord: 13 in Ranger 1970). This mode of 
production was, however, threatened by white requirements of labour on the farms 
and mines. 
32 A letter from P. Hinder in the department of lands dated 25 August 1944 pointed out that "This 
department has no wish to move Natives from place to place in Rhodesdale Estate unnecessarily but 
at the same time must of course ensure that land likely to be required for post War European 
settlement is not unduly occupied or spoilt by Native occupation" (Reports 1/26/48). 
33 This research was not conducted on the `land question per se (Moyo 1986) but will highlight land 
issues in as far as they impinge on natural resource management as these two are closely related. 
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The history of conservation in Zimbabwe cannot be separated from the land issue 
due to the intricate linkage between these two sectors. When the colonial settlers 
came to Zimbabwe most of the areas were regarded as untamed. 
But conservation in the African context should not be seen merely in terms 
of nature conservation; it is also an important part of the reform process in 
land tenure systems, land -use patterns, and land management practices. It is 
primarily in relation to the control of man's exploitation of environmental 
resources that conservation has its greatest relevance" (Areola 1987: 277). 
In the early years people were rewarded for killing wildlife, which was regarded as 
vermin (MacKenzie 1988; Murombedzi 1994a; Musanika -Ncube interview 1 
September 2000). For those who had guns they would get more bullets on the 
production of evidence of killing wildlife.34 Murombedzi (1994) goes further to 
outline the financial reward associated with killing various animal species. 
The racially motivated pieces of legislation such as the Land Tenure Act of 1969 
resulted in unfair land distribution. Table 2 shows the distribution of land according 
to the Land Tenure Act. 
34 Interview with Musanika -Ncube of Gokwe on 10 March 2001. 
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Table 2: Land Distribution according to the Land Tenure Act of 1969 
Land Category Area (hectares) Percentage of total 
European Land 
General Farming 15, 337096 39.4 
Other - Parks, Forests etc. 2, 768 020 7.1 
18 145 116 46.5 
African Land 
Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) 16, 291 670 41.7 
African Purchase Area (SSCF) 1, 415 921 3.6 
Other - Parks, Forests etc. 494 617 1.3 
18, 202.084 46.6 
State Land 2, 727 617 6.9 
Total Zimbabwe 39, 074, 817 100.0 
Source: Moyo 1986. 
There have been efforts to change this land imbalance since independence in 1980.35 
Land available for forestry purposes tends to be the leftover from agricultural 
activities. The forestry degradation narratives have to be viewed within the context 
of the land policies in Zimbabwe, which can be traced back to the colonial 
administration of the then Rhodesia. It is ironical that the current Zimbabwean 
government with different justification has perpetuated the oppressive regime of 
legislation. Fairhead & Leach (1996) argue that widely held views on environmental 
change might be misleading. The centrality of agriculture to forestry policy world- 
wide can be discerned from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) which 
launched the Tropical Forestry Action Plan in 1985 which emphasised the role of 
forestry in agricultural production with the aim of reducing deforestation at the same 
time (Malaya 1996). The current status of forestry is a result of a long process of 
land tenure engineering. This has to be viewed even in the way peasants exploited 
natural resources whether legally or illegally (Matowanyika 1997). 
35 Since 2000 there has been seizures of commercial farming land by government supporters and war 
veterans. Due to the politicisation of the whole process it is difficult to get the actual figures of land 
acquired since the land invasions began. 
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Land distribution affects land use and problems arise as vegetation is caught in the 
crossfire. Forestry in Zimbabwe contributes less than 3% to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).36 All the other non -monetary benefits go unnoticed (Nhira et al. 1998). The 
major source for deforestation in Africa is the clearing of land for agricultural 
purposes (Bradley & Campbell 1998). 
The history of forestry conservation in Zimbabwe is a reflection of dualism in that 
the policy in communal areas was formulated to restrict use of forest resources for 
subsistence use and banned the commercial exploitation of the forestry resources 
(Nhira et al. 1998). The gazetted or the protected forests still suffered from the 
human encroachment problem in some reserves (Nhira et al., 1998). The state has 
realised that it is not capable of sustainably managing the natural resources including 
forests. The section below gives an overview of the different agro- ecological 
settings in Zimbabwe as this is closely linked to the different levels of economic 
activities hence forestry cover. 
2.9. The Agro- ecological Regions in Zimbabwe 
The availability of various local climates in Zimbabwe has to be understood within 
the context of its agro- ecological regions. Zimbabwe can be divided into five agro- 
ecological regions or natural regions as shown on figure 3 below. Divisions are 
based on the rainfall and topography. 
36 Most national accounting procedures tend to undervalue the contribution of forestry. This is 
normally relegated to commercial timber logging thereby undervaluing the contribution of the Non - 
Timber Forestry Products (NTFPs) which contributes significantly to the livelihoods of rural 
communities (Campbell 1996; Nhira et al. 1998; Hobley 1996; Wollenberg 1998). 
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Figure 3: Agro -Ecological Regions in Zimbabwe 
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Source: Michie & Nhandara 1999. 
2.9.1. Natural Region 1: Specialised and Diversified Farming 
This is a Specialised and Diversified Farming area, which receives more than 1000 
mm of rainfall per annum. It lies between 900 and 1 700metres above sea level. 
This region is well suited for plantation farming. This is where most of the pines are 
grown. Some of the areas are hilly and sloppy making them unsuitable for general 
agricultural activities (Phillips 1962; Michie & Nhandara 1999). Fruit and intensive 
livestock production are some of the economic activities in these areas. In frost -free 
areas, tea, coffee, macadamia nuts and other plantation crops are grown (CSO 2000). 
This area covers 7 000 square kilometres that amount to about 2 % of the total land 
area in Zimbabwe. This area is largely owned by large commercial ventures (74 %) 
with 24% being communally owned and the 2% owned by Small Scale Commercial 
Farming sector (SSCF) (CSO May 2000). 
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2.9.2. Natural Region 2: Intensive Farming 
This region receives between 750 and 1000 millimetres (mm) of rainfall per annum. 
Some geographers further subdivide this agro- ecological region into sub -regions 2a 
and 2b. In some seasons relatively short rainy seasons or dry spells may affect crops 
in the dry season. The main agricultural activity is the crop cultivation and intensive 
livestock production. This region covers a total area of 58, 600 square kilometres, 
which accounts for 15% of Zimbabwe's total land area. The Large Scale 
Commercial Farming sector owns 74% of land in this region, Communal farmers 
own 22% and the remainder of 4% is owned by SSCF sector. 
2.9.3. Natural Region 3: Semi -Intensive Farming 
In this region annually rainfall range from 650 -800 millimetres mm per annum. 
These areas experience fairly severe mid -season dry spells. The main economic 
activities are livestock production together with fodder crops and cash crops and 
marginal production of maize, tobacco and cotton. This region covers a total area of 
72 900 square kilometres, accounting for 19% of Zimbabwe's total land area. About 
49% of this area is Large Scale Commercial Farming (LSCF), 43% is communal 
land with the SSCF sector accounting for the remaining 8 %. 
2.9.4. Region 4: Semi Extensive Farming 
Rainfall received in this region ranges between 450 and 650 mm per annum. 
Periodic droughts are experienced. Drought resistant crops and livestock production 
are the main economic activities in this area. This region accounts for 147 800 
square kilometres, which is 38% of Zimbabwe's total land area. Communal areas 
account for 62% of land in this region, 34% is large -scale Commercial Farming 
areas and SSCF sector accounts for the remaining 4 %. 
2.9.5. Region 5: Extensive Farming 
This region experiences very low and erratic rainfall for the production of drought 
resistant crops. The main economic activity is game ranching. This ecological region 
accounts for Zimbabwe's 104 400 square kilometres (27% of Zimbabwe's total land 
area). About 45% of land in this region is communal land, 35% is LSCF and 20% is 
owned by the National Parks (CSO 2000). 
50 
Having looked at a brief overview of the history of forestry management in 
Zimbabwe and the ecological background, the next chapter is going to look at the 
conceptual framework of co- management as a form of environmental 
decentralisation in the Mafungautsi area in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter Three 
Co- management within the Decentralisation Framework 
3.0. Introduction 
This chapter looks at co- management and its definition within the framework of 
decentralisation. It introduces the issue of actors, powers and accountability within a 
decentralised co- management arrangement. It will further analyse the different 
accountability mechanisms. It will then conclude by looking at the decentralisation 
attempts in Zimbabwe. 
3.1. Co- management 
After many decades of state management of natural resources, the state of the 
environment has, in many instances, worsened and at worst there are species 
extinction and irreversible damage. Assessments have shown that the state 
management is now limited. An alternative is to bring back the community as a key 
ingredient of resource management policy. This entails the inclusion of resource 
users as the main stakeholders in the management of forestry resources. Recognition 
of the synergistic role of the community and the state has given rise to "Co- 
management" as a resource management strategy (Posey & Kabuye 1995; Hobley 
1996; Borrini- Feyerabend 2000). These partnerships should also incorporate all the 
different stakeholders who include the private sector which seem to have been 
previously sidelined (United Nations 2002b; World Bank 2002). 
Co- management involves the creation of environmental or resource regimes 
featuring partnerships between local communities or resource users and agencies of 
(sub) national governments. These state agencies normally possess the legal 
mandate for environmental protection, for example department of national parks or 
natural resources boards (Guillet 2002; Young 2002: 284 cf Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 
1989; Berkes 2002). This management strategy connects local level management 
with government level management institutions in areas such as fisheries, wildlife, 
protected areas, forests and other resources (Poffenberger & McGean 1996; Berkes 
2002). 
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Co- management or joint forestry management is a result of the increased pressures 
on the limited forestry resources. It is also a form of decentralisation within the 
forestry sector.37 The fuel crisis of the 1970s saw an increase in deforestation and 
resulted in the setting up of forestry as a vehicle for local community development.38 
This was brought to the world's attention through Eckholm (1975) and the 1981 
Nairobi United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (Bradley & Campbell 
1998 cf Goodman 1985, O'keefe & Raskin 1985; Bradley 1988). In Zimbabwe this 
was to provide a basis for the World Bank funded Rural Afforestation Programme. 
This `crisis' like many others in the environment area, tended to be self perpetuating 
discourses which had the negative effect of excluding alternative histories and views 
on the basis of `scientific evidence' (Leach & Fairhead 2000: 37). It also produced 
standard solutions such as fuel stoves and massive tree planting, which were 
envisaged to help reduce the woodfuel gap or deficit (Munslow et al. 1988, Bradley 
& Campbell 1998; Mahiri and Howorth 2001; Kituyi 2002). 
The co- management could also be linked to the bottom up planning advocacy of the 
1980s, which resulted in the formation of social forestry through establishment of 
woodlots (Hobley 1996; Chambers 1983). The 1990s saw a review of the Forest 
Sector Policy - which has since been revised (World Bank 2002), The Rio de 
Janeiro Agenda 21, The Johannesburg Earth Summit in 2002 and Public Sector 
reform and decentralisation within the environmental sector (Ribot 2001). This 
resulted in the institutional and policy reform resulting in the forging of new 
partnerships through collaborative, joint, participatory and co- management 
arrangements.39 
Co- management describes the partnership between the state and the local 
communities in the management of natural resources. Such natural resources include 
37 Ellis & Biggs (2001) diagrammatically illustrate that decentralisation is one of the mainstream rural 
development narratives of the 2000s. For other narratives stretching back to the 1950s see Fine & 
Stoneman (1996) and Ellis & Biggs (2001). 
38 Hobley (1996) also includes the impact of the Sahelian drought and its implication on 
deforestation. 
39 For a discussion on the paradigm shifts in forestry management see Hobley 1996. 
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forestry (Hobley 1996; Singleton 1998; Pomeroy & Berkes 1997).4° In India co- 
management has also been referred to as joint forest management (Schug 2000). In 
Nepal co- management revolves around Forest User Groups (Nightangle 2003). 
Matose (2002) notes that in Ghana it is called collaborative forest management. 
Co- management can also be defined as a situation in which two or more social 
actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the 
management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or 
a set of natural resources (Borrini -Feyerabend et al. 2000). Ideally, the state should 
share responsibilities in decision making in a co- management arrangement - not a 
milder version of state management (Guillet 2002). 
Co- management has also been described in participatory, collaborative, joint, mixed, 
multi -party or round table management terms. Co- management arrangements are 
deemed desirable for their equity, social justice and democracy in natural resources 
management. This management regime guarantees local people; paying the price of 
conservation, a voice in decision making. Borrini- Feyerabend 2000 goes further to 
characterise co- management as shown in Table 3. 
In the Zimbabwean context the term resource sharing or shared forest management 
have also been used. The main assumption is that the state management of the 
gazetted forests has resulted in the tragedy of the state property. This has come as a 
realisation that "fortress conservation" has failed to result in sustainable management 
of forestry resources (Hulme & Murphree 1999, 2001; Brockington 2002).41 
40 In India Sundar (2000) argues that joint forest management is an old concept going back into the 
forestry practice which has been recently revived by the donor community. 
41 See also Van Den Breemer, Drijver & Venema (1995) on what they term local resource 
management in Africa, an umbrella term for different attempts to decentralise natural resource 
management to the local level. 
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Table 3: Co- management Characteristics 
a pluralist approach to managing natural resources (NRs), incorporating a 
variety of partners in a variety of roles, generally to the end goals of 
environmental conservation, sustainable use of NRs and the equitable 
sharing of resource - related benefits and responsibilities. 
a political and cultural process par excellence: seeking "democracy" and 
social justice in natural resource management. 
a process that needs some basic conditions to develop, among which are: 
full access to information on relevant issues and options, freedom and 
capacity to organise, freedom to express needs and concerns, a non - 
discriminative social environment, the will of partners to negotiate, 
confidence in the respect of agreements, etc. 
a complex, lengthy and sometimes confused process, involving frequent 
changes, surprises, sometimes contradictory information, the need to retrace 
one's own steps. 
the expression of a mature society, which understands that there is no 
"unique and objective" solution to manage natural resources but, rather, a 
multiplicity of different options compatible with both indigenous 
knowledge and scientific evidence, and capable of meeting the needs of 
conservation and development (and that there also exists a multitude of 
negative or disastrous options for the environment and development). 
(Source: Borrini-Feyerbend et al. 2000: 7) 
The nature of natural resource management in Zimbabwe has always been reactive 
rather than being proactive. The emphasis was on the legal framework, which 
outlines punishments for violations of natural resource offences. These legal 
punishments through acts such as the Natural Resources Act 1996, Forest Act 1996, 
Communal Lands Forest Produce Act 1987 and the Parks and Wildlife Act 1975, it 
was reasoned, would curb the degradation of natural resources such as forests. Such 
a criminalisation approach is not unique to Zimbabwe. Criminalisation in Zimbabwe 
entailed coming up with stiffer penalties for those trying to earn a living through 
selling of forest products such as wooden carvings, fruits or using poles from 
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gazetted areas. Those arrested would have to pay fines, the failure of which would 
result in custodial sentences. Elsewhere, stiffer sentences such as the death penalty 
under the Forestry Code of 1972 in Senegal and the "Shoot on sight Policy" of 
Nepal (December 1999) have alienated people from deriving livelihoods from 
forestry resources. Co- management now calls for the meaningful participation of the 
local communities in order to achieve sustainable forest management. Co- 
management is a form of environmental decentralisation. Environment in this 
context is viewed in a broader sense encompassing social, economic and ecological 
attributes (FAO 2003). It is upheld as a form of social justice as it allocates benefits 
to the people who bear the externalities. These are also the people whose livelihoods 
are seriously affected by forestry related decisions. 
The pursuit of sustainable development requires a political system that 
secures effective participation in decision -making.... This is best secured by 
decentralising the management of resources upon which local communities 
depend, and giving these communities an effective say over the use of these 
resources. It will also require promoting citizens' initiatives, empowering 
people's organisations, and strengthening local democracy (WCED 1987 
cited in Hobley 1996:10). 
Wekwete (1990), Conyers (1999) and Mawhood (1983) define decentralisation as 
the transfer of power and decision making to sub -national entities. Decentralisation 
is defined as "a process of change in which functions previously undertaken by 
government institutions at national level become the responsibility of government or 
non -government institutions at sub -national level "42 (Conyers 1999: 6). In 
developing countries decentralisation has been advocated as a strategy for 
development as it involves local communities in decision making and management 
(Conyers 1999). Conyers further notes that: 
Most decentralisation efforts have both explicit and implicit objectives. 
Those objectives likely to appeal to the general public, such as local 
empowerment and administrative efficiency, are generally explicitly stated, 
while less popular ones, such as increasing central control and `passing the 
buck,' are unlikely to be voiced (Conyers 2000: 9). 
Decentralisation of governance to units that are closer to the citizens, is gaining 
increasing significance for governments in developing countries (Mawhood 1983; 
42 A distinction is often made for different forms of decentralisation, which include "devolution ", 
"de- concentration" and "delegation" see Crook & Manor (1998), Mawhood (1983). 
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Crook & Manor 1998; Ribot 1999). The term decentralisation entails a process by 
which bundles of entrustments - including regulatory and executive powers, 
responsibility and authority in decision making, institutional infrastructure and 
assets, and administrative capacity are variously transferred to local groupings such 
as local governments or local communities. Entrustments can be defined as the 
responsibilities given to lower level structures from above. 
In practice decentralisations turn out to be patchy and complex processes, having to 
operate within arenas characterised by the contestation and negotiation of interest 
between and within various levels of society (cf Moore 1993; Peet & Watts 1996; 
Tsing 1999). 
Environmental decentralisation seems to be gaining momentum since the 1970s and 
early 1980s43 (Rondinelli 1983). It was perceived as a way of accelerating economic 
growth and meeting the needs of the poor. Economic and political pressures and 
demand for democratic governance have continued to drive the decentralisation 
process (Smoke 2000). Advocates of environmental decentralisation justify it on the 
grounds of increased efficiency, more thoroughgoing equity, and greater 
participation and responsiveness of government to citizens (Agrawal & Ribot 2000: 
1). An underlying assumption of decentralisation is that it would promote 
democracy, which would result in popular participation and accountability of local 
government. Decentralisation would also entail that the elected representatives 
would become more responsive to the desires of their citizens resulting in more 
effective service delivery.44 
Decentralisation is therefore a key tenet of democracy as it calls for the participation 
of all people. It seeks to make people citizens rather than subjects, with citizens 
having rights whereas subjects have limited or no rights (Mamdani 1996). 
We suggest that three distinct dimensions underlie all acts of 
decentralisation: actors, powers, and accountability. Without an 
43 Forestry and wildlife policy documents of the 1950s and 1960s were already talking of the need to 
share benefits with Tribal Trust lands in the then Rhodesia in order to have sustainable and affordable 
natural resource management see Phillips et al. 1962. 
as This is the more liberal view of democracy. The Marxist view, in general, argues that by just giving 
people equality of rights to vote is not good enough as it will not change the overall political 
economy. They point out that equality should be in terms of equality in terms of access to the means 
of production, which entails nationalisation (cf. Kessal 2002). 
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understanding of the powers of various actors, the domains in which they 
exercise their powers, and to whom and how they are accountable, it is 
impossible to learn the extent to which meaningful decentralisation has taken 
place (Agrawal & Ribot 1999: 476). 
Actors are the players within the decentralisation process. These are at various levels 
and they wield different powers (Wollenberg 1998; Borrini- Feyerabend et al. 2000; 
Ribot 2000, 2001). Decentralisation aims at altering the power relationships between 
the different power holders. Actors might be hereditary, such as chiefs, appointed, 
elected, powerful individuals, and NGOs or corporate institutions. How these people 
relate to the people on whose behalf they are acting brings in the issue of 
accountability (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Ribot 2000; 2001). 
Since not everyone can physically participate, democratic principles therefore call 
for the selection of representatives of the local level community in order to represent 
the interests of the local people. Representation is therefore one of the key issues for 
political or democratic decentralisation. These representatives must have powers 
devolved to them so that they can make meaningful decisions. In Africa there has 
been various attempts to devolve natural resource management in different countries 
with varying degrees of success (Hulme & Murphree 1999, 2001). This has been 
done as a way of reversing the centralised colonial governance (Wunsch & Olowu 
1990; Crowder 1968 in Wunsch & Olowu 1990). The next section will look at 
power within the decentralisation framework before looking at the different types of 
powers. 
3.2. Powers within the Decentralisation Framework 
Decentralisation entails the devolution of powers to the local level (Ribot 1999, 
2001). These powers can broadly be viewed as being executive, legislative and 
judiciary powers. Ribot (2001) further illustrate this point by citing two quotations 
below: 
Without increased local autonomy, increased local representation has little 
meaning (Ole Therkildsen 1993: 88). 
...The most contentious design issue in political decentralisation has always 
been the problem of power sharing between the centre and the localities 
(Oyugi 2000: 9). 
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This study will look at all the three components of Agrawal & Ribot (1999) 
framework of Actors, Powers and Accountability and how these result in particular 
environmental outcomes within the Mafungautsi Forest. These outcomes may be 
social, economic, environmental and ecological. The time frame of this research will 
however not be able to effectively monitor ecological outcomes. 
This study will use Agrawal & Ribot (1999) framework for analysing the various 
forms of powers which have been decentralised. The powers to be decentralised will 
be looked in terms of four categories, which are: 
Powers to create rules 
The Power to make decisions about resource use 
The power to implement and ensure compliance to the new or altered rules and 
The Power to adjudicate disputes that may arise 
Decentralisation of both local governance and natural resources has often resulted in 
decentralisation of limited powers (Ribot 1999; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Conyers 
1990, 2000). It is important to note that democratic decentralisation has often been 
seen as a magic solution to all ills in developing countries (Johnson 2001) since it 
results in institutions that are more responsive to the local needs (cf Crook & Manor 
1998; Manor 1999; Blair 2000). The World Bank Report 2000/1 cited in Johnson 
2001, however, pointed out that "there was no consistent connection between pro - 
poorness and democracy" (Moore & Putzel 1999: 8). The above section gave a brief 
outline of powers within the decentralisation framework. The next section looks at 
the four types of powers in detail. 
3.2.1. Powers to create rules 
These are the powers that are devolved to the local level in order to be able to make 
rules at local level. One advantage of decentralisation has been hailed as the 
possibility of designing rules and regulations that are relevant to the local 
circumstances (GOZ 1998, Ostrom 1990). This then means that decentralised 
structures should be given powers to make rules and regulations that suit the local 
needs and demands. The rules and regulations to be made at local level should 
therefore not be ultra vires the enabling act at higher level. This is also the case in 
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natural resource management where the local resource users are better placed to 
make the resource exploitation rules and regulations which suits their specific 
context (Hulme & Murphree 1999, 2001; Ribot 2000). The argument has been that 
locally made rules are not only relevant, but are also most likely to be enforced 
locally. This then becomes the crunch of decentralisation of powers (Agrawal & 
Ribot 1999; Chitsike 2000). For instance if people set up their own local natural 
resource management rules, it would be much easier for them to abide by the rules 
which they made rather than rules imposed from central government. 
3.2.2. Power to make decisions about resource use 
Decentralisation has to devolve power to make decisions about exploitation of 
natural resources at local level. The subsidiarity principle (Chitsike 2001) has to be 
applied where local communities, through their representative institutions, have to 
choose their own representatives and make decisions on issues which are of a local 
level. If other decisions have to be made at a higher level there is no problem 
making sure that these are moved to institutions at higher levels (Murphree 2000, 
Ribot 2001). People at a local level should take responsibility for the decisions 
pertaining to the use or exploitation of their resources. This then will promote equity 
and efficiency according to the needs of the community.45 The community through 
their elected institutions or representatives should make decisions on the use and 
exploitation of natural resources. This involves the community deciding how the 
resources are to be used. Such powers could be in the form of power to decide what 
community projects to invest proceeds from permit fees in. 
3.2.3. Power to implement and ensure compliance to the new or altered 
rules 
This is the power to make sure that the decisions, which the community makes, are 
implemented. Through their representative institutions the decisions made should be 
implemented for sustainable natural resources. Here institutions play an important 
role. The strength of the institutions lies in the legitimacy through its ability to 
ensure compliance with the rules which may be amended from time to time 
45 The term community is contradictory and confusing. Ribot 2001 points out that there are multiple 
interests within communities, some of which are contrary. One needs to bear in mind that community 
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depending on the local demands or needs. The argument has been that people are 
more likely to comply with their own rules rather than externally imposed rules. 
3.2.4. The Power to adjudicate disputes that may arise 
In cases where the rules have been violated there is need for powers to be devolved 
which will enable the new institutions to be able to pass judgement on the violators 
of the community rules and regulations. This judiciary role is important because if 
its not granted at the local level it will erode and undermine the authority of the local 
or the decentralised institutions thereby undermining the management of natural 
resources at local level. Once violators realise that the local institutions have no 
power to adjudicate over violators this will mean that they will continue to violate 
the rules and regulations which may then result in negative environmental outcomes 
(Ribot 2000). This seriously undermines their capacity to enforce rules. Actors at a 
higher level should also be willing to reinforce decisions of the adjudication process. 
Attempts to quash adjudication at local level will undermine the local judiciary 
system.46 
In the context of the Mafungautsi research area of Gokwe the four types of powers 
which are namely, rule creation, decision making, resource use and implementation 
and ensuring compliance will be important for this study. Co- management, as a form 
of decentralisation, will be analysed by looking at the actors involved and, based on 
fieldwork, how much powers they wield. Once powers have been devolved, it is 
even important to assess to whom are the power holders accountable to. The next 
section therefore looks at accountability of devolved powers. 
3.3. Accountability 
The mere fact that representative institutions have been selected, and powers have 
been devolved in itself does not guarantee that there is going to be positive social, 
economic, environmental and ecological outcomes. Positive outcomes are more 
likely to be achieved as a result of a downwardly accountable representation. The 
representatives have to be accountable to their electorate, which should then make 
them accountable to the people. This can be well described by The Lord Nolan 
needs are not uniform and one has to take account of the differences due to age, caste, wealth, 
education, status, gender etc (Chambers 1983). 
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Standards in Public Life which defined accountability of office bearers as that "they 
should submit themselves to the appropriate scrutiny" of their actions or inaction 
and the resultant consequences (The Economist 23 February 2002: 40; cf Agrawal 
& Ribot 1999; Borrini- Feyerabend et al. 2000). Accountability `forces' the office 
bearers to meet the needs and demands of the electorate or they run the risk of being 
voted out of office. Lonsdale cited in Agrawal & Ribot (1999) notes that "Rulers 
claim to be responsible to their people; people try to hold them to account. 
Accountability is thus the measure of responsibility" (Agrawal & Ribot 1999: 478). 
Agrawal & Ribot (1999) further point out that all modes of accountability are 
"relational ". To understand its nature therefore, it is necessary to attend to the actors 
among whom relations of accountability exist. 
Accountability will be the major emphasis of the analysis of the co- management 
study in Mafungautsi. Accounting for the participation of local communities in 
environmental decision -making, it is reasoned, will promote local interest in 
sustainable use and mitigate practices considered harmful to the environment. 
Accountability is achieved through the exercise of counter power to balance 
arbitrary action (Agrawal & Ribot 1999: 478). Accountability then becomes a key 
tenet of natural resource management. Some researchers have argued that because 
most natural resource institutions have been more upwardly accountable to central 
government than to the local people, this has resulted in negative environmental 
outcomes in forestry, grazing, fisheries, wildlife resource or any other resource. This 
has meant that the people do not associate themselves with the actions or decisions, 
which are purportedly taken on their behalf. So it is important that this relationship 
is understood to make sure that what in many cases has often been referred to as 
decentralisation tends to be upwardly accountable hence the negative environmental 
outcomes. This is what has been called decentralisation in order to "centralise" (cf 
Wekwete 1990). 
There are various mechanisms, through which the local people can hold the office 
bearers to account. These include elections,47 embeddedness, witchcraft, auditing, 
46 See The Herald 24 February 2003. 
47 Elections alone are a crude measure of accountability as they occur once in a number of years (after 
some time) and they address broader issues (Blair 2000). 
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report- backs, meetings, social capital (cf Lin 2001; Schuller, Field and Baron 2000), 
legal recourse, polycentrity, balance of powers, third party monitoring, lobbying, 
free media, transparency, information provision, public discussions, public 
reporting, participating processes, social movements, civic education, discretionary 
powers for governments, proximity, ideologies, civic dedication, reputation, trust, 
administrative dependence on local government, taxation, central government 
oversight, professing ignorance of the project (cf Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Ribot 
1999, 2000, 2001). The section below looks at some of the accountability 
mechanisms. 
3.3.1. Accountability Mechanisms 
A basic step in accountability mechanism is the election of representative of the 
local community. Representation has been an important element of western style of 
democracy, which has seen representatives being elected to go and speak on behalf 
of the local people. The chosen representatives are then expected to advance the 
interests of their electorate. The thesis is that representatives have to keep on 
advancing the interests of the people who chose them otherwise they would not be 
able to secure another term of office. Ribot (2000) notes that elections are an 
important mechanism of accountability but on their own, elections do not always 
hold leaders accountable to their electorate (Ribot 2000, 2001; cf Mawhood 1983). 
How the elections are conducted could be manipulated in such a way that whether 
people support or oppose a particular candidate will not affect the outcome of the 
elections.48 In Zimbabwe some members of parliament (MPs) are known for visiting 
their constituencies during election time only. One needs to bear in mind that at 
times, even unelected people such as chiefs could be more accountable and 
responsible to their people than elected councillors or other representatives as will 
be shown in one instance in the Mafungautsi case study.49 
48 Recent Presidential elections in Zimbabwe have been described as having been won by the 
opposition which, however alleges to have lost the count. In most normal instances elections are 
expected to result in the people's choice being identified. Ribot 1999 notes that in Mali people are 
asked to vote for candidates along party lines in an environment which almost gives the government 
all the advantages and with the opposition candidates being portrayed as enemies of the state (cf 
Kessal 2002 for the Tanzanian case). 
49 Hachileka (2000) using Zambia's South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU) demonstrates 
that there are cases where chiefs are not accountable to their people - instead they exploit their 
communities to further their personal interests in what he terms "chief- based" wildlife management 
programme instead of the "Community Based" wildlife management. 
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Embeddedness is the responsibility that local representatives feel for their 
community by the mere fact that they are part of the community. Questions like 
"what would my community say" may force the local representatives to pursue the 
interest of the community represented. This is why decentralisation is said to 
advance the interests of the local people unlike instances where the central state, 
which has no close ties or attachments to the community may make decisions, which 
are not in the best interests of the local community. 
Auditing is a key mechanism for making sure that the resources are being used in 
the best interests of the local community. The community may carry out various 
forms of auditing to make sure that their interests are being advanced. This can be 
done jointly with report backs, which are meant to give feedback to the local 
community on how their resources are being managed. Report backs may also be in 
the form of meetings. 
Social capital is a key aspect which affects the decisions made by selected 
representatives. If local people are representing their community by merely 
misrepresenting their people they may loose social capital through the loss of 
friends, loss of help in times of need or even the `loss of one's face' or 
embarrassment. 
The prejudiced community can threaten to sue or resort to the courts in order to 
correct an injustice. This can be done through traditional or modern day courts. 
Once this threat is available office bearers might not want to be dragged to court 
over misrepresentation of community interests. The community might not use this 
recourse to justice but the mere fact that it is a possibility might force the office 
bearers to be more downwardly accountable to their electorate. 
Third party monitoring also serves as a downward accountability mechanism. The 
government might have an oversight by looking at what the devolved units are doing 
with the decentralised power to make sure that they are still pursuing policies, which 
are in the best interest of the community. This is normally done by watchdog 
institutions, and at times NGOs. Lobbying by either the local people or watch dog 
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institutions might force the local actors to act in the interest of the local people 
thereby becoming downwardly accountable. Accountability is relational hence an 
ideal situation is where the actors are more downwardly accountable to the people 
who elected them than they are upwardly to the central state. 
Free media will help actors to be accountable, as the mere prospect of being publicly 
shamed will force the actors to be accountable to their electorate. However, this also 
assumes that the actors are themselves not in control of the means of disseminating 
the information in which case the information disseminated could be censored. Free 
media on its own is not enough. Kelsall (2002) points out that presence of free 
media has not made politicians accountable to their constituencies in Tanzania. 
Public discussions and meetings also help to make office bearers more accountable 
to their electorate. This can be further enhanced through civic education, which 
demand that leaders are transparent in the way they conduct their business. 
Transparency also demand that they should be honest through declaring conflict of 
interest in order to be trusted by the local communities. A number of leaders use the 
public office in order to advance their personal interests. 
Witchcraft is another mechanism which has been used by the weak50 to make sure 
that the elected people are accountable to the people who elected them or whom 
their interests they are supposed to advance. The mere threat or fear of community 
people using esoteric powers might force the office bearers to be accountable to 
their community. However, as will be shown later, this may, in some instances, be 
used against accountability if those perceived to be wielding esoteric powers are 
elected into office and community members are frightened of questioning their 
integrity or their abuse of community resources. Communities have various 
weapons of the weak that they may use to make sure that office bearers are held 
5o Klooster (2000) modifies Scott (1985)'s concept of the `weapons of the weak' to `weapons of the 
not -so -weak' to reflect their response. Nygren (2001) illustrates that local communities often end up 
using their weapons against global challenges on their livelihood strategies as demonstrated in his 
Costa Rican case study. In Cameroon villagers blocked roads in 1993 to stop the exploitation of 
`their' forests by concessionaires. The government responded by sending troops (Ekoko 2000: 153). 
Pathan et al (1990) notes that in Gujurat 383 officers were injured and four died in 376 cases of 
dispute between 1985 and 1989 (cited in Sundar 2000:256). In Zimbabwe a concessionaire was 
chased by communal residents when he started logging sacred sites in Gokwe (Interview with 
Mockdale Pvt. Limited 21 June 2000). 
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accountable for their actions or inaction (Scott 1985) and these might include 
professing ignorance of certain issues or withholding taxes. 
The above section has looked at some accountability mechanisms. The above 
mechanisms will be important in the Mafungautsi context. Co- management, 
implemented mainly through Resource Management Committees, will be analysed 
to assess what mechanisms are being used by the local community to "force" their 
representatives to be accountable to the Mafungautsi community. The next section 
will look at decentralisation efforts in Zimbabwe. 
3.4. An Overview of Decentralisation in Zimbabwe 
Decentralisation has been high on the Zimbabwe Government's list of policy 
priorities since the country became independent from Britain in 1980 (Gasper 1997; 
Makumbe 1998; Nkomo 1999; Conyers 2001). Conyers (2001) points out that the 
decentralisation history of Zimbabwe can be divided into three phases: Phase 1: 
Deconcentration: 1980 to 1992; Phase 2 Attempts at Devolution: 1993 to 1999 and 
Phase 3, Passing the Buck: 2000 to present. 
Decentralisation has meant different things to different people throughout the world 
(Conyers 1983, Mahwood 1983). Decentralisation is the transfer of responsibility 
for planning management of natural resources to the lower tier of natural resource 
management. Decentralisation can be categorised into de- concentration, delegation, 
devolution and privatisation (Chitsike 2000). Political decentralisation, which is also 
called democratic decentralisation, occurs when powers and resources are 
transferred to authorities representative of and downwardly accountable to local 
populations (Manor 1999; cf. Crook & Manor 1998; Agrawal & Ribot 1999). 
Democratic decentralisation increases public participation in decision making. 
Through greater participation democratic decentralisation is believed to help 
internalise social, economic, developmental and environmental externalities, 
to better match social services and public decisions to local needs and 
aspirations; and to increase equity in the use of public resources (Ribot 2001: 
11 cf World Bank 2000; Manor 1999; Hilhorst & Aarnicnk 1999; Crook & 
Manor 1999; Cernea 1989; Cheema & Rondinelli 1983). 
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Democratic decentralisation or political decentralisations are very strong forms of 
decentralisation from which theory indicates the greatest benefits can be derived 
(Ribot 2001). Co- management in Mafungautsi, as a form of decentralisation, will be 
viewed from the point of view of political or democratic decentralisation. 
Other forms of decentralisation, which will not be the main focus of this study, are 
deconcentration or administrative decentralisation and privatisation. 
Deconcentration or administrative decentralisation may be defined as the transfer of 
central state, such as prefects, administrators, or local technical ministry agents 
(Ribot 2001:11). These are locally appointed bodies or individuals who are 
upwardly accountable to the people who appointed them (Oyugi 2000; Manor 1999; 
Agrawal & Ribot 1999). In this instance there is a weak form of decentralisation 
with a weak downward accountability as most local representatives are more 
accountable to the centre which appoints them than they are to the local 
communities or people (Ribot 2001). This form of decentralisation might display 
some forms of democratic or political decentralisation (Blair 2000). Privatisation on 
the other hand often takes place in the name of decentralisation (Ribot 2001). Some 
academics dismiss it as a form of decentralisation because it operates on a different 
form of logic (Ribot 2001; Oyugi 2000; Balogun 2000; Agrawal & Ribot 1999). 
Privatisation takes place when public resources are transferred to private 
groups, such as individuals, corporations, forest service or donor -organised 
management committees, NGOs (Ribot 2001: 11 cf Oyugi 2000; Manor 
1999; Agrawal & Ribot 1999). 
In Zimbabwe decentralisation was seen as a development strategy for the newly 
independent state. In 1984 therefore the government pronounced the Prime 
Minister's 1984 Decentralisation Directive. Decentralisation was seen as expediting 
development in the rural and urban areas. In Zimbabwe the Prime Minister's 
Directive led to the decentralisation of power from the central government to the 
local authorities. Under this decentralised structures new levels of local authorities 
were established going down to village level as shown in the diagram below: 
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Figure 4: The Local Government Structure after the Prime Minister's directive of 
1984 
Central Government 
Provincial Government 
(Provincial development 
Committee) 
Rural District Council 
Rural District Development 
Committee) 
Urban Local 
Authorities 
Ward development Committee 
(WARDCO) 
Village Development 
Committee (VIDCOs) 
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The aim of the above structure was to decentralise power to the grassroots levels at 
the village. This was also seen as a development vehicle, which would see local 
people initiating development projects at grassroots level. Some researchers have 
however questioned the wisdom of this approach as it was seen as a mechanism of 
sidelining the traditional leaders who were seen as largely having corroborated with 
the colonial government51 (Wekwete 1990; Murombedzi 1991; Mandondo 2000). 
Wekwete's analysis shows that the lowest tier in the decentralisation process was the 
village and it did not have financial resources to implement development projects. 
Most of their development needs ended up being some form of shopping lists to be 
submitted to the District Development Committee which was largely composed of 
line ministry representatives at District level. The same dilemma faced the Ward 
Development Committee, which is a tier above the VIDCO. The District 
Administrator who is a political appointee of the central government chaired the 
District Development Committee. District Administrators (DAs) in some instances, 
ironically took over the offices formerly used by the Native Commissioners, who 
kept an eye on the then Tribal areas as the "central government's eyes" on the 
ground (cf Blake 1977; Wunsch & Olowu 1990; Mukamuri 1995; Mamdani 1996). 
There were many incidences of conflicts between the Chief Executive of the rural 
district council and this political appointee in a number of local authorities. Parallels 
can be drawn from conflicts , which existed, between the African Councils and the 
appointed Native Commissioner (Howman 1963; Holleman 1969). After drawing 
the District Development Plans these were further sent to the Provincial 
development Committee. Another political appointee in the name of Provincial 
Governor chaired the Provincial Development Committee. The Provincial 
Governors are cabinet ministers who are appointed to the post by the president.52 
They are also part of the members of parliament who were appointed by the then 
51 This was not always the case as some traditional leaders such as Rekayi Tangwena demonstrated 
the land conflicts with the colonial government over their eviction from the Gaerezi area, in the 
Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe. Being appointed a senator in the post- independence government in 
1980 was largely viewed as a reward for his efforts (Moore 1998). 
52 After the Urban Councils elections in 2000 which saw the election of opposition party councillors 
and mayors in Harare, Bulawayo and Masvingo, the government subsequently invoked a Statutory 
Instrument which paved way for the appointment of governors for Harare and Bulawayo to whom the 
opposition councils must report through (See Mudiwa in The Daily News 11 December 2002). 
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Prime Minister.53 The Provincial Committee sifted through the plans submitted by 
the District Development Committees in their province and then submitted a 
Provincial plan to the central government which ultimately approved the plans. The 
central treasury had the powers to allocate resources for the implementation of the 
development plans. This meant that at all levels submissions were mere bids, which 
were finally determined by the central government. 
The Prime Minister's Directive, it was hoped, would bring about the grassroots 
participation and some kind of a bottom up approach. At Village level most of the 
members were also members of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic 
Front (ZANU PF). There were posts designated for the youth and women. Arguably, 
this form of decentralisation was a strategy for consolidating the ZANU PF 
government's control of the rural people (Wekwete 1990; Conyers 1999, 2001). 
Some researchers even question whether decentralisation in Zimbabwe was 
designed to increase participatory planning. Makumbe (1998) further labels this 
"Decentralisation for social control" rather than the government's stated objectives. 
Decentralisation in Zimbabwe was designed to develop a one party state by default 
(Makumbe 1998). The institutional constipation that has further resulted in the 
creation of a Man, Women and Youth Leagues has further caused institutional 
chaos. In Gokwe for instance, there has been the creation of the Men, Women and 
Youth leagues at Party District Level - a level almost equivalent to the RDC ward 
level. The Leagues comprise of the chairman, secretary, treasurer, Political 
Commissar, security, publicity and transport, welfare secretary, development, 
education, health, legal information and two committee members. All the above 
posts, except for the committee members have a deputy. These are duplicated for the 
women and youth. Resulting in 72 people holding posts, over and above other 
institutional posts. 
The initial phase of decentralisation as a result of the Prime Minister's Directive 
succeeded in consolidating the government's power rather that decentralise power to 
the local people. It was due to the perceived failure of the Directive that the 
53 From 1980 to 1987 Zimbabwe had a Prime Minister and a ceremonial President. The introduction 
of an executive Presidency in 1987 saw the abandonment of the Prime Minister's office. 
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government has revisited the concept of decentralisation in the 1990s. In 1998 the 
government produced an Outline of the Decentralisation Implementation Strategy 
under its Capacity Building Programme. In 1993 the President of Zimbabwe told the 
Association of Rural District Councils that they would be assuming an increasing 
role in the provision of services. This has however to be viewed in the context of the 
declining national resources due to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) that the government had embarked on. Responsibilities to be decentralised 
were to be in phases as the government had to gradually hand over responsibilities to 
the local authorities. The main thrust of the decentralisation programme is the 
decentralisation to the Rural District Council (RDCs). The new phase of 
decentralisation has been closely linked to the Rural District Councils Capacity 
Building Programme (RDCCBP). The cabinet has adopted thirteen principles to 
guide the Decentralisation process. Under the RDCCBP donors and multilateral 
organisations were to adopt and fund RDCs in Zimbabwe. 
Objectives of the Decentralisation Process, according to the donor community, are 
perceived as the promotion of democracy, good governance, public participation and 
civic responsibility in the development process, increase efficiency and effectiveness 
in both central and local government and therefore enhance service delivery and 
reduce the role and cost of central government in the management and provision of 
local services. As envisaged in the outline document that it will increase public 
participation, create opportunities for local communities and institutions to influence 
decisions and thus lead to better governance (GOZ 1998). 
The state in Africa has largely been privatised or personalised by incumbent 
rulers to the extent that decentralisation, however defined, has meant very 
little empowerment of the people at the local levels - the grassroots. Even for 
late starters in the decolonisation race such as Zimbabwe, the wealth of 
lessons of experience of other countries does not seem to have resulted in the 
evolution of a local government system which effectively diffuses power and 
facilitates the people's participation in the planning and implementation of 
local development and governance activities (Makumbe 1998: 1). 
Gokwe was a Pilot District Support Project (PDSP) funded by the then British 
Government's Overseas Development Administration (Makumbe 1998). This meant 
that decentralisation initiatives are expected to be more developed as compared to 
the rest of the 55 districts in Zimbabwe. 
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Decentralisation seems to have been ineffectively implemented or has produced 
disappointing results (Sazanami in Cheema & Rondinelli 1983). "Decentralisation" 
has been thought to be capable of performing miracles resulting in little or no 
attention being paid to the power dynamics and accountability configurations within 
decentralisation. 
Decentralisation has been seen as a means by which the state can be made 
more responsive, more adaptable, to regional and local needs than is the case 
with a concentration of administrative power and responsibility in the central 
state.... But decentralisation of government itself does not necessarily 
involve devolution of power. The extension of the state outwards and 
downwards can equally serve the objective of consolidating the power of a 
state at the centre as well as that of devolving power away from the central 
state; it can both extend the state's control over people as well as the 
people's control over the state and its activities. Decentralisation is a two - 
edged sword (Webster 1990 cited in Hobley 1996: 10). 
Decentralisation of forestry resources through co- management, must be legitimate 
and must emerge from social consensus so that the people view decentralised 
powers as legitimate. Decentralisation in the form of co- management is about the 
interaction of power and actors in the context of decentralised forestry management. 
It's some form of appreciation that the government should not keep on extending its 
hand beyond its reach (Murphree 1991; Hulme & Murphree 1999, 2001). 
Decentralisation is important due to the difficult of administering effectively from 
the centre when problems are poorly understood, resources are short, and 
management systems inappropriate (Morris 1976; 1981; Leonard 1986; Leonard & 
Oyugi 1985; Wunsch 1986); the effective self -defence of the rural masses from the 
market economy (Hyden 1980; 1983); the erosive effects of such policies have had 
on the entire economy (World Bank 1981); and the use in few cases of brutal 
tyrannies to hold power (Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Austin 1984; Decalo 1985:7). 
This study will use the decentralisation conceptual framework to analyse the co- 
management initiative in the Mafungautsi Forest area of Gokwe in Zimbabwe. Most 
studies have looked at the co- management narrative without looking at the 
accountability arrangements. It will go beyond the assumption that participation on 
its own will result in positive environmental outcomes. This study will look at the 
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impact of the accountability mechanisms and how these will impact on the 
environmental outcomes. 
Environmental and ecological outcomes are the results that can be attributed to the 
nature of the accountability mechanism arrangements. In social, science perspective, 
it might not be definitive to come up with causality but these outcomes, using 
different kinds of data will then be used to determine the most likely outcomes. 
Ecological outcomes may be difficult to monitor within a short time frame and also 
taking into account the fact that the FCZ itself does not have a management plan 
which would assist in terms of ecological monitoring over a long period of time. 
Social outcomes are the social results of the decentralisation of forestry resources. 
What has been the impact of the decentralised forestry management on gender 
issues, stratification of society by age, wealthy etc., have these been worsened or 
improved due to the introduction of co- management? Who is benefiting and who is 
loosing and what are the implications of this in the power configuration or re- 
configuration within the research sites of Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi? 
This chapter started off by looking at the emergence of co- management. It then 
looked at co- management, its definition and ended up by looking at the attempts at 
decentralisation in Zimbabwe. The next chapter takes up the issue of the decision to 
have co- management in Zimbabwe and the crafting of the co- management 
institutions. 
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Chapter Four 
Co- management in the Mafungautsi State Forest 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter puts the previous chapter's general discussion of co- management in the 
context of Zimbabwe's Mafungautsi state forest. A historical background to this 
management strategy is detailed in the first part of the chapter. The key point that 
this chapter is demonstrating is that the establishment of the co- management 
arrangement was not only motivated by the FCZ's intention to devolve forestry 
management to the local communities but the main driving force was the influence 
of donors initially through the World Bank and then later CIDA. The chapter will 
also look at the crafting of the institutional infrastructure and how this introduced 
some dynamics in a setting of an already conflated institutional framework. The last 
section concludes by briefly commenting on co- management in relationship to the 
conceptual framework. 
4.1. The setting up of the Co- management arrangement 
The Co- management project fell under the framework of the Community Based 
Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) which is part of the Forest Resources 
Management and Development Project Forestry II. Forestry II was a follow -up to 
the Rural Afforestation Project (RAP) which was funded by CIDA between 1983 
and 1989. The initial proposal covering areas such as co- management, rural 
afforestation and the improvement of commercial sawing mills owned by the 
Forestry Commission, was prepared by the Forestry Commission with subsequent 
funding from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) /World Bank 
Cooperative Programme (CP) mission which visited Zimbabwe in August - 
September 1988. The World Bank Appraisal Mission that visited Zimbabwe in 
February/March 1989 recommended that a feasibility study be undertaken for the 
consent of Pilot Forest Grazing. 
The World Bank, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) initially entered into an agreement for parallel 
financing of the Mafungautsi Co- management Project. CIDA later funded a 
consultancy to help develop the proposal that was subsequently submitted to CIDA 
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around mid -1990. The formal agreement between the GOZ and CIDA was signed in 
November 1991 (FCZ Revised Project Management Document November 1997). 
The revision of the 1988 proposal in 1991 saw the incorporation of the wildlife sub- 
component. CIDA agreed to provide Canadian $1 340 000 which was meant for 
foreign currency requirements in order to acquire vehicles, equipment, monitoring 
and evaluation. 
The co- management arrangement was to be implemented in all communal lands 
surrounding the Mafungautsi Forest covering 8 wards which are namely Njelele 1, 2 
and 3, Ndhlalambi 1 and 2, Chirima, Muyambi and Ngomeni. The population of 
these wards is 82 799 (CSO 1992). The Zimbabwean government was expected to 
contribute from a local currency counterpart fund created through the monetisation 
of Canadian commodity exports. 
Different interpretation of this agreement later caused some disagreements between 
CIDA and the government of Zimbabwe. By the year 2000 the government of 
Zimbabwe had contributed a small proportion of its share. CIDA's contribution 
ended up funding some recurrent expenditure. One, however, needs to appreciate the 
politics of development aid and begin to unpack aid as its distribution affects 
balances of power among competing recipient - country interests (Boyce 2002). The 
perceived misunderstandings by the GOZ might have been a tactical move as CIDA 
ended up contributing nearly all the resources needed for co- management. 
Co- management could be viewed as a result of a change in the conservation 
narrative, which is being advocated for by donor communities (IUCN 1980; IUCN, 
UNEP & WWF 1991; Campbell 2002). The World Bank's Revised Forestry Policy 
also adds to the urgency of meaningfully co- managing forestry resources with the 
rural resource users (World Bank 2002). Participatory Rural Appraisals and 
Feasibility Studies were carried out in villages surrounding Mafungautsi Forest 
between 1993 and 1994. This saw co- management dropping the wildlife component 
and altering the grazing to free range within the forest rather the initial paddocks that 
had been envisaged under the 1988 proposal. This was mainly due to the limited 
carrying capacity of the forest and the people' opposition to a move that would 
entail limiting their livestock' access into the forest area and possibly an increase in 
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the stock theft within paddocks. Paddocking was also opposed due to the importance 
of cattle for draught purposes, which would have seen people walking long distances 
to collect their livestock in order to provide draught power. 
Interviews in the research area also revealed the mistrust of the FCZ's generous 
proposal to provide watering points within Mafungautsi.54 Some pointed out to the 
potential loss of animal manure, which greatly adds to soil fertility in light of the 
escalating costs of artificial fertilisers. Demarcation of grazing boundaries through 
fences for paddocks was seen as a potential conflicting point with communities that 
would have been excluded from the grazing scheme. This was a challenge on trying 
to introduce solid or hard boundaries in an instance where fluid boundaries have 
been serving their purpose well. 
The FCZ has been under immense financial strain just like most of the government 
departments in Zimbabwe. The co- management initiative could be viewed as a two 
pronged solution: firstly, as a solution to the conflict existing between the resource 
poor communal lands and the resource rich gazetted forests. "The state control is 
being contested by the local communities on the grounds of legitimacy in terms of 
the history of land occupation as well as on the basis of the communities need for 
the forest products for their livelihoods" (Baker 1997: 21). 
Secondly, co- management as a form of decentralisation in the forestry sector would 
attract funds that would help contribute towards the financial resources of the FCZ. 
The FCZ wrote a proposal to the World Bank as a follow up to the Rural 
Afforestation Program. A memorandum of understanding was then signed between 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Government of 
Zimbabwe that would provide funding for the co- management project. 
4.2. Why Co- management in Mafungautsi? 
Reasons for the introduction of comanagement range from the political to the 
economic as well as ecological. However a reading of FCZ documents and 
sa One respondent said pane kona yavaive vakananga, which means that the FC was up to some trick, 
which would probably see communal farmers being forced to pay for fencing and water provision in 
the paddocks. 
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interviews with senior staff shows that the following reasons are given for the 
establishment of a co- management regime: 
1. The differences in perception of the forest between the FCZ and local 
communities as discussed above, have led to conflict over its control and 
utilisation. Hence there has been a dire need to resolve the conflict between the 
FCZ and the local communities. 
2. Sustainable management of the forest can not be accomplished in the face of 
conflicting management principles and regimes (This meant that co- management 
would be used as a conflict resolution mechanism between the FCZ and the local 
resource users). 
3. Forestry development dynamics in many parts of the world have indicated 
resource sharing or co- management strategies as viable options for the 
management of indigenous State Forests subjected to high resource demands by 
local communities. This point could be questioned in that the fact that similar 
arrangements have worked elsewhere does not entail that they would work in 
Zimbabwe, as there are differences in the socio- economic and political settings. 
This further illustrates the role of donor funding, which embarks on 
`development' projects from one country to another without critically assessing 
its suitability in a given context. 
4. Zimbabwe enunciated a multiple use policy for indigenous forests in 1985 and 
since then, there has been a thrust to implement the policy (FCZ 1997: 21). The 
Mafungautsi Forest area has provided an opportunity for pilot implementation of 
the policy (Baker in FCZ 1997: 21). 
In the concluding remarks of the FCZ 1997 Report it says, "It is important that the 
communities are made a part of the decision making and implementation process 
throughout the project" (Baker 1997: 22). These are the expressed reasons. Practice 
on the ground, as will be illustrated in the two case studies, seem to have different 
objectives in addition to the ones stated above. 
Having looked at the motivation and reasons for co- management the next section 
now looks at an overview of the research area. Mafungautsi State Forest Reserve, in 
west central of Zimbabwe, is one of the 21 state Forests falling under the control of 
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the FCZ. Mafungautsi State Forest comprises some 82 100 hectares of forestland, 
which is part of a national estate of 827 200 hectares of indigenous forest reserves, 
mainly in the western parts of the country. Mafungautsi comprises of nearly ten 
percent of the indigenous forests being managed by the FCZ. 
4.3. Overview of the Research area 
Like most such state forests in Zimbabwe, Mafungautsi was created through the 
eviction of peasant communities originally residing in that area before it was placed 
under statutory designation in 1954. Tenurial debates in Mafungautsi are 
characterised by contests over legitimate ownership of the forest reserve. The 
community feels that the independence government owes the community restitution 
of its rights while the state as the custodian of the Forest Act of 1996 feels that the 
reserved forest must be protected for reasons cited in the first part of this chapter. It 
is therefore characterised by tenurial and other conflicts between official state forest 
custodians and surrounding peasant communities. 
Over the years the boundaries of Mafungautsi have undergone cycles of expansion 
and contraction, reflecting the extent to which neither the FCZ nor the local peasant 
communities can assert effective and exclusive control over the forest estate. In 
1972, 22 900 hectares were excised from the then 104 900 hectare Mafungautsi 
forest. Despite the removal of twenty -one percent, nearly one percent (900 hectares) 
was incorporated into the Mafungautsi Forest as a way of meeting the requirements 
of the Forest Act of 1996, which stipulate that for every piece of land that is de- 
gazetted from a reserved forest, another piece of land has to be gazetted. "The total 
extent of forest land shall not be reduced by more than one per centum of the total 
extent of forest land on the appointed day (Forest Act 19: 05 Section 34[2]). FCZ 
argued that they acquired unsettled land 
Pieces of unsettled communal land south of the forest were added to the 
forest as partial compensation for land transferred to communal lands. In 
1986, the army forcibly removed settlers who had remained in the forest 
since 1972. (Italics added) (Maturure et al. 1994: 3). 
This clause, it may be argued, was put in to ensure that the size of the forest reserves 
do not diminish rapidly. Such legislation is meant to perpetuate the government's 
protectionist approach. The areas that were incorporated into the forest in 1972 
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included parts of Nyaje an area which is also participating in co- management. The 
simultaneous excising with the gazetting of parts of the Nyaje area further raised 
communities' suspicion. The local communities were under the perception that, 
through the introduction of co- management, FCZ was planning to take part of their 
communal land. Nyaje villagers who lost their fields to the forest in 1972 felt that 
the FCZ was living up to its reputation of giving with one hand and taking away 
with another (Interview Mr Nkomo 2 August 2000). The revised boundaries were 
largely enforced in the post- independence period. For the local people this gave 
them the impression that even the postcolonial government considered communal 
areas land as "free land" - whether occupied or not. 
A FCZ Report notes that "There was widespread rumour that the FCZ was now 
changing its strategy of expanding the forestry boundaries. The communities were 
dramatised to believe that the agro- forestry programme, where promotion of 
planting trees was being embarked on was done to assess the area's potential in 
order to grab the lands. This view was widespread in Ndhlalambi 1 and 2 wards and 
to some extent in Muyambi" (Undated FCZ Notes). 
The issue of boundaries and unsettled or unoccupied land is very controversial when 
traditional land tenure ownership is confronted with modern cadastral boundaries 
(Hughes 2001a). Land use in the context of some rural communities is comprised of 
soft boundaries which comprise of shifting boundaries which are determined by the 
resource in question, what has been termed tenurial niches (Nhira & Fortmann 
1993). These also have invisible fences and gates (Fortmann 1995). The assertion by 
the FCZ that the areas incorporated into the forest area were "unsettled communal 
land" demonstrates the wrong assumptions that were being made by the state . 
The recognition that the conservation of the estate could only be secured with the 
support and co- operation of neighbouring peasant communities spans back to the 
1960s (Phillips et al. 1962). Over the years management formulations that have 
sought to involve local communities have mainly been structured to secure 
conservationist goals, and not to genuinely empower such communities. Such 
formulations have come under a variety of fashion and populist sounding terms 
including the "community development" ruse of the 1960s (Mutizwa -Mangiza 
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1985), the co- management and resource sharing rhetoric of the early 1990s (Matzke 
& Mazambani 1993; Matzke 1993), and lately adaptive collaborative management.55 
This research uses the Mafungautsi case to expose some of the ambiguities and 
complexities of "peasant empowerment" under the co- management initiative. The 
central thesis is that the state and other external actors have sought to mould 
seemingly local institutions56 and have tried to discipline these institutions towards 
the achievement of top -down conservation objectives. This thesis demonstrates that 
there is little scope for genuine local empowerment in partnerships in which 
community or committee apparently appears to be manipulated. The next section 
moves on to look at the socio- political complexity in relation to crafting the 
institutional infrastructure for co- management. 
ss For instance the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) has commissioned an 
extended research project on Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) in Mafungautsi. 
56 Cleaver (2000) calls for the need to focus on "getting the institutions right" (Cleaver 2000: 361). 
However, one could further add, that the institutions further need to have "real" powers for them to 
be able to effectively exercise their duties. 
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Figure 5: The location of Gokwe District in Zimbabwe and of Mafungautsi State 
Forest within the district 
Figure 5 shows the location of the district in relation to the rest of Zimbabwe. The 
insert below shows the location of the two case study sites, which are Batanai and 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs. 
4.4. The institutional infrastructure for co- management in Mafungautsi 
In order to create a co- management partnership that includes local communities, the 
Forestry Commission has, since 1995, been involved in the setting up of Resource 
Management Committees. Figure 5 shows the case study RMCs. Ideally, a Resource 
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Management Committee comprises of seven members namely chairperson, vice 
chairperson, secretary, treasurer and three committee members. Although the RMC 
members occupy office through elections involving adult village suffrage,57 the 
Forestry Commission wields advisory powers on who gets co -opted as members or 
subcommittees of the RMCs, particularly during the grass- cutting season, which 
spans June to October. The formation process seems to be undemocratic. "In some 
instances, RMCs were self elected /appointed. Forestry Commission will have to 
review the RMC formation methodology to ensure democracy. The RDC, FCZ and 
Agritex could be observers during the elections" (The 10th Project Review Meeting 
Minutes 2 -3 September 1997, Kadoma Ranch Motel). Although this window of 
discretion enjoyed by the FCZ may be well- intentioned e.g. to reduce transaction 
costs of decision making, its overall effect is to subordinate democratic processes to 
bureaucratic fiat and thus discounting the social significance of the elections. The 
arrangement also reinforces top -down orientations. 
Electing RMCs itself is also a patchy process with regard to popular participation, as 
it often does not generate much interest among the potential voters, who do not 
attach much significance to the elections. Mark Dube remarked that being chosen 
into the RMC was being perceived as "chituko" or a curse given the conflict climate 
that had been epitomised through forced evictions from the forest area which was 
effected by the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) ( Mafungabusi Resource Sharing 
Workshop, 6 -9 November 1995, Gokwe). Lack of interest could also be attributed to 
the unresponsiveness of the FCZ to the people's needs. For instance, at the year 
2000 pre -grass cutting workshop at Shingai Training Centre, people requested to be 
permitted to sustainably collect fibre for construction purposes. The FCZ responded 
by saying that the peasants should buy ropes - which are beyond reach for the 
peasant farmers. Earlier, in 1995, a FCZ official had indicated that the Mafungautsi 
should be viewed as a factory machine, which meant that trees were not to be 
57 Any adult resident within the village above the age of 18 is entitled to vote. In some instances this 
`right' can be manipulated to meet specific ends. For instance a 30 year old man was disqualified 
from standing for councillorship as he was said to belong to the youth in terms of the ZANU PF 
structures. Immigrants with new ideas and perceived to be ambitious were often referred to as 
Mafikizolo ' meaning recent arrivals. At a meeting to discuss development issues with the national 
broadcasting agency, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), the immigrants were accused 
of trying to usurp power, as they have no understanding of how issues have "traditionally" been 
resolved in Gokwe. A close associate of the councillor murmured that that's why they no longer 
wanted immigrants. 
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removed. He further suggested the planting of trees within the communal land as 
"spare parts" for the Mafungautsi factory. 
RMCs themselves have to be pieced together from a multiplicity of local 
institutional bases, adding to the ambiguities and complexity of the whole process as 
shown by Figure 6. The complexity was due to the insertion of a new institution, the 
RMC, into a community, which already had a number of overlapping institutions. 
One could argue that a number of donor initiatives do not want to be part of an 
existing framework. Introducing new institutions, even if they are redundant, will 
make them "more visible." There was a similar incidence in the same Midlands 
Province in the water and sanitation programme. A donor organisation dug a new 
borehole because they did not want to rehabilitate an existing one. The following 
section will look at the Resource Management Committees, which will further 
demonstrate the socio- political complexity in the crafting of the institutional 
infrastructure. 
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Figure 6: A Simplified Institutional Organogram on Zimbabwe's Rural Local 
Governance System 
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Traditional 
Village Heads 
4.5. Resource Management Committees 
Resource Management Committees (RMCs) were introduced as part of 
decentralisation within the co- management initiative.58 The RMCs were formed as 
sub -committees of the Village Development Committees BUT, confusingly, some 
were covering more than one VIDCO or even ward. This resulted in some form of 
`crisis of identity for the RMC' due to its confusing linkage to the existing 
institutions as shown by the simplified institutional organogram, in Figure 6. 
Right from the beginning of co- management, the issue of institutional set up was 
already under contestation. "Mr Mateta questioned the compromise in uniformity if 
in some cases RMCs were going to be a subcommittee of a VIDCO and in some a 
subcommittee of the WARDCO" (Meeting held at the District Administrator's 
Office, Gokwe on 14 October 1994). How RMCs have been operationalized in 
practice will be analysed below. The RMC activities are governed by a constitution 
and the case study will analyse the processes of formulation, implementation and 
contestation of the RMC constitutions. 
On one hand, residents in communal lands adjacent to Mafungautsi State Forest are 
members of Village Development Committees ( VIDCOs) or Ward Development 
Committees (WARDCOs), units created under a Prime Ministerial directive in the 
immediate post- independence period, ostensibly to democratise the process of 
planning for local development. The VIDCOs and wards are demographically 
defined administrative units that, in principle, are based on a system of popular 
representation. A VIDCO consists of 6 members, 4 of whom are selected through an 
adult village suffrage of about 1000 households, with 2 posts being allocated to 
members of the ruling party's Women and Youth Leagues. The VIDCO is presided 
over by an elected chairperson, and it is tasked to come up with a local village 
development plan. Six such villages constitute a ward, which is headed by a 
WARDCO, also having six members constituted on similar lines as the VIDCOs, 
but presided over by an elected councillor, who represents the ward at the District 
Council level. Although VIDCOs and WADCOS in principle appear democratic, in 
practice they are not effectively representative of local interests and aspirations as 
58 Decentralisation of power and responsibilities were cited as one of the principles of co- 
management in Mafungautsi (FC 1997). 
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argued by some researchers (Murombedzi 1991; Mandondo 2000; Mapedza & 
Mandondo 2002). In Batanai RMC the current councillor is not popular as he was 
accused of stifling development, especially on the issues of a school and dip tank. 
The people were further surprised when he was interviewed on the national radio 
saying that he had managed to successfully develop his ward since his election. In 
Chemwiro -Masawi the councillor was said to be doing nothing to convince the RDC 
that timber revenue had to be ploughed back to the communities. 
Moreover, the VIDCOs and WARDCOs were not created in an institutional vacuum 
- they were superimposed on a "traditional "59 system of social organisation. In this 
system the household (musha), under a patrilineal household head (samusha), 
comprises the smallest social unit. Several households constitute a village (bhuku) 
under the village head (sabhuku). Several villages constitute a dunhu, presided over 
by a headman (sadunhu), and these in turn constitute chiefdoms (nyika) under the 
chief (mambo). Related traditional institutions include spirit mediums, rainmakers 
and other holders of ritual office (Bourdillon 1991). The role of RMC chairpersons 
was made more difficult as even their fellow committee members would question 
their legitimacy. In an interview on 4 November 1999 with the Batanai RMC 
Chairperson on why they were not effectively mobilising the people, he pointed out 
that he needed to mobilise the RMC itself before moving to the ordinary peasant 
farmer. Some people would remind him that he was not the villagehead or the 
headman. The institutional ranking conducted on 30 November 1999 rated the 
Villagehead and traditional leaders highly with 69 points, with RMCs getting 11. 
Councillors and the Member of Parliament each got 0. The support for traditional 
leaders was even more resounding in Mutanhaurwa60 village where 216 people felt 
that the traditional leaders were the most appropriate institutions for rural 
development initiatives. Vidcos got 48 with councillors getting 33. 
59 Most of the so- called traditional institutions were remoulded to extend colonial rule over the 
African population through a system of indirect rule. For instance, the term sabhuku literally and 
symbolically means the keeper of the book - i.e. records of taxes extracted from the African 
population by the colonial governments through these leaders. Bhuku is a "Shonalised" English word 
for book. 
60 Mutanhaurwa village is not one of the two case studies RMCs BUT it is participating in the co- 
management. 
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The VIDCO -WARDCO and traditional systems of leadership rely on different 
systems of legitimisation, which makes conflict between them inevitable. Each of 
the two systems relies on a unique corpus of regulation systems. Among other 
things, traditional regulatory mechanisms include explicit rules as well as implicit 
norms and taboos including a moral economy of "rules that are written within the 
hearts of the people ". Local censure mechanisms include payment of material fines, 
admonition and belief in the omnipotence of the spirits and spiritual censure 
(Matowanyika 1991; Mandondo 1997). 
Rather than a simple matter of "top- down" "disciplining" for conservation 
objectives, the new organisations seem to be entangled with both bureaucratic 
politics (at multiple scales) and local politics. The Chemwiro -Masawi pre -grass 
cutting workshop recommended that the RMCs should be a subcommittee reporting 
through the village head. Example of traditional judiciary in natural resource issues 
include the judgements given by Headman Ndhlalambi in Batanai on the 29th of 
June 2000 when 9 people were ordered to pay Z$490 each for cutting down fruit 
trees for various purposes. 
One needs not over -romanticise the respect of traditional leaders as they are 
dynamic and are being faced with new challenges. Village heads in both Batanai and 
Chemwiro -Masawi lamented the loss of control over their people as a result of 
challenges from new churches, mainly the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church. A 
village head, Mr. Nkomo, in Nyaje pointed out that he had to set aside a fine for one 
of the villagers after the sons of the accused who are based in urban areas threatened 
to sue him. As a traditional leader he felt it was face saving for him to drop the fine 
rather than be "dragged to court" by people who claimed to have lawyers. In Batanai 
a village head was severely assaulted and suffered broken ribs as he was accused of 
having handed down a biased verdict on his Sunday court sessions. The councillor 
for Batanai in an interview with the researcher on 2 September 2000, argued that the 
RMCs were not going to succeed as they were hiving themselves off from him as 
the representative of the RDC. He further argued that even the proposed school in 
Batanai would not materialise, as he would fight to assert his power over the 
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traditional headman of the area. He likened Batanai people to the grass bearing the 
brunt of two elephants fighting.61 
In both Batanai and Chemwiro- Masawi there were further conflicts between 
traditional leaders and VIDCOS. VIDCOS viewed themselves as having positively 
contributed to the liberation of Zimbabwe from the colonial administration, which 
resulted in independence in 1980. Traditional leaders were labelled collaborators 
with the colonial administration. Whilst it is true that some traditional leaders 
buttressed the colonial regime, some chiefs were known for fighting against the 
colonial administration thereby costing them their lives, chieftainships or even 
allowances (Ranger 1982; Alexander 1993; Nyambara 2001). In Gokwe Chief 
Mukoka was labelled as uncooperative in terms of the enforcement of conservation 
measures (Nyambara 2001). Within VIDCOs in the Gokwe area, there were 
conflicts between former ZANU (PF) members (mainly Shona) and former 
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)62 (mainly Ndebeles). On the other hand 
official regulation systems are part of a top -down rational -legal corpus that bears 
little relation to local cultural systems. In practice the two systems have permeated 
and contaminated each other such that practical interaction in everyday social 
practice reflects a mix of both, and the extent of blending varies from time to time 
and from place to place depending on preference, precedence and other factors. The 
RDC, interestingly, felt that the institutional multiplicity and confusion was going to 
be solved through "awareness workshops" which would define roles for all the 
different committees and sub -committees. 
Local government reforms towards the turn of the 21st century have further conflated 
the above structures with a new system of village and ward assemblies. These are 
constituted through a curious mix of elected and nominee leaders and 
representatives. Membership of the village assembly is open to all adults in the 
village, but such bodies are presided over by hereditary traditional leaders, whose 
nominations and appointments are approved by chiefs and the minister - in 
61 The councillor was also accused of converting cement donated to kick start the school project into 
personal use. 
62 This was the second largest political party in Independent Zimbabwe. It merged with ZANU (PF) 
through the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987, paving way for its leader, Dr. Joshua Nkomo, 
becoming the co -Vice President in Zimbabwe. 
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accordance with local culture.ó3 A ward council comprises of village heads of its 
constituent village assemblies, a councillor of the ward and a cohort of headmen 
nominated by chiefs and endorsed by the minister of local government and national 
housing. 
The ward assembly is presided over by a headman elected by members of the 
assembly from among themselves. Village assemblies elect VIDCOs and supervise 
and approve plans from VIDCOs, whilst ward assemblies oversee all the roles and 
activities of their constituent VIDCOs. The superintendence of RMCs, headmen and 
village heads over VIDCOs and WARDCOs elevates a system of nominee lineage 
leaders over elected representatives. Furthermore, the village head to headman to 
chief to minister cascade of approving hereditary nominees potentially creates a 
system of patronage in spite of the appointment of such leaders in accordance with 
local culture. The new allowances for Chiefs and headmen are now widely viewed 
as a patronage mechanism for the government to get support in the face of stiff 
competition for the electorate from the opposition party.64 Traditional leadership is 
based on gender, seniority and caste, as it is normally conferred upon male elders of 
certain lineages, recreating the erstwhile decentralised despotism65 administrative 
model of the colonial period (cf Mamdani 1996, 1999). The same could be said with 
traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. 
The introduction of remuneration for both the chief and headman and possibly 
villageheads in the future has set in motion new struggles and dynamics. The 
conflict between the Batanai councillor and headman has now taken a new 
dimension. The councillor now wants the ward to be split into two, so that he 
becomes the headman for the other ward, a better rewarding post than that of 
councillorship, which relies on allowances and is subject to re- election. The 
conflation of village and ward councils upon VIDCO -WADCO and traditional 
leadership systems is a recipe for further conflict. The likelihood of conflict is 
63 Traditional Leaders Act of 1998. 
64 The allowances of chiefs and other traditional leaders have been increased by over 170% (Mataire 
in The Daily News 23 November 2002, see also Chiefs now mere pawns in Zimbabwe's political 
minefield by Matikinye in The Daily News 21 and (the Bulawayo Correspondent) 29 January 2002 
and The Herald 17 April 2002). 
65 It is important to note that despite having support over councillors traditional leaders are not 
subjected to electoral process and this tends to weaken downward accountability. 
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further aggravated when foresters seek to enlist local support for conservation 
through the creation of partnership committees that should potentially be 
representative of and nuanced with all these systems. Overlapping and non - 
concordant and ever -changing memberships and degrees of interest, affection and 
association within and between these systems and units further add to the 
contradictions of forging locally -legitimate RMCs in view of the extent of 
entanglement of the systems. 
Not surprisingly RMCs have been variously constituted at the level of sub- 
committees of VIDCOs, at VIDCO level, or even at the level of three or four 
VIDCOs. The first 1995 RMC in Batanai was at ward level and was made up from 
four VIDCOS. In 1996 this was dissolved and four VIDCO - level RMCs were 
established. Whilst some of the RMCs coalesced into larger units others 
disintegrated into smaller units possibly reflecting the contestation and negotiation 
of interest within and across various groups. The question of scale with respect to 
size of units for local natural resource management lies at the centre of the Common 
Property Resource (CPR) debate (McCay & Acheson 1987; Ostrom 1990; Berkes & 
Farvar 1989; Murphree 1991). Small units appear to be favoured as people are 
assumed to be in everyday social contact, which is thought to foster social cohesion, 
and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with resource use and 
management.66 The evolution, in Mafungautsi, of RMCs across a range of scales is 
probably a reflection of complexity and entanglement across local ecological and 
social systems. Rather than being seen as a problem requiring institutional 
"packaging" it lends weight to Murphree's (1990) argument that small has to be 
conceptualised with respect to ecological and socio- political constraints. VIDCO 
sub -committees appear to have enjoyed favour within FCZ as appropriate units 
around which RMCs were moulded. This appears to go against the `small is 
beautiful' grain of logic as well as what has evolved on the ground. The next section 
considers the question, whose agenda? Before concluding by briefly looking at co- 
management and the conceptual framework. 
66 Researchers including its early proponents have empirically and theoretically questioned `small 
scale' as suitable units for natural resource management. Others have radically argued that you need 
larger units (cf. Beckerman 1995's argument that `small is stupid'. 
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4.6. The RMCs: Whose Agenda? 
The whole set up seems to have been an initiative driven by the FCZ with CIDA's 
backing. The people were simply pulled along, as they were not involved in the 
actual negotiations of co- management. Most people seem to have been interested in 
getting land in Mafungautsi. During the feasibility study workshops one villager 
lamented how they were not negotiating co- management but were simply being 
lectured on forestry: 
What we are doing with the Forestry Commission is that we are putting them 
into a position of teaching us. Our grievance is for you to meet our needs - 
people want fields, gardens. I asked my children what they answered you 
(referring to the questionnaire survey). They were crying for fields, gardens 
in the forest area. Forestry Commission is showing us importance of forests - 
not meeting our needs (Nhira's Notes dated 9 December 1993, Italics section 
has been added). 
Right from its conception the co- management in Mafungautsi seem to have been 
decided by the FCZ with the financial backing of CIDA. The local communities 
might have spoken, but their voices were not taken into account when the final co- 
management arrangement was put into practice as will be shown later in Chapter 
seven. 
4.7. Co- management and the conceptual framework 
The evolution of co- management and its implementation will be analysed within the 
framework of decentralisation of natural resources. The different actors, powers 
devolved, decisions being localised, the accountability mechanisms and their 
implications for the social and ecological outcomes will be analysed. Ecological 
outcomes tend to take a long time to be effectively analysed so any comments in this 
respect will only be tentative. The powers will be assessed within the framework of 
judiciary, executive powers and legislative powers (Agrawal & Ribot Summer1999; 
Ribot 1999; 2000). These various powers will then be assessed in terms of 
accountability mechanism to see whether they are downwardly accountable (to their 
electorate) or upwardly accountable to the FCZ or other institutions at a higher level. 
These issues will be explored further in chapter seven. 
This chapter showed that the motivation towards the establishment of co- 
management was a donor driven initiative which was conveniently accepted by the 
FCZ which was facing some financial difficulties in line with the austerity measures 
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introduced under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
introduced in the 1990s. The next chapter will look at the research methods that 
were used in the Mafungautsi co- management research. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Methods 
In selecting certain methods you are consciously or unconsciously taking aboard their 
methodological assumptions about the nature of the social world and the principles of social enquiry 
(Hall and Hall 1996. 29) 
5.0. Introduction 
The previous chapter showed the setting up of the co- management arrangement in 
the Mafungautsi area of Gokwe. Theoretical reviews show that it is only 
downwardly accountable institutions which are more likely to result in positive 
social, economic and ecological outcomes. Questions thus emerge on the issues of 
powers given to the devolved institutions and their accountability arrangements. 
This chapter outlines how these questions and assumptions were tested in the field 
through the use of various research methods. Triangulation was used as different 
methods were used to measure the same phenomenon. 
5.1. Research Methods 
This study uses review and case -study approaches to critically examine the 
ambiguities and complexities of "peasant empowerment" in a co- management 
arrangement from a Zimbabwean protected forest interface zone. The study 
questions benign- sounding presumptions of co -equal partnership status among co- 
managing actors that are often implicit in the designs of such projects. It argues 
instead that real -life co- management lies at the intersection of interests arrayed in 
particular sites, including states, international organisations, business and grassroots 
actors. 
The main research period was between September 1999 and August 2001.67 I first 
visited the Mafungautsi area in 1997 as a field trip which formed part of the two -day 
Project Review Committee (PRC)'s 10th meeting held in Kadoma, in the Midlands 
Province of Zimbabwe. My interest in Mafungautsi further developed as a result of 
the initial field trip. The co- management in Mafungautsi had its own in built review 
67 The researcher carried out a preliminary research in 1998, which covered areas such as Batanai, 
Chemwiro -Masawi and Kana. The Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of 
Zimbabwe through Calvin Nhira had earlier on initiated research into the Mafungautsi area of 
Gokwe. 
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and I was specifically interested in the dynamics of the co- management 
arrangements through looking at powers devolved and the accountability 
arrangements. 
I then carried out a second reconnaissance survey into the Mafungautsi area of 
Gokwe in 1998. The recognisance survey was meant to identify research sites. This 
also included a preliminary questionnaire survey for Batanai, Chemwiro -Masawi 
and Kana area. During the reconnaissance survey it was felt that Kana was too far 
away from the Mafungautsi Forest Boundary hence it was not involved in the co- 
management program. The Kana area was involved in a "grazing project," which 
involved the collection of thatching grass as well. This alternative source made 
them less dependent on the Mafungautsi thatching grass under the co- management 
initiative. Discussions with the FCZ for a success and failure RMC were also held 
during the reconnaissance mission. The research was meant to try and carry out 
research in a poorly performing RMC and the other one performing well so that one 
would try to account for the difference in the two outcomes. 
As will be shown later, this criteria did not prove to be useful as what is labelled 
success by the FCZ might have nothing to do with the performance of the RMC - 
but its allegiance to the FCZ. This was carried out as feelers to help identify the key 
issues in the Mafungautsi Forest area of Gokwe. The two case studies may be 
justified in the sense that Batanai is situated in an area, which was de- gazetted in 
1972, and it offers an interesting contrast with Chemwiro -Masawi, which has a 
longer settlement history. Commercial logging of timber took place in the 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMC area and this offered an important opportunity to look at 
the co- management dynamics in the context of logging proceeds and compare it 
with Batanai RMC where there was no commercial logging of timber. At the 
beginning of the research there were 8 RMCs. By August 2001 when the fieldwork 
ended, the total had risen to 15 RMCs. 
The land invasions within the research area began towards the end of the research 
period. Land invasions are the forceful and illegal occupation of mainly white - 
owned commercial farms by the pro -government war veterans within the framework 
of the government's "Fast Track Land Resettlement" which is meant to address the 
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racial land imbalances. This research is not on the land invasions per se, but looks at 
how the invasions have impacted on the co- management dynamics. For a detailed 
report on the "land invasions" up to August 2001 see Marongwe (2002). 
Prior to the identification of the case study RMCs, I held key informant interviews 
with most of the traditional leaders in the proximity of Mafungautsi Forest Reserve. 
These included Chiefs Njelele (now deceased) and Mukoka, Headmen Ndhlalambi, 
Chirima (now deceased), councillors, Kana Grazing Scheme members, Zimbabwe 
Farmers Union (ZFU), Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cotton Company of 
Zimbabwe (Cottco), Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP), 
village development committees (VIDCOs), kraalheads, Batanai Burial Society, 
Batanai Women68 Garden Project, RMC members and some villagers. Government 
departments such as Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX), 
Forestry Commission (FCZ), Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the 
Gokwe South Rural District Council were consulted in the reconnaissance mission. 
The Gokwe South Rural District Council further gave permission for the research to 
be conducted in the Mafungautsi area. Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi were then 
selected out of the initial 8 RMCs in the Mafungautsi area. Some interviews were 
recorded on tape to be transcribed later. 
The oldest villagers such as "vaOne" proved to be helpful "human archive ". The 
information obtained from such sources was used to cross check the official records 
written by the Native Commissioners. It is equally important to be aware of the 
pitfalls of oral evidence as it can be easily distorted in order to project a particular 
image. Official minutes of the RMC meetings were also used. The disadvantages of 
using such official data are that it tends to be selective and it might not reflect the 
issues raised in those meetings. Archival records were an important source of 
information on the background of Gokwe South District. These traced Gokwe's 
history from the time it was part of the Sebungwe region up to when it was 
partitioned into Gokwe South and North in July 1993. Gokwe South Rural District 
Council came into existence due to the "amalgamation" Act (Rural District Councils 
68 All members are women except the villagehead who is also a member. They also act as a society 
lending each other money to buy kitchen utensils - the village head buys utensils for his wife who is a 
member as well. 
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Act of 1988) as implemented from July 1993. In contrast Gokwe South was created 
not due to the amalgamation in the literal sense, but was due to the separation of 
Gokwe -Cheziya District Council into Gokwe North and South Rural District 
Councils. 
I spent at least two months in each RMC. This was only a period of residence but I 
also followed up issues in other RMCs. I also attended RMC meetings, workshops, 
developmental meetings and political party meetings. 
Field research assistants helped with data collection and they all kept field 
notebooks which had to be filled in on a daily basis. Whilst it makes acceptance into 
a research area much easier when working with local research assistants, one of the 
potential dangers is that the research assistants are also part of the power struggles 
and dynamics. They might end up being trapped in their local politics to an extent 
that they would not be able to collect impartial data. One other strategy was to also 
make sure that they were from both Shangwe and Madherukas groupings. In 
instances where meetings were held in my absence, research assistants took notes of 
all the proceedings. These, together with minutes taken by myself were important in 
cross checking the official record of the meetings. 
Traditional leaders court sessions were also attended. These were opportunities to 
listen to traditional jurisdiction powers being exercised. Traditional leaders also tried 
people who had violated traditional tree conservation rules and regulations. This was 
an opportunity to assess how well traditional conservation mechanisms were still 
being enforced. Since the meetings do not neatly fit into RMC boundaries, in a 
number of instances, meetings outside the research area were also attended 
especially those discussing issues pertinent to the research. Key informant 
interviews69 were conducted, segregating groups along gender and age differences. 
Historical household profiles were also conducted for some individuals and 
households especially those who were actively involved in the harvesting of forestry 
69 It is important to note that the human mind is highly selective when it comes to historical narrations 
- at times it tends to be negotiated from the present (Chambon 1995; Fairhead & Leach 1994; 
Townsend 1995, cf. Nygren 2001. See also Fortmann (1995) on how `stories' convey certain 
narratives and are highly selective depending on, amongst many things, the audience. Peters (1984) 
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products. A total of 240 household questionnaires were administered with 119 being 
administered in Batanai and 121 administered in Chemwiro -Masawi. 
Changes in land cover were examined through a combination of Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers 1994; IIED 1995) and analysis of historical aerial 
photography. Interviews with selected groups of local inhabitants were conducted 
during the research period to identify current land use, perceived changes in 
vegetation, and their possible causes. The following sections give a more detailed 
account of the field research methods used. 
5.1.1. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
Participatory Rural Appraisal has arisen due to the shift in rural development 
paradigm (Chambers 1997) which promotes the advancement of the bottom -up 
approach and views the local community as being central to any form of meaningful 
rural development. This entails that the local people should be responsible for their 
fate unlike the previous top -down approach (Murphree 1991). This is an 
international research technique as an alternative and to complement the 
conventional survey research methods. It is intensive, systematic and semi - 
structured learning with the community (Theis & Grady 1991). Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) is now regarded as an appropriate tool for carrying out rural 
development researches (Messerchmidt 1995; Goebel 1996). There is an increasing 
conviction that development through the use of participatory methodologies is a 
critical component for the success of development (IIED 1995; USAID 1987; Baker 
et al 1988; Cernea 1991; Gujit 1991; Uphoff 1992, World Bank 1994, Chambers 
1983,1997). Participatory methodologies, where used properly, will result in the 
collection of data that has relevance to the community. Gokwe area has some of the 
lowest literacy levels in Zimbabwe70 (Central Statistical Office 1992), so 
participatory approaches had to be used. 
cited in Fortmann (1995: 1054) argues that stories are an important oral manifestation of a local 
discourse seeking to define and claim "local" resources. See also Rose 1990; Roe 1991). 
70 See 'The forgotten people of Gokwe North' (Iwueke in The Daily News 20 September 2001) on the 
lack of development in Gokwe North which was the same trend in Gokwe South as these two districts 
used to be one district prior to 1993. 
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A basket of participatory methodologies were used to complement data collected 
using other research methods. Participatory appraisal encourages meaningful 
community participation. It goes beyond getting agreement to decisions by local 
authorities but to involving local communities in identifying problems and 
opportunities and taking action for change (New Economics Foundation 1998): 
Community appraisal is a survey of the community, by the community, for 
the community and an action plan or list of recommendations for the future 
of the community (New Economics Foundation 1998: 27). 
One has to be aware of the pitfalls of using some of the participatory approaches. 
Some researchers have critically questioned some of the assumptions in 
participatory approaches (Cooke & Kothari 2001, cf Pretty 1994, 1995; Cleaver 
1999). Pretty (1994) further gives a typology of participation starting from passive 
participation, participation and information giving, participation by consultation, 
participation for material incentives, functional participation, interactive 
participation and self -mobilisation (IIED 1995 cf Pretty 1994). 
These participatory tools were also intended to obtain information and views from 
various sectors of the community. The Participatory Research tools seemed suitable 
in the context of Gokwe due to their empowering nature where they give a voice to 
the voiceless (Chambers 1983). PRA is tailored to make sure that all people 
participate. The use of stones and seeds in participatory approaches allowed local 
people to use things they are familiar with rather than chalks and pens which might 
be associated with the schools and institutions of higher learning. Various flexible 
techniques were used in the Mafungautsi area. No hard and fast rules were followed 
in the PRA exercises, as they had to be responsive to the needs and the dynamics of 
the different groups. Some of the PRAs took a lot of time and food was provided to 
make sure that people were well fed during the exercises. 
Focused group discussions involving up to 10 peopled were used to discuss 
different uses of the forest and perception of change over time. Follow -up 
discussions were then conducted separately with groups of men, youths and women, 
71 The exact number of participants varied from one case to another and would be a response to the 
number of people who came and local group dynamics. However those who `distracted' other 
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thereby encouraging women and youths to express views independently of men. 
Cleaver & Kaare (1998) however, point out that in the Tanzanian Water and 
Sanitation Programme there were many men speaking with a few women talking. 
Further research in Tanzania, indicated that women had deputed one or two women 
who were eloquent speakers in order to effectively represent their interests. The 
focused group discussions helped out to bring the voice of the women whom, as 
evidenced by some meetings in Gokwe, were dominated by men with women being 
quiet. While this was the general trend in Gokwe, there was however one particular 
case of a very vocal woman who at one time became a member of the RMC. Group 
discussions separated by gender and age helped to get different views on issues such 
as priorities of development. In Batanai, one of the RMC case study areas for 
instance, men put the issue of a dip tank as their main concern whereas women in 
the same community felt that the main issue was the construction of a primary 
school in their area as their children where walking very long distances to Nyaradza 
Primary School. The same trends emerged with the perceived changes in terms of 
forestry and vegetation cover where women lamented the increasing distances which 
they had to walk in order to collect firewood whereas the men where more 
concerned about poles for the construction of maize storage facilities, the 
"ngarani ". Despite the fact that women brought together would be better positioned 
to articulate their concerns the facilitation skills had to be used to make sure that 
even amongst the women themselves there was no domination by other women. The 
same could also be said about the male and youths groups. PRAs were conducted in 
both RMCs. The main exercise was conducted in August and September 2000. This 
was timed in order to have bigger attendance as this is usually the off farming 
season which tend to have less disruptions in terms of the normal farming activities. 
5.1.2. Institutional Mapping and Ranking 
Institutional mapping and ranking was also carried out in order to identify the 
institutions working in the Mafungautsi area. The institutional ranking exercises 
helped identify the institutions that are considered to be more relevant and meeting 
the needs of the local people (IIED 1995). An Agricultural Extension (AREX) 
worker later spoke to one of the research assistants highlighting his fears that the 
respondents were moved to individual interviews so that the group is not a reflection of an 
individual's ideas but of all members of the group. 
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people no longer wanted him as he was lowly ranked in one of the PRA exercises. 
This exercise triangulated with key informant interviews helped to identify the 
accountability mechanisms within various institutions operating in the case study 
communities. 
During this exercise people freely pointed out their perception of the operations of 
various institutions and personalities. One woman lamented the low levels of 
education in Batanai, which she then attributed to the low levels of development, as 
people could not mobilise themselves against organisations such as the FCZ 
(Batanai PRA Exercises of 30 August 2000). This was done in a flexible manner. 
After the mapping exercise listing of institutions were then done using shapes 
chosen by the community. In some cases people would use shapes such as a hat for a 
chief and a crescent for a headman. Each person in the group was given seeds or 
stones to place below symbols of their choice. The symbol with more seeds /stones 
was an indication of the most effective institution. 
The results were summed up to see the proxy votes that different institutions were 
working with. The results were then discussed in the group and people could make 
adjustments if they felt that the results did not closely approximate the situation on 
the ground. This helped to assess institutions that work closely with the community. 
This also gave a reasonable picture for identifying institutions that could be helpful 
to the communities (IIED 1995). Community leaders presence was likely to have an 
impact on the institutional ranking exercises. People tended to freely express 
themselves in the absence of their leaders. 
5.1.3. Wealth Ranking 
This is a PRA tool that was used to ascertain the differential wealth levels amongst 
the households in Mafungautsi. The community decided on the criteria used to 
assess household wealth. This gave an indication of household differences to be 
used to assess the impact on households. Amongst Kenyan herders wealth ranking 
helped to cast light on household differentiation and perceptions of solutions to 
herding problems (IIED 1995). Once one identifies social stratification in a 
community this will enable assessment of various priorities. Information provided in 
100 
most cases is loaded with social class values and meanings. Participatory Rural 
Appraisal has to be facilitatory and sensitive so that the wealthy will not take 
advantage of their position at the expense of the poor households (Waters -Bayer 
1995). In both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi more stones and seeds were allocated 
to households with more livestock. It was argued that those with more livestock 
could plough bigger plots in good time, resulting in higher yields and higher 
incomes, which enabled them to send their children to school. They would be able to 
build better houses and a few of them could even invest in businesses such as 
grinding mills and shops. 
5.1.4. Focused Group interviews 
This is where a group of people is jointly interviewed as a group about a particular 
subject. This is an important approach in forestry if the research wants to get views 
from different people who may be grouped according to gender, age, wealth and 
ethnic background. This research approach accepted that there is no uniformity 
within the rural area. This further helped to demystify the concept of community as 
a grouping of people with common goals, ambitions, interests and objectives. This 
method then seeks to listen to all voices, including the low voices that are often 
unheard through the `conventional' research methods (Chambers 1983). The aim is 
to get views from all the people without the powerful dominating the whole process. 
This will also help ascertain different priorities among the different stakeholders in 
Mafungautsi. 
5.1.5. Seasonal Calendars 
These were used to determine seasonal household activities and capture seasonal 
forestry use patterns (IIED 1999). In both case study sites it was important to see 
how people structure their household activities. One would then superimpose the co- 
management activities and determine their implications on the household activities. 
The fact that the FC blamed RMCs for being "interested in grass only" and not the 
monitoring of the forest throughout the year does not take into account the 
household's labour demands for agricultural production (cf Worby 1992 on cotton 
production in Gokwe). Co- management has to be inserted within the household's 
political economy if it is to be relevant to the rural communities. 
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broom grass collection, areas affected by fire, areas where pole poaching was 
common and cropland areas damaged by wildlife. 
Black and white 1:50 000 aerial photography from 1996 was used for these 
interviews, which were subsequently enlarged to 1:25 000 scale to make 
interpretation easier. Separate photo mosaics were obtained for the two study areas 
of Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. Aerial photography was used in preference to 
large -scale topographic maps because previous studies suggested that they were 
easier to interpret among those with only basic education. Aerial photography has 
successfully been used in interviews with lowly educated farmers in Nepal (Mather 
et al. 1998), Cote d'Ivoire (Bassett 1993) and in educational studies of young 
children from South Africa, the United States, England, Mexico and Iran (Blades et 
al. 1998). 
Three interviews based around the aerial photographs were conducted. The first 
interview was conducted in Batanai RMC with a group of 7 local farmers. Although 
one of these farmers was an RMC member, the majority were not directly involved 
in natural resource sharing. A second interview was conducted with 12 farmers 
within the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC. In general, this group was more directly 
involved in resource sharing and community groups. This group included the 
secretary of the local RMC, the ward councillor, and several RMC members. Both 
groups were comprised almost exclusively of men. Finally, an interview was 
conducted with a member of the Forest Protection Unit (FPU) based within 
Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, who was familiar with the study areas. The researcher 
wrote a synopsis of the discussions the evening after each interview. In addition, a 
research assistant took notes during the exercise, thus providing two written 
accounts of each interview. 
The aerial photo mosaics were subsequently scanned onto computer, imported into a 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and geo- referenced. Land use zones and 
other observations recorded during all three interviews were then digitised on top of 
the geo- referenced scanned images by reference to the original acetates. The section 
below gives a brief overview of the importance of GIS into which the scanned 
images were imported into. 
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5.1.9. Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can be defined as a powerful set of tools 
for collecting, storing, retrieving at will, transforming and displaying spatial data 
from the real world for a particular set of purposes (Burough 1986). Cowen (1988) 
defines GIS as a decision support system involving the integration of spatially 
referenced data in a problem -solving environment. GIS is an interdisciplinary and 
multi -disciplinary tool. Despite being a technical tool it is important to put it in its 
social context as noted by Bruce Babbit 
we cannot become a cheerleader for a science that is disembodied 
from human values. The accumulation of data is meaningless unless 
it is underlain by a clear definition of our goals and our definitions 
about how we shall use and structure that science towards an 
informed, decision -making process (21 May 1996). 
Geographical Information Systems has a number of applications in environmental 
and forestry planning which include, environmental monitoring, modelling, and 
management for land degradation, land evaluation, rural planning, landslides, 
desertification, water quality and quantity, plagues, air quality, weather and climate 
prediction. In forestry GIS can be used for management, planning, and optimising 
extraction and replanting. GIS can also be used for the analysis of demographic 
movements and developments. 
GIS is an evolving tool, which has recently been used, in a participatory approach. 
Participatory GIS is an evolving approach in which more people are to be involved 
in the use of GIS. This includes its use for sustainable forest management. GIS is 
becoming a very powerful tool of analysis in the social sciences. It is an important 
tool for analysing spatially related data. The success of GIS as a tool will ultimately 
rest on whether it was used properly or not (Bourough 1986). 
Within the field of GIS it has been realised that participation of the farmer at grass 
roots level has been a missing link in the application of GIS. What is signally absent 
in most public discussions of development are the ways in which the knowledge of 
the peoples being developed are ignored or treated as mere obstacles to rational 
progress (Hobart 1993). In South Africa GIS production process is undertaken with 
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concern for the competing discourses associated with post- apartheid social 
transformation in South Africa and in full appreciation that geographic information 
systems are social constructions (Weiner et al. 1995). In South Africa participatory 
GIS research is now being used. The participatory approach to GIS is what 
Obermeyer (1995) has called `democratising GIS'. Participatory GIS was used to 
come up with forestry resource inventory in the communal land and Mafungautsi 
Forest. This was done through participatory mapping exercise using some aerial 
photographs showing trends in vegetation cover over the years. 
The use of participatory GIS helped to demystify modern technology hence it 
improved dialogue with the local farmers. This is important as it can be used in 
negotiating powers to be devolved to them. In a number of instances the FCZ 
justified holding on to most powers on the basis that they had the "technical" know - 
how of how forests are managed. They forgot that most for the farmers have been 
living with the trees for the all their lives. 
5.1.10. Historical aerial photography analysis 
Aerial photo mosaics of the Batanai area of Mafungautsi and surrounding farmland 
were obtained for three years 1976, 1984, and 1996. Black and white aerial 
photographs (scale 1:50 000) were scanned onto computer as three images for each 
year and geo- referenced to Universal Transverse Mercator co- ordinates. This was 
achieved by taking control points from two sources, a 1996 panchromatic Spot 
satellite image and 1:50 000 scale topographic maps and applying a linear 
transformation to these points. The satellite image was not used as a basis for 
identifying vegetation because of its resolution and to ensure that remote sensing 
data sources were consistent across the years studied. Root Mean Square (RMS) 
errors were calculated for each scanned image based on the formula (Johnston 
1998): 
RMS = Ai{E [(x; - X;)2 + (y; - Y1)2] / n} 
(Where x; y, are the true co- ordinates of the control points, X, Y; are the control point 
co- ordinates given by the transformation, and n is the number of control points 
used). The RMS error statistics for each image will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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The researcher then digitised polygons over these photographs to delineate one of 
four main types of land cover: agricultural land, woodland/scrub, vlei, and forest as 
further explained in Chapter 8. 
5.1.11. Key Informant Interviews 
Key informant interviews were also an important source of information. These were 
interviews conducted with people who are knowledgeable about particular issues 
pertaining to Gokwe. These people who included ordinary villagers had knowledge 
about their area, traditional leaders who tend to have historical knowledge about 
their areas and chiefs, who in most cases are the gatekeepers of their communities. 
The other people interviewed included the Acting Chief Executive Officer of Gokwe 
South Rural District Council, Mr Mandibaya. Throughout the period of the research 
Gokwe South Rural District Council was rocked by corruption scandals which saw 
most of the employees working in an acting capacity due to the long legal battles 
which were going on with the suspended officials. This was worsened by the 
intervention of the war veterans who closed the RDC offices for a long period on 
allegations of corruption. Other people interviewed included the Campfire Co- 
ordinator, the acting Campfire Co- ordinator, the Poverty Alleviation Action 
Programme Officer, the Executive Officer Finance (EOF), Council Chairman, 
Chairman of the Conservation Subcommittee of the Gokwe South R.D.C., some 
councillors, ORAP group leaders, RMC members, Village Community Workers, 
ordinary farmers, FCZ staff at District, Provincial and Head Office level. 
Some elders within the community such as Mr Musanika Ncube were also very 
helpful sources of information. Most of these interviews related to specific issues 
and in some cases it was based on the broader research topic. The Agritex office was 
also very helpful so much that we ended up exchanging notes with one officer who 
had a lot of interest of community management of natural resources. Individuals 
within the community, such as recent immigrants, Mr Muzenda, who was 
considered a "wise man" by the local people, had some interesting perspective on 
life in Gokwe. One needs to acknowledge that although these people were 
knowledgeable about certain issues, knowledge on its own is heavily tainted with 
personal values. One respondent lamented how the people of Mafungautsi were 
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"backward" as they did not want to use fertilisers and often left trees and stumps in 
their fields which would reduce their yield. This seems to be against the grain of 
agroforestry logic and the arguments by the local farmers who felt that Kalahari 
sands were not suitable for the use of artificial fertilisers. They argued that cattle 
manure was more effective as it helped to bind the loose grains of sand, a feat that 
could not be achieved through the use of artificial fertilisers which would quickly be 
lost through leaching. This research method was helpful in that it provided insights 
into issues, which would be followed up later using other methods such as the 
Focused Group Discussion. 
5.1.12. Archival Research 
The National Archives of Zimbabwe proved to be a very important source of the 
background of the Mafungautsi area of Gokwe. Through the various documents in 
the National Archives in Harare the researcher was able to get an overview of the 
perception of the colonial government and its inspiration towards the development 
of Gokwe. National archives have all the records that were produced by government, 
non -government institutions and individuals in Zimbabwe. These records include the 
Native Commissioner's reports, which lay out in detail the government policy at the 
local level and how it impacted on the local communities (in the then Native areas) 
in the communal lands. The Native Commissioners' reports have to be read with 
caution due to the fact that these tended to be perceptions of a Native Commissioner. 
In a way, the report may be a reflection of the personality of the Commissioner and 
his views towards the African communities. This raises lots of debate on the 
knowledge creation - whose knowledge? Stokes (1966) further illustrates this issue 
by citing Harding 
Truly the pen is mightier than the sword, and in the hands of 
experts...achieved more in Barotseland than the most potent lethal weapon 
in many of our less fortunate dependencies (Harding in Stokes 1966: 261). 
Issues covered also included the role of local leaders such as chiefs and headmen 
who seem to have worked closely with the Native Commissioners. Reports into the 
conservation, agricultural and general development were analysed at a broad 
national level before zeroing in on Gokwe District. The district boundaries have 
been shifting since the 1890s and the archival research took note of that. These 
helped to shape an understanding of why the Mafungautsi area is what it is today - a 
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product of amongst others, colonial policy towards tsetse eradication, the 
designation of forest reserves and the forced evictions from areas which were 
designated as commercial farming land. These records also helped understand why 
Gokwe has a very high number of immigrants through the analysis of the 
communication of the Native Commissioners and how people were moved from 
areas, which had been designated for settler farmers mainly after the Second World 
War. The Centre for African Studies at the University of Edinburgh also proved to 
have lots of golden oldies in its library. These included parliamentary debates and 
government documents. This special collection also had material that was also 
available in the National Archives in Harare. The Special Collections library at the 
University of Zimbabwe also had important documents on Gokwe. 
Archives are an important source of information as they include documents and 
reports that were formally classified. These are likely to shed light on the motivation 
of particular policies in a given area. The theme of power struggle and dynamics of 
forestry resource management is likely to be discerned from such reports. The power 
struggle between the government and the FCZ and the community are likely to be 
discerned from some of these reports and documents. Central issues to be considered 
were the power struggles and dynamics that have been played out nation -wide in 
terms of access to land. This method is aimed at assessing how the levels of power 
and decision making have impacted on the conservation of forest reserves in 
Zimbabwe, and specifically in Mafungautsi. 
5.1.13. Participant Observation 
This is qualitative research conducted through a very long contact with the field or 
life situation, which is reflective of everyday life of individuals, groups, societies, 
and organisations. The researcher attempts to capture data on the perceptions of 
local actors `from the inside' (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
This is the research method in anthropology that was used by researchers such as 
Malinowski amongst the Trobriand Islanders. The Chicago School of Sociology has 
helped in the advancement of this research approach (Robson 1993). 
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The demand for direct observation by the researcher, instead of relying on 
informants reports, derives from the notion of analytical objectivity in 
anthropology" Ellen 1984: 25. A key feature of participant observation is 
the fact that the observer becomes some kind of a member of the observed 
(Robson 1993: 193). 
This form of research has also been referred to as case study research. In some 
instances the researcher has to be a complete participant where the researcher 
conceals his motives. In other instances the participant -as- observer where the 
researcher makes clear his motive to the community being researched. The latter is 
the approach that was used in Mafungautsi. 
I embarked on the field research within the two sample Resource Management 
Committee areas (RMCs). At least two months were spent living with community 
households and observing their day to day activities. My role was made clear to the 
community being researched. More disjointed periods were spent in the research 
areas. Whilst this may result in people changing their behaviour once they know that 
they are being observed, what has commonly been called the "Hawthorne effect ", 
the researcher is reasonably convinced that given the later political climate in the 
rural areas of Zimbabwe it would have been dangerous for a `stranger' to keep on 
staying in the rural communities without raising suspicion of the ruling ZANU (PF) 
party officials. However at the beginning of the research political victimisation was 
not prevalent. It only picked up after the referendum of February 2000 which saw 
the government loosing in its constitutional referendum. In one household there 
were attempts to mislead the researcher but they later abandoned this course as the 
people gained more confidence and trust of the research agenda. This was when 
people opened up and started telling the truth. In one instance, one household in 
2001 gave the researcher lunch of sadza (some thick maize meal porridge which is 
the staple food in Zimbabwe) which was served with buck meat poached in 
Mafungautsi Forest. The household head made it clear that he was not open with me 
at the beginning because they felt that I was working for the FCZ . 
This is of paramount importance as this ensures that one captures the dynamics 
occurring within a given community. This also involves direct or indirect 
participation in everyday activities within the community. Use of field notes and 
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observations were also made and at times mundane issues where also noted so that 
they would then be analysed in the context of an analytical framework (Miles & 
Huberman 1994). This was the key method of the research in Mafungautsi, which 
saw the researcher attending events and meetings, which at face value, would seem 
remotely connected to forestry issues. The piles and piles of field notes would then 
be analysed to look at the various actors and institutions in the case study areas and 
how at times the way they act is occasioned by various forces which might have 
nothing to do with forestry issues. This strategy was also suitable in ensuring that 
the accountability mechanism area understood and gave an indication of the power 
dynamics and counter powers from various perspectives. This then informed the 
researcher to appreciate the interrelationships with other powers and how actors 
would negotiate their powers in the context of decentralised forest management in 
the co- management context. Field notes even helped to capture dynamics such as the 
low tone discussions /whispers about people's main concerns which do not get 
minuted or at times heard by all the people. Lobbying before a meeting and the 
different camps or divisions are not captured and motives for voting in a particular 
manner has to be analysed and will help understand why the people are behaving in 
the way they are doing. 
This method also has its shortcomings in that in the research area there were power 
contests between one headman and a councillor. At one point the struggle became 
serious and involved forging of resignation letters allegedly written by the headman. 
There were also contests and appeals for the village head position for the Matashu 
village. Interviewing one party would be used as an endorsement by the university 
(thereby Government of Zimbabwe) of their legitimacy. The researcher clearly 
explained this to all the leaders and both opposing views were sought. Some leaders 
intentionally misrepresented the research in order to advance their own objectives. 
At a meeting in Chemwiro -Masawi one RMC member told the people that he had 
invited the researcher to carry out research in his area since the researcher had 
agreed to bring in donors to build the school. The researcher clearly refuted this at 
that meeting. 
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5.1.14. Meetings Attendance 
In order to have a clear understanding of the power dynamics, powers decentralised, 
the actors involved, their stake, interests and the various accounting mechanism it 
was therefore important that the researcher and the research assistants had to attend 
all meetings within the study areas. Dynamics in natural resource management tend 
to be related to dynamics in other arenas, therefore, the researcher attended meetings 
within the research sites and at times even meetings outside the research sites but 
which were dealing with issues impacting on the natural resources in the research 
areas. The meetings attended were at various levels. The Project Review Committee 
(PRC) comprising of the FCZ's senior management, CIDA and senior civil servants 
in related fields and the University of Zimbabwe kindly allowed the researcher to 
attend their quarterly review meetings and also receive the official minutes of their 
meetings. The FCZ invited the researcher to participate in a number of their 
workshops and seminars. The researcher and the research assistants also made notes 
of all the meetings without participating in the proceedings of the meeting. However 
in some instances, the opinion of the researcher was asked for. This particular 
strategy had to be abandoned towards the end of the research as some ZANU (PF) 
party members began to question why the researcher was now attending 
developmental and party business meetings instead of focusing on the RMC 
business only. However all traditional leaders were still welcoming me to their 
`courts' to hear the traditional judiciary system being practised on Thursdays and 
Sundays. 
Minutes of the RMC meetings were also used to assess how issues were discussed. 
The researcher and the research assistants also made their own verbatim minutes, 
which were then to be compared with the final `official' minutes which were written 
by the FCZ. This was necessitated after the realisation that `official' minutes tended 
to be edited minutes which eliminated unfavourable and controversial subjects. The 
fact that these minutes were written by the FCZ representative tended to portray the 
official position. The official minutes were then typed and kept in files at the FCZ 
offices at Gokwe centre. 
Meetings alone do not yield important results. Meetings also proved to be a good 
opportunity to identify follow -up issues after the meeting. It was also a good 
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opportunity of identifying key informers. It was also an opportunity to attend some 
follow -up social events. 
5.1.15. Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire survey involves the asking of pre -set questions to a respondent. This 
is what Chambers refers to as the "Quick and Dirty" research method (Chambers 
1983). Prior to conducting the questionnaire survey research assistants who had 
taken part in the early reconnaissance survey were further trained using the previous 
exercise as a benchmark. The first two weeks were used for pre- testing the survey 
instrument. The training session in Gokwe included the translation of the 
questionnaire into the local languages of Shona and Ndebele, how to approach the 
households, introducing the research objectives, whom to interview and sampling 
procedures. Mock interview sessions were then later followed up with practical trials 
in the field with an opportunity to review the field experiences. A questionnaire 
survey was conducted in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. One hundred and 
nineteen questionnaires were conducted in Batanai with one hundred and twenty -one 
questionnaires being conducted in Chemwiro -Masawi RMC. The questionnaire 
covered issues such as the ethnicity, place of birth, to help determine issues such as 
migration. The questionnaire also covered issues such as resource ownership, use of 
forestry resources and institutional analysis and ranking. The questionnaire was 
conducted to adults within the household. The main targets for the questionnaire 
were the household heads. Children were interviewed only if they were above 21 
and the head of the household was absent on the second visit. Most people 
interviewed were the husbands or their wives. These households were randomly 
selected within the RMC. 
The field research assistants conducted the field data collection for the 
questionnaires after a three -day training period in Gokwe. The researcher carried out 
the field supervision and quality control. Evenings and early mornings were used to 
monitor the quality of data collected so that mistakes and problems were detected 
quickly. This was also an opportunity for the research assistants to point out at 
challenges emerging in the field. This proved to be a very useful exercise as it 
helped to detect problems at an early stage. Quality control remained a key 
component in the whole data collection exercise. The questionnaire had both open 
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ended and closed questions. Once all the 240 questionnaires were filled in, they 
were then entered into the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) at the 
University of Zimbabwe. This process was useful in that soon after the analysis of 
data using SPSS it was then possible to go back into the field carrying out key 
informant interviews as a follow -up to the issues emerging from the questionnaire 
findings. The questionnaire instrument was mainly pre -coded except for the sections 
where the respondents were supposed to give their own opinion. Some of these 
open -ended questions were later coded using the responses coming from the field 
results. The questionnaire instrument used in this study is attached as annex 1. 
It is important to note from the beginning that this method like any other method has 
its disadvantages but when used to complement other methods it helps in cross- 
checking PRA results. This probably explains why it is still one of the most popular 
methods used in research work (Robson 1993). 
5.1.16. Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources of data proved to be very useful for this study. The research 
made use of the valuable information in libraries at various sites. The University of 
Zimbabwe and its departmental libraries such as the Centre for Applied Social 
Sciences (CASS), Institute of Environmental studies (IES), Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) and the Map Library were valuable sources of information. Other 
libraries in Zimbabwe used included the Agricultural Rural Development Authority 
(ARDA), Department of Physical Planning (DPP), IUCN and the Zimbabwe 
Environmental Research Organisation (ZERO) Resource Centre. The Edinburgh 
University library was very useful. The National Library of Scotland proved to be a 
good source of material on Africa and Zimbabwe. One other library that was used 
for a very short period of time was the Centre for Basic Research, in Kampala, 
Uganda. The electronic age has also made access to information fairly quicker and 
more affordable. At Edinburgh University I was able to access a number of papers 
and journals some of which were accessed through databases on the internet. This 
also enabled me to access papers presented at various conferences, which were 
published on the internet. Conferences and workshops were also an important source 
of some of my references. These helped shape and modify the way I viewed the 
issue of decentralisation within the forestry sector. Conferences and Workshops 
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organised by the World Resources Institute (WRI)'s Institutions and Governance 
Programme helped me to discuss and debate issues on decentralisation within the 
forestry sector. This also drew researchers from various parts of Africa, which 
enabled me to share and have a critical analysis of decentralisation within the 
forestry sector in Zimbabwe. 
5.1.17. Other secondary data sources 
Several routinely collected government data sets were used to cross -check the findings 
from the interviews. This included 1981 -1993 crop yield data for Gokwe communal 
land as collected by agricultural extension services (Agritex/USAID FEWS 2001), 
precipitation records for the meteorological station at Gokwe, and the number of 
poaching arrests in Mafungautsi made by the FPU. The Zimbabwe Republic Police 
keep the records on arrests. After the February 2000 Constitutional referendum in 
Zimbabwe, it became difficult to get any records from the police as they were under 
instructions not to give out any information which could be used against the 
government. The above methods were used in order to assess the power dynamics 
within the devolved forestry management in Mafungautsi. 
5.2. Conclusion 
The use of the different research methods was an important way of triangulating the 
findings from Mafungautsi. All research methods have their own inherent 
weaknesses and strengths. Through the use of different methods it was possible to 
assess decentralisation through co- management in Mafungautsi. The fact that field 
based research assistants were also residents of the villages meant that they were in a 
better position to know more about their area. Issues such as who wields power can 
at times be derived through observing those who have power and how they use and 
exercise it. This is why it proved to be highly informative to attend not only co- 
management meetings but also all other meetings as the power dynamics in co- 
management within the co- management arena influence and are also influenced by 
the political economy at a local and broader level. Having looked at how the 
research was conducted through the use of various research techniques and their 
relevance, the next chapter gives a detailed background of the research area. 
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Chapter Six 
Background to Gokwe 
6.0. Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, which is in the 
north -western part of Zimbabwe. It will look at land use and tenure in Gokwe, the 
rainfall, topography, soils, vegetation, population characteristics, energy and the 
Gokwe South RDC administrative structure. It will conclude by looking at an 
overview of the case study sites. Mafungautsi is one of the 21 gazetted forests in 
Zimbabwe, which is located in Gokwe South Rural District Council area, which lies 
in the north -western part of the Midlands Province. It is bordered by Matabeleland 
North to its south and west, Gokwe north to its North, Mashonaland West province 
to the East, and Zivagwe Rural District Council to the South. 
6.1. Background to Gokwe 
In the pre- 1980's Gokwe was largely viewed as part of the Sebungwe region. This 
region consisted of Omay, Kariba, Matusadona, Sanyati, Binga and Chizarira areas. 
Common features for the Sebungwe region were its remoteness, lack of basic 
infrastructure, and sparse population distribution (Gokwe delineation Report 1963; 
Worby 1992; GSRMP 1994; Nyambara 2002). The Sebungwe area is the only 
district which the Morris -Carter Commission of 1925 regarded as unworthy of first 
hand inspection and only 3% of its land was designated for European occupation. 
The next lowest percentage allocated to Europeans was 25% (Worby 1992). Worby 
(1992) further notes that the first mission school in Gokwe was established as late as 
1963 yet other mission schools in Zimbabwe go back to the late 1890s and early 
1900s (cf Worby 1992; Nyambara 2002). Gokwe South, alongside other districts 
such as Gokwe North, Binga, Centenary, Guruve, Hurungwe, Kariba, Mount 
Darwin, Mudzi and Rushinga experienced some form of spontaneous settlements 
after the eradication of the tsetse fly in the middle parts of the Zambezi Valley in the 
post independence era72 (Hoare & Du Toit 1999; Chimhou 2002). 
72 It is equally important to note that this should not be construed as downplaying the role of 
migration into such frontier areas. For Gokwe cf. Worby 1992; Nyambara 1999. 
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Gokwe South RDC came into existence due to the "Amalgamation" Act, the Rural 
District Councils Act of 1988, as implemented from July 1993. The Rural District 
Councils Act of 1988 sought to merge the District Councils covering communal 
lands, and the Rural Councils covering the commercial farming areas. In contrast, 
Gokwe South was created not due to the amalgamation in the literal sense, but was 
due to the splitting of Gokwe -Cheziya District Council into Gokwe North and South 
RDCs. Zimbabwe is divided into 55 Rural District Councils, which are the local 
authorities in the communal and commercial farming areas (see Figure 5 for the 
location of Gokwe South RDC). The other local authorities administer the urban 
areas. 
Gokwe South Rural District Council covers a total area of 11 477.41km2. 
Development efforts in the area concentrated more on opening up the area for 
human habitation, especially through the eradication of tsetse and infrastructure 
provision73 (Gokwe Delineation Report 1963). The period after 1980 saw the 
provision of infrastructure on a large scale like schools, roads and water facilities. 
This was made necessary by the rapid population growth experienced in the area due 
to both migration and natural increase. Provision of infrastructural services has also 
been closely linked to the cultivation of cotton in Gokwe (Worby 1992; Nyambara 
1999, 2002). Nyaradza area, in Gokwe, used to house political detainees who were 
restricted from interacting with the ordinary people. Due to the prevalence of tsetse 
fly and the subsequent lack of road infrastructure, it was also seen as a good area to 
operate from by the liberation fighters in the pre -1980 independence guerrilla 
struggle. 
Since Gokwe South RDC is in the Midlands Province it is a meeting point for the 
Shona, who are mainly in the Mashonaland area, and the Ndebele, who are 
concentrated in the Matebeleland area. Gokwe suffered in both the pre and post - 
independence periods (cf Alexander, McGregor & Ranger 2000). The post 
independence suffering was mainly as a result of the outbreak of the "dissident" 
fighting which was mainly concentrated in Matebeleland and the Midlands. This 
was the time that the government of Zimbabwe was trying to enforce a "one party 
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state" in line with its pronounced socialist principles. Residents in the Mafungautsi 
Forest were evicted in 1985 on the pretext that they were supporting dissidents. This 
was after the FCZ tractor and buildings at Lutope Camp were allegedly burnt down 
by the "dissidents ". This resulted in a lot of suffering and loss of lives. Some chiefs, 
including Njelele were incarcerated as they were accused of supporting the 
"dissidents." The general perception in Matebelaland and the Midlands is that 
development was then used as a political tool, with people in the areas affected by 
dissidents being punished through withdrawal of state funding. Various reasons 
were cited including the fact that civil servants were not safe to work in such areas 
(cf Alexander, McGregor & Ranger 2000). 
Having suffered in the pre- independence liberation struggle, in the post 
independence "dissident" era, Gokwe South was also worst affected by the political 
violence in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary elections. This violence dragged on 
up to the 2002 Presidential elections. Parliamentary seats for both Gokwe North and 
South were nullified due to the amount of violence and deaths experienced during 
the election period. 
6.2. Land uses and Tenure 
Gokwe South Rural District has three main tenure types, which are: communal, 
small -scale commercial farming, and state (forestry land and wild life game 
reserves) which are shown by Table 4 below. Tenure regimes in Zimbabwe are 
closely related to the availability of natural resources including forestry. 
Table 4: Land uses in Gokwe 
Land use Area square km Percentage Tenure 
Game reserve 1718 15% State 
S.C.C.F.A 554 5% Private 
Communal 8138.41 71% Communal 
Forestry 1067 9% State 
TOTALS 11477.41 100% 
Source: Gokwe South Rural Master Plan 19 
73 The European Union has significantly contributed to the eradication of tsetse fly in Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe also has a beef quota to the European Union Market. 
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6.2.1. Communal Land 
The largest percentage of the land area in Gokwe is used for communal farming 
(71% as shown in Table 4). Crop farming is the main agricultural activity with about 
45 percent to 50 percent of cultivable land being used for crop cultivation (Gokwe 
South Rural Master Plan {GSRMP} 1994). 
A number of the wards in Gokwe South District are now densely populated due to 
in- migration. Wards such as Ndhlalambi II, Chisina I, Nemangwe IV, Ngomeni, 
Njelele I and Njelele III have population densities which varies from 33 to 40 people 
per square kilometre. The problem of dense population and the shortage of grazing 
has been worsened by the absence of planned settlements, natural increase and in- 
migration since in these wards the agricultural potential is quite good, attracting a 
big number of people in search of land to resettle74 (Gokwe South Rural Master Plan 
1994). An assessment of people in need of resettlement throughout the district 
reflects that a total of 1650 families registered to be resettled. Gokwe was not 
considered for the first post independence resettlement phase as it was considered as 
having abundant land. The policy to resettle communal farmers within their 
respective districts disadvantages Gokwe South residents, as there are no large -scale 
commercial farms within Gokwe South District. This has meant that there is more 
demand for land as compared with other districts which have commercial farms for 
resettlement. The fragile nature of the Kalahari sands in most parts of Gokwe South 
RDC means that each household needs a bigger hectarage in order to derive a 
livelihood from farming. The communal lands in which the majority of black 
farmers reside were set aside in a process, which began in 1898. These areas were 
further consolidated through the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land 
Husbandry Act of 1951. The post independence Land resettlement programmes have 
tried to address this racial imbalance without much success (Moyo 1986, 2000; 
Marongwe 2002). In the year 2000 the government began promoting land invasions, 
in terms of the "Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme." 
74 This seemed to be a widely held belief that Gokwe was an area ready for opening up. However due 
to the influx of immigrants, both forced through the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and those 
who moved on their own accord, land shortages are now being experienced in Gokwe. Land 
ownership is also highly skewed with some people now relying on `land rentals' from those with 
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6.2.2. Small Scale Commercial Farming Area 
This zone is found in the south -eastern part of the district (Chemagora area) and lies 
in Natural Region III. Unlike in the communal farming area, individuals can own 
land in this area. Population densities of 1.63 persons per Square kilometre (km2) are 
much lower than in the communal lands, which are as high as 40 people per km2. 
These areas have more secure tenure as compared to their counterparts in the 
communal lands. Security of tenure in the small -scale commercial farming areas is 
through title deeds, which can be used as collateral in raising capital. In terms of 
forestry produce, any commercial logging proceeds will accrue to the farmer after 
deducting the FCZ's supervision fees. 
Chemagora area also has an abundance of indigenous timber with Mukwa 
(Pterocarpus angolensis) in particular being exploited on commercial lines by 
private companies under the supervision of FCZ. The revenue from the exploitation 
of timber on private property accrues to the individual farmers. The farms also 
supply firewood to the Growth Point and areas outside the district. Some 
enterprising individuals could be seen along the Gokwe -Kwekwe road selling 
firewood to the users of this highway. 
Small Scale Commercial farming areas were set up by the colonial government as a 
way of relieving pressure from communal land. This was also seen as a pre - emptive 
strategy for containing the middle class black farmers' demand for land. These were 
then called the African Purchase Areas (APA). Most of them were in marginal agro- 
ecological regions where large -scale commercial farming was considered 
uneconomic (Moyo 1986). This was also meant to ensure that these new farmers 
would not compete with large -scale commercial farmers. Legislation such as the 
Maize Control Act of 1931 was passed so as to stifle competition from black 
farmers. 
6.2.3. Forest Area 
This area is mainly covered by Mafungautsi Forest and is 82 100 hectares in extent. 
It is situated in the southern part of the district and is administered by the FCZ. It is 
abundant land (Interviews with Mr Muzenda 1999, Nyambara 1999). In 2000 one Gokwe resident 
offered the researcher land for either purchase or rental. 
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an area where controlled exploitation of timber on a commercial basis occurs and is 
a central watershed for several rivers in Gokwe South. The forest area also supports 
a considerably big population of wildlife and offers opportunities for grazing of 
cattle for the people in the surrounding wards. In the past the local people used to 
get salt in the Mafungautsi plateau (Beach 1977, 1984; Nyambara 2002). Currently, 
there is no commercial exploitation of timber within the Mafungautsi Forest 
Reserve. The people of Mafungautsi have always contested the designation of 
Mafungautsi. Chiefs such as Njelele argued that their people used to stay in the 
gazetted area. They felt that the government stole their land. Headman Ndhlalambi 
echoed the same views. In Nyaje people were also bitter as they argued that not only 
did they lose their land in 1954, but the FCZ further carved off their fields when 
they degazetted the area for Batanai and simultaneously gazetted parts of Nyaj e in 
order to meet the legal requirements for de- gazetting reserved forests. This highly 
contested forest is now the area where co- management has been introduced with 
communities surrounding the forest reserve. 
6.3. Rainfall 
Gokwe South RDC lies in natural regions III and IV. The rainfall pattern in the 
district is in two broad categories: areas which receive rainfall ranging between 700- 
800 millimetres (mm) and those areas receiving between 600 -700 mm. Areas in the 
eastern and southern parts of the district generally receive more rainfall than areas in 
the northern parts and western parts of the district. Much of the rainfall is accounted 
for by infrequent heavy falls hence it is not very reliable. Some parts of the district 
are prone to droughts. This limits the range of crops peasants can grow since dry 
land farming is the dominant method of crop cultivation. It is often argued that it 
was due to the low rainfall and the perceived inhospitable climate that the term 
" Shangwe" which has often been used to describe the indigenous people of Gokwe 
was first coined. The Shangwe are possibly part of the Shona Dynasties who moved 
west and south -west of the Mutapa State between the 16th and 18th Centuries to areas 
such as Hurungwe and Mafungautsi plateau (Beach 1984; Interview with Chief 
Njelele 2000). The name is said to have connotations of famine and misery coming 
from the Shona word Shangwa (cf Nyambara 2002). Some point out that it was 
derived from Abashankwe meaning `people who live alone', a description that is 
thought to have originated from Rozvi Chiefs. The Shangwe were renowned for 
120 
trade in the "Inyoka" tobacco industry as well as trade in hoes (Beach 1984 cf 
Nyambara 2002). It was for its isolated nature that Gokwe was used as a detention 
centre for political activists in the 1960s. In Batanai area, the area close to 
Nyaradza75 Shopping Centre used to be one of the detention centres - meant to keep 
political activists away from contact with other "innocent" citizens. 
6.4. Topography 
Gokwe South district lies between 600 -1200 metres (m) above sea level. The highest 
part of the district is in the southern section of the district Mafungautsi forest on the 
Mafungautsi plateau being 1 324 m above sea level. Generally the land drops gently 
in altitude as we go northwards and westwards except in the North where the district 
ends with a steep descend. 
The Mafungautsi Plateau is a watershed as it is the source of the Lutope, Sengwa, 
Mbumbusi and Ngondoma rivers. These rivers flow into the Zambezi River on 
which the Kariba dam, a major source for hydroelectric power is housed. It was 
because of the need to protect the catchment area for the Zambezi River that the 
Mafungautsi was gazetted. The electricity generated from Kariba Dam supplies 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
6.5. Soils 
There are varied types of soils in Gokwe South. These types of soil are directly 
related to the underlying parent rock from which they were derived. All areas below 
the escarpment have heavy soils and rainfall pattern is low and erratic. Crops grown 
include cotton and sunflower. Maize is grown as a staple food although the weather 
is not suitable and there is no access to irrigation. These soils have serious 
implications for the agricultural activities (GSRMP 1994). The Kalahari soils are 
quickly leached resulting in poor yields after a few seasons of opening up virgin 
land, even with the help of artificial fertilisers. This has resulted in the demand for 
land within the Mafungautsi forest estate, an area perceived to be ready for 
cultivation. 
75 Nyaradza, according to Mr Musanika- Ncube, used to be a big forest and due to its sheer size people 
walking across it would talk and exhaust all stories before crossing the forest - hence the name, which 
means "to silence" (Interview of 1 September 2000). 
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6.6. Vegetation 
Where not cleared for cultivation, the vegetation is predominantly savanna 
woodland of a type and density related to the underlying rock. The terrain is 
characterised by an open tree savanna of acacia species with muunze (Brachystegia 
glaucescens) flourishing on the ridges of Mafungautsi and Mopane 
(Colophospermum mopane) in the less well drained areas, the latter becoming more 
abundant at lower altitudes in the north of Mafungautsi. The elevated country 
underlain by Deweras and Lomagundi rocks has a well developed mixed savanna 
woodland consisting of dominant Mupfuti (Brachystegia Boehmii) lesser amounts of 
Munondo (Julbernadia globiflora) and patches of Musasa (Brachystegia 
spiciformis). The Karoo sandstones of the Mafungautsi plateau have a similar but 
more open assemblage characterised by stands of palms (Hypaene and Phoenix spp) 
along spring horizons. A grassland of Hyparrhernia spp. with only stunted thorn 
bushes is found on the basalt flats upon the top of the plateau, in contrast to the 
mixed forest of well -grown musasa, munondo, Zimbabwean teak (Baikiaea 
plurijuga) mukwa (Pterocarpus angolensis) and mobola plum (Parinari 
curatellifolia) that is developed on the Kalahari sand. The recent deposits are 
characterised by a well grown mixed woodland of mupfuti, mopane, patches of 
combretum thicket and large baobabs (Adansonia digitata) 
6.7. Population Characteristics 
6.7.1. Population Size 
The administrative district of Gokwe was divided on 1 July 1993 to form two new 
districts, Gokwe North and Gokwe South. The last reliable population data were 
collected during 199276 census, prior to the division. The population of the whole 
district of Gokwe at the time of census was 403,653 and for Gokwe South as from 
ward population statistics was 239,704 (CSO 1994). This represents approximately 
18,4 percent of the Midlands Province total population, and about 2 percent of the 
national population. 
6.7.2. Population Distribution and Density 
The population of Gokwe South is distributed as shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Population Distribution according to Tenure 
Land Tenure Population Percentage of Total 
Communal Wards 231 124 (96.4 %) 
Gokwe Growth Point 7 418 (3.1%) 
Chemagora SSCF Area 902 ( 0.4 %) 
Chirisa Safari Area. 260 ( 0.1%) 
Total Gokwe South District 239,704 (100 %) 
Population distribution and densities by wards indicate high population densities. In 
the communal wards, population density ranges from 13 inhabitants per square 
kilometre in Huchu Ward, to 40 per square kilometre in Njelele 3 and Nemangwe 4. 
Densities are much lower in the adjacent areas of Chemagora Small Scale 
Commercial Area (1.63 per square kilometre), and Chirisa Safari Area (0.15 per 
square kilometre). Mafungautsi Forest itself is not accounted for, as the people are 
not allowed to stay in the forest except for the FPU manning the Lutope Camp. 
The total population, 1982, for the Cheziya Gokwe District Council area (i.e. 
communal wards including Gokwe Centre and Chemagora) was 229,382. Copper 
Queen, then in Chitenderano Rural Council Area, had a population of 2,071. 
Therefore the total population of the area now covered by Gokwe North and South 
RDC's was 231,453 in 1982. The 1992 population for Gokwe North and South 
RDC areas was 403,653. This implies a population growth rate of 5.72 % per 
annum, significantly higher than the rate for the nation of 3.13 %. There is no doubt 
that there was significant in- migration to Gokwe District during the 1980's. 
Nevertheless it is clear that the rate of natural increase (i.e. the difference between 
fertility and mortality levels, and excluding migration) has been considerable 
(GSRMP 1994). 
76 The Herald of 4 December 2002 reported that the population of Zimbabwe is now 11.6 million, but 
the provincial profile summaries are not yet published. 
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In 1986 the CSO carried out a series of population projections for Zimbabwe to the 
year 2032 (CSO 1986). These were based upon the 1982 Census, assumptions about 
future fertility and mortality levels, and assumptions about the impact of health and 
education programmes upon population growth. Three scenarios were provided: a 
high variant, a medium variant and a low variant. All three projections were under- 
estimates, although the high variant is the most accurate: it projected a 1992 national 
population of 9,978,869 compared to an actual population of 10.4 million; and an 
inter -censal growth rate of 2.88% p.a. compared to an actual growth rate of 3.13 %. 
Gokwe South's population growth rate is 5.7% per annum, which is above the 
national average of 3.13. This could be attributed to the fact that Gokwe South has 
been experiencing net immigration since the late 1950s (Mehlo 1970; Worby 1994; 
Matose 1994; Nyambara 1999). 
6.7.3. Household Size 
Gokwe South has high household sizes. In communal wards population per 
household ranges from 5.45 in Chisina 3 to 6.45 in Jahana with a mean of 5.97 per 
household, compared to 5 per household for the Province as a whole. Mean hectares 
per household in communal wards range from 15.56 in Ndhlalambi 2 to 43.64 in 
Huchu, with a mean across communal wards of 23.10. These figures should be 
treated with some caution if one takes into account the fact that they were computed 
after the 1992 census and a number of changes are bound to have taken place. 
Secondly, the land areas may have changed, as there have been some recent ward 
boundary changes. Thirdly, there are undoubtedly significant variations in land 
holdings both within and across wards. The mean figure of 28.61 hectares per 
household is distorted by the inclusion of Chirisa Safari Area, a large area with very 
few households. Household sizes have implications for new households and the 
demand for land (CSO). 
6.8. Energy Sources 
The major source of household energy in Gokwe South district is wood fuel. Over 
98 percent of households obtain their energy from fuel wood (GSRMP 1994). This 
has implications on the use of forests and woodlands in Gokwe. Mafungautsi Forest 
is seen as one of the main sources of firewood for domestic energy purposes. Its 
proximity to the Gokwe Centre provides a ready market for firewood. Gokwe South 
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District is predominantly rural which explains its high dependence on firewood as 
compared to the rest of the Midlands Province. This has implications on the demand 
for forestry products from the Mafungautsi under the co- management arrangement 
(CSO 1994). This does not automatically imply that firewood use is the main cause 
of tree loss in Mafungautsi. 
6.9. Timber exploitation 
Gokwe South District is one of few areas where significant stands of indigenous 
hardwood remain. Commercial species include mukwa (Pterocarpus angolensis), 
mukamba, or pod mahogany (Afzelia quanzensis), mukusi or teak (Baikiaea 
plurijuga), and mugaranyenze (Albizia antunesiana). There were two main timber 
operations in the district, both involving timber companies who have been awarded 
concessions, on a competitive basis, to cut timber. The first involves exploitation of 
timber in the Mafungautsi Forest Area, directly managed and supervised by the 
FCZ, with royalties paid to the FCZ. In 1991 the volume of timber taken from 
Mafungautsi was in the region of 4,000 cubic metres generating some $290,000 in 
royalties. Currently, exploitation of indigenous timber in Mafungautsi is suspended. 
The second involves timber exploitation in the communal lands, particularly in the 
Mbungu area in the extreme south west of the District and, more recently, in Svisvi 
and Chemwiro -Masawi areas. This is managed by the RDC with advice and 
guidance from the FCZ, with royalties going to the RDC. A maximum of 4 800 
cubic metres is allowed to be taken from the communal lands, generating some 
royalties for the local authority. 
The exploitation is, in theory, strictly controlled and the timber companies are 
limited in the volume of timber they can extract. However, it is very difficult in 
practice to supervise the timber companies all of the time and the local authority and 
FCZ have to rely, to an extent, upon the good will of the companies involved. By its 
own admission, the company working in the communal land has exceeded its quota 
and is not supervised effectively by the FCZ (GSRMP 1994). Timber revenue will 
be a major source of contest between the Gokwe South RDC and the local farmers. 
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6.10. Administration 
Gokwe is administered in terms of the Rural District Councils Act of 1988 (cf 
Figure 4 Decentralised structure). Gokwe South is further divided into 30 wards 
with each ward being represented by a councillor. The Full Council meeting of the 
30 councillors makes policy decisions pertaining to the district. For efficient 
administration the councillors are further divided into committees. Currently in 
Gokwe South RDC the following seven committees exist, 
Finance 
Roads and Works 
Area Committee for Gokwe Centre" 
Social Services 
Human Resources 
Administration and 
Natural Resources, Conservation and Planning Committee 
The Executive on the other hand, headed by the Chief Executive Officer is the 
technical side /expertise which implements decisions made by the councillors and 
also advises the councillors on technical issues. The line ministry representatives at 
district level also provide technical support to the RDC in their various fields mainly 
through the District Development Committee. The line ministry representatives at 
district level are however accountable to their line ministries at the provincial level 
or head office level in Harare. The Gokwe South RDC can not demand their input if 
their line ministry at head office has other priorities. The next section gives an 
overview of the case study sites. 
6.11. An overview of the Case Study Sites 
The case studies are two Resource Management Committee (RMC) areas 
neighbouring the Mafungautsi Forest as previously shown in Figure 5. The research 
sites are Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. 
Batanai RMC is in Ndhlalambi Ward 1, which is under the Nemangwe 
Chieftainship. Ndhlalambi is a son -in -law to Chief Nemangwe. Batanai RMC area 
" This committee will be disbanded soon with the designation of Gokwe Centre as a Town, which 
will see the establishment of a Town Board to run the affairs of the town centre. 
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corresponds to a VIDCO comprising of three traditional villages. The VIDCO 
according to the 1984 Prime Minister's directive was composed of about 1 000 
people in a rural area. This resulted in a number of traditional villages being merged 
to come up with the VIDCOs thereby creating new authorities. The main aim of this 
new institution was to undermine the traditional institutions that were perceived to 
have collaborated with the colonial government (Makumbe 1998). The three 
traditional villages comprising the Batanai RMC are Mafa, Manita and Matashu. 
The total population for the Batanai RMC is 1 797 people. Batanai area is a former 
forest area, which was de- gazetted in 1972 in order to accommodate people being 
moved from the gazetted forest. Due to the gazetting of the Mafungautsi Forest in 
1954 the people of Batanai were moved to Chief Nemangwe's jurisdiction. Prior to 
the designation of the forest reserve they were under Chief Njelele. Such forest 
demarcations did not take cognisance of the traditional boundaries alongside land re- 
organisation and land use planning under the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 
(Holleman 1969; Drinkwater 1989). CSO statistics (1992) show that Ndhlalambi 
Ward 1 in which Batanai VIDCO is found, covers an area of 405.63 square 
kilometres with a total ward population of 12 197 and a population density of 30.07 
people per square kilometre. The average household size is 5.95 people with an 
average land holding unit of 19.78 hectares per household. Ndhlalambi Ward 1 has a 
total of 9 437 cattle, 3194 goats, 74 sheep, 969 donkeys. Batanai RMC is in natural 
region 3. 
Chemwiro -Masawi is an older settlement as compared to the Batanai RMC area. 
The location of Chemwiro -Masawi is shown in Figure 5. Chemwiro -Masawi is an 
RMC under Chief Njelele. It is in Njelele Ward 3, which is at times also referred to 
as ward 3. Most of the people in this ward are the original Shangwe people under the 
Chieftainship of Njelele due to the reference of the Korekore of Neshangwe area. 
Chief Njelele is one of the early settlers into this area when they migrated from 
Guruuswa in the 16th Century (Chief Njelele Personal Communication). The 
original settlers are often referred to as the Shangwe people - a derogatory term, 
which is mainly used by the immigrants (cf Worby 1992, Alexander & McGregor 
1997). This myth of backward Shangwe people in Gokwe was further entrenched by 
the colonial native commissioners (cf Native Commissioner's Reports 1948/1949). 
The Shangwe who are the early settlers of Gokwe found themselves comprising the 
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minority due to the influx of immigrants from other parts of Zimbabwe. The 
"Shangwe" in turn called the immigrants the "Madherukas," which meant 
undomesticated animals or sounded like the noise made by government lorries that 
dumped them in Gokwe (Worby 1992; Nyambara 2002). Nyambara (2001) notes 
that between 10 000 and 12 000 people forcibly evicted from Rhodesdale that had 
been designated a Crown Land to accommodate white servicemen who had served 
in the Second World War of 1939 to 1945. The evicted people were settled in 
Gokwe or Sanyati. Chemwiro -Masawi lies along the main Gokwe -Kwekwe road. 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMC is made up of two VIDCOS, which are Chemwiro and 
Masawi. It is slightly less densely populated than Batanai with a total of 1 500 
people. The villages in Masawi VIDCO are Cheza, Mandiya and Mancuma. The 
Chemwiro VIDCO traditional villages are Msongelwa, Mufanawegudu and 
Charuma. Soils in Chemwiro -Masawi are the Kalahari clays and loam soils. CSO 
(1992, 1994) Statistics show that Njelele 3 ward, in which Chemwiro -Masawi is part 
of, has an average area of 200 square kilometres with a total ward population of 8 
118, a population density of 40.58, 1 272 households, an average households size of 
6.38 and an average of landholding size of 15.73 hectares per household. Chemwiro- 
Masawi falls in natural region 4 (CSO 1992). 
This Chapter has looked at the background of Gokwe in terms of physical features 
and linked them to the local livelihood strategies and how these would then relate to 
the co- management initiatives. The last section of this chapter then concluded by 
outlining some key issues about the two case study RMCs of Batanai and 
Chemwiro -Masawi. The next Chapter will look at co- management implementation 
in the two case study sites. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Political Economy of Decentralised Forestry in 
Mafungautsi 
7.0. Introduction 
This chapter gives an account of implementation of the co- management process in 
the two case study RMCs of Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. These two case study 
RMCs were selected out of the initial 8 RMCs when the research began. As cited in 
chapter five, these two areas would provide an interesting comparison as Chemwiro- 
Masawi has a longer settlement history whilst Batanai was de- gazetted in 1972 to 
accommodate people who were evicted from the Mafungautsi forest. The claims 
over forest ownership of the Mafungautsi would be more interesting by looking at 
the Batanai area which is largely comprised of former Mafungautsi residents which 
was not the case in Chemwiro -Masawi. Commercial timber logging took place in 
Chemwiro -Masawi and not in Batanai. These two case studies were relevant in 
terms of social outcomes comparison on the basis of commercial exploitation of 
timber. It is also important to note that by the end of the field research in August 
2001, the total number of RMCs in the Mafungautsi area had gone up from 8 to 15. 
Co- management has resulted in the creation of RMCs which are entitled to collect 
permit fees for thatching and broom grass collection in the areas allocated to them 
by the FCZ. Prior to co- management, permit fees were going to FCZ. FCZ still gets 
permit fees for the areas controlled by the FPU. 
This chapter is an in -depth analysis of the processes and dynamics of co- 
management, which will cover issues such as the formation, implementation, power 
dynamics, struggles and the decentralised powers and how they are contested and 
challenged at local level. A few examples outside the case study areas will also be 
cited in some instances. This chapter demonstrates that co- management in 
Mafungautsi area, was, right from its inception, tilted more in favour of the FCZ 
than the local communities. All the various forms of power were retained by the 
FCZ with the local institutions being marginalized, gaining only peripheral powers. 
This then resulted in them being upwardly accountable to the FCZ. On realising 
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their powerlessness in the face of the state, the local communities then decided to 
embark on their own forms of resistance, which was meant to undermine the co- 
management arrangement. 
7.1. Formation of Batanai RMC 
I understand that every one of us has an important role to play. It is like a 
work party (nhimbe) and I feel it was a wise move by the Commission to 
involve the communities in the management of the forest since (kubata 
mbavha kutuma imwe) you must set a thief to catch a thief. We knew a lot of 
things happening in the forest, but we had kept quite because "Forester" was 
managing the forest on his own (Mr Nkomo interviewed by P. Moyo 12 
December 1995).78 
When co- management was introduced in 1995 the first RMC Chairman, Ignatius 
Nkomo had high hopes for co- management. He outlined his understanding of co- 
management as outlined above. This raised the people's expectation as they felt they 
were going into partnership with the FCZ. 
Batanai RMC was formed in 1995. The RMC is in Ndhlalambi Ward 1. This ward 
has been experiencing power contests. People in Batanai felt that their councillor 
was not doing much for them. The Batanai people chose their RMC, with a parallel 
committee being selected at Nyaradza Business Centre. The FCZ then endorsed the 
committee, which was selected at Nyaradza Business Centre, as it comprised 
political heavy weights. The term heavy weight in Zimbabwe is mainly used in the 
social and political circles to denote people who occupy positions of leadership at 
various levels. The first RMC was called Mbumbusi- Batanai RMC as it was formed 
at ward level (Ndhlalambi Ward 1). Ndhlalambi ward 1 comprised nine Village 
Development Committees (VIDCOs) which are namely Nehanda, Kugarisana, 
Vakanai 1, Vakanai 2, Sokwela, Batanai, Kupfumaishungu, Chemusonde 1 and 
Chemusonde 2. This ward further comprised of 34 traditional villages, which are 
shown in Table 6: 
78 "Forester" is the name used by most people in the Mafungautsi to refer to the Forestry 
Commission. Most people seem to find the full Forestry Commission a mouthful and difficult to 
remember and pronounce. 
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Table 6: Composition of RMCs by villages 
Name of Vidco Villages (Traditional)'' in the Vidco Total 
1. Batanai 1. Mafa 2. Maruta 3. Matashu 3 
2. Nehanda 1. Kampani , Mloyi Tasiyana, Chimbase 
Rumhumha, Sandare and Mutupani 6 
3. Kugarisana Sidaka, Takayendesa, Chipere, Mkwaiki, Never 
Chemusonde and Magobhiyana 6 
4. Vakanai 1 Sigiji, Karara , Dlana 3 
5. Vakanai 2 Mandaba Majerimani , Fuzani and Mapurazi 4 
6. Sokwela Bhandawa , Mabuyani & Makuwerere 3 
7. Kupfumaishungu Fute and Mabiwa 2 
8. Chemusonde 1 Tavayena Mateta, Matengambiri, 
Mgijinyeliwa 
4 
9. Chemusonde 2 w Chikuni Chawa; Zaranyika; Manyepa 3 
The Committee formed at Nyaradza Business Centre was made up of the councillor 
for the ward with the headman as the Treasurer. Table 7 below shows the social 
status of the people who were chosen into the first RMC for Batanai. 
Table 7: Batanai RMC members 
NAME POSITION SEX Other Position 
Ignatius Nkomo Chairman Male Chief's secretary 
Ephraim Chikunichawa Vice chairman Male Chief's Assessor 
Andrew Mateta Secretary Male Councillor 
Leanos Moyo Vice Secretary Male Farmer 
Zwayo Moyo Treasurer Male Headman 
Ground Sibanda Corn. Member Male District chairman 
su 
Edson Sitshela Corn. Member Male VIDCO chairman 
Mzenda Coopted member Male VIDCO secretary 
The first RMC members as shown in Table 7 illustrate the dynamics of public 
office. This was the committee, which was finally endorsed by the FCZ. This 
committee misappropriated the RMC funds. No punitive measures were taken since 
79 The colonial administrator referred to traditional villages as kraals. A kraal is a place where 
animals are kept at night. The same term was used to describe a collection of homesteads under the 
jurisdiction of a village head. 
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the FCZ did no want to antagonise the community leaders. The first committee was 
also composed of males only. Despite the fact that women are involved in the 
collection of forestry products such as firewood and mushroom, the first RMC did 
not reflect such a balance. This further illustrates how power dynamics at a local 
level determines who occupies which position as this will determine the 
accountability of the RMC institutions. In a female focus group to discuss the RMC 
history, one woman lamented that the RMC funds would have been safe had a 
female treasurer been chosen (Batanai Women Meeting 2001). Who gets into which 
position in gender terms is not as simple as illustrated above. On the 14th of March 
2001 a woman had been elected as a treasurer for the Chemwiro -Masawi School 
Development Committee. Her husband denied her the opportunity. Male focus 
group discussions highlighted fears of men that if women are appointed to positions 
in local institutions this entailed travelling which most husbands felt was not 
"acceptable ". Widowed or divorced women tended to have more freedom to 
participate in such committees (Male Focus Group Discussion 28 August 2000). 
The blame for the misappropriated funds was attributed to the wise man81. As a 
consequence of this theft the FCZ was forced to conduct new RMC elections on 6 
May 1997. The elections resulted in the break -up of the first RMC into Batanai and 
Chemusonde -Kupfumaishungu. The new RMC members for Batanai were as listed 
in Table 8 below. 
80 District Chairman for the ZANU PF party. It is important to note that the party districts are at 
smaller scale than the administrative districts. In some instances they coincided with the Rural 
District Council wards. 
81 He was coopted as he was considered to be as a wise man, an immigrant from Masvingo and was 
considered to be a successful cotton farmer who later, further migrated to Nembudziya area which 
has the dark, Chidhaka soils, which are very good for cotton cultivation (Interview Agritex Gokwe 
2000). 
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Table 8: RMC Batanai 
NAME POSITION SEX Other Position 
Nene Sibanda Chairman Male Chairman School Committee 
Neighbourhood Watch 
Mloyiswa Nkiwane Vice Chairman Male Clinic treasurer, Relative 
Daniel Mudhara Secretary Male School committee, church 
chairman 
Blandina Mafa Treasurer Female Village head's wife, Club 
member 
Danisile Khumalo Committee 
Member 
Male Secretary farmers' group 
Agai Kadozoka Committee 
Member 
Male Village chairman 
Chapungu Committee 
Member 
Male Villagehead's secretary 
The Committee chosen on the 6th of May 1997 was formed through the FCZ's 
instructions that the three village heads in the Batanai area (Mafa, Matashu and 
Maruta) should choose representatives in their villages. Mafa village that is closest 
to the forest was told to choose 3 representatives with the remaining two village 
heads being told to choose two each. The FCZ also encouraged them to include 
women. This resulted in one woman, the villagehead's wife, being identified. The 
role of the Batanai community was then reduced to voting for the assignment of the 
different positions for these identified individuals. The Chairman of the RMC was a 
close relative of the village head of Mafa village. The vice Chairman of the RMC 
was a close relative of Mr Nkiwane who is the village head for Manita village. The 
Chairman was also a Neighbourhood Watch Committee member. The 
Neighbourhood Watch Committee is the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) initiative 
to encourage the rural communities to "police themselves." Village Neighbourhood 
Watch Committees help to reduce crime within their villages. The Neighbourhood 
Committee was empowered to arrest criminals in the area and hand them over to the 
Gokwe Centre Police Station. 
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The secretary was not from the royal82 family but was thought to possess important 
skills in terms of his ability to read and write. His appointment to the position of 
secretary was on the basis of the FCZ's insistence that incumbents to secretarial 
posts must be literate. The treasurer was the only female in the RMC. She was the 
wife of the village head. She was considered to be a very powerful woman who had 
sway in terms of the decisions made by the village head such as joining the kitchen 
utensils club as highlighted below. Some people even further claimed that she had 
some esoteric powers but these were never substantiated. The Kitchen Utensils Club 
contributed an amount to allow members to buy kitchen utensils. Her husband was 
also incorporated into the group as the only male member. This insured that she had 
two chances per round to buy kitchen utensils, an advantage over the rest of the 
group members. Since men traditionally do not own cooking utensils, it meant that 
she would have double the amount of utensils as the other members. This was 
because the utensils bought during her husband's turn were hers as well. 
Whilst some form of `guided democracy' was exercised the people were essentially 
hand picked by the village leaders since the traditional leaders were asked to provide 
names of people in their villages with the local people being reduced to voting for 
who gets which position. Traditional leaders are not always democratic as their 
appointment into office is through a hereditary system - and in some instances the 
government has the power to approve the appointment of traditional leaders in 
accordance with local culture (cf. Mamdani 1996; 1999 and The Traditional Leaders 
Act of 1998; Mapedza & Mandondo 2002; Mandondo & Mapedza forthcoming). 
Traditional leaders assume community position by virtue of birth. This does not 
seem to align well with democratic principles, which calls for the "voting out" of 
unaccountable and non -performing leaders. Oppressive traditional leaders are not 
easily removed unlike elected ones who can be voted out after the expiry of their 
term of office. Mandondo (2000) argues that some traditional leaders try to be 
inclusive as far as costs of natural resource management are involved whilst being 
exclusive when it comes to the reaping of natural resource benefits (cf Mukamuri 
1995). 
82 This refers to the people who come from the ruling lineages or clans. These tend to be influential 
and related to the traditional leaders. 
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The formation of the Batanai RMC seems to demonstrate that the power to create 
rules, according to the Agrawal & Ribot (1999) Framework, has been retained by 
the FCZ. Mr Nkomo's optimism, cited earlier in this chapter, was based on the 
assumption that the local community would be involved in rule setting. The arbitrary 
manner in which the electoral process was conducted signified the fact that the FCZ 
would be setting the rules of co- management. The next section looks at the crafting 
of the constitutions governing co- management and the resultant distribution of 
different forms of power. 
7.2. Constitution Formulation 
Constitutions allocate the various forms of power and set up the general rules and 
regulations of co- management. Like national constitutions, co- management 
constitutions need to be democratic and allocate powers evenly so that the resultant 
institution will not end up being a burden for the local communities. The 
constitution governing the activities of the RMCs was a modification by the 
Ministry of National Affairs and Employment Creation (MNAEC) of their standard 
constitution for co- operatives and clubs. This was done through FCZ's request to 
MNAEC (Shingai Workshop 1995). The FCZ handed over the modified 
constitution to the RMCs. RMCs were told that they could modify the constitutions 
to suit their needs. The RMCs were further reminded that the earlier they finish 
amending the constitutions, the earlier they would be able to open their own RMC 
accounts in order to access proceeds coming from grass cutting83. All the 15 RMCs 
embraced the standard constitution without amendments. Accepting the constitution, 
as is, may be explained from a number of perspectives. 
Firstly, the constitutions were written in English. Not only was the language foreign, 
but it was in the legal jargon which rendered it beyond the comprehension of most 
RMCs let alone the ordinary village members. At a workshop held in 2000, people 
requested that the constitution be translated into local languages of Shona and 
Ndebele. The Project Review Committee (PRC) also hinted at the importance of 
translating the constitution so that the people will be able to comprehend what it 
83 In the words of the Gokwe South officer, they should get organised if they want to get any benefits 
(interview on 26 October 1999). 
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says. The official records also show that the Gokwe area has one of the lowest 
literacy levels in Zimbabwe (Mehlo 1970; CSO 1992). Gwatirisa (1996) further 
argues that very few trained teachers have been willing to go and work in Gokwe 
South. This has further contributed to the low pass rates, which has angered the local 
residents and politicians. Given such a scenario there were limits on what changes 
the people could make to the constitutions. 
Secondly, people were desperately waiting for the permission to use their money for 
projects. The constitutions had to be accepted first before being allowed to use the 
RMC funds. Most people were sceptical that the FCZ was telling them the truth that 
they were holding the RMC funds on their behalf. In the event that they were going 
to get the initial deposits, some further wondered whether they were going to get the 
interest generated from the money in the FCZ account. If the people needed their 
funds for projects they were then supposed to quickly agree on the constitution. 
They therefore accepted the constitution, as it was, lock stock and barrel. The 
constitutions outlines a neat bureaucracy which however does not seem to be the 
case on the day to day implementation of the co- management initiative in the 
Mafungautsi communities. The rules and regulations in the constitution did not take 
account of the social, economic and political circumstances of the people of 
Mafungautsi. 
The FCZ was using a carrot and the stick approach to persuade local communities to 
join co- management. People had to accept the constitution in order to access 
proceeds from grass cutting. These are funds obtained through permits issued by the 
RMCs for grass cutting in designated areas. Access to the RMC funds was used as 
an incentive for the RMCs to accept the constitutions despite the fact that they did 
not understand what the constitutions said. 
7.3. Institutional Capacity Building 
This section looks at the institutional capacity building within co- management in 
Mafungautsi. The RMCs were trained in basic bookkeeping courses and the basic 
roles of the western type committee members (cf Murombedzi 1994 for Campfire 
Committees). The FCZ conducted the training and at times external experts were 
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engaged to provide training. Course materials were written in English although 
explanations were also made in local languages. Three people were trained in each 
RMC. 
RMC members were also trained in bee -keeping. As part of the training a field visit 
was organised to some bee -keeping projects in Gokwe North RDC area. Such 
practical training was meant to encourage the RMCs to hasten their pace of 
investment in bee -keeping. Most of the courses provided were not based on the local 
demands but were imposed by FCZ. There was no comprehensive planning of 
courses as these were conducted in an ad hoc manner. Most of the training was 
provided on the assumption that people were going to embark on bee -keeping. Even 
the bee -keeping courses seem to have been provided in a disjointed manner rather 
than in a holistic manner. Officials felt that the local people were ignorant and 
someone had to decide for them. The powers to make decisions about training needs 
seem to have been a preserve of the FCZ. The RMC had not identified it as an 
important aspect that needed training. Only four percent of people interviewed in the 
CASS research in 1993/484 wanted to embark on bee -keeping. Training was 
however provided in that area because it was considered environmentally benign. 
Moreover, the FCZ was controlling the resources hence they had the power over 
resource allocation and use. No training needs assessment was carried out in all 
RMCs. 
7.4. Bee -keeping and Powers over Project Funds 
One of the initial project components of co- management in Mafungautsi involved 
the setting up of a honey processing plant at Gokwe Centre. Honey production was 
therefore going to be a major activity under co- management. The FCZ gave Batanai 
RMC two Kenyan -top beehives (see: Plate 1) in 1996. 
84 This was a feasibility study that was meant to assess the people's perception towards co- 
management. Gordon Matzke headed the research team. 
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Plate 1: Kenyan -Top Bee hive in the Mafungautsi Forest area 
The RMC further "bought" 28 beehives through the FCZ. By September 2001 
nothing had been harvested from these RMC owned beehives. Interviews with 
individual bee hive owners revealed that they managed to get honey at least once a 
year from their privately owned beehives. As individuals, they went on to market the 
honey along the Gokwe -Kwekwe road, or sent it to Bulawayo or sold it to a 
Kwekwe based pharmacist who came once in while to buy honey from those 
involved in bee -keeping in Gokwe. The question still remains as to why the RMC 
owned beehives never produced any honey. Interviews with community members 
and the PRA exercise revealed that most of the community members were not 
interested in bee -keeping. For example out of the whole of Batanai only two people 
had more than two beehives per household. Even in those instances, respondents 
emphasised that bee -keeping was secondary to agriculture hence the lack of interest 
in following up the issue of honey produced by the RMC owned beehives. 
The local people did not decide to buy beehives in the first place. The FCZ 
considered beehives to be a complementary activity for the co- management 
arrangement. By promoting bee -keeping outside the gazetted forest this would 
ensure that there were to be no illegal honey collectors in the gazetted area. The new 
method of honey collection, which called for the avoidance of fire when collecting 
honey, was considered to be very suitable for the sustainability of the forest estate. 
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In Batanai's case most people remarked that there was no change in terms of bee- 
keeping, as those who had always wanted to carry out bee -keeping would still 
continue as before - with or without co- management. The initial proposal for co- 
management envisaged the setting up of a honey processing plant at Gokwe Centre. 
This further spurred FCZ into encouraging bee -keeping. 
By diverting all the resources to bee -keeping some respondents took a resigned 
mood as they felt that the RMC was conniving with the FCZ to deprive them of their 
RMC funds. Some felt that this was the RMC members' reward for handing over 
people accused of committing nefarious activities within the forest to the FPU. 
Some even felt they were powerless to do anything about it85 (Youth Meeting of 30 
November 1999). 
In Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs several people felt that RMC members 
were on the FCZ payroll, just like the FPU. Most people felt powerless to hold the 
RMCs accountable to them in the face of the FCZ, which owned the forest. This 
then justified people to use their weapons of the weak by professing ignorance of the 
co- management arrangement to justify their non -compliance with its rules and 
regulations. Fires were mysteriously set and no one was ever apprehended. On the 
15th of August 1999, one of the severest fires in Mafungautsi was witnessed. Plate 2 
below shows part of the fire as it approached the Lutope camp road. 
85 Chisi chako masimba mashoma - Literary meant you have no power over someone else's property. 
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Plate 2: Forest Fire 
The FPU failed to make any arrests. A meeting of the youths of 30 November 1999 
pointed out that co- management was a major problem as they viewed it as a 
mechanism for receiving endless rules from the FCZ hence the need to "fix" the 
FCZ through burning the forest. 
People were to be free to choose any project to embark on as long as there was 
approval from the FCZ. In Sokwela RMC, neighbouring Batanai, there was an 
acrimonious relationship between the RMC and the FCZ. The locals felt they were 
being forced into bee -keeping. A member of the RMC who eventually resigned in 
protest said that the people of Sokwela were being "forced into a dip tank like 
cattle ". 
The PRA exercises conducted in Batanai (August and September 2000) indicated 
that their first preference in terms of projects was gardening. Such projects were not 
promoted by the FCZ, as they did not directly contribute towards "preservation" of 
the forest. FCZ officials often cited garden fencing as one of the reasons for illegally 
cutting down trees. Market gardening was however, considered as an important 
source of livelihood in Batanai RMC. 
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Interestingly, honey marketing only had the support of 4 percent of the respondents 
yet it was being promoted by the FCZ as the main project component. The 
researcher's questionnaire survey in Batanai RMC area showed that out of the 119 
questionnaires conducted, 42 respondents said they were not involved in any form of 
income generating project. Of those involved, 43% (52) of the total respondents 
were involved in market gardening as shown by Figure 7 below. 
Figure 7: Project Preference in Batanai 
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Figure 7 indicates that the people's preferences for income generating projects do 
not seem to coincide with the FC's priorities. Some community members have 
suggested that they wanted to embark on income generating projects such as market 
gardening and poultry. One respondent wanted to know whether the government 
was also dictating what the FCZ employees should buy with their salaries. He 
concluded by nodding his head saying, "This is not our money ". The RMCs, through 
the FCZ, bought a number of beehives. The only other payments, which have been 
carried out, were to the RMC members for serving the community.86 More recently 
86 There was disagreement as to why the RMC members should be paid since they had not embarked 
on a single project. The issue was only `accepted' when the FCZ gave an "explanation" to the 
residents of Batanai. 
141 
the RMCs have been fast tracked into buying more beehives. The beehives given in 
the name of the RMCs seem to be now benefiting some individuals, as there is no 
serious monitoring of the beehives by the RMC in order to get the benefits accruing 
to the RMC. 
Lack of monitoring could be a sign that the people do not buy into the idea of bee- 
keeping - so why waste time making follow -ups on issues which are of little interest 
to them. The fact that the revenue generated by honey from beehives could also act 
as a disincentive for the people to closely monitor the honey collected. This may be 
viewed in the context of the opportunity cost of time spent on such activities, which 
is time forgone on their agricultural activities or any other activity that directly 
benefits the household. 
The communal lands in Batanai had less vegetation cover as compared to the 
Mafungautsi Forest Area. This meant that some people would have preferred their 
bee hives to be in Mafungautsi forest where there is more vegetation and flowers for 
bees to make honey. This request for bee -keeping by Batanai was refused. In the 
case of Batanai and all the RMCs except Chemwiro -Masawi the bee hives were 
outside Mafungautsi Forest. This could be argued as an attempt to divert the 
people's attention from the forest. The other request equally dismissed was a request 
for the establishment for women garden projects on the vlei close to Batanai RMC. 
Cultivation of wetlands in Zimbabwe has often been severely punished through 
official policy and legislation enforced through the Natural Resources Board (cf 
Sithole 1999). 
The above section on bee -keeping clearly demonstrated that the FCZ wielded not 
only powers to create rules, but it also wielded powers to make decisions about 
resource use. Local people were "encouraged" to buy beehives as they had the 
blessing of the FCZ. Such initiatives would also divert the people's attention from 
other forestry products. In some instances, beehives were supplied to the RMC and 
FCZ deducted the money from the RMC account. Even those who wanted to carry 
out bee -keeping within the Mafungautsi forest, in the Batanai area, were denied that 
opportunity. 
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7.5. Designation of Grass Cutting Areas 
Grass cutting pre -dates co- management in Mafungautsi. The only change brought 
about by co- management was that RMCs were allocated vleis where they issued 
permits and collected revenue in those areas. Under co- management designation of 
grass cutting areas is done each year before the Grass cutting season commences 
around June. All RMCs attend the Pre -Grass Cutting Workshop which sees the 
different RMCs being issued with new permit books if they have finished the old 
ones. The FCZ then discusses in detail the rules that are to be followed during the 
grass- cutting period. The exercise entails the demarcation of thatch and broom 
grass- cutting boundaries depending on the availability of thatching and broom grass 
in designated areas. The demarcation exercise involves the drawing of sketch maps 
and in some cases field visits to show RMC members their boundaries. Designation 
of grass cutting areas was a time for contestation with some RMCs claiming that 
they have been given smaller areas. The FCZ also gets its own areas, which in most 
cases tend to have the best quality of grass and are administered by the FPU. In the 
2000 vlei allocation process some RMCs pointed out that they were disadvantaged 
as the FCZ was allocating itself areas with more grass than RMC areas. Most people 
have accepted the position of the FCZ as they feel they are the owners of the forest 
The RMC goes to meetings with the FCZ and come back to inform us what 
to do. We work with Forestry Commission because they own the forest 
(Interview in Batanai on 29 September 2000). 
Designation of grass cutting areas was carried out by the FCZ. With a little pleading 
an RMC would get more area for grass cutting at the expense of another RMC since 
the FCZ did not want to reduce the permit area under the FPU jurisdiction. This 
further demonstrates that the FCZ had not only the power to make decisions about 
resource use and allocation but also the power to implement and ensure compliance 
to the new or altered rules. The FPU, with the help of RMCs, enforced grass 
collection in designated areas. 
Regulation of thatching grass cutting was one of the main activities of the RMCs. In 
fact it was the only time when some villagers would be reminded of the existence of 
the RMCs. RMCs were often referred to as "Makomiti euswa," which literary meant 
"Grass Committees" a view, which most people felt was a reflection of their 
activities. This view was also echoed in an interview with the FPU guards who felt 
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help from RMCs was at its peak during the grass- cutting period only (December 
1999). The Batanai RMC was actively involved in the issuing of permits to allow 
the people to go and cut thatching grass in the vleis within the Mafungautsi Forest. 
The terms of the permit were set up by the FCZ. The RMC were getting 2 bundles of 
grass out of every 5 that the grass cutter cuts in the forest in a given day. Each grass 
bundle is supposed to have a diameter of 30 centimetres measured at a height of one 
metre above the ground. In the event that the person opted to pay cash the permit fee 
was then Z$7 per day for one person to be allowed into the forest to cut as much 
grass as one can cut. Plate 3 below shows grass cutting in Lutope vlei. 
Plate 3: Grass Cutting in Lutope vlei 
Batanai RMC managed to raise Z$9 826.70 up to 1999 from both grass and broom 
grass cutting. The money or the grass used as payment was supposed to go to the 
RMC treasurer. However, in practice, grass would be taken to any member of the 
RMC. In some instances the RMC's share of grass was left in the vlei areas and they 
had to make arrangements to transport the grass to the RMCs' members homesteads. 
Some people took advantage of this confusion and would claim to either have paid 
in cash or left the grass in the vlei. Although the initial FCZ suggestion was that 
people would get the receipt from the RMC secretary and then pay to the treasurer. 
This was an administrative farce as the two people happened to be staying at 
different places and the secretary ended up, in a number of instances, getting both 
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the cash and the receipts. In other cases some people were paying the treasurer and 
being given hand written papers to use to access the Forest. This then made it 
impossible to be able to audit, with a reasonable degree of confidence, the actual 
amounts obtained from grass cutting. Once the loopholes had been identified, it then 
became important to make sure that people would want as much as possible to have 
their homesteads being used as the grass collection centres. The fact that not all the 
grass was being bought and that a lot of it was rotting was a good basis for falsifying 
the actual bundles that were destroyed by termites or through rotting. The 
researcher counted 230 bundles of rotting grass at the Batanai RMC Treasurer's 
homestead on 19 May 2001. 
There seemed to be no incentive to try and take the grass to better market places 
such as Gokwe centre. The thatching grass is mainly used for the construction of 
huts and lodges. The Picture below shows one of the lodges built by the FCZ as part 
of the Training Centre, which was a component of the co- management project. 
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Plate 4: A grass thatched Lodge 
This highlights that not only did RMCs not have power to adjudicate - they also did 
not seem to have the legitimacy and support of the local people. The people then 
quietly decided to use their various strategies, which included avoidance of paying 
permit fees. 
7.6. Reeds Collection 
The other important minor forest product from the Mafungautsi are the reeds. Reeds 
are not common in the forest area. They are only found along some riverbanks 
mainly along some sections of Lutope, Mbumbusi and Sengwa Rivers. Reeds are 
important for making sleeping mats and baskets. This is not a main product and 
most RMCs do not have this product in the areas that they administer. The making 
of baskets and sleeping mats is an art, which only a few people are involved in. 
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7.7. Livestock Grazing 
Grazing of livestock in the forest area does not need a permit. The grazing area is 
about 40 000 to 50 000 hectares mostly in vlei areas. An estimated 20 932 head of 
cattle enter the forest every year (Matzke 1993). The initial concept to subdivide 
some sections of the forest into paddocks was later set aside due to the reduced 
numbers of livestock to be accommodated. Firstly, Agritex's carrying capacity87 for 
the forest would have meant that a lot of cattle would have to be barred from the 
paddocks. This would entail the reduction of cattle per household; a decision 
reminiscent of the colonial Land Husbandry Act of 1951 that resulted in forced 
grazing and land use planning schemes (Drinkwater 1989). Issues such as the 
security of livestock were also raised. Cattle manure is also an important input in 
farming. The researcher witnessed a number of livestock sales by private buyers, 
mainly the Midlands Agricultural Buyers. Despite the tightening of rules and 
regulations on the selling of cattle by the Veterinary Department, cattle rustlers still 
managed to sell stolen cattle.88 Batanai RMC benefits from grazing their cattle in 
Mafungautsi Forest. The FCZ allowed people to graze their livestock as they were 
helping to reduce fuel load for the forest fires. This was perceived to be a 
mechanism of reducing the risk of forest fires, hence its promotion. 
7.8. Deadwood Collection 
Dead wood collection does not need a permit but the FPU89 has to accompany 
people collecting dead wood. In the communal lands of Gokwe nearly all the 
households use firewood as their main source of energy for cooking and heating 
(CSO 1994; Field Observations and interviews). This means that the other main 
component of the co- management has been the access to dead wood within the 
forest. In Batanai people have been collecting dead wood once every month under 
the supervision of the FPU. In some cases due to the commitments of the FPU, the 
Batanai people were not able to collect firewood. The collection of firewood once a 
month is an inconvenience to the people as events such as funerals, which have 
become common due to the AIDS pandemic have also increased the demand for 
87 The concept of carrying capacity remains a controversial topic with some researchers arguing that, 
its not an exact science, especially if one considers the dynamism of the tropical and savanna 
ecosystems (Cousins 1990, 1993; cf. Mapaure 2002 on fire and ecology cf Tiffen, Mortimore & 
Gichuki 1994; Foundation for Environmental Conservation 1998). 
88 The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Gokwe confirmed cases of cattle rustling but could not 
provide exact figures showing the magnitude of this problem. 
89 These are the armed guards who are employed by the FCZ. 
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firewood which can not wait until the next official firewood collection day. Even for 
those who are present, if one does not have a scotch cart, then it's not possible to get 
enough supplies for a month. One of the golden rules for firewood collection is that 
people should not carry axes with them as these might be used for nefarious 
activities such as pole poaching. People in Batanai have argued that even dead wood 
still needs the help of an axe to cut it into manageable pieces especially for those 
who will be carrying the firewood on their heads. At one meeting the people of 
Batanai questioned why axes were not permitted yet the FPU still moved freely in 
the villages with their guns (22 March 2001). In an instance where the Batanai and 
Sokwela people complained to FCZ the response was that they were only interested 
in firewood and not the co- management project as a whole. This further angered the 
people whose bitterness towards the FCZ can be traced back to the designation of 
the Forest. The bitterness was expressed in the Chirima area 
The meeting with the people of Chirima Ward clearly showed that the 
community was very bitter towards the Forestry Commission's policy of 
being oppressive in its policies of protecting the Mafungautsi Forest 
(Maturure et al 1994: 39). 
The firewood case in Batanai clearly shows the amount of power that the FCZ 
wielded. It created rules, made decisions about resource use, implemented firewood 
collection regulations, ensuring RMC and local people compliance and further acted 
as the jury for those arrested. In some instances, the arrested people were then 
passed on to the magistrate's court at Gokwe Centre. RMCs were more or less an 
extension of the FCZ resulting in them being upwardly accountable to the FCZ and 
not the local people. Those who ran out of firewood before the official firewood 
collection day ended up stealing from "Mugabe's Forest ". This then contributed 
towards negative environmental outcomes. 
7.9. Other Non -Timber Forest Products and access into the forest 
The collection of non -timber forest products such as mushrooms, edible worms and 
indigenous fruits do not require a permit. Mushrooms are the most abundant 
resource especially at the beginning of the rainy season, which normally begins 
towards the end of October. A number of women are mainly involved in mushroom 
collection. Some sell the mushroom along main roads and at Gokwe Centre. A few 
however take the mushroom to urban centres such as Kwekwe or Bulawayo 
e 
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(Interview with Mrs Mumvuri 16 January 2000). Some people dried it, in order to 
use it later as some relish. Mushroom is an important source of protein in rural areas. 
Fruits are also an important source of supplementary feeding. Fruits are an important 
source of nutrition especially towards the new harvest season when food reserves for 
most families would be at their lowest (Campbell 1987). Commercial exploitation of 
any forest products is a criminal offence. The Gokwe South Rural District Acting 
Campfire Co- ordinator commented on the increased marketing of fruits by 
communal land dwellers by saying: 
We have to act to stop the people from selling the fruits. As a Council we 
need to make a resolution. Chief Njelele does not want people to sell 
indigenous fruits but people will not stop (Interview of 16 November 1999). 
Stopping the selling of fruits without understanding why people are involved in it in 
the first place is destined to fail. The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987, 
which has also been cited by the FCZ, forbids any commercial exploitation of 
forestry resources in communal land by the communal land dwellers. This is 
contrary to the co- management notion, which states that "forests should serve the 
people, and that the rural population should have a formal role to play in forest 
management" (Roper & Maramba 2000: 9). Roper (1997) cited in Roper & 
Maramba (2000) further states that the legal framework should be enabling for co- 
management: 
An enabling policy and legislative environment that permits the giving of 
rights and responsibilities for forest management to the people more 
dependent on the resource (Roper 1997: 35). 
It is still a criminal offence to market fruits. Local people felt they were never safe 
when looking for fruits in Mafungautsi as the FPU was always suspecting that they 
intended to commit illegal activities. Many residents of Mafungautsi cited 
harassment incidences at the hands of the FPU on a number of occasions. Dogs 
accompanying their owners into the forest were allegedly shot by the FPU as they 
were perceived as "tools" for poaching within the Mafungautsi forest. 
One of the main concerns of the Batanai communities was that they should be 
allowed to perform some rain making ceremonies along the Lutope River in 
Mafungautsi Forest. This issue was also discussed by the Project Review 
Committee, which said the FCZ had to make an administrative decision. One further 
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sensitive issue was the issue of graves within the forest, as people were not allowed 
to perform ceremonies to appease the dead. The local people, however, always 
found ways to circumvent such a neat bureaucracy. The new representative 
institution of the RMC has not been able to change the FCZ's decision. 
7.10. Powers over Financial Resources 
Power over financial resources and their utilisation is a key element in 
decentralisation (Agrawal & Ribot 1999, Crook & Manor 1998). The RMCs have 
been collecting permit fees over some vleis since 1996 when they had the first 
opportunity to supervise grass cutting. Table 9 shows the amounts that have been 
generated by eight of the most active RMCs. 
Table 9: Revenue generated by the eight most active RMCs 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE REVENUE GENERATED TO DATE 
(FROM 1996 TO 2000) 
Batanai/Mbumbusi Z$9 826.70 
Chemwiro -Masawi Z$23 741.38 
Kushinga /Gwehava Z$6 048.84 
Gababe Z$10 771.00 
Sokwela Z$4 819.20 
Tasununguka /Mukai/Rugare /Chemahororo- 
Hovano 
Z$5 430.24 
Chomusonde (Kupfumaishungu) Z$4 728.45 
Hlangano RMC Z$15 139.85 
Total Z$80 505.66 
Table 9 shows that from 1996 to 2000 a total of Z$80 505 was generated by the 
eight most active RMCs. The amounts that have been generated have not been as 
high as they should be due to the non -payment for permits by the local residents. 
One respondent confirmed that those who would have paid the RMCs were 
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becoming a laughing stock for those who did not pay. This was said to be prevalent 
during beer drinking sessions (Interview Mr Muyambo 20 January 1998). Batanai 
RMC generated Z$9 826.70. 
Despite the RMC "owning" the money it was initially kept by the FCZ. The local 
communities were only allowed to utilise the money on condition that they accepted 
the co- management constitution. Even after the acceptance of the constitution, the 
FCZ had to countersign all the transactions undertaken by the RMCs. No financial 
withdrawals could be undertaken without the FCZ's authority and signature. Whilst 
this could sound like good oversight by the FCZ, the fact that even the projects to 
be invested in had to be decided by the FCZ, would show the centralisation of power 
within the FCZ itself Batanai ended up investing its resources in bee -keeping. On 
realising that they had no decision over "their money" a number of people ended up 
getting resources illegally. Even within the RMC itself, some funds and thatching 
grass could not be accounted for. The local people felt that all this was due to 
connivance between the FCZ and the RMC members. 
7.11. Poles for Construction Purposes 
One of the second most important uses of trees in the Mafungautsi is for 
construction purposes. Most people in the Batanai area have pole and dagga (clay) 
huts with some having upgraded their huts by using burnt or unburnt clay bricks 
with thatch roofing. Very few people had brick under asbestos or iron sheets. These 
people included the Village Community Worker and the "wiseman" who later 
migrated to Nembudziya in Cheziya -Gokwe (also called Gokwe North RDC) where 
there are better soils for cotton cultivation. Poles are important in terms of the 
construction of cattle kraals as is shown in plate 5 below. 
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Plate 5: Cattle Kraal 
Poles are not only important for cattle kraals. They are also used for building maize 
storage facilities (ngarani) and the construction of huts. Vermuelen (1994) estimated 
that an average household in the Batanai area of Mafungautsi required an annual 
total of 8.3 tonnes of wood. Of this, 0.8 tonnes is firewood for 4.0 
tonnes is firewood for day to day use with the remaining 3.5 tonnes as wood for 
construction which comprises freshly cut poles of specific sizes for various 
components of wood structures (cf Vermuelen 1994). This has resulted in the 
incidences of pole poaching by the people in Batanai. The dead wood that they are 
allowed to collect for their firewood is not suitable for the different construction 
purposes. There are also various tree types that are considered suitable for house 
construction such as Mupangara and Mubvamaropa, which are prohibited 
hardwoods. People have also been worried about establishing woodlots in the areas 
outside Mafungautsi for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, there is serious land shortage90 in the Batanai area. Although some people 
have disproportionately large pieces of land, most of the people need large pieces of 
90 Land conflicts were prevalent in Gokwe. Chief Njelele on 16 December 1999 tried land conflict 
cases. He later referred some of the cases to Gokwe South RDC after failing to resolve them. In 2000 
incidences of physical violence were reported on the national radio over ownership of communal land 
in Gokwe South RDC 
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land as the land is not very productive (Personal Communication Manyame 2001, 
Cottco 2001).91 
Secondly, a number of people have hinted at their worry that once they establish 
woodlots in their areas the FCZ would come in and take over their land to 
incorporate it into the forest (cf. Matzke 1993; Ranger 1989 on the Matobo National 
park and Moore 1998 on the Eastern Highlands case). Due to the central role of 
poles for different construction purposes in the Mafungautsi area people have 
continued to illegally cut down trees in the forest area. Table 10 below shows the 
number of arrests for pole cutting in the Mafungautsi Forest area. 
Table 10: Forest Poaching Convictions 
YEAR FOREST POACHING CASES 
1991 5 
1992 5 
1993 14 
1994 11 
1995 3 
1996 22 
1997 26 
1998 (APRIL) 13 
Source: Gokwe Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Records 
Co- management has not helped to reduce the number of forest poaching cases in 
Mafungautsi. Table 10 above shows an increasing trend in forest poaching 
convictions in Mafungautsi. Whilst the figures show an increasing trend it is 
however crucial to note that the data was collected by the police for their own 
purposes. This raises questions on the methodology used and whether the high 
numbers are a reflection of increased monitoring and not an increase in the actual 
figures of poaching. The figures also reflect numbers arrested and not the actual 
level of poaching in Mafungautsi. Some people were not included in the final 
91 Cotton has been doing quite well due to the form of semi -extensive farming that the farmers 
embark on. They cultivate large pieces of land. The harvest per unit area is not high. Montmate 
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statistics as they would be cautioned or they might even bribe the FPU. The outcome 
of co- management does not seem to have improved the forest. On realising that the 
FCZ is still centralising all the powers to its offices, the local community made their 
statements using their axes and lighters. 
7.12. Wildlife Hunting for Domestic Purposes (Poaching) 
Wildlife hunting is not permitted. Wild pigs and zebras were said to be causing 
some crop damages especially in areas, which are closer to the Lutope FPU Camp. 
The "poachers" felt they are justified in killing the animals that would have 
destroyed their crops.92 Table 11 below shows the recorded cases violating the 
Wildlife Act. Figures for latter years have been difficult to obtain due to the 
government's intention to hold on to information, which might be considered as 
detrimental to the security of the country, especially through trying to link land 
invasions with increased poaching figures. 
Table 11: Cases violating the Wildlife Act 
YEAR NUMBER OF CASES 
1991 0 
1992 0 
1993 0 
1994 16 
1995 8 
1996 7 
1997 0 
1998 (APRIL) 0 
Source: Gokwe Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Records 
However, it is also important to note that some members of the FPU itself have been 
involved in poaching. There is one recorded case of poaching where the FPU 
(Cottco) Manager 2001 interviewed at Gokwe Centre. 
92 Sithole, elsewhere, narrated an account of villagers who justified killing wildlife as they argued 
that they wanted to recover their crops, which had been eaten by elephants and other wildlife (Sithole 
Personal Communication 2000). 
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members killed a buffalo for meat. Some villagers argued that some poachers were 
working hand in hand with the FPU. The people in Batanai lamented the cruelty of 
the FPU which they accused of killing dogs seen in the company of their owners in 
the forest, chasing people seen smoking in the forest and general harassment of 
villagers who were suspected of poaching. Villagers also lamented the uneven 
implementation of the rules by the FPU, which was allegedly attributed to 
corruption within the FPU. After realising that the RMCs were not accountable to 
the local community, local people simply did not blame poachers. It was at least 
seen as a way of getting benefits from Mafungautsi. Resource destruction within the 
reserved forest was no longer seen as bad, but it was perceived as a way of "fixing" 
the government and the FCZ. The following section looks at forest fires. 
7.13. Forest Fires 
Wild fires are a major management problem, particularly in protected areas where 
their occurrence is often viewed negatively. Consequently, each year range and 
forest managers allocate huge financial and human resources into fire management 
(cf. Jones 1989; Gondo 1993 ; Mapaure 2001). This view pointed out by Mapaure 
(2001) referring to Sengwe Research Centre (Chirisa Game Reserve) on the northern 
part of Gokwe South District, could well be true for the Mafungautsi area which 
generally approximates the reserved and park areas in Zimbabwe. 
Forest fires have been on the increase in the Mafungautsi Forest area. According to 
the FPU forest fires seem to be well timed in that they occur mainly after the end of 
the grass- cutting season. Most people felt that it would be better to have some sort of 
controlled burning which would help control the tick problem. Burning, it was 
argued, would help eliminate ticks if carried out before the onset of the rain season 
so that the grass would re- generate. In 1999 the problem was exacerbated by the 
reduction in funding for the Veterinary Department which translated into lack of 
dipping chemicals. The colonial Forest Officer was nicknamed "Dzimamoto" which 
literally meant the one who orders people to extinguish fires. In Batanai the 
Mafungautsi Forest is often referred to as Dondo or Sango rasekuru.93 It is also 
93 Dondo is a Shona name for the "Wilderness" whereas Sango Rasekuru literally means the 
grandfather's Forest, which were meant to portray the image that people could do anything in 
Mafungautsi and possibly get away with it, if not caught by the FPU. The Mafungautsi Forest is 
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important to note that forest fires have been a challenge in the Mafungautsi area for 
a number of years (cf Hinde 1949). This early perception of "the Fire Problem" led 
to stiffer penalties, not only in Zimbabwe. In Guinea, setting bush fires carried a 
death penalty (Fairhead & Leach 1996; Grillo & Stirrat 1997). 
The fire fighting techniques recommended by the FCZ were resented quietly by 
some of the RMC members. One RMC member pointed out that the FPU had told 
them that they had to use shovels as effective tools for fire fighting. The RMC did 
not have shovels and they were not permitted to use their traditional fire fighting 
"tree branches ", as it is illegal to cut tree branches. Despite the presence of signs 
along the forestry boundary clearly written "Forestry Commission, Mafungabusi 
Forest: Do not cause fires" fires were an annual event in Mafungautsi. A number 
of people said they were not rushing to assist in fire fighting, as the FPU would in 
turn blame them for having started the fire. 
The fact that livestock grazing is permitted within the forest is a potential way of 
reducing the intensity of the fires as grazing reduces the biomass, which contributes 
to the intensity of fires (Mapaure 2001). Whilst forest protection from fire is an 
important element Mapaure's studies at Sengwe Research Centre (2001) seem to 
indicate that fires might not necessary be dangerous to vegetation in the savanna 
areas. Moore (1987, 1996) further warned of disastrous consequences of over - 
protectionist policies in forest fire management (cf Mapaure 2001). The vegetation 
regime in the savanna woodlands has adapted to the usual fire occurrences. Some of 
the trees have adopted by developing thick barks to protect themselves against fires. 
Despite co- management, there have been fires in Mafungautsi. Some of the worst 
fires were in 1999 and 2000 (see Plate 2). Fires were often attributed to "poaching" 
and the need to improve the quality of grazing. Once people realise they were 
powerless against the FCZ; they then used their own strategies to counter the FCZ 
powers. 
personified as a Grandparent who has a soft spot for the grandchildren. "Wilderness" invokes images 
of something wild that has to be tamed. 
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7.14. Meetings 
The Batanai RMCs mainly conducted in the presence of the FCZ. One RMC 
member confessed that whilst they would have wanted to hold meetings on their 
own, there were a number of questions which would be raised by the people which 
were beyond their scope (Interviews of 20 January 1998). Meetings were conducted 
in the presence of the FCZ, which also took the official minutes of the proceedings. 
These were later typed at FCZ District Offices and later filed. Controversial issues 
such as the firewood and power over the use of resources never made it into the 
official minutes, which were written in English. RMCs did not keep copies of the 
"official" minutes. 
In Batanai RMC, the evidence right from the inception and operation of the RMC 
seem to clearly demonstrate that the FCZ had the final say in all major decisions. 
The FCZ seemed to be lecturing to the people about the importance of "preserving" 
Mafungautsi forest as illustrated previously. On realising that they were not 
benefiting much from co- management the local people decided to contest co- 
management in other arenas through the use of what may be called the weapons of 
the weak. The next section looks at the unfolding of co- management in the second 
case study of Chemwiro -Masawi. 
7.15. Implementation of Co- management in Chemwiro -Masawi 
This section looks at co- management in Chemwiro -Masawi beginning from its 
inception, implementation and the power dynamics in the implementation process. 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMC was formed in 1995 and began grass cutting 
administration in 1996. This RMC falls under Njelele 3 Ward 14. The Chemwiro- 
Masawi RMC was made up of the people shown in Table 12. 
157 
Table 12: RMC Chemwiro -Masawi First Committee Members 
Name Position Sex Other Position 
Joseph Chikate Moyo Chairman Male Chairman: School 
Committee 
Zebedia Supelo Vice Chairman Male Farmer 
Gadzai Marange Secretary Male Village Committee 
Member 
Betty Marumisa Treasurer Female Village secretary /Treasurer 
Philemon Hove Committee 
Member 
Male Committee Member 
(Village Committee) 
Anna Kamusha Committee 
Member 
Female Farmer 
Sipiwe Kimbini Committee 
member 
Female Farmer 
The RMC comprised of four males and three females. The RMC Chairman was 
considered an influential man. Chemwiro -Masawi RMC had three women in its 
committee. This was one of the highest representations of women within co- 
management. 
7.16. Constitution 
In Chemwiro -Masawi as in Batanai the constitution was a prototype handed over to 
the RMC by the FCZ. The interesting part was that one of the traditional heads who 
is a former teacher later questioned what the constitution meant by saying that an 
RMC could expel anyone from the community yet it was traditional leaders who had 
powers to do that. The people of Chemwiro -Masawi were in the same dilemma as in 
Batanai in terms of comprehending "their" constitution. They also accepted it in 
order to access the RMC funds. 
7.17. RMC Funds 
The first RMC in Chemwiro -Masawi could not provide a good financial record as 
most of the financial records were destroyed by fire during the grass- cutting season. 
In the 1996 grass- cutting season some RMC members were allowed to camp in the 
vleis together with the FPU to enable them to monitor and supervise the people 
cutting grass and receive payments within the Mafungautsi Forest itself They built a 
temporary thatching grass shelter. A fire from within the shelter burnt the financial 
records. The fire, according to the RMC Chairman, also destroyed some of their 
permit records therefore making it difficult to know how much had been collected. 
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This made auditing some form of guesswork at best, as there was no longer a solid 
basis for carrying out the audit. This was seen by most community members as a 
deliberate move to destroy the financial records so as not to be held accountable for 
financial misuse. In 1997 the same RMC was retained. The only change was the 
addition of three co -opted members. Co -opted members were people added to the 
RMC who had no specific positions. The main reason was to increase the number of 
people monitoring resource use in Mafungautsi thereby reducing the transaction cost 
for each RMC member. 
The FCZ seemed to be sending contrasting signals about the participation of 
women94 in co- management. Female members of Chemwiro -Masawi were chosen 
after the FCZ pointed out that there was a need to elect women in the RMCs. On the 
other hand, the invitation note for the Workshop at Shingai Training Centre held 
from 6 -7 November 2000, stipulated that each traditional leader had to bring along 
one male from their village.95 
The revenue generated by the RMC was initially kept by the FCZ since RMCs had 
no constitutions, which would enable them to open bank accounts. This was 
considered unfair. One man pointed out that, "We want to have control of our 
finances - not to have the FCZ controlling our finance. The RMC should make it 
clear to the FCZ "96 (Mr Gumberu 9 November 1999). The fact that it took the RMC 
over two years to get their own account book was considered unfair. During that 
time the Co- ordinator said she was "keeping the funds safe ". To make matters 
worse, even after the opening of accounts all transactions had to be countersigned by 
the FCZ. Chemwiro -Masawi was strongly advised to embark on bee -keeping 
projects. This chapter will later look at attempts to hi-jack the bee -keeping project 
by a consortium of business people. The next section looks at the organisation of 
RMC meetings. 
94 Mayoux cited in Locke (1999: 280) points out that the participation of women should be carefully 
scrutinised to make sure that its not an addition of burdens with marginal benefits. 
95 Muuye nemunhu mumwe chete wechirume wemuraini menyu. An invitation letter dated 2 
November 2000. 
96 Tinoda kuva nesimba pamari yedu kwete kutongerwa neFC. Pamwe RMC yedu haisi kujekesa 
nyaya iyi. 
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7.18. Organisation of RMC Meetings 
In Chemwiro -Masawi there were three meetings conducted in 1998. The agenda for 
the first meeting was mushroom collection, dead wood collection and report back. In 
this meeting the FCZ was taking the "official" minutes of the meeting. The second 
meeting was on 21 April 1998. This was a pre -grass cutting meeting meant to 
discuss entry rules and regulations during grass cutting. Chief Njelele, head of the 
FPU and FCZ Promoter,97 attended this meeting. The third meeting for 1998 was in 
October. The agenda was to discuss the fire that destroyed the permit book and the 7 
bundles of grass that had been stolen. The fire was said to have engulfed the 
temporary shelter used by the RMC during the grass- cutting period. 
All the meetings were called for by the FCZ. The RMCs have not organised their 
own meetings as yet. The main reason why RMCs have not had an opportunity to 
organise their own meetings is that there are few activities to report on. Besides 
grass cutting there are normally no other activities. As Mr Chikate (Chemwiro- 
Masawi RMC Chairman) remarked, people would not come to meetings where they 
are promised development projects which never materialise. It would be more 
productive to go to their fields or gardens rather than attend unnecessary meetings. 
In Batanai it was surprising that an RMC member said they needed FCZ to come to 
their meetings because the people will not listen to the RMC members alone. It 
looks like the RMC, as an institution, does not have legitimacy in the eyes of its 
constituency. 
The RMC in Chemwiro -Masawi was accused of behaving like an appendage of the 
FCZ 
RMCs are now behaving like FCZ employees. They won't do anything 
without consulting the Forestry Commission. They can not even hold 
meetings without the assistance of the Forestry Commission98 (Mr Matambo 
11 November 1999). 
The fact that in Chemwiro -Masawi people realised that their RMC had no decision 
making powers and whatever they requested still had to be authorised by FCZ 
97 Co- management resulted in the employment of two Forest Promoters. Their main task was to 
promote the co- management concept in villages surrounding Mafungautsi. 
98 MaRMC vavakushanda sevanhu veFC nokuti havadi kuita chinhu vasina kunzwa kuFC. Chero 
misangano vanoda kubatsirwa neFC. 
160 
resulted in them deciding not to attend RMC meetings - since they did not yield any 
results. The FCZ was making all the decisions and the RMC was now seen as only a 
mouthpiece for the FCZ. The RMC was therefore upwardly accountable to its 
master - the FCZ. The following section looks at the question of RMC legitimacy. 
7.19. Legitimacy of the RMC 
People in Chemwiro -Masawi often questioned the legitimacy of the RMC. A 
number of people agreed to get permits for grass cutting and promised to pay using 
bundles of grass. After cutting of grass they then sneaked out of the forest area 
without paying the required permit fees. This became a serious problem for the 
RMC. Table 13 below shows some of the people who owed the RMC some funds. 
Table 13: Outstanding RMC payments 
NAME No.OF BUNDLES PRICE PER UNIT TOTAL 
OUTSTANDING 
Esther Jojo 8 $6 $48 
Chasunda Simbarashe 12 $6 $72 
Dawu Mutoranhema 4 
a 
$6 $24 
Mubaiwa Mukulumo 4 $6 $24 
Mazithulela Dokotera 8 $6 $24 
Brian Mangisi 16 $6 $96 
Isaac Moyo 4 $6 $24 
Total I 56 I $6 
I 
$336 I 
Some of those who did not pay for grass cutting professed ignorance of the payment 
mechanisms. They argued that they felt it was the RMC's role to come and collect 
the thatching grass from their homesteads. 
The reason why the community questioned the legitimacy of the RMC can also be 
attributed to the fact that RMC members tended to associate themselves more with 
the FCZ rather than with the people they were supposed to be representing. Mr 
Chikate, the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC Chairman - in an interview with the 
researcher (2 February 2001 and during the 2000 Pre -Grass Cutting Workshop) 
asked for uniforms and arms similar to the ones given to the FPUs as a way of 
frightening the people into following the rules and regulations governing the 
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forest.99 The chairman further claimed that he had seen poachers with four dead 
zebras driving out of the Mafungautsi Forest. But when he was questioned further 
whether he had reported the incident he said he had not. This illustration might have 
been used as a way of reinforcing the need to get FPU uniforms and arms. RMC 
members were locally perceived as assuming superior postures as they had attended 
courses organised by the FCZ. 
The RMC Chairman also questioned why the fine on forestry poachers was still 
being sent to central government and not the RMC. He said this was a disincentive 
for arresting poachers. Moreover, he argued they were not even getting an allowance 
for the time they were in the forest. In my discussions with the RMC Chairman, I 
could discern that the chairman felt that being an RMC member was the first step 
towards being employed by the FCZ. He felt that, in the long term, the FCZ would 
employ him. In some instances he would inquire from the researcher if he could 
offer him some employment opportunities at any level. During the mid term 
evaluation exercise Willie Matambo said; 
We no longer understand the operations of the RMC. They have forgotten 
that we elected them into office. The RMC chairman now sees himself as a 
senior employee of the FCZ who can make decisions. All the time he tells us 
that the FCZ has ordered him to do this and that (9 November 1999).100 
RMCs are unilaterally making decisions, which at times bypass traditional leaders. 
In most cases they simply say the FCZ told us to do this (Chief Njelele 17 January 
1998). This was compounded by the continued presence of the FPU, which gave the 
local communities the impression that it is still business as usual for the FCZ. One 
member of the FPU said most people were questioning why they were still 
patrolling the forest with guns, the same approach used before the introduction of 
co- management. People questioned why they are still carrying guns as if they are 
going for a battle.101 This then led people to think that they were still dealing with 
the same oppressive FCZ, which evicted some of the Gokwe residents in the 1960s, 
and again in the 1980s. 
99 Munhu anotoda anepfuti which literary meant that you can only be obeyed if you have a gun. 
ioo Kushanda kwavo hakuchanzwisisiki. Vakanganwa kuti vakatumwa nesu. Havana kubvunza FC 
musi wesarudzo yayo. Chairman avakutozviona semushandi mukuru weFC anogona kupa (decision) 
zvokuita ari oga. Anenge oti FC yati "Ndidai ". 
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7.20. Electoral Fiat 
For instance, in Mafungautsi, there is guided or controlled democracy, and elections 
are held under the auspices of the FCZ. The FCZ `encouraged' communities to elect 
RMCs. In Chemwiro -Masawi, elections were first conducted in April 1996. This 
was the inaugural committee in Chemwiro -Masawi. In May of the same year the 
RMC began grass cutting supervision. In 1997 there was another election for the 
RMC members. On 5 July 2000 the community passed a vote of no confidence in 
the RMC and elected a new RMC. However, the FCZ nullified this move on the 
grounds that it was better to retain `trained' committee members despite the fact that 
they no longer had the people's mandate. Some people resorted to stealing grass 
from the forest without paying the permit fees - as either way, the funds were not 
benefiting the community in any way. The next section looks at the controversial 
issue of proceeds from commercial timber logging. 
7.21. Proceeds from Timber Logging 
Co- management entailed sharing of decision -making and benefits derived from the 
Mafungautsi Forest. Commercial timber logging is considered one of the most 
lucrative benefits from forestry - the "green gold" of forestry. In the Chemwiro- 
Masawi area the Gokwe South RDC gave a concession to a private company called 
Mockdale. The Company was granted the right to cut commercial timber outside the 
Mafungautsi Forest in terms of the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987 as 
read together with the Rural District Councils Act of 1988. These two statutes 
empower the RDC to derive benefits from the commercial exploitation of forest 
resources in the areas under its jurisdiction, while the FCZ get a supervisory fee as 
they are the ones who do the inventory of the forest resources and also supervise and 
help measure the volumes of timber that have been cut. From August102 to 
December 1999 commercial timber logging was taking place in Njelele 3 (Ward 14). 
The commercial exploitation of Mukwa and Teak was highly resented by the people 
in Chemwiro -Masawi especially considering that it was ill timed as it was also 
during the summer season when most crops are growing in the fields. A number of 
people tried in vain to stop the heavy machinery and equipment from destroying 
101 Ko muchiri kutakura pfuti semurikuenda kuhondo seiko? 
102 Timber logging in the area under Chief Njelele area began in June 1999 (Ms Chidzonga, Gokwe 
South RDC, Acting Campfire Co- ordinator). 
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crops in their fields but they were reminded that the RDC has power over trees - 
even the ones they had been reserving. 
Despite the disappointments the people felt that maybe this could be a blessing in 
disguise in that it would enable the people to have access to funds through the co- 
management arrangement which called for the sharing of resources through their 
partnership with the FCZ. The green gold was seen as an important source of real 
revenue and not proceeds from grass cutting, which would not be used for bigger 
projects. The Masawi people saw part of the proceeds going to the development of 
their school whilst the Chemwiro community saw their share going towards the 
Chemahororo Clinic. The RMC chairman further raised the people's hopes and won 
their support when he said he was going to make sure that the Masawi School gets 
the RMC funds (School Meeting of 14 January 2000). 
The people of Chemwiro -Masawi made a representation to the FCZ, not through the 
RMC, but through a village head and to the RDC on why they were not benefiting 
from forestry products yet the same district was involved in the Campfire 
programme. The RDC argued that Ward 14 (Njelele 3) was not a Campfire ward, 
which made them ineligible for the dividends under the Campfire programme. 
Moreover, the district understood Campfire to be encompassing wildlife - not 
forestry resources despite the acronym encompassing all natural resources 
(Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources - Campfire). 
The timber dividends issue was debated in a full council meeting. 
The Masawi people argued to their councillor that they needed the money for 
development of their school. When they realised that the council was not 
forthcoming and they were receiving letters from debt collectors advising them to 
settle their school furniture bill they then directed the Midsec Investigation Services 
Debt Collectors (Final Demand Letter dated 22 °a February 2000) to the Gokwe 
South RDC which they argued had to use the timber revenue to settle the 
outstanding debt. The RDC felt that it was now cornered. The RDC grudgingly 
agreed to helping Masawi School but argued that they had no money so they were 
not in a position to pay back the community. The tripartite argument is still raging 
on. An earlier interview with the Acting Chief Executive, Mr Mandibaya on 26 
164 
October 1999 indicated that the RDC was going to give a certain percentage of the 
timber revenue towards the school but he had no clear time span under which this 
was going to be done. The Acting Campfire Co- ordinator confirmed his statement. 
Masawi School is going to be one of the schools to benefit from commercial 
timber logging. It will probably get something but there are still some 
logistical issues to be sorted out (Acting Campfire Co- ordinator, Ms 
Chidzonga, Interview of 16 November 1999, Italics added). 
At the time of the final demand from the Debt Collectors, the total amount owed had 
gone up to $88 477.81. An interview with Mr Chikede who is the councillor for the 
Njelele 3 (Ward 14) on 10 December 1999 indicated that the Gokwe South RDC had 
tentatively said it would give 25% of the logging timber proceeds to the villages 
where logging would have taken place. He said he would have wanted the share 
going to the communities to be raised to 80% of the total revenue collected from 
commercial logging. 
Co- management in Chemwiro -Masawi seemed to be advocating for the management 
of resources without benefits. Murphree (1991) points at the need to have both 
resource use and management. Murphree (1991) further argues that resource use 
without resource management is not sustainable and that any attempt to establish 
resource management without resource use is likely to be futile. 
Roper and Maramba (2000) in the mid -term evaluation of the co- management 
initiative argue that government policy and the legal framework is not conducive for 
co- management. 
In Zimbabwe, community -based forest management is not a concept 
acknowledged in the official forest policy or in the Forest Act. In fact, the 
current forest policy is quite traditional in its scope, addressing the issues of 
maintaining and protecting the forest estate, reforestation and afforestation, 
promoting research and education, and developing forest industries and 
markets based on sustained yield forest management. These are very valid 
objectives for a national forest policy but there is no specific mention of 
community -based forest management or managing forests to meet 
community needs (Roper & Maramba 2000:10). 
Having looked at commercial timber logging, the next section looks at dead wood 
collection. 
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7.22. Dead wood Collection 
In Chemwiro -Masawi RMC the dead wood collection arrangements were similar to 
the ones in Batanai. Chemwiro -Masawi was however unique in the sense that there 
were still more pockets of vegetation cover within the communal lands as compared 
to Batanai. Firewood could also be illegally collected from the neighbouring 
Chemagora Small Scale Commercial Farming (SSCF) area, which was not under 
FCZ administration. The boundary with the reserved forestry was also distinctly 
marked by the Gokwe -Kwekwe main road, which made it easier to monitor illegal 
firewood collection. 
7.23. Grass Cutting and Administration 
The Chemwiro -Masawi RMC has been administering grass cutting since 1996. The 
RMC has been faced with a number of people who are refusing to pay their permit 
fees with others resorting to collecting either grass or broom grass illegally. This has 
been made more difficult due to the difficulties of enforcing the rules by the RMC, 
which seems to be developing cold feet. According to the RMC Chairman, people 
prefer to do other activities, which are more relevant to their livelihoods rather than 
attend to the unproductive co- management issues. 
7.24. Medicines 
Collection of tree parts such as leaves, roots or barks is not permitted in terms of the 
co- management arrangement. However a number of traditional healers have covertly 
continued to collect their medicines in the Mafungautsi forest. The strategy is to 
make sure that you are not caught. Mrs Kapamba, a member of the Zimbabwe 
National Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA) (interviewed 1 March 2000), 
argued that as members of ZINATHA they should be allowed into the forest to 
collect essential medicines in view of the escalating cost of conventional medicines 
and the non -availability of some of the medicines in the clinics and hospitals. The 
situation, she argued, has been exacerbated by the advent of Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). She argued that traditional medicine collection 
mechanism such as barking on the east and west sides of a tree ensured that the tree 
would survive and would be available for future generations. 
Another traditional healer interviewed on 25 November 1999 who declined to be 
named also confirmed this view. He also pointed out that he was not a member of 
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ZINATHA but it was in his interest to make sure that forestry resources are not 
destroyed, as they are a source of his medicines. Chief Njelele further pointed out 
that it was traditionally believed that if you let the tree where you collect medicine 
die, it would be a bad omen for the patient (Interview of 19 November 1998). He 
strongly felt that ZINATHA should be permitted to go into the forest for purposes of 
collecting herbs and medicines. Permission under the escort of the FPU would not 
work due to the secrecy nature of most healers, as they would not want anyone else 
to discover the source of their herbs. However some traditional healers such as Mr 
Magucho argued that they were collecting all the medicines which they needed 
within the communal lands (interviewed on 17 January 2000). Cavendish (1994) 
lists a number of trees and their sacred uses in Zimbabwe. Mubvumira (Kirkia 
acuminata) is used for talking to ancestors, whilst Muchakata (Parinari 
curatellifolia), Mukamba (Afzelia quanzensis), Mupfura (Sclerocarya birrea) are 
used for rainmaking and talking to ancestors and Chitarara being used for providing 
shade on the graves (cf McIvor 1989; McGregor 1995). 
7.25. Bee -keeping Initiatives: Who benefits? 
Chemwiro -Masawi has 30 beehives, which have not yet been commercially 
exploited as no honey has been harvested for the benefit of the community. The 
emphasis on FCZ - local relations in the above analyses may also misleadingly 
portray the co- management project as an arena exclusively pitting the state against 
local interests. Co- management can be an arena in which heterogeneous local 
interests are argued out simultaneously together with the overbearing interests of 
trans -local constituencies. For instance, a consortium of 10 business people, in 1999, 
approached the FCZ Provincial Manager and the RMC chairperson for Chemwiro- 
Masawi for a piece of land in the Mafungautsi Forest area for apiculture.'°3 
A 
portion of land measuring 4 900 square metres was excised and allocated to the 
group for the establishment of some 1 500 beehives. The FCZ Provincial Manager 
endorsed the agreement on the understanding that it was a genuinely community - 
backed development, but the arrangement happened to short- circuit the Project Co- 
ordinator who was away at the time. The FCZ reversed the agreement, ordering the 
community to take over the fenced area, and to reimburse the business people. Local 
'03 Ribot 1999:23 points out that decentralisation attempts may "reinforce the very structures of 
unequal privilege they (the enterprises) seek to upset" (cf. Dove 1993). 
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communities quietly ignored the order - their priorities were in developing Masawi 
School and Chemahororo Clinic. It was ascertained, meanwhile, that the RMC 
chairperson had allegedly been bribed in the deal. It was the rest of the community's 
feeling that the chairperson should solely be held accountable for reimbursement 
since he alone had been responsible for the penetration and capture of "their" project 
by the business elite. Moreover, their funding priorities were on Masawi School and 
Chemahororo Clinic. 
7.26. Powers over Financial Resources 
The Chemwiro -Masawi people wanted to embark on other income generating 
projects for which the FCZ did not give its blessings. A questionnaire survey 
conducted on 121 households in Chemwiro -Masawi showed that most people had no 
interest in bee -keeping. Figure 8 shows that out of the total of 121 respondents 
interviewed, 50 said they were not involved in any income generating activity. Of 
those involved in income generating activity 55 (41% of the sample) said that they 
were involved in market gardening as the main income generating project - outside 
the mainstream farming, as shown below: 
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Figure 8: Types of Projects in Chemwiro -Masawi 
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One respondent identified honey marketing as an important source of income, an 
activity that was promoted by the FCZ. Even the "illegal" fruit selling was 
considered to be a more important source of income than bee -keeping. The question 
then is: Why did FCZ promote bee -keeping? 
7.27. Environmental Destroyers 
The FCZ's impression on why the villagers should not be treated as equals with their 
own indigenous knowledge system was pretexted on their superior technical 
knowledge. In the workshops attended by the researcher it was constantly made 
clear that the main basis for designating the forest was on ecological grounds so as 
to reduce the amount of siltation getting to Zambezi River where the Kariba Hydro 
Electric Project is situated. The Mbumbusi, Sengwa and Lutope have their sources 
within the Mafungautsi Plateau in Mafungautsi Forest. The people of Gokwe were 
aware of the reduction of forest cover. There has not been any explanation on the 
impact of the forced removal of people from areas such as Rhodesdale into an 
ecologically fragile region of Gokwe and how this might as well have contributed to 
the reduction in vegetation cover; the whole issue had to be put in its political 
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economy context. Just before the implementation of the co- management began in 
Mafungautsi the FCZ chartered a light aircraft in March 1993 which flew the 
traditional leaders, councillors, the then Cheziya -Gokwe District Council Staff, FCZ 
staff and the District Administrator over Mafungautsi and its neighbouring 
communal land. The main purpose of the fly -over was to show the councillors (and 
traditional leaders) the difference between the state protected forest and the 
surrounding communal areas with regards to depletion of resources and vegetation 
cover (FCZ March 1994: 7). The people of Chemwiro -Masawi were aware of the 
environmental changes in their area. Of the 121 people interviewed 115 (95 %) 
noted that there were environmental problems in their community. Figure 9 shows 
that the local farmers were using various mechanisms to keep environmental 
degradation in control. The researcher witnessed such efforts as people in Masawi 
covered up a gully close to Masawi School as a way of reducing soil erosion. 
Figure 9: Conservation Methods Practised in Gokwe 
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As shown by figure 9 all the respondents were using various methods of 
conservation with most of them using contour ridges (49 %). Interviews with Chief 
Njelele also showed that traditional leaders were still making people pay fines for 
destroying natural resources. The researcher also attended traditional court sessions 
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where some villagers were ordered to pay fines to the chief or headman for violating 
traditional resource management rules. This however does not remove bias and 
favouritism by traditional leaders in exercising their duties as guardians of natural 
resources (cf Mandondo 2000; Mukamuri 1995). In some instances traditional 
leaders "manipulate social controls so that they are inclusionary with respect to cost 
but exclusionary with respect to benefit" (Mandondo 2000: 71). Some residents used 
the religious arguments to justify the need to protect natural resources which man is 
holding in trust for God. This was illustrated in Mbuya Manquma's sermon from the 
book of Genesis at a sermon attended by the researcher in Masawi Village (African 
Apostolic Faith Mission Service held on 11 March 2001). Mr Siwela, a church elder, 
had previously cited Genesis 1 verse 26 (Interview of 27 December 1999). These 
two sermons pointed out that God created the earth and it was important that man 
looks after the natural resources entrusted to him by God. Having looked at the co- 
management arrangement in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi the next section is 
a comparative analysis of the two case study RMCs. 
7.28. Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi: a comparative analysis 
7.28.1. Formation Process 
In both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs the formation process was clearly 
driven by the FCZ. The electoral process for the RMCs were carefully manipulated 
in both RMCs. In the case of Chemwiro -Masawi it involved the nullification of a 
vote of no confidence passed by the community on the pretext that there was a need 
to maintain the trained RMC members, even given their inefficiency. In Batanai, the 
FCZ approved a committee with political heavy weights who later misused the RMC 
funds. Later they were to manipulate the electoral process in order to sideline a 
female considered counter productive. This involved manipulating the number of 
votes that she got. These two were both created at the beginning of the 
implementation process. In both instances it was the FCZ which had the power to set 
up the rules of co- management. In the face of the FCZ and its upwardly accountable 
RMC, the people felt they would contest their case through defying and 
undermining co- management's neat bureaucracy. Chemwiro -Masawi even tried to 
challenge the FCZ's choice of the RMC through the passing of a "vote of no 
confidence" in their RMC. This was subsequently overruled thereby further 
entrenching the RMC's upwardly accountability. 
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7.28.2. Constitution 
In both RMCs the constitution was adopted without any amendments. This was also 
true of all the RMCs in the co- management project. The operational framework was 
the same as they were all governed by the FCZ. Rules were beyond the 
comprehension of both RMCs as they were all written in English. 
7.28.3. Commercial Timber Logging 
Chemwiro -Masawi was unique in the sense that there was commercial timber 
logging going on in the communal area. This gave an opportunity for contestation 
between the local people, the FCZ and Gokwe South RDC. Commercial timber 
logging by Mockdale Company gave an opportunity to the local community to claim 
proceeds from timber. In terms of the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987, 
the proceeds are supposed to go to the RDC with FCZ getting a supervisory fee. The 
community was further confused in that they felt that co- management, which was 
joint management and ownership, was supposed to make them equal partners in 
deriving benefits from timber rather than being restricted to some peripheral benefits 
such as thatch and broom grass. The arguments and debates between the community, 
represented by the traditional village head, not the RMC, and the need to pay for the 
school furniture led to the community directing debt collectors to the RDC so that 
payments of the amount owed had to be paid by the RDC. This forced the RDC to 
accept to pay some proceeds but without any serious commitment as to when and 
how it was going to be done. This further exposed the RDC's double standards in 
that the same RDC that was engaged in Campfire on one hand disputed the fact that 
Campfire was about all the natural resources - not wildlife only. The machinations 
of the Chemwiro -Masawi Community could partly be attributed to the machination 
of one of the village heads who was also the secretary to the late Chief Njelele. The 
same village head was also a member of the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)'s 
provincial committee. He also boasted of having visited Sweden as part of a group 
of farmers who wanted to assess the operations of farmers' organisations in other 
countries. He was a former teacher who lost his job when the government removed 
untrained teachers. The need for benefiting from commercial timber logging was 
also raised in Ngomeni and Muyambi Wards during the 1993 Ward Workshops. The 
people pointed out that the Arusha Timber Company, another concessionary 
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company that operated in Gokwe earlier on, should not have benefited alone from 
the concessions, as the community felt it was entitled to the benefits. 
7.28.4. Bee -Keeping within Mafungautsi 
Chemwiro -Masawi was in a unique position in that they were allowed to set up a 
bee -keeping project at the edge of the Mafungautsi forest. The project, however, 
seem to have been hijacked by the elite, most of whom were not resident in either 
Chemwiro or Masawi. This group of ten business people had co -opted the RMC 
chairperson as the eleventh member. The people saw his co- operation with the 
business community as a betrayal of their interest. This is probably one of the 
reasons why a vote of no confidence in the RMC was passed. The vote of no 
confidence was however over -ruled by the FCZ. The group of business persons 
further had a vision of starting a dairy project within the Mafungautsi forest. 
However, the community did not want to buy out the business people as they felt 
they could use their money better, elsewhere. 
7.28.5. Availability of Firewood 
Whilst the issue of firewood was important for both areas, the Batanai area was in a 
more desperate situation as compared to the Chemwiro -Masawi area which was 
closer to the SSCF area, which was also reasonably endowed with trees. This meant 
that the people had a choice of getting firewood from the small scale farming areas. 
There was much more vegetation cover within Chemwiro -Masawi RMC. This can 
be explained by the fact that a number of people were moved from the Mafungautsi 
Forest and forced into a small part of the Batanai area, which resulted in more 
people occupying small pieces of land. However, Chemwiro -Masawi did not have 
such a history and the influx of people has not been to the same degree as in Batanai. 
Batanai used to be closer to Nyaradza which used to house former detainees. This 
was an area where the former political detainees were kept, in a remote area far 
away from the rest of the people whom they were not supposed to contaminate with 
their radical political ideas. This was mainly in the 1960s. The firewood shortages 
are therefore more pronounced in the Batanai area than Chemwiro -Masawi area. In 
both instances people continued to collect firewood "illegally" as the co- 
management arrangement was strategically designed to keep firewood collection to 
the minimum. It did not dovetail well into the labour demands for households in 
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both RMCs. Faced with such a scenario; even RMC members were allegedly 
involved in the "illegal" or unsupervised firewood collection. 
7.28.6. Financial Resources 
The Chemwiro -Masawi RMC was the first to question why there was no provision 
for RMC funds from money from CIDA. The RMC, mainly through the traditional 
village leader, was of the opinion that project funds should benefit the community in 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMC. The communities were supposed to benefit directly from 
the funds rather than have all the funds going towards the acquisition of FCZ 
vehicles and equipment. Such echoes came more from Chemwiro -Masawi than from 
Batanai RMC. The Mafungautsi Project spent a budget of Z$8 246 422 on 
operational costs. Capital costs amounted to Z$4 606 243. This totalled Z$12 852 
665 of which most of it directly benefited the FCZ alone. The RMCs received less 
than one percent of the total co- management budget. This meant that co- 
management benefited the FCZ more than the local community. The FCZ got 
vehicles, office equipment, FPU houses at Lutope, lodges and equipment for use by 
the FPU. 
7.28.7. Powers to hold Meetings 
Both RMCs seem to rely on the FCZ coming and organising meetings. The FCZ 
would take the official minutes at these meetings. The issue of conducting meetings 
was outlined in the constitutions. The fact that this was not a negotiated constitution 
meant that many RMCs did not understand what was written in it. This then made 
the communities dependent on the FCZ even on issues, which were clearly 
stipulated in their constitutions. The constitutions seem not to have been user 
friendly as they were written in English, a language that alienated most of the people 
in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. In the event that they held meetings on their 
own, such meetings would not decide on any forestry decision without the FCZ's 
endorsement. 
7.28.8. Accountability 
Political or democratic decentralisation occurs when powers and resources are 
transferred to authorities representative of and downwardly accountable to local 
populations (Crook & Manor 1998; Agrawal & Ribot 1999). In both Batanai and 
174 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs the RMCs seem not to have been given much room to 
manoeuvre. As the two case studies have shown the new institutions do not seem to 
have been given any form of meaningful powers resulting in them being upwardly 
accountable to the FCZ. 
The co- management gospel according to the FCZ was to be seen from the 
perspectives of ecological conservation. Mr Foyo (19 December 1995) pointed that 
the objective of the project was to conserve trees and natural resources in the forest. 
Mr Dzinoreva (the then District Administrator) pointed out that the people were 
accepting the gospel that they were preaching (20 December 1995). A respondent in 
Chemwiro -Masawi RMC area seem to have summed up the RMC business when he 
said, "RMCs are dying a natural death because the power was given to the RMCs 
and not the ordinary community people" (Mpofu, interviewed on 21 August 2001). 
Right from the conception of the co- management it looks like the FCZ was moving 
into co- management only as a way of resolving conflicts. At the beginning of the 
implementation of the project the first field officer to implement co- management 
said: 
The Forestry Commission controls the forest area and will continue doing so 
after the implementation of the project. It will maintain the role designated to 
them by the government. ...co- management is meant to minimise conflicts 
between the Commission and the communities, which normally lead to the 
destruction of natural resources (Mr Ngwenya, Forestry Commission Gokwe, 
11 and 22 December 1995 cited in Nhira's Notes). 
From this statement one notes that the co- management of forestry resources in 
Mafungautsi was not a negotiated arrangement but only had conservation objectives 
without the need to take on board the values and beliefs of the local partners in co- 
management. What is outstanding about the approach in Mafungautsi is how the 
social considerations for the local actors in the Mafungautsi area were often seen as 
what Hobart calls the "obstacles to rational progress" (Hobart 1993: 2). The FCZ 
tried to convince the people that destroying natural resources was illegal by citing 
sections of the Forest Act Chapter 19:05, Communal Lands Forest Produce Act 
1987 and the Natural Resources Act 20:13 of 1996. Their explanations, using 
English terms, were probably not understood as the post - meeting interviews 
showed (15 March 2001). 
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The project co- ordinator argued that this was a resource sharing scheme NOT a co- 
management scheme. There was no management role for the communities. 
Management of the forest, it was argued, was still a preserve of the FCZ. The rural 
communities were compared to children in a household who were said to have no 
say in how the head of the household runs it - and probably one could add or mis- 
runs it (Interview of 13 February 2001). One of the traditional leaders in Chemwiro- 
Masawi, Mr Manquma, questioned why the donor funds were being used to acquire 
tractors and vehicles, which did not directly benefit the communities but FCZ 
(Focus Group Discussion of 15 January 1998). 
7.28.9. Land Shortages 
The underlying challenge, which comes out in both RMCs, is the issue of land. Most 
people feel that the FCZ stole their land (Headman Ndhlalambi 22 January 1998). 
He further pointed out that 7 of his villageheads were chased out of Mafungautsi 
Forest. The eviction of people from the forest also saw the Batanai people, who were 
originally under Chief Njelele, being moved to the other side to be under the 
Nemangwe Chieftainship. 
Chikati, the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC Chairman, said that there was a need for a few 
people to be allowed to settle in the forest so that they will be monitoring illegal 
activities from within the forest. He said he felt that there were very productive 
pockets of soil in the forest area (15 January 1998). All such moves were an attempt 
to address the land issue. Natural resource issues are interlinked with the availability 
of land. By August 2001, 49 households had settled in Mafungautsi Forest with a 
total of 180 households said to have "registered" with the new Mafungautsi village 
head. This also coincided with the government's controversial land invasions (cf 
Moyo 2001; Marongwe 2002). This sounded like the death sentence for co- 
management in Mafungautsi. 
This Chapter has looked at the implementation of co- management in both Batanai 
and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs. It concluded with a comparative analysis and 
commentary on the case study RMCs. The next chapter investigates the processes 
governing land cover change in and around Mafungautsi forest using GIS and 
participatory mapping. 
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Chapter Eight 
An investigation of land cover change in Mafungautsi Forest, 
using GIS and participatory mapping 
8.0. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the processes governing land cover change in and around 
the Mafungautsi Forest Reserve in Zimbabwe. The last chapter mainly looked at the 
social and economic outcomes of decentralised forestry management. This chapter 
further aims to demonstrate some of the driving forces for such land cover loss 
processes. Through the use of GIS and participatory mapping, trends towards 
landcover changes will be demonstrated and the general decline of landcover in the 
communal area and its potential impact on the demand of forestry resources within 
Mafungautsi will be illustrated through the use of maps. This study site, as 
previously explained, lies at the interface between the state and communal property 
regimes. Land cover change was analysed using aerial photography for 1976, 1984 
and 1996 within a Geographic Information System (GIS). Perceived change and its 
causes were investigated through governmental data sources, participatory mapping 
and interviews with the local community and forest guards. It was found that whilst 
forest cover within the reserve has remained constant, there has been a steady 
decline in forest cover outside its boundaries. This decline, a result of agricultural 
expansion and demand for building materials and firewood, was perceived as more 
pronounced by local farmers than the FCZ. 
In the last decade, the established view of land cover change in Africa has been 
reappraised. For much of the last century, environmental degradation (loss of forest 
cover and soil erosion) were held to increase linearly with population density and 
measures were put in place to combat such changes (Tiffen, Mortimore & Gichuki 
1994a, 1994b; Bassett & Bi Zueli 2000). In Zimbabwe, for example, forest reserves 
were gazetted to protect river catchment areas through the removal of human 
population. More recent work in Guinea, however, has shown that the relationship 
between population density and land cover change is more complex (Fairfield & 
Leach 1996). In the longer term, cyclical expansion and contraction of forests may 
take place as agricultural land is abandoned and then recolonised. "Crisis narratives" 
of environmental history have also been challenged by further work in Cote d'Ivoire 
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(Bassett & Bi Zueli 2000) and Kenya (Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki 1994a, 
1994b). 
Previous research (Elliot & Campbell 2001) has also questioned the simplistic 
assumption that a reduction in percentage tree cover necessarily leads to greater 
scarcity of woodland resources. Within Zimbabwe, Scoones & Wilson (1988) have 
shown that biomass production per hectare may actually increase as tree cover 
diminishes when remaining woodlots are managed by pollarding or coppicing. 
Similarly, Wilson (1989, 1990) showed that the abundance of fruit trees did not 
decline after deforestation, because fruit trees were selectively conserved and their 
value recognised by smallholders.'°4 
Specific responses to resource shortages in miombo woodlands are often complex 
and may vary between locales. Privatisation of resources has been documented as 
one response to scarcity in Zimbabwe's smallholder areas (Scoones & Wilson 1988; 
Mukamuri 1995), but elsewhere communal arrangements have been re- instigated in 
the face of natural resource shortages (van den Brink & Bromley 1992). Campbell 
Grundy & Matose (1993) found that the choice of tree species for construction and 
firewood became less selective as resources became scarcer. As firewood 
availability declines, harvesting arrangements change and men often become more 
involved in its collection (Campbell, Grundy & Matose 1993; Mapedza, Wright & 
Fawcett 2003). These findings imply that responses to perceived scarcity of natural 
resources may be complex and unpredictable. 
Many of these more recent studies have relied on participatory methods to explore 
local understanding of environmental history. However, findings from Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) can be affected by the composition of participant groups and 
group discussions influenced by one or two dominant individuals. To overcome 
these inherent weaknesses, Goebel (1996) has suggested that techniques such as 
PRA should best be deployed in conjunction with other methods, so that findings 
104 In Mafungautsi most farmers left a lot of fruit and non -fruit trees in their fields as a mechanism for 
getting nutritional supplement, cash income through selling of fruits and addition of soil fertility 
through litter fall in the Kalahari sands of Mafungautsi (cf Wilson) for Chivi whilst other researchers 
have noted the same practice elsewhere in Zimbabwe (Robinson 1953; Murphree 1969; Wilson 
1989). 
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from technical and social research methods may subsequently be triangulated. One 
such complementary technology is GIS, which has previously been used with 
participatory methods to explore land cover change in Ghana and Zimbabwe (Elliot 
and Campbell, 2001). A second complementary technique is participatory mapping, 
in which maps or aerial photographs form the basis for group discussion of 
environmental change or land ownership. Aerial photography has successfully been 
used in interviews with illiterate farmers in Nepal (Mather et al. 1998), Cote d'Ivoire 
(Bassett 1993), and in educational studies of young children from several countries 
(Blades et al. 1998). 
This chapter explores land cover change in and around Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, 
part of the Zambezi River catchment area in central Zimbabwe. Changes in land 
cover between 1976 and 1996 are assessed using historical aerial photography and 
land use is described using participatory interviews centred on the 1996 aerial 
photographs. Comments from these interviews about underlying drivers of land use 
change (population, soil fertility, and enforcement within the forest reserve) are 
compared, both between respondents and with other data sources. The reasons for 
the adoption of this strategy were two -fold. Firstly, whilst remote sensing studies 
can identify changes in land cover, the changes in land use that lead to vegetation 
change are very difficult to determine without follow -up fieldwork on the ground. 
Secondly, vegetation change as perceived by land users may differ from actual 
vegetation change and be an important determinant of behaviour among those using 
local natural resources. Participatory mapping techniques were therefore used to 
elicit information from residents regarding land use and perceived land cover 
change. 
Changes in land cover were examined through a combination of: 
(i) Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers 1994; IIED 1995; Goebel 
1996), 
(ii) Semi - structured interviews using aerial photographs, 
(iii) Analysis of historical aerial photography within GIS, 
(iv) Analysis of secondary data relating to rainfall, crop yields, and arrests, 
(v) Follow -up interviews with FCZ staff and groups of youths, women, and the 
elderly. 
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The above methods were used as previously outlined in Chapter 5. 
8.1. Results 
A clear -cut perceptual division between the forest reserve and the communal land 
pervaded all the interview sessions and is therefore reflected in the presentation of 
results here. The pattern of land cover change in both areas as recorded through 
interviews with the FPU and communal farmers and through aerial photography 
analysis are shown as Annex 2. This annex also compares perceived changes in land 
use and its drivers according to these interviews and governmental data. 
8.1.1. Land Cover Changes within Mafungautsi 
The FPU guard interviewed felt that tree cover within Mafungautsi had remained 
largely unchanged in the last 10 years, although pole -poaching had reduced tree 
cover in some peripheral areas of the forest reserve. At Batanai, the farmers' group 
felt strongly that tree cover had increased within Mafungautsi over the past ten 
years, whilst opinions at Chemwiro -Masawi were divided, some perceiving 
increased tree cover and others a decrease. The PRA interview with the women's 
group at Batanai suggested that they were even more aware of the reduction in tree 
cover than the male farmers' group. 
Analysis of aerial photography for the Batanai area supported the observations of 
farmers within this RMC. Within Mafungautsi forest reserve, tree cover declined 
from 68% in 1976/7 to 66% in 1984, but then rose again to 71% by 1996. Some 
1.5% of this change may be due to positional inaccuracy in delineating the reserve 
boundary, as estimated from the RMS errors in Table 14 below. 
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Table 14: Root Mean Square error statistics (in metres) 
year Image no. RMS error No. control points 
1976 1 22.7 16 
1976 2 19.4 14 
1976 3 15.4 15 
1984 1 12.0 13 
1984 2 25.4 15 
1984 3 25.3 15 
1996 1 23.9 12 
1996 2 28.7 12 
1996 3 23.0 11 
Figure 10 illustrates the changes in land cover within Batanai. During and 
immediately after the independence war, several communal fanners encroached into 
the forest reserve as political insecurity led to the suspension of enforcement of its 
boundaries. The land cleared by the "settlers" can be seen on both the 1976 and 
1984 aerial photographs in Figure 10. By 1996, the northern area of encroachment 
had largely reverted to forest, whilst the southern encroachment area remained as 
grassland. 
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8.1.2. Land Cover Changes in Communal Areas 
The Batanai group felt strongly that tree cover was diminishing rapidly within their 
village, because of pressure for agricultural land, building materials, and wood for 
fuel. The situation was further exacerbated as diminishing crop yields forced some 
farmers to cultivate streambeds. In Chemwiro -Masawi, the situation was somewhat 
more complex. In one part of the communal area, trees had been felled 
commercially by permission of the RDC, but against the wishes of local residents as 
described in Chapter seven. 
Elsewhere, piecemeal tree -felling for timber and land clearance was taking place. 
Chemwiro -Masawi residents felt that the composition of tree species on their land 
would shift towards eucalyptus species and away from indigenous species. 
Although the forest guard felt unfamiliar with the situation within the communal 
areas, he did feel that there had been some localised loss of tree cover. This was 
confirmed in a subsequent interview with another FCZ representative, although 
there was no systematic monitoring of forest composition and biodiversity. In 
common with many other communal areas (Campbell, du Toit & Attwell 1989) 
indigenous fruit trees were not felled and no respondents envisaged a situation 
where fruit trees would be at risk. In addition, some remaining patches of vegetation 
cover were associated with rain making ceremonies (mutoro). Those who violated 
these rules were fined or cautioned by traditional leaders such as Chief Njelele and 
headman Ndhlalambi. Nevana is the spirit medium for the Gokwe area who gives 
general guidelines on sacred trees. He is based in Gokwe North RDC, in 
Nembudziya. 
The observations of the Batanai community are again supported by the aerial 
photography. Percentage tree cover was estimated to have declined from 51% in 
1976/7, to 47% in 1984 and then to 14% by 1996. This large decrease was mainly 
due to the de- gazetting of Batanai and subsequent clearing of land for cultivation 
and homesteads by immigrants. As shown in Figure 10, in 1972 a section of forest 
was de- gazetted and legal occupation by smallholders began. By 1996, virtually all 
of this forest had been felled, whilst elsewhere in the communal area, further losses 
of tree cover took place, albeit on a smaller scale. 
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Whilst many land use drivers had been identified prior to fieldwork, several themes 
only became apparent during the semi - structured interviews. These themes included 
the importance of declining soil fertility (Kalahari sands) and crop yields in driving 
land clearance in the communal areas and the perceived effect of land cover changes 
on rainfall patterns and stream flow. 
8.1.3. Fire 
The group of farmers at Chemwiro -Masawi held that the frequency of fires within 
the forest reserve had declined following co- management, principally because of 
community enforcement and the imposition of steep fines for offenders. In contrast, 
the FPU felt that the burning regime had remained unchanged over the previous 10 
years. In Batanai, fire was regarded as a useful means of managing vegetation. Not 
only did regular burning of vleis make hunting of game easier, but it also reduced 
the tick population. Burning therefore combated cattle disease and encouraged grass 
re- growth, thus improving grazing potential. Fires were occasionally started as a 
means of collecting honey. Fire was also considered a means of settling scores with 
the FPU and a useful tactic for distracting forest guards for those wishing to enter 
the forest reserve illegally. The Chemwiro -Masawi group felt farmers there realised 
that persistent burning reduced thatch and broom grass quality, whilst the Batanai 
group considered burning a means of improving grazing quality for cattle. The FPU 
regarded vlei- burning as more frequent in the Batanai area, with vleis closest to the 
communal areas being most at risk. In contrast, an earlier study at Mafungautsi 
(Matose 1994) found that people starting fires were reprimanded, because fires were 
often followed by invasion of a noxious weed known as mukauzani, which is 
poisonous to cattle 
All respondent groups agreed that livestock numbers had not changed substantially 
in the last ten years. It was felt that there was a natural limit to the number of cattle 
that could graze within Mafungautsi. All respondents reported that cattle graze 
unsupervised within Mafungautsi, but concentrate largely in the vleis and grassy 
areas once occupied by "settlers ". Approximately 20 000 cattle are estimated to enter 
the forest every year (Matzke 1993). 
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Views about tree planting within Communal Areas differed between the three 
interviews. In Batanai, farmers believed that there was little benefit to be derived 
from planting trees, partly because of the long delay before any wood could be 
harvested. Some also believed that the FCZ might repossess communal land 
afforestated with eucalyptus and were suspicious of planting schemes. In 
Chemwiro -Masawi, it was felt that uptake of planting was high because of free 
seedlings and pockets provided by FCZ. However, some people expressed concern 
about limited land availability for tree planting. Subsequent field visits suggested 
that only a few individuals had planted eucalyptus extensively. 
All respondent groups showed clear awareness of their designated permit areas for 
thatch and broom collection, and there was a broad correspondence between the 
areas identified by the forest guard and those identified by villagers (Figure 11). In 
Batanai, very little thatch and broom was available in the communal areas, and this 
led to some illegal collection of inferior quality Ndabula grass for thatch from the 
forest margins, in addition to grass collection from permit areas. In Chemwiro- 
Masawi, however, thatch and broom grass grew within the communal area and so 
local residents had less need to visit Mafungautsi regularly to collect grass for their 
own huts. This meant that the local RMC could grant permits to outsiders from 
neighbouring communal areas such as Nkayi, thereby guaranteeing income for the 
RMC. It was anticipated that local residents would continue to use thatch and 
broom from within the VIDCO in the future, but that demand for thatch and broom 
from other areas - and with it the value of permits - would increase as natural 
resources elsewhere became depleted. 
8.1.4. Timber and Firewood Collection 
Pole poaching was considered to be most intense near the Bulawayo road (See 
Figure 11), in the forest areas closest to communal settlement. 
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A similar decrease in pole cutting with distance from settlement was observed in a 
previous study of basal area plots within Mafungautsi (Vermeulen 1996). Those 
interviewed felt that this area was especially prone to pole poaching both because 
homesteads were located close to the reserve boundary and because pole trees within 
the communal area had been exhausted. All respondents felt that firewood 
collection was restricted to the forest margins. The Chemwiro -Masawi group 
suggested that collection was well controlled by the RMC, with dead wood only 
being gathered on designated days. In Batanai, respondents suggested that firewood 
collection was less well controlled and that those with scotch carts could forage 
further for wood than those without transport. 
All those interviewed believed that collection of wild fruits and mushrooms was 
restricted to the edges of the forest reserve. The Batanai group of farmers considered 
both fruit trees and mushrooms to be evenly distributed throughout the forest, whilst 
the Chemwiro -Masawi group felt that there were slightly more fruit trees along the 
edges of vleis. Only one respondent, the FPU guard, identified an area with a high 
density of mazhanje fruit trees (Uapaca kirkiana). 
8.1.5. Underlying Drivers of Land Cover Change 
Drivers of land cover change identified in this study included population increase, 
declining soil fertility and increased monitoring of illegal activities within the 
Mafungautsi Forest. These underlying drivers for land cover change are discussed 
below. 
All groups agreed that increasing population was a major cause of vegetation 
change. The FPU noted that pole poaching often increased following the arrival of 
new immigrants to an area, as the new arrivals sought materials within Mafungautsi 
for housing. In Chemwiro -Masawi, those interviewed felt confident that future 
population gains were likely to come from natural increases in population rather 
than immigration. In Batanai, it was felt that natural population increase was 
slowing down because of HIV /AIDS, but immigration was continuing. One 
respondent suggested that anyone leaving his or her home temporarily would risk 
losing land and housing to a newcomer, implying that immigration was perceived as 
ongoing. 
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The PRA and resource mapping exercises revealed details of migrant characteristics 
and the timing of migration episodes. Following tsetse eradication, the original 
Shangwe people inhabiting the area surrounding Mafungautsi were joined by 
migrants from elsewhere in Zimbabwe, attracted by its cotton -growing potential. On 
discovering that this area was not very productive and now densely crowded, some 
of these migrants moved further north to areas with less sandy soils known as 
Chidhaka, such as Madzivazvido or Chireya. Although cotton income later attracted 
immigrants to the area, some were forcibly moved by the colonial government as a 
result of the Native Husbandry Act of 1951. This act allocated certain areas to white 
settlers and many of the current Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi residents were 
forcibly evicted from Rhodesdale. After Rhodesdale was designated "Crown (state) 
Land ", its population was evicted in stages during the 1950s and 1960s (Ndanga 
1987; Nyambara 1999). Others migrated from densely settled rural areas such as 
Zimuto, Chivhu, Chirimuhanzu, Gutu, Bikita, Gweru, and Nkayi, as a result of land 
shortages (Mehlo 1970; Nyambara 1999). Some immigrants were retrenchees from 
the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) near Kwekwe, about 130 
kilometres south of Gokwe centre. Many immigrants to Gokwe tended to be 
wealthier than the original Shangwe people and some were former civil servants, 
such as teachers. This meant that they had enough capital to buy inputs for cotton 
farming. 
Declining soil fertility was cited as a major cause of land hunger in both RMCs. This 
is mainly due to the local Kalahari sandy soils, which are productive during initial 
cultivation but quickly lose fertility over time (Manyame, per. Comm. 2000). Most 
communal farmers historically countered this problem by cultivating extensively, 
but this is becoming increasingly difficult due to the shortage of virgin land. 
Indirectly, declining soil fertility increased pressure on the forest reserve by 
reducing the land available for planting eucalyptus within the communal areas. In 
Batanai, some farmers cultivated streambeds to overcome declining yields. In 
Chemwiro -Masawi, most farmers held that fertilisers did not improve yields in the 
predominantly sandy soils there and so even greater input availability would not 
counteract declining soil fertility. Such scepticism about fertiliser effectiveness was 
also found in an earlier study of Mafungautsi (Matose 1994). 
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Aside from the independence war, when lack of enforcement enabled migrants to 
settle in Mafungautsi, enforcement changes have also profoundly influenced land 
cover at other times. The group at Batanai felt strongly that the number of people 
arrested entering Mafungautsi had increased sharply in the last ten years. Not only 
were perimeter patrols more frequent, but offenders were now more likely to be 
prosecuted and fines had become more expensive. This stricter enforcement was the 
principal reason why the group considered tree cover within Mafungautsi reserve to 
be increasing; yet simultaneously decreasing in the surrounding communal areas.1o5 
This observation is supported by quantitative data on the number of arrests within 
the reserve, which rose from an average of 8 per year between 1991 -94 to 16 per 
year between 1995 -98. However, such prosecution figures are only a crude 
indicator of enforcement and may also reflect changes in poaching levels. The 
Chemwiro -Masawi group also felt that enforcement had become stricter, both 
because fines were more expensive and because the RMC were now involved in 
enforcement. 
8.1.6. Discussion 
Previous studies have examined land use and land cover change by combining 
remote sensing with a variety of interview techniques. In the UK questionnaires 
were used to assess the impact of farming on vegetation change (Potter, Barr & 
Lobley 1996), whilst in Ethiopia ecological time -lines were used to reconstruct 
histories of land cover change (Reid et al. 2000). In Kenya, interviews focusing on 
land use were conducted whilst walking along vegetation transacts with respondents 
(Mahiri 1997), whilst in Cote d'Ivoire group discussions with herders were used to 
identify the drivers of changes in savanna landscapes (Bassett & Bi Zueli 2000). In 
this study, semi - structured interviews were combined with participatory mapping 
using photo- mosaics. The advantages of this technique were that it yielded land use 
maps that could be easily geo- referenced and related to remote sensing data, whilst 
being sufficiently flexible to explore unanticipated themes that arose during 
1°5 It is also important to note that this could be as a result of the increased scarcity of trees in the 
communal area which has resulted in more people getting forestry products from Mafungautsi. 
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interview. It thus represents a promising addition to the range of interview 
techniques available for exploring land use and land cover change. 
Participatory mapping revealed greater detail about the timing and causes of land 
cover change than aerial photo analysis alone. Previous studies have identified 
substantial variation in both socio- economic characteristics and vegetation in many 
of Zimbabwe's communal areas (Jackson & Collier 1988; Campbell, du Toit & 
Attwell 1989). Whilst this local variability was apparent in PRA and group 
interview data, this variability is not discernible from government data sources. For 
example, the interview data here suggested that in eastern Batanai, settlements were 
close to the forest margin, thus leading to greater crop damage by wildlife and pole 
poaching. Such local variations in settlement patterns are not apparent in census 
population counts, which are available for the whole of Batanai RMC only. Specific 
events that affected land cover and its drivers - such as the evictions that took place 
under the Native Husbandry Act - could only be identified through interviews on the 
ground. This lends weight to the need to marry technical methods with participatory 
approaches (cf Elliot & Campbell 2001). 
However, one difficulty with the participatory mapping technique lies in 
distinguishing the relative impact of discussion group composition versus 
geographical location on interview results. In this study, the different results in the 
Chemwiro -Masawi and Batanai interviews were in part due to geographical 
differences between the two RMCs and partly due to differences in group 
composition (i.e. the presence of senior community representatives and RMC 
members in one group, but not in the other). In a rural developing country setting, 
where respondents may be travelling some distance to attend interviews on an 
allocated day, standardising group composition across different sites is in practice 
difficult to achieve (Goebel 1996). 
8.1.7. Land Cover Change in Mafungautsi 
The FPU perceived land cover change somewhat differently to the smallholder 
farmers living on the forest reserve margins. Whilst many of the farmers felt that 
tree cover within the reserve had increased, the FPU felt that tree cover was stable 
with localised losses due to pole -poaching. The farmers were also more acutely 
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aware of the loss of tree cover in the Communal Areas than the FPU. Such 
differences in perception of land cover change have also been found in other studies 
that combined interviews with remote sensing in West Africa. Fairhead and Leach 
(1996) described how technical officers may interpret local developments so as to 
justify their own interventionist policies. The differing perceptions of land cover 
change between the Batanai farmers and the FPU could be due to the latter's need to 
maintain their status. By suggesting that forest cover in the reserve was unchanged, 
the FPU could justify their presence as a barrier against forest degradation. In the 
Gokwe study sites, women were more aware of a reduction in vegetation cover, 
probably due to their key role in firewood collection and the need to walk further as 
fuel wood became scarcer. This awareness of forest cover among women concurs 
with previous work (Clarke, Cavendish & Coote 1996), which found that women 
knew of uses for a greater number of tree species than men did. 
Underlying tensions between many of the key actors at Mafungautsi became 
apparent during the course of the study. Some neighbouring communal farmers had 
cultivated land within the reserve during the period of weak enforcement from 1978- 
1983106 and subsequently been expelled. This group still felt entitled to the gazetted 
land within the reserve and resented the presence of the FPU in enforcing the 
reserve's boundaries. When co- management was introduced, it was seen as a 
mechanism for resolving this conflict (Matzke 1993; Nhira et al. 1998). However, 
the FPU clearly felt that the new RMCs contributed little to enforcing regulations 
within the reserve, whilst one RMC was criticised for not distributing income 
generated through co- management more widely within the community. 
Given the evidence presented here, it seems likely that the communal areas 
surrounding Mafungautsi will experience ever -declining tree cover, unless 
participatory action is taken. Even without any local population increases, this trend 
seems likely to continue because of soil fertility decline and because of felling by 
remote actors. If current land use drivers continue to operate, the remaining 
communal woodland is likely to shift in composition towards fruit trees and 
eucalyptus as felling continues and some farmers take up incentive schemes for tree- 
106 The period is often referred to as "madiro" (cf. Matose 1994; Moore 1994). 
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planting. Within Mafungautsi, increased pole poaching seems likely without greater 
economic incentives for local communities to respect the reserve's boundaries. The 
gazetting of Mafungautsi resulted in local communities perceiving it as state 
property and the `withdrawal' of traditional forestry conservation practices within 
the gazetted area. Imposed solutions, such as the rural afforestation programme 
(Whitlow 1988; Elliot 1991; McGregor 1995), appear unsustainable in the long term 
and there is need for local solutions adapted to the particular social, economic and 
political circumstances in Mafungautsi. This may be achieved, one may argue, 
through the creation of a downwardly accountable RMCs in the co- management 
arrangement as pointed out in previous chapters. 
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Chapter Nine 
Devolved forestry management in Zimbabwe: Reality or 
Rhetoric ?107 
9.0. Introduction 
This chapter is an overview of the research findings from Mafungautsi's co- 
management attempts in Gokwe South District of Zimbabwe. The chapter will be in 
the form of an overall assessment of co- management in terms of its inception, 
powers, accountability arrangements, local and non -local interactions and questions 
whether the Mafungautsi has resulted in co- management or co- ownership of the 
forestry resources. This research has demonstrated that decentralisation of forestry 
resources in Mafungautsi is "supply led" rather than "demand driven ". It then 
concludes, based on the evidence from Mafungautsi in Zimbabwe, that co- 
management does not seem to have produced the pronounced intentions, as it has 
been rhetoric rather than reality. The conclusion further outlines key themes 
emerging from the study. These key themes will then inform the research 
recommendations in chapter 10. 
Devolved forestry management in Mafungautsi seems to be a serious challenge due 
to its mismatch with practice on the ground. The ambiguous roles of the FCZ as 
player, referee and coach in the Mafungautsi co- management arrangement contradict 
its supposed co -equal partnership status, sending signals that make co- management 
unsustainable. The presumption of a co- equality status on the part of the 
participating communities is also fundamentally contradicted by the equivocal 
nature of certain FCZ roles and training (cf Palit 1993, 1994; Schug 2000; Sundar 
2000 for the Indian case). An example from the Chemwiro -Masawi area portrays 
them not as partners, but as villains helping bolster the extractive legitimacy of the 
Gokwe South RDC. The RDC had, in line with the provisions of the Communal 
Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987, awarded concessions for the commercial 
extraction of hardwood timber from the peasants' fields. Under the same act peasants 
are not entitled to the benefits of commercial use of forest resources available in 
107 After Lind & Cappon (2000) 
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their areas. FCZ employees played a supervisory role during the operation. This 
compartmentalist approach does not augur well with the Mafungautsi people, as 
their lives are not compartmentalised, as the cutting of timber in their fields will 
have consequences on their participation in the co- management (cf Sundar 2000). 
This further raises questions on the contradictions in scientific forestry, which are 
not simply addressed by community participation (Klooster 2000: 283). 
For any decentralisation attempt to succeed there has to be a downwardly 
accountable institution which will transform the interest of the people into reality. 
The decentralisation framework that has been used in the Mafungautsi co- 
management seems to indicate that the RMCs are upwardly accountable to the FCZ. 
As demonstrated earlier in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs, RMCs are 
more upwardly accountable to the FCZ than they are to their constituency. The issue 
of upwardly accountability is clearly illustrated in the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC 
where the people's attempt to hold the RMC to account through passing a vote of no 
confidence was reversed by the FCZ. 
Before the establishment of RMCs one of the main activities which used a 
significant amount of resources was the chartering of a plane to fly leaders from 
Mafungautsi over the gazetted forest and communal areas so that they could 
appreciate the differences in land cover between the two resource regimes. From the 
community's point of view, these were resources, which could have been put to 
better use. People on the ground could easily tell that there is more tree cover in the 
gazetted forests than the communal areas as demonstrated by the participatory 
mapping exercises in Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs. The fact that 
traditional and RDC leaders were flown was seen as a mechanism to bribe them into 
the co- management rather than serve any other purpose. 
Murphree (1990) argues that it is through the demonstration of benefits that 
communities are willing to incur management costs. These costs have to be clearly 
linked to the benefits. This does not seem to be the case in Mafungautsi. 
Unfortunately, the socio- economic benefits to the participating communities are not 
central to the Project's goal and objective (Roper & Maramba 2000). 
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In Mafungabusi, it is still questionable whether there are enough potential 
economic benefits to attract the communities to assume the responsibilities 
of co- managing the resource. Where forests have limited economic potential, 
there is the need for economic diversification to lessen dependence on the 
stressed forest resource (Roper 2000: 10). 
"Community -based forest management embraces the notion that forests should serve 
people and that the rural population should have a formal role to play in forest 
management "(Roper & Maramba 2000: 9). Watts (1989) underlines the fact that 
deforestation is a result of contestation over property rights and authority over 
forests. 
The team is of the opinion that the term "shared forest management" as used 
by Commission staff is actually "shared forest access" because, as will be 
discussed later in this report, there has been really no shared management to 
date (Roper & Maramba 2000: 10 cf Palit 1994; Shah 1995; Banerjee 1996). 
Sundar (2000) similarly questions the "jointness" in the Indian co- management 
approach (cf Sivaramakrishnan 2000). The research findings for the Mafungautsi 
Co- management in Gokwe will be analysed within the context of the 
decentralisation framework. The analysis will look at the inception of the co- 
management, the powers exercised and the accountability arrangements. The 
following section looks at the inception of co- management within the decentralised 
framework. 
9.1. Inception of Co- management and the role of donors 
The FCZ needs to be applauded for embarking on the co- management project in the 
first instance. The co- management arrangement was a top -down initiative since it 
was a FCZ decision backed by CIDA funding. Whilst some Participatory Rural 
Appraisals were carried out, the issues raised in these workshops were not 
incorporated in the implementation process (cf FCZ 1994).108 This was not only top 
down at the local and national levels but it was a global concept that, through CIDA 
(Globalisation syndrome, cf. NRC 2002), filtered its way to the local level as a part 
of a participation discourse. Such international interventions might be mis- conceived 
and may result in inappropriate solutions (cf Munslow et al. 1988; MacGregor 
108 This could approximate to Arnstein (1969)'s third rung of informing the people of decisions which 
have already been made which is some form of tokenism in the ladder of citizen participation. 
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1995; Elliot & Campbell 2001).109 In the Mafungautsi peasants were told that in 
order to benefit from donor funds they had to embrace the co- management 
arrangement. Justification of the co- management was that it would improve the lives 
of the rural communities. In crafting of the co- management one needs to take 
cognisance of the fact that `history matters' 110 as it shapes the present (Watts 1995; 
Sivaramakrishnan 2000: 82). In the Indian case, Shah (1995/6), a forest officer, 
argued that the decision for Joint Forest Management was impulsively taken due to 
pressure from the donor organisations: 11 Smoke & Lewis (1996) note that 
developing countries have often been driven into decentralisation initiatives by 
donors. Most such initiatives, he argues, have failed, as they did not take into 
account the local circumstances as the donor imposed such initiatives. In Nepal 
WWF and the World Bank were said to have "initiated" community forestry in areas 
such as Mbugu. There is a serious need to re- appraise the role of international 
donors in the management of natural resources such as forestry. This has to be tailor 
made to suit the local circumstances - not having a prototype that is duplicated 
across different continents without any consideration for the specific local 
circumstances. The following section analyses the powers devolved within the co- 
management in the Mafungautsi area. 
9.2. Powers Devolved 
Devolved natural resource management may be assessed in terms of the various 
powers that are devolved to the lower level. The following section looks at the 
different webs of power and assesses which actor was exercising which powers? 
This section also looks at relational powers in respect of other institutions. A number 
of development agencies and government departments have often been trapped in a 
new institution syndrome where they try to introduce new institutions disregarding 
existing traditional institutions - which are often perceived as being "inherently 
weak" (Seabright 1993 cited in Cleaver 2000: 364). The powers devolved to the 
RMCs through the co- management project were highly "prescriptive" without any 
109 See Ferguson (1990) for CIDA's role in Thaba Tseka Grazing Scheme and Nightangle (2003) for 
the role of the World Bank and WWF in the Mbugu District of Nepal. 
11° This was also the title of a Lecture given by Terence Ranger at the University of Zimbabwe on 31 
May 2001 - any development initiative has to be placed in its historical context in order to be 
relevant. 
111 Cf. Eaton 2001 on the impact of donors on decentralisation in Argentina and Philippines and 
Ekoko (2000) on the impact of World Bank and French politicians on the reform of the forestry 
sector in Cameroon. 
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room for the local communities to experiment with new ideas. The decision over the 
allocation of the financial benefits from permits was "centralised" to the FCZ, which 
had to make decisions on how the funds were invested by the communities. The fact 
that the FCZ approved only environmentally benign activities meant that all RMCs 
ended up "choosing" to invest in the bee -keeping projects.112 Field research in both 
Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi showed that most people preferred other income 
generating projects such as market gardening rather than bee -keeping as previously 
highlighted in earlier chapters. 
9.2.1. Legislative Powers (The Power to create rules) 
The legal framework governing forestry resources has not been changed. The Forest 
Act of 1996, the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987 and the Rural 
District Councils Act of 1988 have not been amended. Whilst it is arguable that in 
some instances policy formulation or change may be informed through practice but 
in this instance the practice has not changed the formulation process (Dasgupta 
2002; Dyson 2002). The Rural District Councils Act of 1988 is not complementary 
to the attempts to decentralise forestry management. The fact that co- management is 
restricted to the minor forest products meant that communal farmers have not 
benefited from commercial timber logging that has been taking place in areas such 
as Chemwiro -Masawi RMC area. Valuation exercises carried out at the interface 
zone have demonstrated that local communities tend to put a lower value on minor 
forest products compared to timber and land for farming. Commercial timber 
revenue tends to generate larger amounts of revenue as compared to the minor forest 
products. Co- management in this instance seems to have marginalized the people to 
accessing "less valuable" benefits from the Mafungautsi. 
"2 This approximates to what Mackenzie (2000) felt were agricultural and environmental narratives 
that were serving the interests of state power in Kenya. In the case of Mafungautsi, co- management 
seem to have been aimed at consolidating FC's control over the local communities. How far they 
succeeded in achieving this objective varies from one RMC to another. MacKenzie (2000) further 
demonstrates how scientific objectivity was used to define a `crisis', which would then justify the 
need for state intervention. It is important to note that interpretation of environmental history has its 
own set of competing genealogies and agendas (Moore 1998: 380). On the un- preciseness of the 
`science' "Estimates of stock -carrying capacity, of waste land and availability are only 
estimates....rather than exact figures and precise knowledge (Ranger 1989: 247) quoting 
Confidential, Assessment Committees, Inspector's Comments, 10 August 1954, s.160.5/25/55. 
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There are efforts to synchronise the legislation governing the management of 
environmental legislation. The Environmental Management Bill of 1998 has been on 
the drawing board for a very long time. This piece of legislation intended to remove 
the contradictions within the environmental laws. Not much headway has been made 
considering the time that has elapsed since the first bill was drafted for consultation. 
Given this scenario, it means that co- management is still operating within the old 
legal framework, which does not recognise its existence. The legal framework at 
national level would give signals to the RMCs at a local level as to how they are 
supposed to operate. The fact that the enabling act, The Forest Act of 1996 or the 
Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987 do not recognise them, means that 
they are not legal entities. This means that whatever rules they may come up with, 
will be quashed if they contradict these pieces of legislation. In the event of a legal 
conflict with the FCZ, RMCs are in a weaker position as they are only armed with 
RMC constitutions which have no legal reinforcement in the form of a piece of 
legislation. The constitutions further give the FCZ powers to make the final 
decisions on issues decided upon by the RMCs.113 In the Indian context Chopra had 
similar findings: "JFM projects in most states have been largely restricted to 
downgraded forest lands that offer villagers few immediate income -generating 
opportunities. Even given this restriction JFM programmes are often not 
participatory in the sense of an equal partnership between the forest administration 
and village residents" (Chopra 1995: 1481). This seems to have been the case with 
co- management in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs. 
9.2.2. Power to make decision over resource use 
The FCZ, as demonstrated through the case study sites of Batanai and Chemwiro- 
Masawi RMCs, wielded power over the resources and their use. It was the FCZ that 
had control of the disbursed donor funds. The FCZ further had the final say on the 
revenue collected by the RMCs. This resulted in the investment in bee -keeping by 
both RMCs despite its unpopularity. 
13 Cf. Acheson & Brewer (2000) on how the Maine Lobster industry had a genuine co- management 
arrangement through powers devolved through the Lobster Zone Management law. 
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9.2.3. Power to implement and ensure compliance 
Decentralised natural resource management has been argued to result in positive 
social, environmental and ecological outcomes due to its key tenets which give the 
local communities power to make decisions. It is often argued that once people 
genuinely make rules and decisions, such decisions are more likely to be binding, 
resulting in reduced costs of enforcing those decisions (Ostrom 1990, Stern et al. 
2002). Decision -making powers were vested in the FCZ. The local RMCs were 
empowered to make decisions, which were subject to the approval of the FCZ. This 
was mainly due to the fact that the FCZ approved all the decisions that were made 
by the RMCs, especially where financial resources were involved. As previously 
demonstrated, the FCZ wielded a lot of sway and influence in terms of what 
investments were made using the RMC funds. In most instances, they "encouraged" 
RMCs to invest their income in environmentally benign activities such as bee- 
keeping despite this being the least popular activity as demonstrated by the survey in 
both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs. 
The legal framework that governed gazetted forests had not been changed and this 
meant that, legally, the FCZ was still responsible for the day to day management of 
the Mafungautsi Forest. The constitutions were a creation of the FCZ and the then 
Ministry of National Affairs and Employment Creation (MNAEC) without input by 
the RMCs themselves. This meant that these constitutions were tailored to protect 
the interests of the state. The constitutions were written in a language, which 
alienated the majority of the people who could not speak English. The two case 
studies of Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi demonstrated that FCZ wielded powers in 
the co- management initiative. The local people were, however, not totally 
powerless, as they inserted their rights through using the Mafungautsi Forest 
products illegally and at times professing ignorance of the co- management initiative. 
9.2.4. Powers to adjudicate 
The issue of adjudication over the forestry offences has been one of the dilemmas 
for the new institutions of the RMCs. The RMCs, which were promoted by the FCZ, 
are now almost like local "policing agents" reporting any violation of the Forest Act 
to the FCZ through the FPU. This means that offenders end up going to the 
magistrate's court in Gokwe where they may serve months in prison or alternatively, 
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pay fines. This form of adjudication is far removed and in total contradiction with 
the traditional system which meant that the people had to go to a village head 
(sabhuku) first, then up to the headman (Sadunhu) and the Chief (mambo) in order 
to resolve natural resource management decisions. The new institutions of the RMC 
had no legitimacy in the eyes of the local residents, as it was an extension of the 
government that was trying to reach beyond its grip (Murphree 1991 cf Mandondo 
2000). This resulted in practical implementation challenges for the FCZ in 
Mafungautsi. Some traditional leaders began to question why they were now being 
by- passed by the FCZ rule enforcement mechanism. In instances were RMC funds 
had been misused the FCZ confusingly told the RMC to try and resolve it through 
their traditional structures. This was an attempt to pass on an unpopular role to 
traditional leaders. 
The passing of the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 and its implementation, which 
began in Gokwe in 2000/1 period also, introduced some new dynamics and 
contestation. The traditional leaders were in some circumstances the land allocation 
authorities by default. The VIDCOs were the lowest administrative tier in local 
governance as previously shown. The Traditional Leaders Act desolved the VIDCOs 
and replaced them with the traditional villages, which are headed by the traditional 
leaders. This hand -over and take -over period resulted in some power struggles, as 
people wanted to stamp their authority - whether real or imagined. This further put a 
strain on RMCs as some traditional leaders felt that RMCs should be seen as one of 
the development committees proposed by the Traditional Leaders Act and should 
therefore report directly to the responsible traditional leader and not link directly 
with the FCZ. This further took a new twist when one traditional village head and 
his community passed a vote of no confidence on "their RMC" and elected a new 
one. This machination was nullified by the FCZ who felt that the trained people 
should remain in the RMC despite the fact that they no longer had the mandate of 
their electorate. 
The issue of traditional leadership has also helped to manifest some local power 
dynamics and struggles in the Mafungautsi area. Soon after independence it was a 
struggle between the traditional leaders and the newly elected VIDCOs which 
sought to replace the traditional leaders. In 1998 the government passed a new piece 
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of legislation which sought to give back power to the traditional leaders who were 
perceived as having the authority and respect over the local communities unlike the 
elected VIDCOs and councillors. This was also done at the time the government's 
support was waning. The Traditional Leaders Act also introduced allowances for 
Chiefs and Headman. Promises were also made for allowances for the traditional 
village heads, who were already getting a percentage of revenue collected on behalf 
of the RDC. Tax collection by traditional leaders made them very unpopular during 
the liberation struggle, which ended with the first democratic elections in 1980. In 
Gokwe village heads were re- assigned the same unpopular mandate with an 
incentive of getting ten percent of the revenue collected in their village. Co- 
management arrangements, however, bypassed traditional leaders in favour of the 
magistrate's court at Gokwe Centre.114 Having looked at the different forms of 
powers within the co- management arrangement, the next section will look at the 
accountability arrangements for the RMCs. 
9.3. Accountability 
Accounting for the participation of local communities in environmental decision - 
making, it is reasoned, will "promote local interest in sustainable use and mitigate 
practices considered harmful to the environment" (Lind & Capon 2001: 2). The new 
institutions are more upwardly accountable to the FCZ than to their constituencies. 
This has compromised their legitimacy in the eyes of the people. However, this does 
not imply that the local people do not have their own mechanisms of holding the 
office bearers to account for their actions or inaction. In the case studies it has been 
demonstrated that the people use various weapons of the weak (Scott 1985) which 
include the embeddedness of the leaders, arson, burning of the forest, social capital 
and witchcraft. In Chemusonde, an RMC outside the case studies, one RMC 
member had his hut burnt allegedly for his overzealousness in enforcing the co- 
management regulations. This would force the local leaders to be accountable to 
their constituency. However, this does not stop them from being upwardly 
accountable to the powers above. 
114 There are however, initiatives to bolster the authority of the traditional judiciary system in 
Zimbabwe (see The Herald 24 February 2003). 
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In the Mafungautsi case study the RMCs were more accountable upwards to the 
FCZ than to their constituency. The fact that the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC had a 
vote of no confidence passed against them and still had the FCZ protecting them 
against the wishes of the people further made them even more upwardly 
accountable. Once the new institutions had the feeling that they were cushioned 
against the electoral power (people power) 15 they were then more likely to do as 
their masters above (FCZ) wished rather than what the local communities wanted. 
This would further mean that people's local level concerns about the co- 
management arrangement would not be communicated to the FCZ. Even this 
discretion of removing unaccountable leaders through the ballot was not always 
available. Attempts by the people of Chemwiro -Masawi to pass a vote of "No 
Confidence" in their RMC and elect a new RMC were nullified by the FCZ as 
previously illustrated. A woman who had been voted into the RMC lost through the 
FCZ counting. This counting "mistake" was deliberate as the woman was considered 
a troublemaker by the FCZ who was not supposed to be a member of the RMC. 
With such backing from the FCZ, this further alienated the RMCs from their local 
constituencies. 
9.3.1. Accountability - Outcome Relationships 
This component, in the Zimbabwean case study, looked at how access to resources 
and the benefits derived from them, as well as the use and management of natural 
resources, have changed under changing accountability regimes in the process of 
setting up decentralised and community -based natural resource management. This 
assessment was based on historical interviews about access to natural resources by 
various local groups (local ethnic, professional, gender, religious, age, income etc.) 
and changes in the environmental use and management practices. These changes are 
proxies for ecological change where ecological change cannot be measured (changes 
to patterns of access to land, investments in related services such as forestry 
extension, changes in the kinds of management practices that are in use, etc.). 
In the co- management initiatives in Gokwe South RDC, there seemed to be negative 
environmental outcomes as demonstrated in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi 
115 The term people power was popularised when the Philippines President Joseph Estrada was ousted 
in a mass demonstration in 2000. 
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RMCs. Poaching for both trees and wildlife seemed to be on the increase. Stealing 
from the forest was condoned even by traditional leaders who felt that people were 
stealing from "Mugabe's Forest ". This meant that the forest reserve boundary also 
acted as a boundary for the end of traditional conservation norms and practices. The 
use of snares was often blamed as a dangerous strategy as it harmed livestock, but 
not that the practice was unacceptable. Forest fires increased despite co- 
management. The "invasions" into the reserved forest, with 49 households staying in 
the forest by August 2001, introduced a new level of local level response in line with 
the "land invasions" enunciated at national level. About 180 households had 
registered to return to their old homelands (matungo) within Mafungautsi. This is 
probably going to accelerate the extraction of forest products as fields for farming 
are opened up. Interviews with the people who had moved into Mafungautsi 
demonstrated their tenure insecurity, as they were still aware of the previous waves 
of evictions from Mafungautsi forest. Most of them pointed that they were 
previously evicted from the forest hence the need to go back to "their old homes ". 
The land issue in Zimbabwe is a more complex issue, which is arguably beyond the 
remit of FCZ alone. 
9.4. Local and non - local interactions 
Co- management as a form of decentralised forestry management is introduced on 
the premise that new conservation practices will be adopted at the local level. The 
whole debate of the interaction and counter interaction between new ideas and 
traditional knowledge systems that have been in practice does not seem to be 
addressed in the Mafungautsi case study. The assumption was that the local people 
have not been having their own forms of natural resource use and adjudication (Lind 
& Capon 2001; cf Long 1984). Decentralisation within the natural resource sector, 
as in a broader sense, may follow different trajectories (Agrawal 1999:15). 
Decentralised forestry management is supposed to be about the democratic 
devolution of power (Lind & Cappon 2001). One key element in co- management 
arrangement is the question of institutional interactions (Agrawal 2002; Stern et al. 
2002; Ostrom 2002). Institutions in co- management, just as in the commons debate, 
interact at a vertical and horizontal levels (Stern et al. 2002). "Outcomes are a result 
of interactions at different levels and scales or cross scale institutional linkages" 
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(Berkes 2002: 295).16 These levels also result in soft and permeable boundaries 
(Peters 1994) or overlapping boundaries (Moore 1998). The assumption in 
Mafungautsi was that RMCs would be able to operate independently of other 
institutions. However, their introduction further introduced complexities and 
dynamics on the institutional terrain. 
9.5. Co- management or Co- ownership? 
The Mafungautsi co- management scheme raises key questions on the approach 
towards co- management. The concept of co- management, which is supposed to be 
co- ownership (Borrini- Feyerbend et al. 2000; Hobley 1996) between the local 
communities and the state, seem to have been undermined in Mafungautsi. This 
move towards co- ownership was a strategy to avert the tragedy of the state property. 
Implementation in Mafungautsi has demonstrated that instead of averting the 
tragedy of the state property, it has actually accelerated the degradation of the forest 
resources. In Mafungautsi people have continued to cut down trees which are owned 
by the "government" and not by the local people. The state's half measures have 
further alienated the people from co- operating with the state. The little measures 
attempted, unimpressively, have gone a long way to demonstrate to the local 
communities how much they are missing."' Now they even know how much 
logging concessions are generating from areas such as Chemwiro -Masawi yet they 
do not get a small percentage of the benefits. Their benefits have been restricted to 
the minor forest products that a number of researches have shown have low values. 
This may be contrasted with the Campfire approach in Zimbabwe that has 
demonstrated the benefits to the local communities (Matzke & Nabane 1996; Hulme 
& Murphree 2001). One needs to note that in some cases benefits have not trickled 
down to the lowest level. Some benefits have been hijacked at the RDC level as 
some researchers have demonstrated (Murombedzi 1992, 1994; Alexander & 
McGregor 1996, 2000; Sibanda 2001) and at times RDCs have used heavy handed 
methods to push through the conservation agenda (Alexander, McGreggor & Ranger 
2000; Hammar 2001; Hughes 2001a). But nevertheless, under the Campfire 
Programme, the communities have been able to derive more benefits, which have 
16 Murphree (2000) further "frames the discussion with an examination of the theoretical and 
practical dimensions of boundaries, borders and scales in commons management." 
117 Murphree at the IASCP 2002 conference cited similar comments on Campfire when it was still in 
its initial stages by those who opposed it. 
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resulted in higher benefits accruing to the Village Campfire Committees (VCCs). 
The VCCs have powers through their village meetings to decide on what they want 
to invest their funds in without unnecessary interference from the RDCs. 
In other areas such as Masoka, schools and clinics have been built. However, it is 
important to note that some researchers have argued that this has led to the 
withdrawal of the state funding, as the local communities are perceived as being 
self -sufficient. Some researchers further argued that the need to embark on Campfire 
by some RDCs has resulted in the violation of human rights as people are bulldozed 
(herded) into the programme by their co- beneficiary, the RDC (Alexander & 
McGregor 1996, 2000). One should note that in a number of circumstances, 
Campfire has positively contributed not only to the welfare of the local communities 
but towards the sustainable management of natural resources. Individual incentives 
are generally the most important factor in the transformation of organisational 
structure into outcomes (Wilson 2002: 347; cf Williamson 1986; Pfeffer 1995; 
Runge 1992; Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne 1993; Seabright 1993; Wade 1988; 
Cleaver 2000). This seemed to be the missing link in the co- management attempt in 
Gokwe South RDC. 
Decentralisation has often been seen as a magic bullet that solves the environmental 
degradation through introducing new "participatory" institutions (Mugabe's 
Foreword in Lind & Capon 2001). Introduction of decentralised forestry 
management demands that the implementers have a vision and understand that the 
outcome of the policy process is a result of an interaction between external and local 
ideas. The outsider ideas are not imposed on a passive and empty local community. 
The final outcome is a result of the contestation and competing interests of the 
various actors. This therefore calls for the need to be flexible and make adjustments 
in order to suit the dynamic and changing contexts (cf Ferguson 1990). This seems 
not to have been seriously considered in Mafungautsi. Co- management was seen as 
a way of buying time, whilst perpetuating the traditional "fortress conservation." 
9.6. The Rationale of Bureaucracy 
The co- management initiative in Mafungautsi seems to have set up a neat 
bureaucracy on paper. However, the political economy on the ground seems to be 
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producing results which might not have been expected. Peasants are innovative and 
find ways of circumventing the bureaucracy in order to meet their own needs. Thus, 
some people in Batanai manipulate the situation, illegally collecting products - 
including game -from Mafungautsi when the FPU is not in the vicinity. Since the 
whole circumference of the 82,100- hectare forest cannot be effectively monitored all 
the time, some villagers also sneak in and out of the forest without paying permit 
fees. Similarly, peasants tend to hand over smaller bundles of thatching grass to the 
RMCs and retain the bigger ones. Moreover, the bundles of grass given to the 
RMCs are not always sold as intended. The cost of transporting and selling the 
grass at Gokwe Centre has meant that no RMC member has been willing to sell 
brooms or thatching grass away from their villages. The bundles have simply been 
dumped at the homesteads of the RMC members, in most cases the treasurer or the 
chairperson. This has resulted in lots of bundles rotting. In Batanai 115 bundles of 
thatching grass were rotting at the treasurer's homestead in April 2001. The 
situation was similar at the homestead of the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC chairman, 
although the exact number could not be counted due to the advanced stage of 
rotting. Some informants alleged that the RMC members were now using rotting of 
grass as an excuse for misrepresenting the actual number of bundles sold during 
auditing, while some RMC members were reported to be using the grass before it 
even begins to rot.118 These are clear illustrations of how the rationality of co- 
management does not necessarily coincide with that of the local people, who 
manipulate the rules to suit their own purposes - which Scott (1985) calls the 
weapons of the weak. 
9.7. Co- management Impact 
Co- management has been theorised to increase the amount of co- operation in the 
management of natural resources which is more likely to result in sustainable 
resource management (Tietenberg 2002). Some empirical support for this 
proposition in implemented programs is beginning to appear. For example, one 
study of compliance behaviour in the United Kingdom fishery (which was not an 
individual transferable quota) found that individuals who felt more involved in the 
management system had a statistically significantly lower probability of violation 
118 Grass collection now seems to be a lucrative venture, as most RMC members want to use their 
homes as grass collection centres in order to benefit if the grass "rots." Those whose homes are not 
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(cf NRC 2002). In Mafungautsi there is little involvement of the people with RMCs 
being viewed as an extension of the FCZ. RMCs could not hold meetings in the 
absence of the FCZ. RMCs were further asking to get FCZ badges and uniforms. 
This then increases chances of violation of rules. The case of animal traps, 
previously cited, demonstrates that most of the people were against the method used 
as it endangered livestock, but not the practice itself. 
9.8. Enforcement 
Successful enforcement program requires a carefully crafted set of sanctions for 
non -compliance. Penalties should be commensurate with the danger posed by non- 
compliance. Penalties that are unrealistically high may be counterproductive if 
authorities are reluctant to impose them and people are aware of this reluctance 
(Tietenberg 2002). The arrangement in decentralised natural resource management 
should be such that its "economically viable, environmentally sustainable and 
socially acceptable" (Dore & Chafota 2000: 2). Once the arrangement meets all 
these criteria, it is then more likely to be easier to enforce the rules. The balance of 
evidence from the commons literature of the past few decades is that neither purely 
local -level management nor purely higher level management works well by itself. 
Rather, there is a need to design and support management institutions at more than 
one level, with attention to interactions from the local level upwards and vice versa. 
(Berkes 2002). In the Mafungautsi co- management the FCZ overshadowed the RMC 
as its involvement at the local level was going well beyond the need for oversight. 
9.9. Holistic Approach to Decentralised Forestry Management 
The implementation of the co- management initiative in the Mafungautsi area 
demonstrated the weaknesses of a sectoral approach towards co- management. The 
initial indications were that the co- management arrangement would be implemented 
jointly with the Gokwe South RDC, which is the land authority in Mafungautsi. 
However, the RDC seem to have been marginalised and the FCZ did not want many 
actors involved, as the resources would be spread thinly. However, when general 
development issues were raised in the RMCs, for instance, issues of schools, clinics 
and dip tank, the FCZ felt that such issues would better be addressed by the RDC. 
The RDC was not actively participating in the co- management arrangement. When 
designated as collection points do not cooperate fully in the RMC activities. 
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the Mid -term evaluation team was carrying out its evaluation the acting Chief 
Executive Officer pleaded ignorance of the co- management arrangement and 
confessed that he had been given the co- management documents by the FCZ prior to 
the evaluation team's visit. This clearly demonstrates the need to involve all the 
relevant institutions in natural resource management. The RDC, in terms of the 
Communal Lands Act of 1982 and the RDC Act of 1988, is the land authority in 
communal areas of Zimbabwe. This means that they are entitled to all the 
concession fees coming from communal areas. Since they were not participating in 
the co- management arrangement, they are not in a strategic position to be able to 
debate the issues of sharing the proceeds from timber concessions in line with the 
co- management arrangement. 
A co- management agreement goes only part of the way to produce a viable 
arrangement. In Mafungautsi there seemed to be little incentive for the FCZ to share 
the power they held (Lele 2000; Berkes 2002). Longer term studies, such as those by 
Singleton (1998) & Kendrick (2000), characterise co- management, not as an end 
point, but as a process of mutual social learning in which each side learns from and 
adjusts to the other over a period of time) in Berkes (2002:304). Attempts by CIFOR 
in Mafungautsi through its Adaptive Collaborative Management might be a good 
social learning exercise which might help shape the direction of co- management in 
Mafungautsi. CIFOR could further play a facilitatory role between the FCZ and the 
Mafungautsi RMCs. 
9.10. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at an overview of the research findings of the Mafungautsi 
study. It sought, based on the field evidence, to assess if the devolved forestry 
management was a reality or rhetoric? This was done by looking at the beginning of 
co- management, the different powers held by different actors, accountability 
arrangements, and the implication of the accountability arrangements on the social, 
ecological and environmental outcomes. It also further questioned whether in 
Mafungautsi there was co- ownership? It also looked at the rationale of bureaucracy, 
co- management impact and enforcement. Some of the emerging cross -cutting 
themes of this study are: 
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 Donors should meaningful consult local actors. 
Co- management bodies should be legally recognised. 
Some powers should be decentralised to co- management bodies. 
Forest management institutions should be downwardly accountable. 
Rural Communities should benefit from Co- management. 
Institutional arrangements should be relevant to the local context. 
Co- management should build on existing institutions. 
Land Redistribution needs to be addressed. 
The concept of State Property regimes for the forests should be re- visited. 
Women need to be better represented in co- management institutions. 
Evidence from Mafungautsi's two case studies seem to demonstrate that co- 
management as a form of environmental decentralisation in Gokwe, is only rhetoric 
rather than reality. The next chapter expands the above themes in the form of 
recommendations and the way forward before concluding by looking at areas for 
future research. 
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Chapter Ten 
Research Recommendations 
10.0. Introduction 
This chapter concludes by looking at the research recommendations and the way 
forward for decentralised forestry management. These recommendations are based 
on the field findings in Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs. Suggestions are 
made in the form of recommendations in the way that co- management might be 
carried out. It is important to note that contexts are unique as well as being dynamic 
and these have to be underlying factors in any co- management attempt. Changes in 
power dynamics may entail changes in the approach, and in some instances, a total 
review of the whole co- management process. This should be an ongoing process 
rather than an event. The last section concludes through identifying areas for further 
research. In the Mafungautsi co- management the social political and economic 
environment are dynamic, moreso because Gokwe is a frontier region which has 
continued to see a number of immigrants coming into the district. This thesis 
rhetoric of natural resource decentralisation in Zimbabwe through the 
co- management of forestry resources which, according to research evidence, is 
largely "supply led" rather than "demand driven." 
10.1. Recommendations and the way forward 
Co- management of forestry resources between the FCZ and the local people was a 
new paradigm in forestry management in Zimbabwe. Considering the long history of 
natural resource management in Zimbabwe, which was based on enforcement from 
above, through "fortress conservation," it was a welcome shift in the forestry 
discourse. The fact that the FCZ considered the need for co- management, for 
whatever reason, was a major paradigm shift within the forestry sector. It seems to 
have borrowed lessons of experience from the Campfire approach in the wildlife 
subsector. Campfire, by its definition refers to all indigenous resources, but it has 
often been perceived and primarily implemented on the lines of wildlife 
management or consumptive tourism. This view is changing as the Campfire 
program is diversifying into other ventures such as photographic safaris, tourist 
lodges and bird viewing. Campfire is also further broadening its horizons to include 
fisheries and forestry. The FCZ joined the Campfire Collaborative Group (CCG) 
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which comprises of agencies responsible for the implementation of the Campfire 
Program. These include Campfire Association (a grouping of all rural district 
councils in the Campfire Program), Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban 
Development, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM), 
CASS at the University of Zimbabwe (Socio- economic monitoring and evaluation), 
Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust) (Training and capacity building), ACTION Magazine, 
African Resources Trust (ART) lobbying, public relations, World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature (WWF) for ecological monitoring and the Southern Alliance for Indigenous 
Resources (SAFIRE). These organisations all play different roles in order to 
successfully implement the Campfire programme in Zimbabwe. 
This thesis set out to look at the impact of decentralisation of forestry management 
in Mafungautsi. The research aimed at assessing the powers devolved and 
accountability mechanism in decentralised forestry management. The main guiding 
thesis was that more downwardly accountable institutions are more likely to result in 
more positive environmental and ecological outcomes (Ribot 1999, 2000). More 
downwardly accountable institutions in the context of Mafungautsi were assessed 
within the co- management arrangement. The advocates for co- management point 
out that there must be a partnership between different institutions which would have 
realised that each player has a different role to play (cf Lawry 1989; Murombedzi 
1990). For any co- management to work there has to be clear definition of powers 
and responsibilities. In the Mafungautsi case study it was demonstrated that the FCZ 
assumed the role of being both a player and a referee resulting in the confusion 
which ensued. In other words, the FCZ ended up with an unenviable position of 
being a regulator and a partner in the co- management initiative. Table 15 below 
summarises the key recommendations before moving on to further discuss each 
recommendation. 
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Table 15: Summary of Recommendations 
Summary of Recommendations 
Donors should meaningful consult local actors 
Co- management bodies should be legally recognised 
Some powers should be decentralised to co- management bodies 
Forest management institutions should be downwardly accountable 
Rural Communities should benefit from Co- management 
Institutional arrangements should be relevant to the local context 
Co- management should build on existing institutions 
Land Redistribution needs to be addressed 
The concept of State Property regimes for the forests should be re- visited 
Women need to be better represented in Co- management institutions 
The first recommendation below looks at the role of donors and international finance 
in environmental and conservation discourses. 
10.1.1. Donors should meaningful consult local actors 
The FCZ, World Bank and CIDA initiated the Mafungautsi co- management. 
Funding of the co- management was provided by CIDA. As demonstrated in this 
thesis, CIDA helped shape the co- management arrangements through assistance in 
the designing of co- management in order to suit their proposal format and reporting 
structure. What ended up happening was the establishment of co- management as an 
international discourse without much regard for the local circumstances. A study 
tour to India was meant to allow the FCZ to "draw lessons of experience ". Funding 
seems to be following a fashionable trend. In 1997, as pointed out earlier, the 
Department for International Development (DFID) was talking of funding a Shared 
Forest Management arrangement in Gwaai. This initiative seems to have been 
shelved since the withdrawal of international finance, including DFID, to Zimbabwe 
with the onset of the land invasions. 
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Donors and international financiers should try to be flexible and facilitatory. 
Development funds, where necessary, should be flexible in terms of local level 
implementation strategies as this will help promote positive environmental outcomes 
within the forestry sector. Donors should try to be intermediaries between the state 
agencies and the local communities. In some instances this could be done through 
third parties such as researchers who could assume the facilitatory role. 
10.1.2. Co- management bodies should be legally recognised 
For the partners to whom the powers to manage have been co- decentralised, there is 
a need for the passing of an enabling legal framework in order to allow for the 
recognition of the rights of the co- owners. In the Mafungautsi case the Forestry Act 
of 1996 did not recognise the co- management arrangement, as it was an internal 
arrangement without the necessary legal enforcement. This further compromised the 
local communities and their RMCs, as these had no legal mandate in a court of law. 
In terms of their constitutions, which were drafted by the FCZ and the MNAEC, the 
FCZ had the final decision in everything they intended to do. The co- management 
rights have to be guaranteed through the passing of legislation so that this is not seen 
as a temporary measure. The community's security and rights must be guaranteed 
through some legal instruments or legislation as there tends to be "no development 
without real (legal) rights" (Lagos Declaration on Land Rights 16 July 2002, word 
in italics added). 
Constitutions are not even mentioned in either the Forest Act of 1996: Chapter 19:05 
or the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987. This is almost a reflection of 
what is happening within the Campfire Programme where the appropriate authority 
status is given to the RDC and not the wildlife producer communities at ward or 
village level. This means that the lower tier units have no legal recognition in the 
management of local resources. It is only legally enforceable rights that should then 
be accompanied by responsibilities. Benefits and responsibility have to be matched 
otherwise there will be unsustainable management of natural resources (Murphree 
1991). The fact that the most active 8 RMCs directly received Z$80 505 through 
permit fees whereas the FCZ got over Z$12 million showed the skewed nature of co- 
management benefits. The share for the community is less than one percent of the 
total potential funds and furthermore, this small amount was spent on activities 
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which the local people did not want. The co- management arrangement seems to 
have granted people peripheral rights, which are not legally enforceable. 
Government recognition is an important support mechanism, which will even 
contribute towards improved reinforcement (NRC 2002). Co- management should 
have legal backing through legislation. This will help reinforce the rights and 
privileges of all actors involved in the co- management. 
10.1.3. Some powers should be decentralised to co- management 
bodies 
The community partners, as represented by the RMCs, have often wondered what it 
was that they were benefiting. One field officer referred to the community members 
as "children" who are not supposed to have the same rights as an adult (FCZ). 
Policies might have started changing at higher level but it is still questionable if the 
officers at local level were at the same pace as their seniors at head office. It looks 
like some officers at a local level were expecting the local communities to make 
adjustments without them attempting to make any adjustment at al1.119 Peluso (1992) 
points out at the need to restructure forest bureaucracies in order to suit the demands 
of co- management. Whilst it is indeed true that communities and their FCZ partners 
do not have the same expertise, this should be seen as complementing each other. 
This will mean that they will all be bringing something into the co- management or 
partnership without one part feeling belittled. All actors involved should view co- 
management as a learning process. In the co- management in Mafungautsi there 
seemed to be an attempt to belittle whatever knowledge the local communities had. 
With the benefit of history one might postulate that considering the way the FCZ has 
been operating as an enforcer of the "fortress conservation" approach, the co- 
management seems to have been too much of a paradigm shift for some of the 
officers who might still have been doing their "business as usual" approach. Old 
habits seem to take some time before they finally die. There was a need to make sure 
that the FCZ had embarked on some sort of change of their management style 
especially at the field or operational level so as to be able to practice and implement 
co- management in Mafungautsi. The perception seem to have viewed the local 
19 See also Nygren on the view of Costa Rican state officials on the peasants whose "lack of cultural 
awareness of the value of conservation has resulted in deforestation" (Nygren 2000: 24). 
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communities as perpetual infants and not partners who were bringing in their 
expertise, in their own right whilst the FCZ was also bringing in its own expertise as 
well. The forest management bureaucracies seem to be very slow in changing from 
its past authoritarian approach to a more enabling and co- management arrangement 
(Campbell 1992; Chopra 1995; Schug 2000). 
When new institutions that are created do not have any powers and if they are 
viewed as the extension of a state bureaucracy's (FCZ) hand trying to reach areas 
where it could not reach, this will simply challenge the legitimacy of the "local" 
institutions such as the RMC. In the eyes of the local people these would be viewed 
as agents of the unpopular policing mechanism of the gazetted forest. In some 
instances, as demonstrated in the Chemusonde arson case, this simply makes the 
communities hostile to the partnership or co- ownership attempts. If they loathe the 
FCZ they may not openly demonstrate this but they will simply use their weapons of 
the weak (Scott 1985). Real powers have to be devolved to all the co- managing 
partners. The FCZ has to let go off real powers to lower level institutions. For this to 
be carried out effectively there has to be training for transformation within 
governmental agencies and departments so as to be able to cope with the changes in 
the power balances. This has to be assessed in the context of the local situation. 
10.1.4. Forest management Institutions should be downwardly 
accountable 
The main research question in this research is that more downwardly accountable 
institutions within the decentralised forestry management in Mafungautsi are more 
likely to result in more positive environmental outcomes. There are various 
mechanisms that the local communities can use in order to hold their leaders to 
"account" (cf Ribot 1999, 2000; Economist 23 February 2002). These mechanisms 
will determine whether the new institutions will be upwardly or downwardly 
accountable to the local people. 
In the Mafungautsi co- management initiative there seems to have been a more 
upwardly accountable institution than a downwardly accountable institution through 
the RMC. In Chemwiro -Masawi for instance the decisions made by the community 
such as the vote of "no confidence" by the Chemwiro -Masawi community 
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undermined the community' effort to try and hold the RMC to account for its non- 
performance to the local communities. The fact that the RMC owed its allegiance to 
the FCZ meant that it would make sure that it meets the needs and requirements of 
the FCZ which had the final say in whether they remained in office or not - NOT the 
people who had voted them into office. Ostrom (1990) (cf Agrawal 2002) further 
points out in her institutional design principles that for any successful institutional 
management for natural resources the monitors and officials have to be accountable 
to the resource users. Whilst a number of accountability mechanisms are available to 
the communities, the mere fact these can be overruled by the FCZ undermines the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms. It is therefore important to devolve some real 
powers to the local level institutions so that they are more downwardly accountable 
to their local people or constituency. 
This calls not only for the devolution of powers to local institutions - but further 
more, the institutions to whom power has been devolved need to be downwardly 
accountable to their constituency. It is only downwardly accountable institutions, 
which are more likely to result in positive social, economic and environmental 
outcomes. 
10.1.5. Rural Communities should benefit from Co- management 
Rural communities do have some transaction costs of the time spent on managing 
forests. The monetary gains from forestry are not as high as the returns coming from 
agricultural activities (Nhira et al. 1998). This has meant that the rural communities 
whose benefits were marginalised to the collection of minor forest products felt that 
the Mafungautsi land would be put to better use through crop cultivation. This 
further strained the relationship for the local community with the FCZ as their needs 
were not being met since they felt what they needed was land for cultivation. 
Individual incentives are generally the most important factor in the transformation of 
organisational structure into outcomes (Williamson 1986; Pfeffer 1995 cf James 
Wilson 2002). Therefore sharing commercial timber logging proceeds will result in 
local people perceiving forestry as a competitive land use option (cf Duffy 1997 for 
similar arguments within the wildlife sector in Zimbabwe). It is when communities 
get tangible benefits from a resource that they will sustainably manage it (Murphree 
1991; Madzudzo 2000). Any co- management attempts should genuinely incorporate 
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the views of the local communities on benefit streams. If this is not genuinely done, 
co- management of forestry resources under co- management will be unsustainable. 
At present natural resources legislation is a projection of the colonial legislation. 
There has not been any meaningful amendment to the Forest Act of 1996. By 
introducing co- management the FCZ feels it is doing a favour to the local 
communities. There should be meaningful participation of the communities if ever 
the co- management is going to succeed. The legal framework should allow for 
resource use rather than focusing on resource management only. Murphree (1991) 
points at the need to have both resource use and management. 
The current legal framework does not allow for any meaningful participation of the 
communal people. In Mafungautsi, benefits to the RMCs do not include a share of 
the proceeds from commercial timber logging. The co- management arrangement has 
allowed the community to benefit from less lucrative products such as mushroom 
which seem to be of no interest to the FCZ. Some RMC members felt that they were 
allowed to cut thatching grass and graze their cattle in Mafungautsi so that the fire 
risk of the forest is reduced. 
The approach where the FCZ tinkers with peripheral rights is not likely to result in 
sustainable environmental outcomes. What is needed is a true commitment to let the 
people meaningfully participate in the management and utilisation of Mafungautsi. 
Co- management needs to respond to the need of the people and participation should 
not be forced from above. According to Borrini (1990) "There is a difference 
between participating in the carrying out of the work and participation in the sharing 
of responsibility and decision -making "(Borrini 1990: 6). 
It is ironic that there is no room for the communal partners to benefit from the 
dividends from the income from concessionaires. The FCZ's circular to the RDCs 
encouraged them to plough back about 15% of concessionaire revenue to the 
communities where logging would have taken place. This is being done in the 
footsteps of Campfire. There seems to be no meaningful co- management in 
Mafungautsi. It seems the state's principal objective is to centralise control over 
resources and to assert political authority over local interests and not create a new 
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and more effective resource management regime (Murombedzi 1994b). Co- 
management must demonstrate tangible benefits - not just peripheral benefits. The 
local people should be able to link the new management responsibilities with the 
benefits. If there are only burdens without benefits, co- management will not achieve 
positive environmental outcomes. 
10.1.6. Institutional arrangements should be relevant to the local 
context 
The issue of institutional arrangements raises a pertinent issue of scale and 
boundaries (Murphree 2000). When one considers the issue of devolved natural 
resource management a key question then becomes to what level should the resource 
management be devolved - and to which institutions? (North 1990; Murphree 1991). 
On the institutional arrangements questions such as to what levels and to whom are 
the powers devolved to, become pertinent issues as different institutions begin to 
compete for political space (Cocks, Dold & Grundy in prep.; Mosimane 2000; 
Madzudzo 2000). In the Mafungautsi case this was a pertinent issue as identifying 
the most relevant institutional level would have serious repercussions on its 
operations. Whilst some researchers have often argued for the "small is beautiful" 
argument (Schumacher 1992; Murphree 1990, 1991) this principle seems to be more 
effective. Murphree (1991) further points out that small scale has to be visualised 
not only in terms of the size of the community (cf Bond 1996; Hulme and Murphree 
2001; Wilson 2002) but also in terms of the ecology of the resource in question. 
Common property theories tend to view communities as comprising a homogeneous 
grouping (Salazar & Lee 1990; Murphree 1991; Ostrom 1997; Mandondo 2000). 
Whilst in some instances it might be necessary to use lower level boundaries and 
borders, there are cases where the ecological units at that level would make it 
uneconomic to manage the resources at such a level. Once the decentralisation of 
forestry resources had been announced in the form of the co- management of forestry 
resources other dynamics set in with the interaction of institutions and individuals as 
people seek to insert themselves and carve out new niches and power. 
Institutional arrangements have to be flexible to accommodate the issues at stake in 
particular circumstances but this, however, has to take into account the situation on 
the ground as one might have a neat bureaucratic arrangement on paper which is 
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often defied on the arena of implementation. In the Mafungautsi case there were 
instances when the communities questioned the legitimacy of the RMC. The case of 
the Chemwiro -Masawi community is interesting in that the community passed a 
vote of no confidence in its RMC on the 5th of July 2000. This was however 
nullified by the FCZ. In this particular instance this created some sort of malice 
towards the RMC as it was no longer viewed as the people's RMC but a monster 
imposed and maintained by the FCZ. Locally created and adaptive institutions with 
the facilitation of the implementing agencies is needed to have local legitimacy 
(Ostrom 1990). This should be the approach in co- management for it to have local 
rather than state or donor legitimacy. 
When the co- management arrangement began in Gokwe it fell into the trap that a 
number of rural development initiatives have fallen into. Most rural development 
agencies have quickly moved in to set up their own committees for implementing 
their activities. This institutional multiplicity has had its problems as they failed to 
link up with existing institutions resulting in conflicts and power struggles which at 
times worked against the success of the initiative. The case of co- management was 
one example. Instead of trying to link with existing institutions new institutions were 
introduced which related to existing institutions at various and confusing levels 
which varied from one RMC to another. Whilst flexibility in institutional design is 
important if determined from a local level but in the co- management initiative these 
were determined from above, with little input from the local people. 
In this vein, one may argue that where possible, it would be better to try and work 
with existing institutions. New institutions bring in new dynamics and in most cases, 
seem to "die" once donor funds have been withdrawn. New institutions also add to 
the burden of institution proliferation as a result of most donors and government 
departments trying to establish new institutions. Establishment of new institutions is 
often cited as "a major achievement" for donor initiated projects. 
10.1.7. Co- management should build on existing institutions 
Within the context of co- management in Mafungautsi it is important to identify the 
role of traditional institutions in the conservation of natural resources. It is important 
to note that despite their waning powers, with the advent of independence in 1980, 
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traditional leaders were sidelined as they were seen as collaborators of the colonial 
government. In Mafungautsi it is still necessary to incorporate the traditional 
leadership structure. Most people still perceive them as "legitimate" leaders of the 
community. The recent government Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 seems to be a 
move in that direction. One still wonders how the "modem" local level structures 
such as the councillors and VIDCO leadership will react to such a power shift 
considering that salient power rifts can be detected in most of the communities. 
However for the sake of co- management, chiefs and headmen have a legitimating 
role in the operations of the RMCs. Chief Njelele and Headman Ndhlalmbi 
exercised punishments over the destruction of sacred trees. There is a need to build 
upon such practices and in cases where they are not responsive to current demands, 
they have to be improved upon so that they represent the interests of their local 
communities. Chief Njelele argued that the "Zunde Ramambo "12° concept could be 
modified to establish community orchards that would help improve nutrition of the 
children in Gokwe. 
A major strength of the traditional system of "justice" is its corrective nature rather 
than being punitive. Chief Njelele pointed out that his punishment was corrective 
and there is a lighter sentence for offenders who show remorse and regret over their 
actions. This seems to be at tandem with one of Ostrom (1990)'s design principles 
which calls for a graduated sanction mechanism. 
It is important that one does not romanticise the role of traditional leadership 
especially in the face of challenges from immigrants who have different cultural 
backgrounds. Gokwe has seen the influx of people from areas such as Masvingo and 
parts of Matebeleland. This cultural adulteration has resulted in the dilution of the 
influence and power of the traditional leaders. The "immigrants ", who according to 
Worby (1992); Nyambara (1999, 2000) are normally labelled the "Madherukas" as 
opposed to the local "Shangwe ", boasts of a superior level of education and look 
down upon the local people and their culture. The advent of some churches such as 
The Seventh Day Adventist locally referred to as "Masabata" is challenging the 
authority of the local traditional leaders, in terms of sacred trees and sacred days 
120 This is where chiefs maintained communal fields. Produce from those fields would be used to feed 
orphans or those in need. 
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(chisi) when people are not supposed to work in their fields. The SDA rests on 
Saturday (sabbath day) and traditional leaders were asking them to rest again on 
Wednesday - this to them implied two working days lost each week. This creates a 
dilemma of an authority structure without capacity to enforce the regulations 
(Murombedzi 1990). These are some of the challenges that will have to be addressed 
in order to remould traditional institutions for them to be responsive to the current 
social, economic, environmental and political demands. Recently, traditional leaders 
were being enticed into being the leading supporters for the government. This could 
be another source of their opposition from people who might be of a different 
political persuasion. 
Depending on the local context, it might be worthwhile considering the role of 
traditional leaders. This is not meant to romanticise their role but in the case study 
sites, traditional leaders had a legitimating role as they were considered as having 
authority unlike some of the state endorsed institutional structures which might have 
little powers but without local legitimacy. In such instances it is important to make 
sure that they then become more downwardly accountable to their local 
communities than they are upwards to the centre. 
10.1.8. Land redistribution needs to be addressed 
The land question was the root cause of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (Moyo 
1986, 2000; Marongwe 2002). The land issue has assumed a centre stage at the 
international arena since the land invasions began in 2000. Whilst this research was 
not mainly focusing on the land issue, natural resource management and the land 
issue are closely linked. You can't do justice to the issue of natural resource 
management without looking at the land issue. The land tenure in Zimbabwe, which 
can be traced back to the colonial history, had implications on how the land was 
allocated and how the rural communities had access to natural resources. With 
agriculture being the main livelihood strategy in most parts of rural Zimbabwe, this 
means that land for natural resources such as forestry was only seen as a remainder 
from agricultural farming. People in Mafungautsi, like in all former Tribal Trust 
Lands (now communal areas) are faced with a dilemma of shrinking land for 
cultivation. 
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Whilst most communal people appreciate the need to conserve forests theirs is a 
fight against poverty which makes them feel that the opportunity cost, to them, of 
having forests is their suffering and poverty. People understand the processes 
operative in the degradation trend (du Toit 1985) but are trapped within an 
environment, both socio- economic and physical, not well suited for crop cultivation. 
Local people only respond to locally perceived needs. Communal farmers appreciate 
that when the environment is green they will have enough food and when the 
environment is exhausted, people share its fate. Sometimes the communal dweller 
rationale is based on survival. Poverty reinforces the detrimental impact of 
population build up. No person causes greater injury to natural environments than a 
hungry farmer does. Campbell (1994) points out that the main reason for woodland 
cover clearing is for cultivation of crops rather than harvesting of wood fuel. The 
wood fuel crisis (Munslow et al. 1988) questioned the whole concept of the fuel 
wood crisis, which seems to have been based on wrong assumptions. The main 
assumption seem to have been that the local people need firewood for heating and 
cooking yet the main reason why vegetation cover was being lost was opening up of 
land for agricultural activities in areas such as Gokwe which experienced a cotton 
boom after independence from Britain in 1980. The cotton success story has 
continued to be one of the main pull factors for new immigrants despite the 
reduction of available land. This research, through its participatory GIS, also found 
out that land has mainly been opened up in Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs 
for agricultural expansion, largely due to immigration and local population 
expansion. 
There was a constant reference to the "land hunger" yet a few people were still 
moving into Gokwe as recently as the mid- 1980s. This migration could have been as 
a result of the general perception. One village head pointed out that whilst it is true 
that population is increasing, most people perceive the dark forest soils as being rich 
and ripe for cultivation. Land problems can be attributed to the highly uneven 
distribution of land. Some people have very small pieces of land whilst some have 
large pieces. Field surveys in Batanai revealed that 19.7% of the household heads 
had no fields with 70% owning between 1 and 5 hectares of land whilst others had 
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close to nothing with some relying on land renting121 (Field surveys; Nyambara 
1999). 
For sustainable natural resource management in Zimbabwe the land issue needs to 
be addressed. This has to be done in an orderly manner so that it relieves land 
pressure on communal areas such as Gokwe South, which are in the marginal agro- 
ecological regions. The impact of the land invasions is difficult to assess at present 
due to the unavailability of records. Land reform would go a long way in providing 
land for agriculture for communal farmers, hence its link with management of 
forestry resources. Combined with the land reform, there is a need to make sure that 
there are viable natural resource management institutions in place and these 
institutions should have rights. 
10.1.9. The concept of State Property regimes for the forests should be 
re- visited 
Security of tenure is an important attribute, which determine the manner in which 
the local communities look after natural resources. In the Mafungautsi context the 
Mafungautsi forest still belonged to the state. Unlike in the Campfire approach 
where at least people feel they own the land, co- management in Zimbabwe meant 
that the FCZ still has control and ownership of land in terms of the Forest Act. This 
removes room for the communities to experiment and learn through practice. Under 
the co- management arrangement the FCZ, an arm of the government, still has 
ownership of the land with the local communities reduced to some use rights which 
are defined on the terms of the FCZ. Its implementation almost sounds like the park 
outreach programme (Barrow and Murphree 2001). This resulted in the Mafungautsi 
being referred to as the "Mugabe" or "Commission's forest" thereby denouncing the 
concept of "their forest" as the co- managing partners. 
10.1.10. Women need to be better represented in Co- management 
institutions 
The issue of gender and representation is one of the key issues in the 
decentralisation of natural resources of which forestry forms part. In the co- 
121 In Chemwiro -Masawi 7.7% of the household heads had no land for cultivation with 75% owning 
between 1 and 5 hectares. 
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management attempt the RMCs seem to be underrepresented in terms of women. In 
the case of Gokwe the majority of the people in the rural areas are women as most of 
the men are working in urban areas or simply go to urban centres in the hope of 
getting employment (CSO 1992, 1994). In the Mafungautsi case study there was 
little representation of women in the RMCs. After initial years of implementation 
the FCZ decided to encourage the election of women by "encouraging" people to 
elect female representatives. This meant that a number of women were seconded 
into the RMCs. It was however due to the FCZ's mechanisation that a female lost 
the "count" despite having won the vote of the people. However, the issue of who 
represents the community via the RMC cannot be an issue of just mere numbers. 
Some researchers such as Hughes (Personal Communication 2002) citing the 
Tanzanian case point out that in some instances people choose males whom they 
might feel would be able to stand their ground in the face of the government 
bureaucracy, namely the FCZ. This then reverts to the question of accountability. 
How accountable are the elected women in those RMCs to the people who elected 
them. You might have a committee of either men or women who are upwardly 
accountable to the powers above. This means that the committees will not be serving 
the interests of their electorate irrespective of their gender. In the Batanai case study 
area one woman was removed from the RMC by the FCZ because she was 
questioning the powers of the FCZ over their funds. Both Batanai and Chemwiro- 
Masawi RMCs, which were dominated by men, had no powers resulting in them 
being more upwardly accountable to the FCZ than to their local communities. 
10.2. A Comparison with Campfire 
Co- management in Mafungautsi seems to have an advantage over Campfire in that 
trees are fixed and do not destroy any crops unlike wildlife. Forestry resources are 
immobile which is an advantage in that its not like wildlife which may destroy crops 
in one area and move to another area managed by a different institution. Dividends 
earned in the Campfire areas have an element of compensation in -built unlike 
forestry products, which do not negatively affect agricultural activities. It is however 
important to note that non -timber forest products have very low values as compared 
to trophy hunting. Indigenous timber in Mafungautsi takes up to 60 years to mature. 
Revenue generated from mushroom, broom grass and thatching grass is not very 
high to act as an incentive to the local communities to meaningfully manage the 
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forests. "Woodlands generally have lower direct financial values than the game 
resources on which Campfire has been based" (Nhira et al. 1998: x). There seem to 
be more costs than benefits hence communities will be hesitant to invest their time 
and effort in managing the resource. 
10.3. Why co- manage in the first place? 
Co- management, in general, was introduced for three main reasons according to 
Hulme & Murphree 2001 
Conservation should revolve around the communities and not the state. 
Things to be conserved should be viewed as exploitable natural resources that 
can be managed to achieve sustainable development. 
The neo- liberal thinking that markets should be playing an important role in 
shaping the structure of incentives for conservation (Hulme & Murphree 2001, 
paraphrased). 
Co- management in the Mafungautsi area of Zimbabwe was an attempt to change the 
state enforced environmental protection. This research sought to find out what 
happens when policy is implemented at a local level. Despite the fact that policy 
might make sense, there is a need to understand why policy outcomes do not seem to 
match intended or targeted outcomes. In the Mafungautsi area what was set out at 
the beginning was not achieved by the time the field research was carried out. One 
of the reasons was the design of the co- management. 
The co- management arrangement in Zimbabwe seems to have been designed to fail 
or was rather set to fail due to the fact that the local communities' inputs were not 
incorporated or accommodated in the final document. A number of issues raised by 
the community were not addressed. The first issue to be highlighted was the land 
issue. This was one of the main issues raised during the feasibility surveys 
conducted in communities surrounding Mafungautsi. Land seemed to be what most 
of the people wanted which did not match what the co- management was offering. At 
first they felt that the arrangement would generate benefit streams which would 
compensate the need for land. The monetary benefits from the co- management were 
restricted with a lot of conditionalities. Once the communities realised that there 
were more costs than benefits they opted to avoid bearing all the costs through 
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subversive activities or simply not actively participating. On designing co- 
management arrangement it is important to take into account views of the 
community. This should be an ongoing process where the communities are 
consulted through the different stages of implementation. Communities have a right 
to change their minds as circumstances change. This should be taken into account 
through coming up with flexible implementation strategies in order to adapt to the 
changing situation. Co- management should not be perceived as an event, "but as a 
process of mutual social learning in which each side learns from and adjusts to the 
other over a period of time" (Berkes 2002: 304; cf. Singleton 1998; Kendrick 2000). 
The Adaptive Collaborative Management recently introduced by CIFOR could be a 
step in that direction. 
10.4. Decentralisation - the new fashionable currency 
The term decentralisation seems to have gained currency within the donor 
community (UN 1963; Smoke & Lewis 1996; Conyers 2000; Ribot 1999, 2000). 
More than 50 countries, according to the FAO survey, pointed out that they were 
following initiatives to devolve forestry management to the local levels (FAO 1999). 
Decentralisation is then therefore, seen as having a central value that none dares 
question it as long as it is "decentralisation." Similar arguments can be seen with 
words such as "civilisation" in the nineteenth century and "development" (cf 
Ferguson 1990). Like development in Africa, decentralisation appears in many 
official government documents even though there has been no meaningful power 
devolved to the local people. Why then keep on talking about decentralisation of 
powers and natural resource management when nothing has been done? This seems 
to approximate what Ferguson (1990) refers to as resulting in the "entrenchment of 
bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a representation of 
economic and social life, which denies `politics' and, to the extent that it is 
successful, suspends its effects" (Ferguson 1990: xv). More often than not, the 
government has represented interests other than those of the rural poor and it is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that public intervention has in practice been harmful to 
the majority of the rural people rather than beneficial (Heyer, Roberts & Williams 
1981). This is the unfortunate result that Ferguson (1990) calls the "anti- politics 
machine." 
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In this perspective, the "development" apparatus in Lesotho is not a machine for 
eliminating poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy, it is a 
machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, 
which incidentally takes "poverty" as its point of entry - launching an intervention 
that may have no effect on the poverty but does in fact have other concrete effects. 
Such a result may be no part of the planners' intentions - indeed, it is almost never is 
- but resultant systems have an intelligibility of their own (Ferguson 1990). This 
probably results in what some researchers call a drama/comedy of the commons 
(McCay 1995, 1996; McCay & Acheson 1987; Rose 1994), but one with a happy 
ending - for the entrenched state. This could also be said of co- management in 
Gokwe, which buttressed the "Fortress Conservation" yet it was all carried out in the 
name of devolving powers to the Mafungautsi communities. This approximates what 
some researchers call decentralising in order to re- centralise power (Wekwete & de 
Valk 1990). 
10.5. Institutional Arrangements for Forestry Management 
The research has highlighted the weaknesses of fortress conservation. This calls for 
a more open- minded approach, which accepts the possibility and the potential of 
common property management of forestry resources. Co- management is an option 
which, given a genuine opportunity, could demonstrate the capability of local 
communities to act as joint managers of natural resources. There are many plausible 
alternatives of managing natural resources than fortress conservation (Agrawal 
2002). In addition, national governments in nearly all developing countries have 
turned to local -level common property institutions in the past decade as a new policy 
thrust to decentralise the governance of the environment. This shift in policy is no 
more than a belated recognition that a sustainable resource management can never 
be independent of sustainability of collective human institutions that frame resource 
governance, and that local users are often the ones with the greatest stakes in 
sustainability of resources and institutions (Agrawal 2002). Given an opportunity 
and an enabling environment the local communities can set up effective institutions 
for natural resource management (Agrawal 1999; McKean 1992). It is however 
important to note that there are some instances where the local communities do not 
look after their natural resources (Agrawal 2002). This should not be used as an 
excuse for not experimenting with co- management of natural resources. 
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10.6. Conclusion 
This research further confirms findings by other researchers (Ribot, 1999, 2000, 
2001) which observes that downwardly accountable institutions at local level makes 
a strong contribution towards positive social, ecological and environmental 
outcomes. Decentralisation which results in an upwardly accountable institution will 
not likely result in a sustainable management regime for natural resources such as 
forests as demonstrated in this research which looked at the Mafungautsi area of 
Zimbabwe. Upwardly accountable institutions do not build trust and may not resolve 
conflicts between the state and the local communities (Singleton 1998; Berkes 
2002). 
The management of natural resources has to be seen in the context of the overall 
livelihood strategy of a community. This has meant that most of the institutions have 
to be dealt with within the overall framework of decentralisation covering all the 
natural resources. Decentralisation has often been used to mean different things to 
different people. Even upwardly accountable institutions have often been labelled as 
decentralisation by governments who look at these institutions as serving their 
interests and purposes. Devolution of power has often been used as a tool for either 
punishing and rewarding the people who support the incumbent or a particular party 
that is in power at that particular time. This has not been an exception in Zimbabwe. 
Rhetorical powers have often been devolved without the necessary devolution of 
fiscal authority. Lack of devolution of fiscal authority to the local level institutions 
has meant that they have continued to depend on the centre, which they have to be 
accountable to. 
10.7. Further Research 
In this study, interviews based around aerial photographs were used to analyse 
historical patterns of land cover change. All respondents were able to interpret the 
photographs, but it was apparent that perceptions of change differed between 
respondents. One way of resolving such differences may be to use discussion based 
around aerial photographs as a tool for planning future natural resource use. For 
example, permit zones for thatch and broom collection could be delineated through a 
discussion process between the FCZ and the RMCs, referring to relevant aerial 
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photographs as necessary. This approach has already proved successful in one study 
of forest resource conflicts in Nepal (Mather et al. 1998). 
This study has highlighted the importance of integrating GIS and participatory 
approaches to explain vegetation cover changes in two RMC areas in Gokwe. This 
integration of technical and participatory tools will go a long way to empower the 
local communities as it demystifies scientific knowledge. This dialogue between 
technical and participatory research methods empowers local people to counter 
"technical wisdom" using participatory technical tools. Such knowledge will 
strengthen the local communities' discussions with the FCZ, which at the moment 
claims to have the monopoly of knowledge. However, these two case study areas 
may not be typical of Mafungautsi Forest Reserve as a whole, since only localised 
changes were assessed and not the entire reserve area. Furthermore, there may be 
conflicts in natural resource use amongst the different RMCs, particularly as 
different communities may graze cattle or collect firewood in the same geographical 
areas. There is a need therefore to undertake similar research across a broader area 
and covering more RMCs. Future work could also examine vegetation change over a 
longer period of time, since aerial photographs are available for earlier years. 
Research in West Africa (Fairhead & Leach 1996) has shown that there may be 
cycles of expansion and contraction of vegetation cover and this cannot be deduced 
by analysing a short time span. It would also be interesting to draw conclusions from 
the three tenure regimes, communal, state and private (Chemagora SSCF area). 
In this study, participatory mapping using aerial photography and PRA were carried 
out in parallel by different groups of respondents. However, a more useful approach 
may be to undertake an initial PRA exercise, followed by photo -based interviews 
with several groups differentiated on the basis of the PRA. The initial PRA exercise 
with a large group could identify key sub -groups within the community on the basis 
of gender, age, wealth, or length of residence. This group could then be separated 
into different sub -groups for the aerial photo -based interviews. In this way, different 
perceptions of land cover change within the same community (e.g. between men and 
women) could be identified. 
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This study has looked at the political economy component of the co- management 
arrangement in the Mafungautsi. On the environmental outcomes of the co- 
management arrangements what has been used are proxies of ecological indicators. 
As a long term strategy, it would be a useful approach if one pursues a combined 
social and ecological studies in order to come out with some ecological study since 
the FCZ itself does not have consistent ecological surveys to determine the 
outcomes of the various management regimes. This entails the setting up of 
ecological studies over a period of time. These surveys will also take into account 
the changes, which may be attributed to the climatic conditions from those which are 
a result of the institutional arrangements under co- management. This has to be 
carried out over a long period of time looking at issues such as biodiversity. This 
ecological survey combined with a political economy approach would most likely 
produce important results on decentralised forestry management in the Mafungautsi 
area - or any other efforts to decentralise natural resource management. 
This research has highlighted a number of recommendations as to how co- 
management could be implemented. It would be an important step if co- management 
is carried out through experimentation with the suggested recommendations, making 
adjustments as and when it is necessary. That would more likely result in important 
applied research scholarship. 
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Annex 1: Questionnaire 
UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE 
CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Mafungabusi Resource Sharing Project Questionnaire. 
A: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
01.Interview Number 
02.Interviewer 
03.Respondent 
04.Date 
05.Ward 
06.RMC 
07.VIDCO 
08.Sex of Respondent M 
09.Status of respondent 
a.Head 
b.Spouse 
c.Child 
d.Other (specify) 
l0.Age of household head 
a.18 -20 years 
b.21 -30 years 
c.31 -40 years 
d.41 -50 years 
e.51 -60 years 
f.Above 60 years 
F 
11.Ethnic identity of household: 
a.Shone 
b.Ndebele 
c.Tonga 
d.Nyanja 
e.Karanga 
f.Other (Specify) 
263 
12.Household head's birthplace 
a.same village 
b.same ward 
c.Same district 
d.Another district (Specify) 
e.Outside Zimbabwe 
13.What is the birth place of household head's parents? 
a.Same village 
b.Same ward 
c.Same district 
d.Another district (Specify) 
e.Outside Zimbabwe 
14.Marital Status of household he 
a.Single 
b.Married (monogamous) 
c.Married (polygynous) 
d.Divorced 
e.Widowed 
15.Highest level of education of head of household 
a.No formal education 
b.2 years 
c.5 years 
d.7 years 
e.Junior Certificate 
f.Ordinary Level 
g. "A" Level 
h.Vocational training 
i.Technical College Diploma 
j.University degree 
16.Family size 
17.What is your predominant religion? 
a.Traditional Culture 
b.Christianity 
c.Islam 
d.Other (Specify) 
264 
18.What is the main source of income for the household 
head? 
a.Employment (Civil Servant) 
b.Employment (private sector) 
c.Self employed (Specify) 
d.Unemployed 
e.Housewife 
f.Farming 
19.If household head is employed what is the gross monthly 
salary? 
a.Below $500 
b.$501- $1000 
c.$1001 -$2000 
d.$2001 -$4000 
e.$4001 -$6000 
f.Above $6000 
20.How many members of the household are employed? 
21.Are you involved in income generating activities? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
22.If Yes in 21 what are the projects? 
B.AGRICULTURE 
Also observe presence or absence of grain storage 
facilities and material used for its 
construction 
23. What are your agricultural activities in order of 
importance (Area cultivated)? 
a.Crop cultivation 
b.Cattle rearing 
c.Market gardening 
d.Fruit selling 
e.Other (Specify) 
265 
24.Agricultural production 
CROP HECTARAGE QUANTITY 
HARVEST 
AMOUNT SOLD 
Maize 
Sorghum 
Cotton 
Tobacco 
Mhunga 
Groundnuts 
Sunflower 
Rapoko 
Other(Specify 
25.How did the household acquire land? 
a.No land 
b.Cleared forest land 
c.inherited from father 
d.From relatives and friends 
e.Other (Specify) 
C. LIVESTOCK 
26.How many cattle do you own? 
a.0 
b.1 -3 
c.4 -5 
d. 6 -7 
e.8 -9 
f.10 and above 
27.Where do you graze your cattle in the rainy season? 
a.Mafungabusi Forest 
b.Close to homesteads 
c.In the fields 
d.Other (Specify) 
266 
28.Where do you graze your cattle in dry season? 
a.Mafungabusi 
b.Close to homesteads 
c.In the fields 
d.Other (Specify) 
29.Did the household sell any cattle in the last 12 months? 
a Yes 
b.No 
30.If Yes, how many and why') 
31.Does your household require more grazing land? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
32. If Yes, how will access to more grazing be acquired? 
a.From government 
b.From traditional leaders 
c. Resettlement 
d.Move fields 
e.Go to another area 
f.Other (Specify) 
33. Does the household have problems with the size and 
management of grazing areas? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
34.IF, Yes what are these problems? 
i.Too small, too few 
ii.Overgrazed 
iii.No grass in dry season 
iv.Crop and grazing areas conflict 
v.Poisonous plants 
vi.Drought 
vii.Settlers in grazing area 
Viii.Outsiders bring cattle 
ix. Other (Specify) 
267 
35.If Yes how should they be solved? 
i.Resettle homes 
ii.Designate grazing areas 
iii.Paddocks or fences 
iv.Community should decide 
v. Men should decide 
vi.Other (Specify) 
D. NATURAL RESOURCES 
36. Are there any environmental problems in your area? 
Yes 
No 
b. If Yes, what are they? 
37.What are the local tree species and their uses? 
38.Which tree types do you have? 
39.What is the number of trees? 
40.What conservation methods do you use? 
41.What do you 
(Cooking) 
use as fuel? 
42.Interviewer to observe type of housing structures and 
construction materials (wall and roofing materials) 
43.Do you think it is important to conserve trees? 
44.Why do you say so? 
45.What do you get from Mafungabusi? 
46.Where does the household get firewood? 
i.Nearby (distance) 
ii.Mafungabusi (distance) 
iii.Other (Specify) (distance) 
268 
47.Does the community have an adequate and accessible 
supply of firewood? 
YES 
NO 
48.IF No, what needs to be done to assure a good supply of 
firewood? 
49.During the last 12 months has the household cultivated 
any streambank /riverbank plots? 
Yes 
No 
50.If crops grown how was the tiling done? 
a.hand 
b.Animal 
c. Tractor 
d.Other (Specify) 
51.Is tree cutting in this area controlled? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
52.IF Yes, How? 
a.Self restraint, responsibility 
b.Educate people 
c.Community pressure 
d.Legal controls 
e.Traditional leaders 
f.Forestry Commission 
g.Natural Resources Board (NRB) 
h.Other (Specify) 
53.How effective is the control mechanism? 
i. Good 
ii.Moderate 
iii.Poor 
Explain 
269 
54.Where does the community get thatching grass? 
55.Does community have adequate thatching grass? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
56.Should new immigrants be permitted into the ward? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
57.Are there sacred places in your ward? 
a.Yes 
b.No 
58.If Yes above what are they used for? 
59.Would you want to join the Mafungabusi Resource Sharing 
Project? 
Yes 
No 
60.What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages 
of joining the Resource sharing scheme? 
270 
61.Whom do you regard as the custodian of natural resources 
in your village? 
E. GENERAL COMMUNITY ISSUES 
62.Which two organizations /institutions does your Village 
normally deal with 
1 
2 
63.What are the major problems faced in your village? 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. 
271 
A
nn
ex
 2
: 
L
an
d 
C
ov
er
 C
ha
ng
e 
R
es
ul
ts
 
FO
R
E
ST
 P
R
O
T
E
C
T
IO
N
 
U
N
IT
 
B
A
T
A
N
A
I 
L
A
N
D
 C
O
V
E
R
 &
 
W
IL
D
L
IF
E
 C
H
A
N
G
E
S 
V
E
G
E
T
A
T
IO
N
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
N
o 
ch
an
ge
 e
xc
ep
t f
or
 t
he
 5
 -6
km
 T
re
e 
co
ve
r 
ha
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 
in
 M
af
un
ga
ut
si
 
be
lt 
al
on
g 
B
ul
aw
ay
o 
ro
ad
. 
M
af
un
ga
ut
si
 
V
E
G
E
T
A
T
IO
N
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
L
oc
al
is
ed
 l
os
s 
of
 tr
ee
 c
ov
er
 
IN
 C
O
M
M
U
N
A
L
 A
R
E
A
 
W
IL
D
L
IF
E
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
L
A
N
D
 U
SE
 C
H
A
N
G
E
 
C
A
T
T
L
E
 N
U
M
B
E
R
S 
A
N
D
 G
R
A
Z
IN
G
 
T
R
E
E
 P
L
A
N
T
IN
G
S 
Se
ve
re
 l
os
s 
of
 tr
ee
 c
ov
er
, 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
st
re
am
 b
an
k 
cu
lti
va
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
ri
ve
r 
be
ds
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 w
ild
lif
e 
nu
m
be
rs
, 
W
ild
lif
e 
co
nc
en
tr
at
ed
 a
ro
un
d 
m
or
e 
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n 
ar
ou
nd
 F
PU
 t
he
 c
am
p,
 b
ut
 n
o 
ch
an
ge
 i
n 
ca
m
p 
at
 L
ut
op
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 
no
 c
ha
ng
e 
N
ot
 a
w
ar
e 
of
 pl
an
tin
g 
w
ith
in
 
co
m
m
un
al
 a
re
as
 
no
 c
ha
ng
e 
C
H
E
M
W
IR
O
-M
A
SA
W
I 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
tr
ee
 c
ov
er
 i
m
pl
ie
d 
D
ec
re
as
e 
du
e 
to
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 
lo
gg
in
g,
 I
nd
ig
en
ou
s 
tr
ee
 
de
cr
ea
si
ng
, 
gu
m
 tr
ee
s 
ar
e 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 -m
or
e 
gu
m
 tr
ee
s 
th
an
 
in
di
ge
no
us
 t
re
es
 i
n 
fu
tu
re
 
So
m
e 
fe
lt 
th
at
 t
he
re
 w
as
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 w
hi
ls
t 
ot
he
r 
fe
lt 
th
at
 
th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 d
ec
re
as
e 
no
 c
ha
ng
e 
So
m
e 
pl
an
tin
g 
an
d 
so
m
e 
ar
e 
no
t 
A
ct
iv
e 
pl
an
tin
g 
ta
ki
ng
 p
la
ce
 
fo
r 
fe
ar
 o
f l
os
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 o
ve
r 
tr
ee
s 
an
d 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
of
 s
lo
w
 
gr
ow
th
. 
27
2 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 fr
ee
 s
ee
d 
an
d 
po
ck
et
s,
 b
ut
 s
ho
rt
ag
e 
of
 la
nd
 i
s 
a 
m
aj
or
 p
ro
bl
em
 
SE
C
O
N
D
A
R
Y
 D
A
T
A
 
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n 
tr
ee
 c
ov
er
 o
n 
ae
ri
al
 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
s 
as
 f
or
m
er
 
cu
lti
va
tio
n 
re
ve
rt
s 
to
 f
or
es
t 
D
ec
re
as
e 
in
 t
re
e 
co
ve
r 
vi
si
bl
e 
on
 a
er
ia
l p
ho
to
gr
ap
hs
, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 in
 d
e-
 g
az
et
te
d 
ar
ea
 
N
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
D
ip
 T
an
k 
fi
gu
re
s 
E
uc
al
yp
tu
s 
no
t 
di
st
in
gu
is
ha
bl
e 
fr
om
 o
th
er
 f
or
es
t 
co
ve
r 
ty
pe
s 
on
 
ae
ri
al
 p
ho
to
gr
ap
hs
 
C
H
A
N
G
E
 I
N
 F
IR
E
 
N
o 
ch
an
ge
 -
 f
ir
es
 a
nn
ua
lly
 
E
FF
E
C
T
S 
O
F 
FI
R
E
 
M
ak
es
 e
as
ie
r 
to
 k
ill
 g
am
e 
O
B
SE
R
V
E
D
 C
H
A
N
G
E
S 
IN
 L
A
N
D
 U
SE
 
D
R
IV
E
R
S 
ST
R
IC
T
N
E
SS
 O
F 
N
ot
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 
E
N
FO
R
C
E
M
E
N
T
 
C
L
IM
A
T
E
 &
 
H
Y
D
R
O
L
O
G
Y
 
PO
PU
L
A
T
IO
N
 
C
H
A
N
G
E
S 
SO
IL
 F
E
R
T
IL
IT
Y
 
C
H
A
N
G
E
 
N
o 
co
m
m
en
t 
Pe
op
le
 a
re
 s
ta
rt
in
g 
fi
re
s,
 E
as
ie
r 
to
 k
ill
 g
am
e,
 r
ed
uc
e 
tic
ks
, 
D
is
tr
ac
t F
PU
, 
Im
pr
ov
e 
pa
st
ur
e 
qu
al
ity
, R
ev
en
ge
 o
n 
FP
U
, 
en
jo
ym
en
t 
Fi
ne
s 
an
d 
pa
tr
ol
 h
ad
 i
nc
re
as
ed
 
N
o 
co
m
m
en
t 
D
ef
in
ite
 r
ed
uc
ed
 s
tr
ea
m
 f
lo
w
 
an
d 
ra
in
fa
ll 
in
 c
om
m
un
al
 a
re
a 
H
ou
se
 -
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
by
 i
m
m
ig
ra
nt
s 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
ha
s 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
po
le
 d
em
an
d 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 i
nc
re
as
ed
 l
an
d 
de
m
an
d 
an
d 
co
nf
lic
ts
 
N
o 
co
m
m
en
t 
So
il 
fe
rt
ili
ty
 is
 g
oi
ng
 d
ow
n 
th
at
's
 w
hy
 s
tr
ea
m
 b
ed
 
cu
lti
va
tio
n 
is
 h
ap
pe
ni
ng
 
27
3 
Fi
re
s 
ha
d 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
R
ed
uc
es
 t
ha
tc
h 
an
d 
B
ro
om
 
gr
as
s 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t h
ad
 i
nc
re
as
ed
 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
R
M
C
s 
an
d 
co
- 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
N
o 
ch
an
ge
 
N
at
ur
al
 in
cr
ea
se
 i
n 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
bu
t n
o 
im
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
w
as
 g
oi
ng
 
on
 
So
il 
fe
rt
ili
ty
 h
as
 a
lw
ay
s 
be
en
 
lo
w
 b
ut
 i
ts
 d
et
er
io
ra
tin
g 
N
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 n
um
be
r 
of
 p
oa
ch
in
g 
pr
os
ec
ut
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 1
99
1 
-9
8 
N
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l 
fi
gu
re
s 
on
ly
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 d
is
tr
ic
t 
le
ve
l 
M
ai
ze
 y
ie
ld
s 
ad
ju
st
ed
 f
or
 
ra
in
fa
ll 
de
cl
in
e 
fr
om
 1
98
1 
-9
3,
 
bu
t 
co
tto
n 
an
d 
gr
ou
nd
nu
t y
ie
ld
s 
do
 n
ot
. 
A
nn
ex
 3
: 
PR
A
 T
oo
ls
 U
se
d 
PA
R
T
IC
IP
A
N
T
S 
FA
C
IL
IT
A
T
O
R
 
R
E
C
O
R
D
IN
G
 
D
A
T
E
 
L
O
C
A
T
IO
N
 
T
E
C
H
N
IQ
U
E
 U
SE
D
 
A
 
w
 
Ñ
 
U
D
 
á 
B
at
an
ai
 W
om
en
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
30
 N
ov
em
be
r 
19
99
 
B
at
an
ai
 
Y
 
Y
 
B
at
an
ai
 Y
ou
th
s 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
30
 N
ov
em
be
r 
19
99
 
M
af
a 
V
ill
ag
e 
Y
 
Y
 
B
at
an
ai
 M
en
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
29
 N
ov
em
be
r 
19
99
 
M
af
a 
V
ill
ag
e 
Y
 
Y
 
N
ya
je
 M
en
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
1 
D
ec
em
be
r 
19
99
 
N
ko
m
o 
V
ill
ag
e 
Y
 
Y
 
N
ya
je
 W
om
en
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
1 
D
ec
em
be
r 
19
99
 
N
ko
m
o 
V
ill
ag
e 
Y
 
Y
 
M
ut
an
ha
ur
w
a 
W
om
en
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
2 
D
ec
em
be
r 
19
99
 
M
ut
an
ha
ur
w
a 
Y
 
Y
 
B
at
an
ai
 W
om
en
 
M
an
cu
m
a 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
29
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
00
 
B
at
an
ai
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
B
at
an
ai
 M
ix
ed
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
29
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
00
 
B
at
an
ai
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
B
at
an
ai
 M
en
 
Ji
m
 W
ri
gh
t 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
29
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
00
 
B
at
an
ai
 
Y
 
Y
 
B
at
an
ai
 
D
an
ie
l 
Ph
ir
i 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
29
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
00
 
B
at
an
ai
 
Y
 
C
he
m
w
ir
o -
M
as
aw
i 
W
om
en
 
M
an
cu
m
a 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
2 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
0 
M
at
am
bo
 c
en
tr
e 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
C
he
m
w
ir
o 
-M
as
aw
i 
M
ix
ed
 
E
ve
ri
st
o 
M
ap
ed
za
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
2 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
0 
M
at
am
bo
 c
en
tr
e 
Y
 
Y
 
Y
 
C
he
m
w
ir
o 
-M
as
aw
i 
M
en
 
Ji
m
 W
ri
gh
t 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
2 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
0 
M
at
am
bo
 c
en
tr
e 
Y
 
Y
 
C
he
m
w
ir
o 
-M
as
aw
i 
M
ix
ed
 
D
an
ie
l P
hi
ri
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
A
ss
is
ta
nt
 
2 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
00
0 
M
at
am
bo
 c
en
tr
e 
Y
 
27
4 
K
ey
 
FG
D
: 
Fo
cu
s 
G
ro
up
 D
is
cu
ss
io
n 
I.
R
: 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
R
an
ki
ng
 
R
. 
M
: 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
M
ap
pi
ng
 
T
. 
L
: 
T
im
e 
L
in
es
 
W
R
: 
W
ea
lth
 R
an
ki
ng
 
SC
: 
Se
as
on
al
 C
al
en
da
rs
 
PM
: 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
M
ap
pi
ng
 (
ph
ot
o 
an
al
ys
is
) 
27
5 
Annex 4: Research Publications 
276 
Pergamon 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
SCIENCE//? DIRECT 
Applied Geography 23 (2003) 1 -21 
APPLIED 
GEOGRAPHY 
www.elsevier.com/locate/apgcog 
An investigation of land cover change in 
Mafungautsi Forest, Zimbabwe, using GIS and 
participatory mapping 
E. Mapedza a,b, J. Wright b, *, R. Fawcett b 
a Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), University of Zimbabwe, PO Box MP 167, Mount 
Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe 
b School of Geosciences, University of Edinburgh, West Mains Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JG, Scotland, 
UK 
Received 7 March 2002; received in revised form 9 September 2002; accepted 26 September 2002 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the processes governing land cover change in and around the Mafun- 
gautsi Forest Reserve in Zimbabwe. This study site lies at the interface between the state and 
communal property regimes. Land cover change was analysed using aerial photography for 
1976, 1984 and 1996 within a Geographic Information System (GIS). Perceived change and 
its causes were investigated through governmental data sources, participatory mapping and 
interviews with the local community and forest guards. It was found that whilst forest cover 
within the reserve has remained constant, it has been steadily declining outside its boundaries. 
This decline, a result of agricultural expansion and demand for building materials and firewood, 
was perceived as more pronounced by local farmers than by the forest authorities. 
© 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Land use; GIS; Participatory mapping; Resource sharing; Tree cover; Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
In the last decade, the established view of land cover change in Africa has been 
reappraised. For much of the last century, environmental degradation (loss of forest 
cover and soil erosion) were held to increase linearly with population density and 
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measures were put in place to combat such changes (Bassett & Bi Zueli, 2000). In 
Zimbabwe, for example, forest reserves were gazetted to protect river catchment 
areas through the removal of the human population. More recent work in Guinea, 
however, has shown that the relationship between population density and land cover 
change is more complex (Fairhead & Leach, 1996). In the longer term, cyclical 
expansion and contraction of forests may take place as agricultural land is abandoned 
and then recolonized. `Crisis narratives' of environmental history have also been 
challenged by further work in Cote d'Ivoire (Bassett & Bi Zueli, 2000) and Kenya 
(Tiffen, Mortimore & Gichuki, 1994). 
Previous research (Elliot & Campbell, 2001) has also questioned the simplistic 
assumption that a reduction in percentage tree cover necessarily leads to greater 
scarcity of woodland resources. Within Zimbabwe, Scoones and Wilson (1988) have 
shown that biomass production per hectare may actually increase as tree cover dimin- 
ishes when remaining woodlots are managed by pollarding or coppicing. Similarly, 
Wilson (1990) showed that the abundance of fruit trees did not decline after defores- 
tation, because fruit trees were selectively conserved and their value recognized 
by smallholders. 
Specific responses to resource shortages in miombo woodlands are often complex 
and may vary between locales. Privatization of resources has been documented as 
one response to scarcity in Zimbabwe's smallholder areas (Scoones & Wilson, 1988; 
Mukamuri, 1995), but elsewhere communal arrangements have been re- instigated in 
the face of natural resource shortages (van den Brink & Bromley, 1992). Campbell, 
Grundy and Matose (1993) found that the choice of tree species for construction and 
firewood became less selective as resources became scarcer. As firewood availability 
declines, harvesting arrangements change and men often become more involved in 
its collection (Campbell, Grundy & Matose, 1993). These findings imply that 
responses to perceived scarcity of natural resources may be complex and unpredict- 
able. 
Many of these more recent studies have relied on participatory methods to explore 
local understanding of environmental history. However, findings from participatory 
rural appraisal (PRA) can be affected by the composition of participant groups and 
group discussions influenced by one or two dominant individuals. To overcome these 
inherent weaknesses, Goebel (1996) has suggested that techniques such as PRA 
should best be deployed in conjunction with other methods, so that findings from 
technical and social research methods may subsequently be triangulated. One such 
complementary technology is GIS, which has previously been used with participatory 
methods to explore land cover change in Ghana and Zimbabwe (Elliot & Campbell, 
2001). A second complementary technique is participatory mapping, in which maps 
or aerial photographs form the basis for group discussion of environmental change 
or land ownership. Aerial photography has successfully been used in interviews with 
illiterate farmers in Nepal (Mather, de Boer, Gurung, & Roche, 1998), Cote d'Ivoire 
(Bassett, 1993), and in educational studies of young children from several countries 
(Blades et al., 1998). 
This paper explores land cover change in and around Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, 
part of the Zambezi River catchment area in central Zimbabwe. Changes in land 
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cover between 1976 and 1996 are assessed using historical aerial photography and 
land use is described using participatory interviews centred on the 1996 aerial photo- 
graphs. Comments from these interviews about underlying drivers of land use change 
(population, soil fertility, and enforcement within the park) are compared, both 
between respondents and with other data sources. The reasons for the adoption of 
this strategy were twofold. First, whilst remote sensing studies can identify changes 
in land cover, the changes in land use that lead to vegetation change are very difficult 
to determine without follow -up fieldwork on the ground. Secondly, vegetation change 
as perceived by land users may differ from actual vegetation change and be an 
important determinant of behaviour among those using local natural resources. Par- 
ticipatory mapping techniques were therefore used to elicit information from resi- 
dents regarding land use and perceived land cover change. 
The study area 
The study area lies in Gokwe South District in the Midlands Province of Zim- 
babwe (see Fig. 1). The natural vegetation in Gokwe is miombo woodland, domi- 
nated by Brachystergia spiciformis in association with Julbernardia globfora 
(Gokwe South Rural District Council, 1994; Campbell, Frost, & Byron, 1996). There 
are also some areas of teak woodland dominated by Baikiaea plurijuga in association 
with Pterocarpus angolensis and Guibourtia coleosperma. Grassland areas, known 
as vleis, cover lower slopes near surface drainage lines. Outside the forest reserve, 
this vegetation has progressively been cleared for agriculture, initially through shift- 
ing cultivation and latterly as cotton production expanded. Typically, tree cover 
remains along stream and river banks and fruit trees are often left standing. Topo- 
graphically, the study area largely consists of the gently undulating Mafungautsi 
plateau, which is dissected in places by streams. 
Mafungautsi Forest Reserve was gazetted in 1954 for ecological reasons, since it 
forms part of the watershed for the Sengwa -Mbumbusi river system. These rivers 
flow into the Zambezi, which contains the Kariba Dam, an important generator of 
hydroelectric power for both Zimbabwe and Zambia. Before 1940, most of Gokwe 
was sparsely populated, because of the threat of disease from tsetse fly. However, 
some people migrated into Gokwe after the elimination of the tsetse fly whilst a 
significant number were forcibly moved from areas designated for European settle- 
ment in the 1950s and 1960s (Ndanga, 1987; Matose, 1994; Nyambara, 1999). This 
resulted in increased population density in Gokwe and greater demand for land within 
the gazetted forest area. 
In terms of current livelihoods, Gokwe is known for cotton production activities 
(Worby, 1992). Agriculture is the main source of income, with cotton as the primary 
cash crop and maize cultivation also commercially important. Other income- generat- 
ing activities include marketing of fruits (bananas) and non -timber forest products 
(honey, mushrooms and wild fruit). Local grasses are also sold to provide thatch for 
housing and for making brooms. The area is ethnically mixed as a result of continued 
immigration, with Ndebele and Shona -speaking peoples forming the majority of 
the population. 
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Gokwe Communal Area 
Batanai 
lvlafungabusi 
Forest Reserve 
Nkayi Communal Area 
Chemwí ro- 
P.lasawi 
f 
Tributaries of the Sengwa- Mbumbusi river system 
District boundaries 
Communal area / reserve boundaries 
Fig. 1. Location of Gokwe South district, Mafungautsi reserve and the case study communities of 
Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. 
Management of Mafungautsi Forest Reserve 
The Forestry Commission, a central government body, is legally responsible for 
managing the gazetted forest. Tree -cutting, hunting and deliberate burning are all 
prohibited within the forest reserve. A Forest Protection Unit (FPU) within the For- 
estry Commission is responsible for enforcing these regulations and has the power 
to make arrests. In 1995, the Forestry Commission introduced co- management 
arrangements with the rural communities near Mafungautsi Forest. These arrange- 
ments make provision for natural -resource sharing within the gazetted forest but not 
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surrounding agricultural land. The communities have formed resource management 
committees (RMCs), which are new institutions intended to spearhead the co -man- 
agement project. Separate RMCs have been formed for most of the village develop- 
ment committees ( VIDCOs) surrounding the forest reserve. VIDCOs are the lowest 
geographical unit of administration in Zimbabwe's smallholder farming areas and 
each VIDCO typically contains approximately 1 000 inhabitants. Some RMCs have 
also been formed at levels above or below the VIDCO (Mapedza & Mandondo, 
forthcoming). The RMCs have the power to grant permits for collecting thatch and 
broom grass in selected areas of the forest reserve, as well as encouraging tree - 
planting in the smallholder areas and fighting fires within the forest reserve. Funds 
from these permits are controlled by the RMC and can be spent on community 
projects within the VIDCO. 
Two RMCs, namely Chemwiro -Masawi and Batanai (see Fig. 1), were selected 
for this study. Batanai RMC encompasses one VIDCO whereas Chemwiro -Masawi 
RMC comprises two. Batanai was selected as a former forest area that was ceded 
to the neighbouring communities in 1972. Aerial photographs from the 1960s suggest 
that before being de- gazetted in 1972, vegetation cover in Batanai was similar to 
the rest of Mafungautsi Forest. By way of contrast, Chemwiro -Masawi has a longer 
settlement history. 
Methods 
Changes in land cover were examined through a combination of: 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (Chambers, 1994; International Institute for 
Environment & Development, 1995; Goebel, 1996); 
semi -structured interviews using aerial photographs; 
analysis of historical aerial photography within a GIS; 
analysis of secondary data relating to rainfall, crop yields and arrests, and 
follow -up interviews with Forestry Commission staff and groups of youths, 
women, and the elderly. 
This approach was adopted following Goebel's (1996) suggestion that PRA should 
be complemented by other techniques to overcome its inherent weaknesses. Inter- 
views with local residents were conducted in late 2000 to identify current land use, 
perceived changes in vegetation, and their possible causes. People were invited to 
attend meetings in both study RMCs via community leaders. Attendees were then 
split into groups in a participatory manner so that people chose a group they wanted 
to join. Groups participated in PRA and semi -structured interviews as described 
below. The evening after each interview, one of the authors wrote a synopsis of the 
day's discussions. In addition, a research assistant took notes during the exercise, 
thus providing two written accounts of each interview. Subsequently, follow -up inter- 
views were conducted separately with groups of youths, the elderly, and women. 
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Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) 
Gokwe South District has one of the lowest literacy levels in Zimbabwe, with 
only 39% of its people having received formal education (Central Statistical Office, 
1992), so participatory approaches had to be used. The participatory approach was 
also chosen as a means of exploring perceptions of land cover change through a 
dialogue between `outsiders' and `insiders' (Chambers, 1983; Goebel, 1996). 
Focused group discussions involving up to ten people explored different forest uses 
and perceived change over time. Resource mapping was used to obtain the relative 
perception of vegetation cover by the local communities. In this participatory 
research approach, people sketch local natural resources in map form (Chambers, 
1994; International Institute for Environment & Development, 1995). The technique 
was also used with time -lines, where events are placed in relation to significant 
events with known dates, such as a year of drought, independence, or when a new 
school was built. 
Semi -structured interviews using aerial photography 
Simultaneously with the PRA fieldwork, semi -structured interviews were conduc- 
ted with groups of local respondents. Semi -structured interviews involve the use of 
a pre- designed series of open -ended questions, but also allow unanticipated themes 
to be explored by the interviewer (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Respondents were 
asked about land cover changes, use of local natural resources (current, likely future 
and historical) and fire frequency. Mosaics of aerial photographs were obtained for 
these interviews and acetates were fixed over the photo- mosaics. When describing 
the areas used for a particular purpose, respondents could therefore draw the bound- 
aries of the zones used onto the acetate in marker pen. Such zones included areas 
for thatch and broom grass collection and areas affected by fire. Black- and -white 
1:50 000 aerial photography from 1996 was used for these interviews and enlarged 
to 1:25 000 -scale to make interpretation easier. Aerial photography was used instead 
of topographic maps because those with only basic education find aerial photographs 
easier to interpret (Bassett, 1993; Mather, de Boer, Gurung & Roche, 1998). 
Three workshops were conducted using the aerial photographs. The first was con- 
ducted in Batanai with a group of seven local farmers. Apart from one RMC commit- 
tee member, the majority were not directly involved in resource -sharing. A second 
interview was conducted with 12 farmers in Chemwiro -Masawi. This group was 
more directly involved in resource -sharing and community groups and included the 
local RMC secretary, the ward councillor and several RMC members. Both groups 
consisted almost exclusively of men, with only one woman present. Finally, a similar 
interview was conducted with a member of the FPU at Mafungautsi to determine 
his perception of vegetation change. 
The aerial photo mosaics were subsequently scanned onto computer, imported into 
a geographical information system (GIS) and geo- referenced, as described below. 
Land use zones and other observations recorded during all three interviews were 
then digitized on top of the geo- referenced scanned images by reference to the orig- 
inal acetates. 
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Historical aerial photography analysis 
Black- and -white aerial photo -mosaics (scale 1:50 000) of the Batanai area of the 
reserve and surrounding farmland were obtained for 1976, 1984 and 1996 and 
scanned onto computer as three A3 -size images for each year. These images were 
then geo- referenced to Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) co- ordinates by apply- 
ing a linear transformation to control points from a 1996 panchromatic Spot satellite 
image and 1:50 000 -scale topographic maps. Root mean square (RMS) errors, which 
measure the positional accuracy of the UTM transformation (Johnston, 1998), were 
calculated for each scanned image and are shown in Table 1. Allowable RMS error 
was estimated as 15.5 m, based on a 1:50 000 -scale cartographic standard (Clark 
Labs, 1999; US Geological Survey, 1999). Although most of the RMS statistics for 
the images failed to meet this standard, the map layers produced were used solely 
for the calculation of areas and not for map overlay, thus mitigating such pos- 
itional inaccuracy. 
Polygons were then digitized over these photographs to delineate four land cover 
types: agricultural land, woodland/scrub, vlei, and forest. Percentage tree cover was 
estimated for each polygon, being lowest for vlei and highest for the forest category. 
These percentages were derived from field observations of each land cover class 
made during 2000. An attempt was made to identify eucalypt woodlots planted within 
the smallholder farming areas. However, field observations in Batanai suggest 
replanting is piecemeal and small -scale and so these dispersed eucalypt patches 
proved too difficult to identify on the available photography. As significant land 
cover changes had taken place between 1996 (the latest available photography) and 
2000/2001 (the period of fieldwork), formal 'ground-truthing' of these maps was 
not undertaken. 
Secondary data analysis and follow -up interviews 
Several government datasets were used to cross -check interview findings, includ- 
ing 1981 -93 crop yield data for Gokwe communal area (Agritex/USAID FEWS, 
Table 1 
Root mean square error statistics (in metres) for geo- referencing of aerial photography for Batanai, Gokwe 
South district 
Year Image no. RMS error No. of control points 
1976 1 22.7 16 
1976 2 19.4 14 
1976 3 15.4 15 
1984 1 12.0 13 
1984 2 25.4 15 
1984 3 25.3 15 
1996 1 23.9 12 
1996 2 28.7 12 
1996 3 23.0 11 
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2001), precipitation records for the district meteorological station, and the number 
of poaching arrests in Mafungautsi made by the FPU. Follow -up interviews were 
conducted separately with the elderly, women and young people to further investigate 
issues that emerged during the workshops. This enabled women and young people 
to express views independently of men, whilst the elderly gave accounts of changes 
that have taken place within their environment since the 1940s. Follow -up interviews 
were also conducted at various levels within the Forestry Commission. 
Results 
Changes in land cover 
A clear -cut perceptual division between the forest reserve and the communal land 
pervaded all the interview sessions and is therefore reflected in the presentation of 
results here. Table 2 shows the pattern of land cover change in both areas as recorded 
through interviews with the FPU and communal farmers and through aerial photogra- 
phy analysis. This table also compares perceived changes in land use and its drivers 
according to these interviews and governmental data. 
Land cover changes within Mafungautsi 
The FPU guard interviewed felt that tree cover within Mafungautsi had remained 
largely unchanged in the last ten years, although pole -poaching had reduced tree 
cover in some peripheral areas of the forest reserve. At Batanai, the farmers' group 
felt strongly that tree cover had increased within Mafungautsi over the past ten years, 
whilst opinions at Chemwiro -Masawi were divided, some perceiving increased tree 
cover and others a decrease. The PRA interview with the women's group at Batanai 
suggested that they were even more aware of the reduction in tree cover than the 
male farmers' group. 
Analysis of aerial photography for the Batanai area supported the observations of 
farmers within this RMC. Within Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, tree cover declined 
from 68% in 1976 -7 to 66% in 1984, but then rose again to 71% by 1996. Some 
1.5% of this change may be due to positional inaccuracy in delineating the reserve 
boundary, as estimated from the RMS errors in Table 1. Fig. 2 illustrates the changes 
in land cover within Batanai. During and immediately after the independence war, 
several communal farmers encroached into the forest reserve as political insecurity 
led to the suspension of boundary enforcement. The land cleared by these `settlers' 
can be seen on both the 1976 and 1984 aerial photographs in Fig. 2. By 1996, the 
northern area of encroachment had largely reverted to forest, whilst the southern 
encroachment area remained as grassland. 
Land cover changes in communal areas 
The Batanai group felt strongly that tree cover was diminishing rapidly within 
their village, because of pressure for agricultural land, building materials and fuel - 
wood. The situation was further exacerbated as diminishing crop yields forced some 
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farmers to cultivate stream -beds. In Chemwiro -Masawi, the situation was somewhat 
more complex. In one part of the communal area, trees had been felled commercially 
by permission of the district council, but against the wishes of local residents. Else- 
where, piecemeal tree -felling for timber and land clearance was taking place, 
although this was counteracted somewhat by eucalyptus planting. In the future, 
Chemwiro -Masawi residents felt that the composition of tree species on their land 
would shift towards eucalypts and away from indigenous species. Although the forest 
guard felt unfamiliar with the situation within the communal areas, he did feel that 
there had been some localized loss of tree cover. This was confirmed in a subsequent 
interview with another Forestry Commission representative, although there was no 
systematic monitoring of forest composition and biodiversity. In common with many 
other communal areas (Campbell, du Toit & Attwell, 1989), indigenous fruit trees 
were not felled and no respondents envisaged a situation where fruit trees would be 
at risk. In addition, some remaining patches of vegetation cover were associated with 
rain -making ceremonies (mutoro). 
The observations of the Batanai community are again supported by the aerial 
photography. Percentage tree cover was estimated to have declined from 51% in 
1976 -7 to 47% in 1984 and then to 14% by 1996. This large decrease was mainly 
due to the de- gazetting of Batanai and subsequent clearing of land for cultivation 
and homesteads by immigrants. As shown in Fig. 2, in 1972 a section of forest was 
de- gazetted and legal occupation by smallholders began. By 1996, virtually all of 
this forest had been felled, whilst elsewhere in the communal area, further losses of 
tree cover took place, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Patterns of land use 
Whilst many land use drivers had been identified prior to fieldwork, several themes 
only became apparent during the semi -structured interviews. These themes included 
the importance of declining soil fertility and crop yields in driving land clearance 
in the communal areas and the perceived effect of land cover changes on rainfall 
patterns and streamflow. 
Fire 
The group of farmers at Chemwiro -Masawi held that the frequency of fires within 
the forest reserve had declined following co- management, principally because of 
community enforcement and the imposition of steep fines for offenders. In contrast, 
the FPU felt that the burning regime had remained unchanged over the previous ten 
years. In Batanai, fire was regarded as a useful means of managing vegetation. Not 
only did regular burning of vleis make hunting of game easier, but it also reduced 
tick populations. It therefore combated cattle disease and encouraged grass regrowth, 
thus improving grazing potential. Fires were occasionally started as a means of col- 
lecting honey. Fire was also considered a means of settling scores with the FPU and 
a useful tactic for distracting forest guards for those wishing to enter the forest 
reserve illegally. The Chemwiro -Masawi group felt that farmers there realized that 
persistent burning reduced thatch and broom grass quality, whilst the Batanai group 
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considered burning a means of improving grazing quality for cattle. The FPU 
regarded vlei- burning as more frequent in the Batanai area, with vleis closest to the 
communal areas being most at risk. In contrast, an earlier study at Mafungautsi 
(Matose, 1994) found that people starting fires were reprimanded, because fires were 
often followed by invasion of a noxious weed known as mukauzani, which is poison- 
ous to cattle. 
Cattle -grazing 
All respondent groups agreed that livestock numbers had not changed substantially 
in the previous ten years. It was felt that there was a natural limit to the number of 
cattle that could graze within Mafungautsi. All respondents reported that cattle graze 
unsupervised, but concentrate largely in the vleis and grassy areas once occupied by 
`settlers'. Approximately 20 000 cattle are estimated to enter the forest every year 
(Matzke, 1993). 
Tree planting 
Views about tree planting within communal areas differed between the three inter- 
views. In Batanai, farmers believed that there was little benefit to be derived from 
planting trees, partly because of the long delay before any wood could be harvested. 
Some also believed that the Forestry Commission might repossess communal land 
afforested with eucalypts and were suspicious of planting schemes. By contrast, in 
Chemwiro -Masawi, it was felt that uptake of planting was high because of free 
seedlings and pockets provided by Forestry Commission. However, some people 
expressed concern about limited land availability for tree planting. Subsequent field 
visits suggested that some individuals had planted eucalypts extensively. 
Thatch and broom collection 
All respondent groups showed clear awareness of their designated permit areas 
for thatch and broom collection, and there was a broad correspondence between the 
areas identified by the forest guard and those identified by villagers (Fig. 3). In 
Batanai, very little thatch and broom was available in the communal areas, and this 
led to some illegal collecting of inferior quality ndabula grass for thatch from the 
forest margins, in addition to the grass collection from permit areas. In Chemwiro- 
Masawi, however, thatch and broom grass grew within the communal area and so 
local residents had no need to visit Mafungautsi to collect grass for their own houses. 
This meant that the local RMC could grant permits to outsiders from neighbouring 
communal areas such as Nkayi, thereby guaranteeing income for the RMC. It was 
anticipated that local residents would continue to use thatch and broom from within 
the VIDCO in the future, but that demand for thatch and broom from other areas - 
and with it the value of permits -would increase as natural resources elsewhere 
became depleted. 
Timber and firewood collection 
Pole- poaching was considered to be most intense near the Bulawayo road (Fig. 
3), in the forest areas closest to communal settlement. A similar decrease in pole- 
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cutting with distance from settlement was observed in a previous study of basal area 
plots within Mafungautsi (Vermeulen, 1996). Those interviewed felt that this area 
was especially prone to pole -poaching both because homesteads were located close 
to the reserve boundary and because pole trees within the communal area had been 
exhausted. All respondents felt that firewood collection was restricted to the forest 
margins. The Chemwiro -Masawi group suggested that collection was well controlled 
by the RMC, with dead wood only being gathered on designated days. In Batanai, 
respondents suggested that firewood collection was less well controlled and that those 
with Scotch carts could forage further for wood than those without transport. 
Other non -timber forest products 
All those interviewed believed that collection of wild fruits and mushrooms was 
restricted to the edges of the forest reserve. The Batanai group of farmers considered 
both fruit trees and mushrooms to be evenly distributed throughout the forest, whilst 
the Chemwiro -Masawi group felt that there were slightly more fruit trees along the 
edges of vleis. Only one respondent, the FPU guard, identified an area with a high 
density of mazhanje fruit trees (Uapaca kirkiana). 
Honey collection was not permitted within the reserve. However, both groups of 
communal farmers expressed a desire to develop bee -keeping operations within the 
forest reserve, but despite investment in hives and fencing in one location, no such 
schemes were currently operating. 
Underlying drivers of land cover change 
Population 
All groups agreed that increasing population was a major cause of vegetation 
change. The FPU noted that pole -poaching often increased following the arrival of 
new immigrants to an area, as the new arrivals sought materials for housing within 
Mafungautsi. In Chemwiro -Masawi, those interviewed felt confident that future 
population gains were likely to come from natural increases in population rather than 
immigration. In Batanai, it was felt that natural population increase was slowing 
because of HIV /AIDS, but immigration was continuing. One respondent suggested 
that anyone leaving his or her home temporarily would risk losing their land and 
housing to a newcomer, implying that immigration was perceived as ongoing. 
The PRA and resource -mapping exercises revealed details of migrant character- 
istics and the timing of migration episodes. Following tsetse eradication, the original 
Shangwe people inhabiting the area surrounding Mafungautsi were joined by 
migrants from elsewhere in Zimbabwe, attracted by its cotton -growing potential. On 
discovering that this area was not very productive and now densely crowded, some 
of these migrants moved further north to areas with less sandy soils known as Chid - 
haka, such as Madzivazvido or Chireya. Although cotton income attracted immi- 
grants to the area, some were forcibly moved by the colonial government as a result 
of the Native Husbandry Act of 1951. This allocated certain areas to white settlers 
and many of the current Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi residents were forcibly 
evicted from Rhodesdale. After Rhodesdale was designated `Crown Land', its popu- 
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lation was evicted in stages during the 1940s and 1950s (Ndanga, 1987; Nyambara, 
1999). Others migrated from densely settled rural areas such as Zimuto, Chivhu, 
Chirimuhanzu, Gutu, Bikita, Gweru and Nkayi as a result of land shortages (Mehlo, 
1970; Nyambara, 1999). Many immigrants to Gokwe tend to be wealthier than the 
original Shangwe people and some are former civil servants (mainly teachers). This 
meant that they had enough capital to buy inputs for cotton farming. 
Declining soil fertility and crop yields 
Declining soil fertility was cited as a major cause of land hunger in both RMCs. 
This is mainly due to the local Kalahari sandy soils, which are productive during 
initial cultivation but quickly lose their fertility over time (Manyame, personal 
communication). Most communal farmers historically countered this problem by cul- 
tivating extensively, but this is increasingly difficult due to the shortage of virgin 
land. Indirectly, declining soil fertility increased pressure on the forest reserve by 
reducing the land available for planting eucalyptus within the communal areas. In 
Batanai, some farmers cultivated stream -beds to overcome declining yields. In Chem - 
wiro- Masawi, most farmers held that fertilizers did not improve yields in the pre- 
dominantly sandy soils there and so even greater input availability would not counter- 
act declining soil fertility. Such scepticism about fertilizer effectiveness was also 
found in an earlier study of Mafungautsi (Matose, 1994). 
Regulation and enforcement 
Aside from the independence war, when lack of enforcement enabled migrants to 
settle in Mafungautsi, enforcement changes have also profoundly influenced land 
cover at other times. The group at Batanai felt strongly that the number of people 
arrested when entering Mafungautsi had increased sharply in the previous ten years. 
Not only were perimeter patrols more frequent, but offenders were now more likely 
to be prosecuted and fines had become more expensive. This stricter enforcement 
was the principal reason why the group considered tree cover within Mafungautsi 
reserve to be increasing, while it was simultaneously decreasing in the surrounding 
communal areas. This observation is supported by quantitative data on the number 
of arrests within the reserve, which rose from an average of eight per year in 1991- 
4 to 16 per year in 1995 -8. However, such prosecution figures are only a crude 
indicator of enforcement and may also reflect changes in poaching levels. The Chem - 
wiro- Masawi group also felt that enforcement had become stricter, both because fines 
were more expensive and because the RMC were now involved in enforcement. 
Discussion 
Participatory mapping 
Previous studies have examined land use and land cover change by combining 
remote sensing with a variety of interview techniques. In the UK, questionnaires 
were used to assess the impact of farming on vegetation change (Potter, Barr, & 
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Lobley, 1996), whilst in Ethiopia ecological time -lines were used to reconstruct his- 
tories of land cover change (Reid et al., 2000). In Kenya, interviews focusing on 
land use were conducted while walking along vegetation transects with respondents 
(Mahiri, 1997), and in Cote d'Ivoire group discussions with herders were used to 
identify the drivers of changes in savannah landscapes (Bassett & Bi Zueli, 2000). 
In this study, semi -structured interviews were combined with participatory mapping 
using photo- mosaics. The advantages of this technique were that it yielded land use 
maps that could be easily geo- referenced and related to remote -sensing data, whilst 
being sufficiently flexible to explore unanticipated themes that arose during inter- 
views. It thus represents a promising addition to the range of interview techniques 
available for exploring land use and land cover change. 
Participatory mapping revealed greater detail about the timing and causes of land 
cover change than aerial photo analysis alone. Previous studies have identified sub- 
stantial variation in both socioeconomic characteristics and vegetation in many of 
Zimbabwe's communal areas (Jackson & Collier, 1988; Campbell, du Toit & 
Attwell, 1989). Whilst this local variability was apparent in PRA and group interview 
data, it is not discernible from government data sources. For example, the interview 
data here suggested that in eastern Batanai, settlements were close to the forest mar- 
gin, thus leading to greater crop damage by wildlife and pole -poaching. Such local 
variations in settlement patterns are not apparent in census population counts, which 
are available for the whole of Batanai RMC only. Specific events that affected land 
cover and its drivers -such as the evictions that took place under the Native Hus- 
bandry Act -could only be identified through interviews on the ground. This lends 
weight to the need to many technical methods with participatory approaches (cf. 
Elliot & Campbell, 2001). 
However, one difficulty with the participatory mapping technique in a developing - 
country context lies in distinguishing the relative impact of discussion group compo- 
sition versus geographical location on interview results. In this study, the different 
results in the Chemwiro -Masawi and Batanai interviews were in part due to geo- 
graphical differences between the two RMCs and partly due to differences in group 
composition (i.e. the presence of senior community representatives and RMC mem- 
bers in one group, but not in the other). In a rural developing -country setting, where 
respondents may be travelling some distance to attend interviews on an allocated 
day, standardizing group composition across different sites is in practice difficult to 
achieve (Goebel, 1996). 
Land cover change at Mafungautsi 
The FPU perceived land cover change somewhat differently to the smallholder 
farmers living on the forest reserve margins. Whilst many of the farmers felt that 
tree cover within the reserve had increased, the FPU felt that tree cover was stable 
with localized losses due to pole -poaching. The farmers were also more acutely 
aware of the loss of tree cover in the communal areas than the FPU. Such differences 
in perception of land cover change have also been found in other studies that com- 
bined interviews with remote sensing in West Africa. Fairhead and Leach (1996) 
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described how technical officers may interpret local developments so as to justify 
their own interventionist policies. The differing perceptions of land cover change 
between the Batanai farmers and the FPU could be due to the latter's need to maintain 
their status. By suggesting that forest cover in the reserve was unchanged, the FPU 
could justify their presence as a barrier against forest degradation. In the Gokwe 
study sites, women were more aware of a reduction in vegetation cover, probably 
due to their key role in firewood collection and the need to walk further as fuel 
wood became scarcer. This awareness of forest cover among women concurs with 
previous work (Clarke, Cavendish, & Coote, 1996), which found that women knew 
of uses for a greater number of tree species than men. 
Underlying tensions between many of the key actors at Mafungautsi became 
apparent during the course of the study. Some neighbouring communal farmers had 
cultivated land within the reserve during the period of weak enforcement from 1978 
to 1983 and subsequently been expelled. This group still felt entitled to the gazetted 
land within the reserve and resented the presence of the FPU in enforcing the 
reserve's boundaries. When co- management was introduced, it was seen as a mech- 
anism for resolving this conflict (Matzke, 1993; Nhira, Baker, Gondo, Mangono, & 
Marunda, 1998). However, the FPU clearly felt that the new RMCs contributed little 
to enforcing regulations within the reserve, whilst one RMC was criticized for not 
distributing income generated through co- management more widely within the com- 
munity. 
Given the evidence presented here, it seems likely that the communal areas sur- 
rounding Mafungautsi will experience ever -declining tree cover, unless participatory 
action is taken. Even without any local population increases, this trend seems likely 
to continue because of soil fertility decline and because of felling by remote actors. 
If current land use drivers continue to operate, the remaining communal woodland 
is likely to shift in composition towards fruit trees and eucalypts as felling continues 
and some farmers take up incentive schemes for tree -planting. Within Mafungautsi, 
increased pole -poaching seems likely without greater economic incentives for local 
communities to respect the reserve's boundaries. The gazetting of Mafungautsi 
resulted in local communities perceiving it as state property and the `withdrawal' of 
traditional forestry conservation practices within the gazetted area. Imposed sol- 
utions, such as the rural afforestation programme (Whitlow, 1988; Elliot, 1991; 
McGregor, 1995), appear unsustainable in the long term and there is a need for 
local solutions adapted to the particular social, economic and political circumstances 
in Mafungautsi. 
Future research 
In this study, interviews based around aerial photographs were used to analyse 
historical patterns of land cover change. All respondents were able to interpret the 
photographs, but it was apparent that their perceptions of change varied. One way 
of resolving such differences may be to use discussion based around aerial photo- 
graphs as a tool for planning future natural resource use. For example, permit zones 
for thatch and broom collection could be delineated through a discussion process 
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between the Forestry Commission and the RMCs, referring to relevant aerial photo- 
graphs as necessary. This approach has already proved successful in one study of 
forest resource conflicts in Nepal (Mather, de Boer, Gurung & Roche, 1998). 
This study has highlighted the importance of integrating GIS and participatory 
approaches to explain vegetation covers in two RMC areas in Gokwe. This dialogue 
between technical and participatory research methods empowers local people to 
counter `technical wisdom' using participatory technical tools. However, these two 
case study areas may not be typical of Mafungautsi Forest Reserve as a whole, since 
only localized changes were assessed and not the entire reserve area. Furthermore, 
there may be conflicts in natural resource use amongst the different RMCs, parti- 
cularly as different communities may graze cattle or collect firewood in the same 
geographical areas. There is therefore a need to undertake similar research across a 
broader area and covering more RMCs. Future work could also examine vegetation 
change over a longer period of time, since aerial photographs are available for earlier 
years. Research in West Africa (Fairhead & Leach, 1996) has shown that there may 
be cycles of expansion and contraction of vegetation cover and this cannot be 
deduced by analysing a short time period. 
In this study, participatory mapping using aerial photography and PRA were car- 
ried out in parallel by different groups of respondents. However, a more useful 
approach may be to undertake an initial PRA exercise, followed by photo -based 
interviews with several groups differentiated on the basis of the PRA. The initial 
PRA exercise with a large group could identify key sub -groups within the community 
on the basis of gender, age, wealth or length of residence. This group could then be 
separated into different sub -groups for the aerial -photo -based interviews. In this way, 
different perceptions of land cover change within the same community (e.g. between 
men and women) could be identified. 
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ABSTRACT 
Although governance innovations that involve moving powers closer to the citizens are 
receiving increasing policy support, their implementation is not without problems. This 
study uses a review and case study approach to critically examine the contradictions and 
ambiguities of "peasant empowerment" in a co- management venture between 
Zimbabwean foresters and peasant communities. The institutional infrastructure for co- 
management was derived from and superimposed upon a complex web of local power 
bases, further fragmenting existing networks of interest, affection and association, and 
thus limiting the scope for co- management. The legislative environment, at least during 
the pre -2000 period, supported the expropriation and control of the land and resources of 
peasant communities, thus contradicting the underlying principle of co- management, 
which is that of equal partnership. Powers over natural resources have remained 
centralized in the national state; the little power that has been decentralized has been 
transferred to levels that are not close enough to the citizens. Furthermore, there is no 
legislation that gives a legal mandate and fiscal autonomy to units closer to the citizens 
than the district level. The co- management venture is "supply -led" rather than "demand 
driven ", originating in international development assistance circles, and implemented on 
the terms and conditions of their allies in the state bureaucracies responsible for natural 
resource management. However, in spite of their marginalization, peasant communities 
have a wide repertoire of tools, which enable them to significantly penetrate local and 
national political processes. The study identifies the need for fundamental changes in the 
co- management system, including the creation of downwardly accountable institutions 
and experimentation with new co- management relations. It argues that such changes 
require related reversals in the ways that researchers, policy- makers, civil society 
organizations and other facilitators have traditionally conducted their business. The 
central thesis is that the state and other external actors have sought to mold and discipline 
local institutions in order to achieve top -down conservation objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The transfer, through decentralization reforms, of governance powers to units that arc 
closer to the citizens, has been gaining increasing significance for governments in 
developing countries (Mawhood 1983; Crook and Manor 1998; Ribot 1999). The term 
decentralization entails a process whereby bundles of "entrustments" - including 
regulatory and executive powers, responsibility and authority in decision making, 
institutional infrastructure and assets, and administrative capacity - are transferred to 
local entities, such as local governments or local communities. Entrustments can be 
defined as the responsibilities given to lower level structures from above (Ribot 1999, 
2001). In practice, decentralization reforms generally turn out to be disjointed and 
complex processes, having to operate within arenas characterized by the contestation and 
negotiation of interest between and within various levels of society (cf. Moore 1993; Peet 
and Watts 1996; Tsing 1999). 
This study focuses on one particular form of decentralization, namely the co- management 
of forest resources. It uses review and case study approaches to critically examine the 
ambiguities and complexities of "peasant empowerment" through co- management of a 
protected forest in Zimbabwe. The study questions benign- sounding presumptions, often 
implicit in the design of such projects, that there is an equal partnership between the 
actors in the co- management arrangement. It argues instead that in real -life situations, 
the extent of community empowerment through co- management depends on the 
interaction of interests of the various actors involved in a particular site, including states, 
international organizations, business enterprises and grassroots actors. The central thesis 
is that the state and other external actors have sought to mold seemingly local institutions 
and have tried to discipline these institutions in order to achieve top -down conservation 
objectives. The study shows that there is little scope for genuine local empowerment in 
partnerships in which the communities, or committees intended to represent them, are 
being manipulated. However, it also shows that communities are not docile and that they 
have their own mechanisms for responding to such manipulation. 
Research Sites 
The area of study was the Mafungautsi State Forest in the Gokwe South District of 
Zimbabwe.' Gokwe South District came into existence due to the Rural District Councils 
Act of 1988, which was implemented from July 1993. This Act is known as the 
"amalgamation" act, because its main aim was to amalgamate the local authorities 
responsible for "commercial" and "communal" farming areas within each district. 
However, it also resulted in some changes to district boundaries and in Gokwe District, 
where there were no large -scale commercial farms, its main impact was the division of 
the district into two: Gokwe North and Gokwe South. 
Mafungautsi is the correct Shona name for a place where there is mist or smoke. Most documents and 
reports refer to Mafungautsi as Mafungabusi, which is a corrupted version used by the colonial 
administrators. 
The research was conducted in two arcas bordering the Mafungautsi Forest, namely 
Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. These areas constitute two of the 15 resource 
management committees (RMCs) formed by Zimbabwe's Forestry Commission (FC) 
under the co- management arrangement in the Mafungautsi area. They were selected on 
the FC's advice, on the grounds that they represented one successful RMC (Batanai) and 
one failure (Chemwiro -Masawi). The research revealed, however, that "success" and 
"failure" are not useful criterion, since, in the eyes of the FC, "success" is measured not 
so much in terms of the achievements of the RMC, but by how amenable the RMC is to 
manipulation by the FC. The RMCs that stand their ground are labeled "failures ". 
There were, however, other valid reasons for the choice of these RMCs. Batanai is 
situated in an area that was formerly forestland, and some people within Batanai were 
evicted forest dwellers. This offered a contrast with Chemwiro -Masawi, where few 
people used to reside in the forest area. Differences in attitudes towards co- management 
were assessed in the two areas in the light of their different historical relationship with 
Mafungautsi Forest. Chemwiro -Masawi was also selected because it had commercial 
timber extraction, and this provided the opportunity to see how dividends were allocated 
under the co- management arrangement. Some comparative research was also pursued in 
other RMCs, particularly Sokwela and Chemusonde. The findings will be cited in the 
text, but they were minor research sites. 
Research Methods 
The research was conducted mainly between September 1999 and August 2001. 
Towards the end of this period, the area began to be affected by the "land invasions" 
which have characterized much of Zimbabwe in the last few years. These land invasions 
involved the forceful and illegal occupation of mainly white -owned commercial farms by 
pro -government war veterans within the framework of the government's "Fast Track 
Land Resettlement ", which is meant to address the nation's racial land imbalances. In 
some parts of the country, including Mafungautsi, these land invasions were extended to 
state land, such as forests. Although this research is not on the land invasions per se, it 
looks at how the invasions have impacted on the dynamics of co- management. 
Prior to the identification of the case study RMCs, one of the researchers held interviews 
with most of the traditional and other local leaders in the proximity of Mafungautsi Forest 
Reserve. These included Chiefs Njelele (now deceased) and Mukoka, Headmen Chirima 
(now deceased) and Ndhlalambi, kraalheads, councilors, and chairpersons of village 
development committees (VIDCOs). Interviews were also held with representatives of 
government agencies (including the Forestry Commission (FC), Grain Marketing Board, 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, and departments such as Agricultural Technical and 
Extension Services (AGRITEX) and Natural Resources), the Gokwe South Rural District 
Council, a variety of non -government organizations (including the Organization of Rural 
Associations for Progress (ORAP), Kana Grazing Scheme, Batanai Burial Society and 
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Batanai Women` Garden Project) and with RMC members and some villagers. Some 
interviews were recorded on tape to be transcribed later. The oldest villagers, for example 
a man known as "vaOne ", proved to be helpful "human archives ". Official minutes of 
the RMC meetings and archival records were also consulted. The latter were an 
important source of information on the administrative background of Gokwe South 
District, from the time it was part of a much larger area known as the Sebungwe Region 
up to the partition of Gokwe District into Gokwe South and North in July 1993. 
Following the selection of the study sites, the first author spent at least two months in 
each RMC. The same researcher also attended RMC meetings, workshops, development 
meetings and political party meetings. In instances where meetings were held in the 
absence of the researcher, research assistants took notes on all the proceedings. The 
researcher also attended traditional leaders' court sessions. Since the jurisdictions of 
these meetings do not correspond exactly with RMC boundaries, in a number of instances 
meetings outside the research area were also attended, especially those discussing issues 
pertinent to the research. Key informant interviews were also conducted, segregating 
groups according to gender and age differences and household profiles were conducted 
for some households. A total of 240 household questionnaires were administered, 
comprising 120 in Batanai and 120 in Chemwiro -Masawi. 
Structure of the Paper 
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The next section provides the 
background to co- management in Mafungautsi Forest. It documents the history of 
Mafungautsi, describes the role of the RMCs, which were put in place by the FC in order 
to represent the local community and regulate their conduct, and situates the co- 
management venture within the context of the complex institutional structure of the area. 
The RMCs were superimposed upon a multitude of existing social, political and 
administrative structures that are aligned to, and thus derive their legitimacy from, state 
or customary institutions. The section questions notions of distinctness and fixity of 
actors and interests that are often implicit in co- management visions, arguing instead that 
the overall effect of such superimposition is to further strain the underlying and fluid 
networks of interest, affection and association, thereby impairing the scope for co- 
management. An underlying assumption is that people have specific and non -changing 
interests. Societies are, however, dynamic and any intervention that does not seek to take 
cognizance of the dynamics of power within a society is unlikely to succeed. 
The next section examines the "practical political economy" of co- management in 
Mafungautsi. It shows how the co- management venture lies at the intersection of social 
networks, and how the relations of interest and affection within them are in practice 
negotiated through elections, constitutions, land and resource claims, and varying 
definitions of concepts such as "resource ", "management" and "sharing ". The study 
2 All members of this organization are women except the villagehead who is also a member. The 
organization also acts as a savings and loan society, in which the members lend each other money to buy 
kitchen utensils; the village head buys utensils for his wife who is a member as well. 
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argues that co- management is confounded by the conflicting roles of the FC as a player, 
referee and coach within the ensuing milieu. It also shows that, although these roles are 
significant in shaping the environment and how peasants interact with it, the grassroots 
actors have a variety of ways in which they are able to influence social and political 
processes to achieve their own objectives. 
The penultimate section shows that co- management in Mafungautsi is far removed from 
the democratization of forest management. It is a process where international 
development and national environmental protection interests are promoted and defended 
against a backdrop of competing peasant land and resource claims. The section identifies 
the origins of co- management, tracing its inception to international development 
assistance circles, and shows how it filtered its way into existence in a top -down fashion 
through the FC, which is a national government agency located within the ministry 
responsible for the environment. It also describes the costs and benefits that accrue to the 
local people from co- management. 
The concluding section draws the study together, summarizing the ambiguities and 
contradictions of the co- management experience. It also suggests solutions to some of 
the conundrums that Zimbabwe's co- management approach presents, some of which lie 
beyond the forest sector. 
BACKGROUND TO CO- MANAGEMENT IN THE MAFUNGAUTSI STATE 
FOREST 
Origins of Co- Management 
Mafungautsi State Forest Reserve is located in west central Zimbabwe (Figure 1). It is 
one of the 21 state forests falling under the control of the government's Forestry 
Commission. Covering some 82,100 hectares of forestland, it comprises almost 10% of 
the nation's 827,200 hectares of indigenous forest reserves, most of which are in the 
western parts of the country. Mafungautsi was designated a state forest in 1954. Like 
most such forests, its statutory designation involved the eviction of peasant communities 
who resided in that area at the time. Its history has, therefore, been characterized by 
tenurial and other conflicts between official state forest custodians and the surrounding 
peasant communities. Over the years the boundaries of Mafungautsi have expanded and 
contracted, reflecting the difficulty that both the FC and the local communities have had 
in asserting effective and exclusive control over the forest reserve. 
The recognition that the conservation of forest reserves in Zimbabwe could only be 
secured with the support and cooperation of neighboring peasant communities dates back 
to the 1960s (Phillips et al. 1962). Over the years, a number of management systems 
have sought to involve local communities in resource management, ranging from 
"community development" in the 1960s (Mutizwa -Mangiza 1985), to "co- management" 
and "resource sharing" in the early 1990s (Matzke and Mazambani 1993; Matzke 1994) 
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and, most recently, "adaptive co- management ".3 However, as this case study 
demonstrates, despite these fashionable, populist- sounding labels, these systems have 
been structured mainly to achieve conservationist goals, rather than to empower the 
communities. 
Gokwe Communal Area 
Batanai Chemwiro- 
Masawi 
Mafungabu 
Forest Reserve 
Tributaries of the Sengwa -Mbumbusi river system 
District boundaries 
Communal area / reserve boundaries 
Figure 1: The Location of Mafungautsi State Forest 
"Co- management" in Mafaungautsi is an international concept that filtered its way into 
local practice in a "top- down" manner through the FC. When a Rural Afforestation 
Program funded by the World Bank ended in the 1980s, the FC, desperately in need of 
external funding, wrote a new funding proposal. This proposal was initially submitted to 
the World Bank, but later revised to neatly meet the funding criteria of the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA provided funds for local experts to go 
to India on a study tour to learn from the Indian joint forest management experiences. 
J The Centre for International Forestry Research has commissioned an extended research project on 
adaptive comanagement in Mafungautsi. Wollenberg (1998) identifies over 20 commonly used terms for 
local forest management, including "community-based natural resource management ", "joint forest 
management ", "collaborative management" and "resource sharing ". 
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Resource Management Committees 
Resource management committees (RMCs) were established in Mafungautsi by the FC as 
an essential part of the co- management package. The study will show, through the case 
study of Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs which follow, that these new institutions 
introduced new dynamics within the Mafungautsi community. An RMC is typically 
composed of seven members, namely chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, treasurer 
and three committee members, who are supposed to manage the forestry affairs on behalf 
of their communities. The RMC activities are governed by a constitution and the case 
study will analyze the processes of formulation, implementation and contestation of the 
RMC constitutions. Committee members are elected into office through elections in 
which all adult villagers are eligible to vote.4 The election of RMCs is a confusing 
process in terms of popular participation, as it often does not generate much interest 
among the potential voters, who do not attach much significance to the elections. This 
lack of interest could be attributed to the unresponsiveness of the FC to the people's 
needs. For instance, at a workshop held prior to the 2000 grass- cutting season at Shingai 
Training Center, the local people requested to be permitted to collect fiber on a 
sustainable basis for construction purposes. The FC responded by saying that the 
peasants should buy ropes -the cost of which is beyond the reach of peasant farmers. 
Popular participation is further compromised by the fact that, when it comes to 
determining who serves as members of the RMC subcommittees, the FC wields advisory 
powers that are hardly challenged, particularly during the grass- cutting season, which 
extends from June to October and is the time when community members have access to 
the forest to collect grass for purposes such as thatching. The cast study will show that, 
although this window of discretion enjoyed by the FC may be well intentioned (for 
example, to reduce the "transaction costs" of decision -making during a period of high 
labor demand), its overall effect is to subordinate democratic processes to bureaucratic 
fiat. The arrangement reinforces a top -down orientation of the committee. 
Role of RMCs in the Local Socio- Political Structure 
The organizational structures in the study area are, as already indicated, quite complex. 
The RMCs are only one of many overlapping committees that have been or are being set 
up by authorities at the sub -district level (see Figure 2). A Prime Minister's Directive of 
1984 introduced village and ward development committees (VIDCOs and WARDCOs), 
ostensibly to decentralize and democratize the process of planning for local development. 
4 Any adult resident within the village, including immigrants, above the age of 18, is entitled to vote. In 
some instances this "right" can be manipulated to meet specific ends. For instance a 30 year old man was 
disqualified from standing for councilorship as he was said to belong to the youth in terms of the ZANU PF 
strictures. Immigrants with new ideas and perceived to be ambitious were often referred to as 'Mafikizolo' 
meaning recent arrivals. At a meeting to discuss development issues with the national broadcasting agency, 
the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), the immigrants were accused of trying to usurp power, as 
they have no understanding of how issues have "traditionally" been resolved in Gokwe South. A close 
associate of the councilor murmured that that's why they no longer wanted immigrants. 
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Figure 2: A Simplified Institutional Organogram of Zimbabwe's Rural Local 
Governance System 
Central Government 
Provincial Government 
Rural District Council 
(Councilors) 
Ward development Committees 
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Groups, Water User Committees, Burial 
Societies, Women's clubs, Campfire 
Committees, School Committees, Dip tank 
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Headmen 
Traditional 
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They were established over and above the existing traditional institutions. Subsequently, 
various government and non -government organizations have introduced other 
committees, such as ward and village CAMPFIRE committees (CAMPFIRE is the 
Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources), water user boards 
under the Water Act of 1998 and a variety of project- focused committees set up by 
external development assistance actors and their local colleagues in relation to activities 
such as gardening, dam construction, soil conservation, water supply, sewing, brick 
molding and burial societies. Furthermore, at the time of the study the role of traditional 
leaders was being revamped under the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, while a draft 
Environmental Management Bill proposed to introduce environmental protection area 
committees. It should further be noted that the individuals who constitute the RMCs also 
play roles in other local institutions, thereby adding to the ambiguities and complexity of 
the whole process. 
RMCs in most instances cut across the boundaries of traditional villages or kraals. In 
some cases the RMCs were formed at a level equivalent to the dunhu, which is headed by 
a headman. In Batanai, for example, when the present RMC was established in 1996, it 
covered three traditional villages. The heads of each of these villages were requested to 
nominate people for the various posts in the RMC. It should be noted that, at the time 
when the first RMCs were formed, traditional leaders had not been formally given back 
their powers through the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998. 
The relationship with VIDCOs and WARDCOs is similarly complex. The VIDCOs and 
WADCOs are demographically defined administrative units that, in principle, are based 
on a system of popular representation. A VIDCO consists of six members; four of these 
are selected through adult village suffrage while the other two posts are allocated to 
representatives of the ruling party's Women and Youth Leagues. At the time of the study, 
all VIDCO members were, by default, members of the ruling party and there tended to be 
a very thin line between these institutions and the party. The VIDCO is presided over by 
a chairperson elected by the members and its job is to develop a local village 
development plan. Six such villages constitute a ward, which is administered by a 
WARDCO. The WARDCO also has six members, constituted on similar lines to the 
VIDCOs, but it is presided over by an elected councilor, who represents the ward on the 
Rural District Council (RDC). Although VIDCOs and WARDCOs in principle appear 
democratic, in practice they are not effectively representative of local interests and 
aspirations (Murombedzi 1991; Mandondo 2000). Decisions are in effect made at the 
district level with the technical advice of line ministry technocrats. These experts tend to 
make plans based on instructions coming from their head -offices in Harare, rather than 
incorporate the input of the local communities, to whom they are not accountable. In 
Batanai RMC, the current councilor is not popular as he was accused of stifling 
development, especially on the issues of building a new school and a cattle- dipping tank. 
The people were baffled when he was interviewed on the national radio saying that he 
had managed to successfully develop his ward since his election. In Chemwiro -Masawi 
the traditional village head said the councilor was not doing enough to convince the RDC 
that timber revenue had to be ploughed back into the communities. In one instance the 
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village head attended a Gokwc South RDC meeting himself, in order to push through a 
request to get proceeds from commercial timber logging. 
The introduction of RMCs under the co- management initiative was regarded by the FC as 
part of the Government's wider decentralization process, of which the VIDCOs and 
WARDCOs were a critical part.5 The committees were originally intended to be 
subcommittees of the VIDCOs. Confusingly, however, RMCs were sometimes 
constituted at a higher level, covering an area comprising more than one VIDCO and 
sometimes a whole ward. For example, the first RMC in Batanai, which was established 
in 1995, was at ward level and covered four VIDCOs; but in 1996 this was dissolved and 
four VIDCO -level RMCs were established. Whilst RMCs such as Batanai broke up into 
smaller units, some of the RMCs coalesced into larger units. These variations in their 
level of operation have resulted in some form of "crisis of identity" for the RMC. The 
question of scale with respect to size of units for local natural resource management is 
important in common property resource debates (McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 
1990; Berkes and Farvar 1989; Murphree 1991). Small units are favored because people 
are assumed to be in everyday contact, which is thought to foster social cohesion, and 
thus reduce the transaction costs associated with resource use and management.6 The 
evolution, in Mafungautsi, of RMCs across a range of scales is probably a reflection of 
complexity of local ecological systems and the contestation and negotiation of interest 
within and across various social groups. Rather than being seen as a problem requiring 
institutional "packaging ", it lends weight to Murphree's (1990) argument that "small" has 
to be conceptualized with respect to ecological and socio- political constraints. 
The VIDCOs and WARDCOs were not created in an institutional vacuum; they were, as 
already indicated, superimposed on a "traditional"7 system of social organization. In this 
system the household (musha), under a patrilineal household head (samusha), comprises 
the smallest social unit. Several households constitute a village (bhuku) under the village 
head (sabhuku). Several villages constitute a dunhu, presided over by a headman 
(sadunhu), and these in turn constitute chiefdoms (nyika) under the chief (mambo). 
Related traditional institutions include spirit mediums, rainmakers and other holders of 
ritual office (Bourdillon 1991). 
The role of RMC chairpersons is difficult because they lack the authority of other local 
leaders. Even their fellow committee members question their legitimacy. In an interview 
on 4 November 1999, the Batanai RMC Chairperson, when asked why he was not 
effectively mobilizing the people, pointed out that he needed to mobilize the RMC itself 
before moving to the ordinary peasant farmer. Some reminded him that he was not the 
5 Decentralization of power and responsibilities were cited as one of the principles of comanagement in 
Mafungautsi (FC 1997) 
6 
Researchers including its early proponents (Ostrom 1990) have empirically and theoretically questioned 
the proposition that small size units are necessary for common property resource management 
7 Most of the so- called traditional institutions were remolded to extend colonial rule over the African 
population through a system of indirect rule. For instance, the term sabhuku literally and symbolically 
means the keeper of the book - i.e. records of taxes extracted from the African population by the colonial 
governments through these leaders. Bhuku is a "Shonalised" English word for book. 
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villagehead or the headman. "Institutional ranking" exercises were conducted in both 
research sites and, for comparative purposes, in another village, called Mutanhaurwa. In 
Batanai and Mutanhaurwa, traditional leaders consistently ranked higher than RMC 
members - or, in fact, other leaders, such as the councilor or MP. In Chemwiro -Masawi, 
RMC members were initially ranked higher than traditional leaders but this position was 
later reversed. The reasons for this change will emerge later. 
One must not, however, over -romanticize the respect given to traditional leaders. Some 
traditional leaders are even less democratic than the elected committees. In Batanai, a 
village head was assaulted for handing down a ruling that, according to the defendant, 
was "biased ". Manipulation of these leaders by government authorities may result in 
traditional leaders, who are not normally subjected to democratic electoral processes, 
becoming more autocratic than elected committees. Furthermore, the position of 
traditional leaders is dynamic and they are constantly faced with new challenges. Village 
heads in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi lamented the loss of control over their 
people as a result of challenges from new churches, mainly the Seventh Day Adventist 
(SDA) church. 
The VIDCO -WARDCO and traditional systems of leadership rely on different forms of 
legitimization, which produces conflict between them. Each has its own regulatory 
system. VIDCOs and WARDCOs are part of an official regulatory system, which is 
"top- down" and "rational- legal" in nature and bears little relation to local cultural 
systems. Traditional regulatory mechanisms include explicit rules as well as implicit 
norms and taboos, including a moral economy of rules that are written within the hearts 
of the people. Local censure mechanisms include payment of material fines, admonition 
and belief in the omnipotence of the spirits and spiritual censure (Matowanyika 1991; 
Mandondo 1997). An example of the application of traditional judicial systems to natural 
resource conservation is a judgment made by Headman Ndhlalambi in Batanai on the 29 
June 2000, when nine people were each ordered to pay Z$4909 for cutting down fruit 
trees for various purposes. 
The role of the new RMCs is thus not a simple matter of "top- down" "disciplining" for 
conservation objectives; the new organizations find themselves entangled with both 
bureaucratic politics (at multiple scales) and local politics (cf Ferguson 1990). The 
Chemwiro -Masawi pre -grass cutting workshop recommended that the RMCs should be a 
subcommittee reporting through the village head. In Batanai, however, the councilor, in 
an interview with one of the researchers on 2 September 2000, argued that the RMCs 
were not going to succeed as they were hiving themselves off from him as the 
representative of the RDC by jointly organizing meetings with the FC without notifying 
Institutional ranking is an exercise where people rank institutions operating in their community based on 
the various criteria such as responsiveness to local needs, feedback mechanism, accountability. This is 
some form of a proxy voting mechanism as it shows institutions that are positively contributing in a given 
area. 
9 Officially, one US dollar is equivalent to 55 Zimbabwe dollars. It is not a market -determined rate, but an 
artificial rate fixed by the state. On the parallel market the US dollar was trading for as much as 200 against 
the Zimbabwe dollar at the time of the study. 
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him. He further argued that a proposed school in Batanai would not materialize, as he 
would have to fight to assert his power over the traditional headman of the area. The 
councilor even tried to link the headman to the opposition party so that he would be 
forced out of office. In one instance a resignation letter, purportedly written by the 
headman, was sent to the chief. Further investigations showed that the headman's date 
stamp had been forged. The councilor wanted to take over from the headman following 
the government's recent introduction of monthly allowances for traditional leaders. He 
likened Batanai people to the grass bearing the brunt of two elephants fighting (himself 
and the headman). 
In both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi there were also conflicts between traditional 
leaders and VIDCO members. The latter viewed themselves as having positively 
contributed to the liberation of Zimbabwe from the colonial administration, which 
resulted in independence in 1980. They labeled traditional leaders as collaborators with 
the colonial administration. It should, however, be noted that there were also conflicts 
within VIDCOs in the Gokwe South area. The conflicts were between members of the 
two parties which fought in the liberation war, namely the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF), whose members were mainly Shona, and the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), composed mainly of Ndebeles.10 
In practice, the two administrative systems - traditional leadership and the VIDCO- 
WARDCO system - have over the years permeated and contaminated each other, such 
that practical interaction in everyday social practice reflects a mix of both. The extent of 
blending varies from time to time and from place to place, depending on preference, 
precedence and other factors. Representatives of the Gokwe South RDC, interestingly, 
felt that the institutional multiplicity and confusion was going to be solved through 
awareness workshops, which would define roles for all the different committees and sub- 
committees. 
Meanwhile, however, the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 has further confused the 
situation by introducing a new system of village and ward assemblies. These are 
composed of a curious mix of elected and nominated leaders and representatives. 
Membership of the village assembly is open to all adults in the village, but such bodies 
are presided over by hereditary traditional leaders, whose nominations and appointments 
are approved by chiefs and the minister - "in accordance with local culture".I 1 A ward 
council is composed of village heads of the constituent village assemblies, the ward 
councilor and a cohort of headmen nominated by chiefs and endorsed by the Minister of 
Local Government, Public Works and National Housing. The ward assembly is presided 
over by a headman elected by members of the assembly from among themselves. Village 
assemblies elect VIDCOs and supervise and approve plans from these VIDCOs, whilst 
ward assemblies oversee all the roles and activities of their constituent VIDCOs. 
1° ZAPU was the second largest political party in Independent Zimbabwe. It merged with ZANU (PF) 
through the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987, paving the way for its leader, Dr. Joshua Nkomo, to 
become the co -Vice President in Zimbabwe. 
II Traditional Leaders Act of 1998. 
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The new superintendence of headmen and village heads over VIDCOs and WARDCOs 
elevates the position of traditional leaders in relation to elected representatives, thereby 
reversing the situation that had existed since the Prime Minister's Directive of 1984. 
Furthermore, the hierarchical process of approving hereditary nominees (village head, to 
headman, to chief, to minister) potentially creates a system of patronage, in spite of the 
provision that such leaders should be appointed "in accordance with local culture ". The 
new allowances for chiefs and headmen, which were introduced in conjunction with the 
implementation of the Act, are now widely viewed as a patronage mechanism, designed 
to enable the ruling party to maintain electoral support in the face of stiff competition 
from the opposition party. Traditional leadership is based on gender, seniority and caste; 
it is normally conferred upon male elders of certain lineages, in line with the erstwhile 
"decentralized despotism" administrative model of the colonial period (cf. Mamdani 
1996, 1999).12 The introduction of remuneration for both the chief and headmen, and 
possibly in the future village heads, has set in motion new struggles and dynamics, as 
evidenced by the conflict between the Batanai councilor and headman noted earlier. This 
conflict has recently taken a new dimension; the councilor now wants the ward to be split 
into two, so that he becomes the headman for the other ward, a better paying post than the 
one of councilor, which relies on allowances and is subject to re- election. 
The imposition of village and ward councils upon VIDCO -WARDCO and traditional 
leadership systems is thus a recipe for further conflict. And the likelihood of conflict is 
aggravated when foresters seek to enlist local support for conservation through the 
creation of partnership committees that should potentially be representative of and linked 
to all these systems. Overlapping, discordant and ever -changing memberships and 
degrees of interest, affection and association within and between these systems and units 
further add to the contradictions inherent in the forging of locally legitimate RMCs. 
THE PRACTICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CO- MANAGEMENT IN 
MAFUNGAUTSI 
Introduction 
The term "practical political economy" is used by Li (1996) to refer to patterns of 
practical interaction resulting from everyday social practice. According to Tsing (1999), 
it is an analytical concept that reflects the contestation and negotiation of interest among 
and between stakeholders (Tsing 1999), while Walker (1995:1) defines it as "how human 
practices of resource use are shaped by social relations at multiple levels over time ". 
This section considers the practical political economy of co- management in Mafungautsi. 
The analysis draws mainly from the experiences emerging from the two case study 
RMCs, namely Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi. 
12 It is important to note that despite having more support than councilors, traditional leaders are not 
subjected to the electoral process and this tends to weaken their downward accountability. 
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Inception, Election and Representativeness of RMCs 
The principal research sites, which are Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi RMCs, show 
considerable differences with regards to their social geography and political history. The 
Batanai area was once part of the Mafungautsi forest reserve but it was de- gazetted in 
1972 to resettle people who had been evicted from the forest reserve in the 1960s. People 
displaced as a result of conflicts between ZANU PF and ZAPU during the 1980s (usually 
known as the "dissident era ")13 were also settled in the area. In terms of ethnic 
composition, the people of Batanai belong mainly to the Shangwe and other Shona ethnic 
groups, but with a small proportion of Ndebeles. Batanai RMC falls under Ndhalalambi 
ward, which has a longer border - some 46 kilometers - with the forest reserve than any 
other ward. Chemwiro -Masawi, on the other hand, has always been a communal area, in 
which people have been settled for a longer time. The population is mostly Shangwe, 
and the proportion of Ndebele people in the area is even lower than in Batanai. 
Co- management was, as already indicated, introduced into Mafungautsi in a "top- down" 
manner by the FC, as part of a project funded by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). In both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi, the inception of the RMCs was 
at the behest of the FC, who encouraged communities to form RMCs in order to benefit 
from donor funds earmarked for co- management. CIDA's funding practices, which 
required that baseline surveys be conducted before the release of funds for RMC- building 
activities, influenced the FC's co- management proposal. In Batanai the original RMC 
was, as noted earlier, instituted at ward level and it encompassed four VIDCOs, while the 
RMC in Chemwiro -Masawi included two VIDCOs. Although the inception of RMCs in 
both areas reflects differences in local organizational complexity, in neither area did the 
boundaries of the VIDCOs, and thus of the RMCs, coincide with those of other 
administrative units, notably traditional villages, territories under the control of headmen 
and chiefdoms.14 The overall effect of such superimposition has been to fragment local 
networks of interest, affection and association. A number of RMCs that encompassed 
more than one VIDCO acknowledged the difficulties that emerge from working with 
people who are used to doing things in a different way. This seems to weaken the unity 
of purpose for the people, who normally do not share common boundaries. 
RMCs are supposed to be constituted through elections. In practice, however, the 
democratic nature of the elections is impaired by a variety of factors, including cases of 
manipulation and subversion by the FC, which oversees and endorses the process. For 
instance, an interesting medley of parallel inaugural elections occurred in Batanai in 
1995. Owing to an administrative confusion (due in part to the fact that the RMC 
encompassed more than one VIDCO), two elections were held simultaneously: one at 
Nyaradza Business Center and one at Batanai Business Center. The FC officially 
endorsed the results of the former rather than the latter, because those elected included 
13 The fighting ended with the signing of the Unity Accord of 1987. 
14 This is a common phenomenon in Zimbabwe. For example, the Mandivamba Rukuni Land Tenure 
Report notes that, `In Uzumba, Vidco boundaries were neatly penned on maps at the district offices. On the 
ground and in the minds of local leaders, however, these were secondary to both political and traditional 
boundaries' (Rukuni Commission 1994: 216). 
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more senior people, such as the headmen and councilors. This initial RMC was, 
however, dissolved by the FC after an audit in 1996, and fresh elections were ordered. 
The subsequent elections entailed an intriguing blend of election and nomination. Three 
village heads were asked by the FC to nominate seven people. The community's role was 
relegated to that of choosing who among these seven would assume the posts of 
chairman, vice -chairman, treasurer, secretary and committee members. Furthermore, the 
FC simply instructed the traditional leaders to nominate people in their villages without 
informing those nominated of their roles. This could explain why a number of RMC 
members in Batanai could not define what their exact roles were. A village head in 
Batanai said they were told to submit names if they did not want their villages to be "left 
behind ". The FC commissioned designs, and effectively empowered the village heads to 
appoint the RMC members, with the peasants being maneuvered to endorse the outcome. 
The inaugural RMC in Chemwiro -Masawi was formed through open elections but with 
the backdrop of a tactful electoral manipulation. Before the election was conducted, the 
FC limited candidacy to people with the ability to read and write. In addition, people 
were made to vote through a show of hands instead of through secret ballot, with the FC 
supervising the process. Voting by show of hands is highly amenable to manipulation, as 
the communities will be seated in a haphazard manner and can therefore vote more than 
once, and it can also lead to miscounting.16 On 5 July 2000, in Chemwiro -Masawi, a vote 
of no confidence in the RMC was passed through the subtle machinations of a village 
head, who felt that the RMC elected in 1996 was usurping the powers of traditional 
leaders. The people elected a new committee. However, the FC nullified the election, 
dissolved the new committee, and reinstated the 1996 one, purportedly on the grounds 
that continuity and the retention of a critical mass of trained members was paramount. 
But the majority of the ordinary people felt that the committee could no longer exercise 
their mandate. Village heads consulted during the course of the study corroborated the 
allegation that the RMC had been usurping their powers, as it called for meetings 
unilaterally without consulting them. 
The Chemwiro -Masawi RMC's real or perceived illegitimacy at the local level appears to 
arise from its strong alignment with agents and symbols that derive their legitimacy from 
external sources. Thus, instead of being an autonomous unit, the RMC effectively 
complements the Forest Protection Unit (FPU) in policing and issuing grass and broom 
permits. Instead of articulating peasants' needs, such as the staking of cultivation and 
residential rights in the forest reserve, the RMC is seen as an instrument for advancing 
1s Senior people are commonly referred to as "political heavy weights" in Zimbabwe. 
16 At a ZANU PE party election in June 2001, the majority of the voters called for the discarding of voting 
by show of hands as they suspected that unorthodox means would be employed to rig the elections. The 
voters had suggested a more transparent system where people would stand behind a candidate of their 
choice. This would "force" the returning officers to count properly, as the candidate with the longest line of 
voters would be expected to have the highest number of votes. This was dismissed by the senior returning 
officer as he claimed to be taking instructions from above -not from the voters. The controversial 
candidate was declared a winner with a majority of one vote. Dissenting voices were threatened with 
physical violence. 
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and supporting FC goals, such as organizing communities to extinguish fires17 within the 
forest reserve. In more relaxed and jocular moments, people frequently referred to the 
forest reserve as the "Commission's forest" or "Mugabe's forest" 8, brushing aside the 
field researcher's calculated use of the term "their forest" to suggest a truly shared space 
or property owned jointly by them and the FC. In view of the assistance they rendered to 
the FPU, members of Chemwiro -Masawi RMC at one stage made overtures to the FC to 
secure allowances, uniforms and firearms - benefits to which the official forest guards in 
the FPU are entitled. Though the request was never met, it indicates that RMC members, 
by design or default, perceive themselves to be in closer proximity to the FC than to the 
citizens. RMC members also attend training meetings and workshops and are often seen 
by the public as assuming postures and behavior that make them appear "superior" to 
ordinary citizens. 
The public's perception of RMCs' unjustified pride alienates the committees from their 
supposed constituencies, thus weakening the relation between them and the rest of the 
community. The chairman of Chemusonde RMC had many problems with his 
constituents, including being accused of deliberately destroying financial records, which 
he alleged were destroyed by fire, and being questioned about why the committee was 
not holding meetings with the people. In response to the latter, the chairman claimed that 
he didn't know that they were empowered to hold meetings in the absence of the FC - 
thereby supporting the point made earlier that some RMC members are unaware of their 
roles. Under these circumstances simmering animosity occurs. This animosity is, at least 
in part, due to the fact that the RMCs are upwardly accountable to the sources of their 
legitimacy - that is, to those that appointed them. 
Towards the end of the research, the public's confidence in the RMCs was further eroded 
by "forest invasions ", which occurred as part of the wave of "land invasions" in the 
country as a whole and are discussed in more detail in a later section. The secretary of 
Chemusonde RMC, in an interview on 22 August 2001, revealed that his RMC was no 
longer functional due to these invasions. RMC activities in his area were now being 
construed, by those members of the community who had settled in Mafungautsi, as a 
means of reporting to the FC on the forestland invasions. In Batanai, a peasant farmer 
interviewed on 21 August 2001 was pessimistic; he said the RMCs were going to die a 
natural death and would soon be history. 
An analysis of the composition of the inaugural RMCs shows that most of the positions 
were captured by the local political elite at the expense of other social groups. For 
instance, the positions of chairperson, vice -chairperson and secretary in the first Batanai 
RMC were filled by the chiefs secretary, the chiefs assessor and the councilor, 
respectively. The treasurer of the same RMC was a headman, whilst the ordinary 
committee members were a district party chairperson, a VIDCO chairman and a VIDCO 
17 
In the colonial times, the senior FC officer in Mafungautsi was nicknamed "Dzimamoto " - a Shona name 
meaning the one who orders people to extinguish fires. 
18 The President of Zimbabwe is Robert Mugabe, who has been in power since independence in 1980. 
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secretary. Only the position of vice -secretary was filled by an ordinary farmer. The 
inaugural RMC in Chemwiro -Masawi was also dominated by the local elite. 
In both RMCs, virtually all the posts were held by men. The only exception was in 
Chemwiro -Masawi, where a woman was co -opted onto the RMC after the election at the 
insistence of the FC.19 The FC has, over time, become increasingly assertive in 
implementing CIDA's policy on gender balance in the RMCs. It tried to follow CIDA's 
"advice" as they were the funding organization. The FC also, as noted earlier, advocated 
that people should vote for RMC representatives who can read and write. This insistence 
on the possession of reading and writing skills works against the minority Shangwes, 
among whom literacy levels are generally lower compared to the other ethnic groups. 
However, the elected RMCs in both Batanai and Chemwiro- Masawi failed to advance the 
interests of their communities, despite being able to read and write. 
Despite the dominance of the male elite in the composition of the RMCs, the 
configuration of real and effective power may have little to do with who is a member of 
the RMC. For instance, a relative of one of the local headmen was found to dominate 
and hold sway over most decisions made by the Batanai RMC. The community, during 
subsequent probing, intimated the existence of a hidden sphere of interaction, in which 
the headman's relative was variously perceived to wield influence through eloquence, 
charisma or possession of esoteric powers, including witchcraft. People's failure to 
express their interests or intentions openly also helped to explain some of the networks 
and associations. For instance, in Chemwiro -Masawi RMC, a group of business people 
from outside the RMC area conspired with the RMC chairperson to take over a bee- 
keeping project, without the support of the community as a whole. In an interview, the 
leader of the business people confirmed their interest and justified the exclusion of the 
community on the grounds that they did not have the resources to participate effectively. 
The invisible networks of interest, affection and association may be observed through 
actions and the unspoken word, or what people do or don't do. 
Decision -Making and Fiscal Autonomy 
Once RMCs have been elected, they are supposed to formulate and adopt a constitution. 
In practice, however, the constitutions are not formulated by the local communities. The 
RMCs are made to adopt a standard draft constitution, formulated by the FC in 
conjunction with the Ministry of National Affairs and Employment Creation. Adoption 
of the constitution is a tacit precondition for any community to join the co- management 
project. The RMCs are supposed to amend the constitution to meet their particular needs 
before adopting it. In practice, however, they simply adopt it. Failure to amend the 
constitution may be caused by several factors, not least of which is the low literacy levels 
among communities in the Gokwe area. According to Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
19 One of the meetings of women we requested the kraalhead to organize for us was challenged by one 
Batanai villager "What does the kraalhead want to do with our wives ". This is not a unique incident as a 
woman who had been elected as the treasurer for the Masawi School Committee on 14 March 2000 was 
denied the opportunity by her husband. 
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records, in 1992 only 39% of people in Gokwc District20 had received formal education 
(CSO 1992). The constitutions which communities are made to adopt and are expected 
to amend are written in English. The Chemwiro -Masawi pre -grass cutting workshop of 5 
November 2000 demanded the translation of the constitutions into the vernacular 
language so that people would know their "rights and powers ". But, to date, this has not 
been done. 
Read in isolation, section 24 of the standard RMC constitution appears to be devolving 
decision- making autonomy to the RMC, including responsibility for "managing the 
affairs and business of the community and exercising all the powers that are necessary to 
achieve all the objectives of the community "21. In practice, however, this autonomy is 
conditional; it is circumscribed by section 20 of the same constitution, which gives the 
FC veto powers over decisions made by the community. Similarly, considered in 
isolation, section 14 of the constitution vests decision -making authority in the RMC's 
general meetings (which are open to all members of the community as well as committee 
members), including the authority to amend the constitution. In practice, however, the 
FC is the ultimate authority, since it reserves the right to approve amendments to 
constitutions and any other decisions made at the general meetings. Thus, powers 
devolved through some provisions of the constitution are re- centralized via others. This 
makes co- management unsustainable, since the local people feel that they have been 
cheated by the FC, which is perpetuating its old management strategy under a new guise. 
However, it will be shown later that, although appearing to be formally marginalized in 
decision -making, communities still exert an influence on political processes in 
Mafangautsi through a variety of mechanisms. 
The conditional decision -making authority accorded to RMCs extends to the management 
of revenues that accrue from thatch and broom -grass permits. Initially, the FC used to 
bank money on behalf of the RMCs, but RMCs are now allowed to open their own bank 
accounts. However, this does not give the RMCs fiscal autonomy. The FC is a signatory 
to the RMC accounts, which gives them leverage in approving the uses of revenues. In 
Batanai one RMC member, who felt she had been unfairly removed from the RMC, 
refused to cancel her name as an authorized signatory of the RMC account. The FC, 
however, used its muscles to have her name removed from the signatory list in her 
absence. The FC also enjoys audit powers over RMC revenues, and through such powers 
can dissolve RMCs they consider are not performing adequately. 
Over the years, the FC has encouraged the communities to invest their money in 
environmentally friendly projects, particularly bee keeping, for which it is quite easy to 
get funding approval. Much of the accruing revenues have thus been invested in the 
expansion of apiculture, with hives being acquired for the communities through the FC. 
20 Census figures available are for the period before the separation of Gokwe into Gokwe North and South 
in July 1993. 
21 This sounds rather ambiguosambiguous. This is a result of using constitutions designed for specific 
projects, which have specific objectives thatwhich doid not make much sense when applied to a broader 
community. 
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Income from grass permits for the period between 1996 and 1999 was about Z$23,000 
for Chemwiro -Masawi and Z$10,000 for Batanai, none of which has been invested in 
enterprises other than apiculture. Chemwiro -Masawi and Batanai RMCs now own 30 
and 10 hives respectively, although none of these have yet been commercially exploited. 
Investment in apiculture, however, is completely at variance with community priorities. 
In a questionnaire survey of 240 respondents in both Batanai and Chemwiro- Masawi, 
over 70% of the respondents preferred to invest the money in vegetable growing projects 
and another 26% variously preferred fruit marketing, carpentry and other minor 
industries. In contrast, only 4% preferred apiculture, the official favorite. In another 
RMC, called Sokwela, the community also wanted to invest their money in gardening 
and poultry projects, but these were not approved by the FC, which advised an 
investment in apiculture instead. The priorities of communities in the Chemwiro -Masawi 
area also include non -commercial projects, notably the development of the Masawi 
primary school and Chemwiro clinic. 
"Peasant Weapons" against Co- Management 
The FC has powers to enforce comanagement. However, the peasant farmers in both 
Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi also have their own forms of power, which they have 
used to counter those of the FC. This is what Scott (1985) called the "weapons of the 
weak ". The examples below show how the "powerless" peasants have reacted to co- 
management. Their methods have ranged from poaching, arson and setting forest fires, to 
the defying of FC directives on the choice of projects and questioning the contradictory 
roles of the FC. 
The available poaching records are only official figures. They mask the enormity of the 
poaching problem as the majority of the cases, according to locals, go undetected.22 The 
poachers who pay fines are few (Vermeulen 1994). In some cases, poachers apprehended 
by FPU guards are not handed over to the police since such guards have the discretion of 
warning the poachers, confiscating the tools of their trade or just fining them at the FC 
level. Suspicions of connivance and bribery between the guards and apprehended 
poachers were commonplace. Sophisticated poachers were reportedly easily able to 
evade the guards because they have intimate knowledge of FPU and RMC patrols. The 
patrols were reputedly more intensive during the grass- cutting season, after which there 
tended to be significant lulls that poachers could put to good use. Night times were also 
said to be "safe" for poachers. 
Focus group discussions held in both Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi criticized the use of 
snares in the Mafungautsi Forest - not because poaching was unacceptable, but because it 
could possibly result in the loss of domestic livestock. The respondents condemned the 
method, but not the practice. One village elder in Batanai also questioned the double 
standards of the government, pointing out that in the early 1950s people were rewarded 
22 After gaining the confidence of the people in Mafungautsi, the researcher was informed of how people 
poach in the area. In one instance, the researcher had lunch with game meat which had been poached in the 
forest. Some RMC members were not willing to report their fellow villagers to the FC, as it would cost 
them some benefits to be derived from fellow community members. 
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by the colonial administrators for killing game as it was perceived as a way of opening up 
remote areas and helping to eradicate the tsetse fly menace. 
The enforcement of RMC regulations at the local level is not without its problems, since 
disgruntled individuals, it is suspected, often resort to arson. For instance, the hut of an 
RMC member in the Gababe area burnt down in a suspected arson attack, but the culprit 
was never found. The repertoire of suspected arson attempts includes the intentional 
starting of fires within the forest reserve. Most of the fires tend to occur after the grass - 
cutting season, lending weight to the suggestion of some form of conspiracy, since people 
intentionally start fires after grass harvesting. This would be well timed, it was claimed, 
to destroy the "tick menace" in the forests and encourage the growth of new grass for 
cattle grazing. This is probably one means of spiting the FC. 
On other occasions, people simply refuse to carry out an order made by the FC. An 
example relates to the case mentioned earlier of a group of businessmen who tried to 
establish a bee -keeping project in Chemwiro -Masawi. The consortium of ten business 
people, with the support of the RMC chairperson, approached the FC's provincial 
manager for a piece of land in the RMC area to use for apiculture. A portion of land 
measuring 4900 square meters was excised and allocated to the group for the 
establishment of some 1500 beehives. The provincial manager endorsed the agreement 
on the understanding that it was genuinely a community- backed development, but it so 
happened that the arrangement by- passed the project coordinator, who oversees the 
implementation of co- management, because she was away at the time. The project 
coordinator, who reports to the provincial manager, reversed the agreement, ordering the 
community to take over the project and to reimburse the business people for the 
expenditure they had so far incurred. She took this decision because, despite the RMC 
chairperson's involvement, most of the businesspeople resided outside Chemwiro- 
Masawi RMC. The local communities quietly ignored the order; as already indicated, 
their priorities were to develop Masawi school and Chemwiro clinic rather than establish 
a bee -keeping project. Meanwhile, it was alleged that the RMC chairperson had been 
bribed in the deal. The rest of the community felt that the chairperson should be held 
solely accountable for reimbursement since he alone had been responsible for the 
penetration and capture of "their" project by the businessmen. This example also 
demonstrates the fact that co- management is not an arena in which the interests of the 
state are pitted only against those of the local community. Resource sharing is an arena 
in which a wide variety of actors - state and non -state, local and non -local - compete. 
Interviews with people in the Mafungautsi area showed that they were both aware and 
highly critical of the ambiguous role of the FC in the co- management arrangement. The 
fact that the FC is player, referee and coach contradicts its supposed status as an equal 
partner, thereby bringing into question the whole concept of "co- management ". The 
assumption that the FC and the participating communities have equal status is also 
contradicted by the equivocal nature of certain FC activities. The FC's role in the 
exploitation of timber in communal areas illustrates this point. Under the provisions of 
the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act of 1987, RDCs are allowed to award 
concessions for the commercial extraction of timber from land under their jurisdiction, 
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provided they have the approval and technical support of the FC. The RDC receives a 
royalty payment from the concessionaire, based on the amount of timber cut, and the FC 
receives a supervisory fee. However, under the same Act, peasants are not allowed to 
utilize timber on their land for commercial purposes. This caused confusion and anger in 
the Chcmwiro- Masawi area, where the RDC had, under the supervision of FC staff, 
awarded a concession for the extraction of timber from the peasants' fields. In the eyes 
of the peasants, the FC staff were villains, helping the RDC to sanction illegal extraction 
of forest products. What annoyed the people even more was that the cutting of timber 
commenced when crops were growing in the fields. This meant that tractors and lorries 
were destroying the crops in order to cut the trees. 
Co- management in Mafungautsi is, therefore, a case neither of equal partnership between 
the FC and local communities or of an all- powerful state regime pitted against vulnerable 
peasants. The situation on the ground suggests a complex picture with many active 
stakeholders, often with those ostensibly on the fringes of formal systems of power 
significantly involved in local social and political processes. It also shows that local 
peasants have evolved various instruments, such as poaching, for asserting resource 
claims in a protected state forest regime. This suggests the need to broker "win -win" 
arrangements through co- management. 
CO- MANAGEMENT: WHO BENEFITS? 
Introduction 
The new co- management initiatives have resulted in different alignments of the flow of 
benefits to people and groups within the societies concerned. New initiatives introduce 
new dynamics that see certain groups of people benefiting. Co- management aimed to re- 
shape the political economy in such a way that the local communities would benefit. 
However, the evidence presented in this section will show that the creation of upwardly 
accountable RMCs has prevented this from occurring. The benefits to the local 
communities are limited and, as already indicated in the previous section, accrue mainly 
to the committee members and their associates. 
Role of External Lobbies and Interest Groups 
In order to understand who benefits from co- management in Mafungautsi and how and 
why they benefit, it is necessary to look more closely at the evolution of the co- 
management initiative and, in particular, at the various lobbies and interest groups 
involved.23 
The main initiative for the project came from a development lobby represented by the 
Canadian International Development Agency. CIDA saw it as an opportunity for 
investing in the development of the institutional infrastructure for co- management 
23 These competing land use lobbies are discussed in considerable detail in Murphree (1990). 
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between the FC and surrounding peasant communities (Roper and Maramba 2000).24 
The agency provided generous funding, through the FC, for the creation of interface 
institutions to link communities and the FC in the new co- management partnership. A 
project coordination team seconded to the FC was created to facilitate the setting up of 
RMCs and to equip such committees with the requisite capacity in terms of leadership, 
technical and other skills for the effective discharge of their new roles in the venture. 
Recurrent expenditure, including salaries, allowances and logistical requirements (like 
vehicles and tractors) of the coordination team and support and agency advisory staff, 
took up a major proportion of the funding. Related infrastructure developments included 
the construction of a Resource Sharing Center and accommodation, including houses for 
members of the Forest Protection Unit (FPU). 
The original CIDA proposal had envisaged a diversified co- management initiative, 
including eco- tourism and wildlife management ventures as well as forestry. Massive 
funding was thus used to build chalets. However, although completed, the chalets have 
yet to be utilized. There are several factors that have prevented their use, including the 
fact that the water is not connected from the new borehole due to sub -standard water 
tanks, which have fallen down twice before commissioning. The small tourist base, 
which has been further depleted by the invasion of the forest by communal farmers, is 
another possible explanation. 
The wildlife management part of the proposal readily found support from a wildlife lobby 
that included the Gokwe South Rural District Council, under which Mafungautsi state 
forest RDC already held "appropriate 
authority" status over wildlife resources within its area under the Communal Areas 
Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), and any wildlife- related 
venture involving peasants would thus enhance the RDC's leverage. However, the 
wildlife venture never took off because of pressure from a livestock lobby, which 
included AGRITEX (the national agricultural extension agency) and allied international 
partners, who view livestock production as a more viable option for the area than wildlife 
management. One such partner was the European Union, which has, since independence, 
been a key donor to the Zimbabwean animal health sub -sector, particularly in providing 
financial and other support for controlling foot and mouth disease. Some of the measures 
used to control the disease include the erection of game fences to prevent mixing and 
contamination of cattle by buffaloes, which are reservoirs of the disease. Under the 
Lome Convention, Zimbabwe has an annual beef quota export obligation to the European 
Union. 
A conservation lobby, which includes the FC, exercises exclusive management control 
over the state forests by restricting peasant settlement, cultivation and consumptive use of 
24 One can only speculate on the actual interests of CIDA, as it might have been a way of driving the 
Zimbabwean government policy towards the global decentralized forestry management trends (cf. 
Ferguson 1990). It also provided an employment opportunity for its citizens as advisors and through 
consultancies. 
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resources in the forest. Only those activities considered to be environmentally benign 
have found support from this environmental lobby, and these are thus the only ones that 
have been included in the co- management set -up. The main activities are grazing and the 
extraction of thatching grass, which form the core components of the co- management 
scheme as it has come to operate in Mafungautsi today. The controls over these activities 
are seen by the FC as a means of achieving environmental protection goals. They are 
intended to reduce the amount of timber cut for fuel and lessen the damage done by forest 
or veld fires. The FC also uses its powers over RMC finances to prevent RMCs from 
utilizing the revenue they obtain from thatching grass on projects which are considered to 
be environmentally harmful. As already indicated, although such revenue belongs to the 
RMCs, decisions regarding its disposal are subject to approval by the FC. Such controls 
may be well -intentioned monitoring and supervisory tools; however, the fact that the FC 
has authority over a community's use of funds means that the RMCs have no fiscal 
autonomy, which is an important incentive for the promotion of public participation and 
partnership. 
Peasant Access to Forest Resources 
The cutting of grass for thatching and other purposes is, as already indicated, one of the 
most important components of the co- management scheme. It is administered through a 
system of RMC controlled permits for areas of the forest reserve allocated by the FC to 
specific RMCs. Other areas of the forest reserve, particularly vlei25 areas like Lutope, 
where thatching grass is abundant, are still under FC control with the permits being 
issued directly by the FC. Those who want the grass can pay for the permits in cash to 
the appropriate RMC or (in the case of areas like Lutope) the FC. A system of payment 
using bundles of grass is used for collectors who cannot afford to pay for the grass 
permits in cash. For every five bundles of grass cut, the user is entitled to three; the 
remaining two are retained by the RMC or the FC for resale and the revenue accrues to 
them. Reeds for mats and grass for making brooms can also be extracted from the forest 
reserve through similar permits; a single permit entitles the user to a day's extraction of 
the resource with the revenue again accruing to the appropriate RMC or the FC. 
Collection of dead wood for fuel is only permitted under a stringent system of conditions, 
including the requirement that extractors be in the company of members of the Forest 
Protection Unit. Peasants must not be accompanied by dogs and should not carry axes 
and matches or lighters on fuelwood collection excursions. These are seen as tools of 
those likely to be involved in nefarious activities, like poaching (for which dogs are 
used), felling of trees (axes) and extraction of honey (matches and lighters) in the forest 
reserve. Peasant communities are also allowed to graze their livestock within the forest 
reserve but the no -dog policy still applies for herders entering the forest. 
These sound like neat and rational bureaucratic procedures, but practice in Mafungautsi 
does not work this way. Peasants are innovative and find ways of circumventing the 
bureaucracy in order to meet their own needs. Thus, some people in Batanai manipulate 
the situation, illegally collecting products -including game -from Mafungautsi when the 
25 This is a term commonly used within Southern Africa to define a wetland area with grass. 
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FPU is not in the vicinity. Since the whole circumference of the 82,100 hectare forest 
cannot be effectively monitored all the time, some villagers also sneak in and out of the 
forest without paying permit fees. Similarly, peasants tend to hand over smaller bundles 
of thatching grass to the RMCs and retain the bigger ones. Moreover, the bundles of 
grass given to the RMCs are not always sold as intended. The cost of transporting and 
selling the grass at Gokwe Center has meant that no RMC member has been willing to 
sell brooms or thatching grass away from their villages. The bundles have simply been 
dumped at the homesteads of the RMC members, in most cases the treasurer or the 
chairperson. This has resulted in lots of bundles rotting. In Batanai 115 bundles of 
thatching grass were rotting at the treasurer's homestead in April 2001. The situation 
was similar at the homestead of the Chemwiro -Masawi RMC chairman, although the 
exact number could not be counted due to the advanced stage of rotting. Some 
informants alleged that the RMC members were now using rotting of grass as an excuse 
for misrepresenting the actual number of bundles sold during auditing, while some RMC 
members were reported to be using the grass before it even begins to rot.26 These are 
clear illustrations of how the rationality of co- management does not necessarily coincide 
with that of the local people, who manipulate the rules to suit their own purposes. 
There were various other complaints about RMC members. In Chemusonde RMC some 
villagers preferred to cut thatching grass at the Lutope vleis administered by the FC rather 
than in areas controlled by the RMC because they felt that paying the RMC for a permit 
would be a direct transfer of resources to the RMC members. However, some 
Chemusonde respondents interviewed at Lutope FPU camp said that they came to Lutope 
because it has better thatching grass than the area allocated to their RMC. In both 
Batanai and Chemwiro -Masawi there were unconfirmed incidences of non -payment of 
permit fees by the RMC members and in Batanai one RMC member was alleged to have 
harvested broom grass before the official opening of the grass- cutting season, in the 
pretext of monitoring illegal broom grass collectors. In another instance, the research 
assistant successfully traced cartwheel tracks from an area where broom grass had been 
poached to the RMC member's homestead. It was evident from issues raised at the 
workshop held at Shingai Training Center on 4 November 2000 that some of the villagers 
had reacted by joining the RMC members in this illegal collection. This workshop 
recommended the use of incentives to encourage people to assist in the apprehension of 
rule breakers. A similar arrangement has worked well in the Kana Grazing Scheme in the 
western parts of Mafungautsi. People in Kana, through their own initiative, set aside 
some vlei areas within the communal area, for controlled harvesting of thatching grass. 
They made their own rules and established a committee to manage the vlei. The 
committee employs what they call "fiber guards ". These are community chosen guards 
who enforce decisions made by the community in their meetings. They are so called 
because they do not use the conventional handcuffs used by the state police or the FPU. 
Anyone who grazes livestock in the vlei before the end of the grass cutting period is fined 
26 Grass collection now seems to be a lucrative venture, as most RMC members want to use their homes as 
grass collection centers in order to benefit if the grass "rots ". Those whose homes are not designated as 
collection points do not cooperate fully in the RMC activities. 
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Z$15, a third of which goes to the guard who made the arrest. This project was initiated 
by the local people themselves as a way of securing a supply of thatching grass.27 
The emphasis on grazing and thatching grass reflects the fact that the FC favors a 
partnership that revolves around minor forest products rather than timber or land rights 
per se. However, studies conducted in areas adjacent to forest reserves in Zimbabwe 
have consistently demonstrated that peasant communities in such areas attach far higher 
values to the land and construction timber in the protected forest reserve than to minor 
forest products (Matzke and Mazambani 1993; Matose 1994; Gwaai Working Group 
1997). From colonial to present times, state -enforced evictions have not effectively 
stopped peasants from settling and cultivating in the forest reserve. They have not 
completely quelled people's quest to be reunited with what they consider to be their land 
and resource heritage. 
In Mafungautsi, several attempts have been made to regain access to the forest. For 
instance, soon after the Unity Accord of 1987, a peasant delegation from the Ndhlalambi 
area organized to meet the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National 
Housing, whom they lobbied for their return to the forest reserve. Their justification was 
that they had not supported dissidents and that anyway the war was long over; according 
to them, this warranted their readmission into the forest reserve. The move was not 
successful. The Minister explained that the forest reserve legally belonged to the FC, and 
that peasants could not settle on it since it was a protected area. Recently, some peasants 
have started illegally constructing their huts in Gondoma vlei and close to the Lutope 
FPU Camp. This is being carried out in the context of the national land invasions, which 
are taking place in the commercial farms in Zimbabwe. This is a highly polarized issue 
and initial warnings by the FC have gone unheeded. The new settlers, who number about 
49 households, together with another 131 who are reported to have registered their 
intention to settle in the forest, have already established local branches of the ruling party. 
The above evidence shows that the rhetoric of co- management and resource sharing as 
paradigms of social empowerment needs to be subjected to critical analysis. Co- 
management in Mafungautsi was never designed to genuinely empower peasants. 
Furthermore, peasants will never be empowered in the supply -led context in which power 
is transferred from the top -down, and international interests and local functionaries define 
the shape and extent of powers and roles to be assigned to local communities. The 
international interests, manifested through CIDA, have been pushing their interests 
through the FC by constantly reminding them of how the project had to "fit" within its 
terms of reference. The evolving model of co- management in Mafungautsi appears to 
have missed community concerns. The rural communities are often perceived as sleeping 
partners. This idiom, however, only holds true as an obvious acknowledgement that 
natural resource bureaucracies -and the international experts who inform them -are 
powerful shapers of the environment and how people interact with it. But in practice the 
27 No in -depth study was carried out of the grazing scheme at Kana to enable the research to do a 
comparative analysis since Kana was not one of the main research sites. 
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exercise of such power is mediated through a variety of other factors, particularly those 
grounded in contexts in which such power operates. 
CONCLUSION 
Co- management in Mafungautsi thus appears to have very little to do with the 
democratization of forest management, in spite of presumptions implying equal 
partnership, co- ownership, co -use and co- management. The RMCs, which are the 
institutional vehicle for co- management, were created from a multitude of bodies aligned 
with state and customary power bases and were superimposed on local structures, 
creating a complexity that counters the concept of co- ownership through co- management. 
A legislative environment that entrenches the centralization of natural resource 
governance while denying the privilege of legal mandate and fiscal autonomy to units 
closer to the citizens fundamentally contradicts notions of co- ownership and co -use. 
Co- management was supply -led. Like most top -down initiatives, it is practiced on the 
terms and conditions of its authors and their allies, rather than those of the citizens whom 
it is ostensibly designed to empower. RMCs are external initiatives in terms of their 
conception, formation, operation and legitimacy. These imposed structures form a new 
complex and fluid matrix when they interact with the existing power base. Furthermore, 
their imposition on existing structures confuses relationships at the local level. The 
accountability of the RMC institution has remained upward to the Forestry Commission 
in a manner far beyond what is necessary for supervisory purposes. The state seems 
simply to be sustaining or re- producing itself. 
Co- management as an implementation strategy for decentralized natural resources 
management in Zimbabwe has not been successful for two main reasons; firstly, it has 
taken a paternalistic approach, and secondly, insignificant powers have been devolved to 
the local level. The review and case study approach adopted here points to the need to re- 
evaluate the whole co- management process in Zimbabwe so as to meaningfully 
decentralize power to the local actors within the forestry sector. There is, therefore, a 
need to ensure that the RMCs are more demand driven, or at least more downwardly 
accountable with respect to their conception, formation and legitimization. The potential 
for doing this is demonstrated by the Kana Grazing Scheme, where the grazing 
committees were an initiative of the community and the elected committees were 
downwardly accountable to the electorate. Demand -driven and downwardly inclined 
approaches stand a greater chance of generating sufficient internal dialogue and debate, 
which can be the basis on which RMCs become functional. Rather than generating 
fragmentation, they require the coalescence of complex and dynamic networks of interest 
and association. This further lends weight to the notion that downwardly accountable 
institutions are more likely to result in more positive social and environmental outcomes 
(Ribot 1999). 
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Environmental Governance in Africa Working Paper Series 
The Environmental Governance in Africa Working Paper Series presents position papers, 
works in progress, and literature reviews on emerging environmental governance issues 
of relevance to Sub -Saharan Africa. The series is designed to circulate ongoing policy 
research and analysis that derives from and complements the Environmental 
Accountability in Africa (EAA) initiative of WRI's Institutions and Governance Program 
(IGP). Our target audience is the small group of researchers and activists directly 
involved with EAA. The authors and editors welcome questions and comments from 
readers. The series aims to stimulate discussion and dialogue on worldwide issues at the 
intersection of environment, democracy and governance, while providing constructive 
feedback to IGP and the authors. For more information about IGP and EAA please visit 
http: / /www.wri.org /governance. 
EAA seeks to foster development of the essential legal and institutional infrastructure for 
effective, replicable and sustainable environmental governance. This overarching goal is 
supported by three specific objectives: 
To influence the character of ongoing World Bank, U.N. and other donor -driven 
African government decentralization efforts to ensure that rights, responsibilities, 
capacities, and accountabilities are consistent with sound environmental management; 
To promote national -level administrative, legislative, and judicial reforms necessary 
to accomplish environmentally sound decentralizations and to enable public interest 
groups to hold governments and private actors accountable for their environmental 
management performance; and 
To develop regional networks of independent policy research and advocacy groups 
that are effective in promoting and utilizing the above reforms in the interests of 
improved environmental management. 
EAA achieves these objectives through three inter -related efforts: 1) Decentralization, 
Accountability, and the Environment, 2) Environmental Procedural Rights, and 3) Non - 
Governmental Organization Capacity -Building. 
The Decentralization, Accountability and the Environment effort aims to identify and 
promote policies and laws essential for effective, efficient, and equitable decentralization, 
including those establishing accountable representative authorities for local communities 
in participatory natural resource management; laws specifying the distribution of 
decision -making powers over nature among state authorities, civil, and private bodies; 
laws assuring just recourse; and laws ensuring an enabling environment for civil action. 
Through informed analysis, the effort aims to influence national -level policy- makers to 
develop environmentally sound decentralization policies and an enabling environment for 
civic action concerning environmental policy and its implementation. It reaches this 
audience directly and through the international financial and donor organizations, 
environmental policy research institutions, and international and local non -governmental 
organizations involved in environmental policy matters. This effort supports research on 
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existing decentralization policies and on the enabling environment for civic action. To 
further these goals it conducts research jointly with independent policy -focused 
institutions, the preliminary results of which are presented in this series. 
The Environmental Procedural Rights component of the EAA initiative is designed to 
establish and strengthen an enabling environment for citizens and advocacy organizations 
both to enforce their constitutional rights to a clean environment and to meet their 
constitutional responsibilities to ensure sound environmental management. This 
environment includes fundamental civil liberties, such as freedom of association and 
expression, and basic rights, including access to information, justice, and decision - 
making in environmental matters. This component works at three levels. At the national 
level in pilot countries, the initiative supports the work of local policy groups to improve 
the law and practice of environmental procedural rights. At the regional level, the 
initiative supports networks of local organizations to promote legally- binding regional 
environmental governance instruments, similar to the European Aarhus Convention, that 
provide for procedural rights irrespective of citizenship and place of residence. At the 
global level, this component supports African involvement in a coalition of organizations 
to collaborate on the establishment of international environmental governance norms and 
on ensuring compliance by governments and private corporations. 
The Non -Governmental Organization Capacity -Building component of the EAA 
initiative aims to strengthen a select group of independent policy research and 
environmental advocacy groups and their networks. This group includes, for example, the 
Lawyers' Action Team (LEAT) in Tanzania, Green Watch, Advocates for 
Development and Environment (ACODE) and the Center for Basic Research in Uganda, 
and the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) in Kenya. These environmental 
advocacy organizations seek to improve environmental management and justice by 
contributing to policy and legislative reform, and ensuring compliance to environmental 
laws and norms. The groups use a range of approaches and tools to influence policy 
formation, including policy research and outreach, workshops and conferences, public 
debates, press releases, and litigation. This EAA project component supports efforts in 
organizational development, capacity building in advocacy approaches and skills, and 
technical competence in specific environmental matters. Federations and networks of 
such NGOs, joint initiatives, and South -South collaborative efforts are also facilitated and 
supported. 
The Environmental Governance in Africa Working Paper Series aims to further these 
objectives. All papers in this series are reviewed by at least two outside reviewers. It is 
the aim of the editors that select working papers be published in more broadly circulating 
fora, including academic journals, or as WRI reports. The feedback gained from 
discussion of these working papers should form the basis for the authors to rewrite their 
papers for publication. 
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Papers in the Environmental Governance in Africa Working Papers Series 
1. Analyzing Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian and West African 
Environmental Cases. Arun Agrawal and Jesse C. Ribot. 
2. Breathing Life into Fundamental Principles: Implementing Constitutional 
Environmental Protections in Africa. Carl Bnich, Wole Coker, and Chris 
VanArsdalc. 
3. Partitioned Nature, Privileged Knowledge: Community Based Conservation in 
the Maasai Ecosystem, Tanzania. Arun Agrawal and Jesse C. Ribot. 
4. Whose Elephants Are They? Decentralization of Control Over Wildlife 
Management Through the CAMPFIRE Program in Binga District, Zimbabwe. Diana 
Conyers. 
5. Co- Management in the Maf ungautsi State Forest Area of Zimbabwe - What Stake 
for Local Communities? Everisto Mapedza and Alois Mandondo. 
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World Resources Institute 
The World Resources Institute provides information, ideas, and solutions to global environmen- 
tal problems. Our mission is to move human society to live in ways that protect Earth's environ- 
ment for current and future generations. 
Our programs meet global challenges by using knowledge to catalyze public and private action: 
To reverse damage to ecosystems, we protect the capacity of ecosystems to sustain life 
and prosperity; 
To expand participation in environmental decisions, we collaborate with partners 
worldwide to increase people's access to information and influence over decisions about 
natural resources; 
To avert dangerous climate change, we promote public and private action to ensure a 
safe climate and sound world economy; and 
To increase prosperity while improving the environment, we challenge the private sector 
to grow by improving environmental and community well- being. 
Institutions and Governance Program 
WRI's Institutions and Governance Program addresses the social and political dimensions of 
environmental challenges, and explores the equity implications of alternative environmental 
management regimes. IGP aspires to inform environmental policy arenas with analyses of why 
apparently sound technical and economic solutions to environmental problems often fail to be 
implemented, and to generate and promote ideas for how constraints to such solutions can be 
lifted. The program's principal, although not exclusive, focus is on developing and transition 
countries, and the representation of the interests of those countries in global environmental 
policy arcas. For more information please visit http: / /www.wri.org /governance. 
World Resources Institute 
10 G Street, N.E., Suite 800 
Washington, D.C. 20002 USA 
http://www.wri.org/wri 
World Resources Institute 
10 G Street, N.E., Suite 800 
Washington, D.C. 20002 USA 
